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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
that man only is to be
condemned and despised who is not in a state of
transition.
Lord Acton's Inaugural Lecture at Cambridge 1895
"

•

.

.

in knowledge,

,

•

In recent years historians have expressed a growing

interest in the study of the history of historical thought.
As early as 1938, James Shotwell of Columbia University had

attempted to arouse interest in this task with his two volume History of History

,

and had taken a very strong position

on the matter by defining the "history of history

.

.

.

[as]

that part of the human story which one should master first
if one would ever learn to judge the value of the rest."
In 1936 Charles Beard, deeply involved in controversy over

historical method found it advantageous to define truly

qualified historians as those "who try to comprehend the
intellectual operations which they themselves are performing."

2

And his colleague in several of the controversies,

Carl Becker, argued from the perspective of a life-time of

historical work "Now that

I

am old the most intriguing

Barnes Shotwell, The History of History (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1939) p. 1.
,

Charles Beard, The Discussion of Human Affairs
Maomillan, 1936)
p. 10.
(New York:
2

,

2

aspect of history turns out to be neither the study of history

[i.e.,

[i.e.,

the mechanics of research] nor history itself

the significance of events]

.

.

of the history of historical study."

3

.

but rather the study

Herbert Butterfield

goes beyond these general arguments for the importance of
this kind of study to suggest that "history of historiography

may be better training for the young research student than
the marshy ground of social and intellectual history." 4

His

ideas on the use of the study of history as a training ground

may be exemplified in several recently published books which

contain analyses of a series of major historians.^
These arguments may be sufficient grounds for inves-

tigating the methodological odyssey of a contemporary historian such as Arnold J. Toynbee.
fact that Toynbee'

s

They are supported by the

career and work has an intrinsic interest

and importance for present day historians.

Thomas Africa,

historian from the University of Southern California,
Becker, "What is Historiography," American
Historical Review XLIV (October, 1938), 20.
3 Carl

,

Herbert Butterfield, Man on His Past (Cambridge:
Preface xvi.
Cambridge University Press, 1955)
4

,

Herman Ausubel, J. Bartlet BrebFor example, see:
ner and Erling M. Hunt, editors, Some Modern Historians of
Dryden Press, 1951); S. William Halperin,
Br itain (New York:
Some 20th C entury Historians (Chicago: University of Chicago
Frederick Maurice Powicke, Modern Historians
Press, 1961)
and the Study of History (London? Oldhams Press, Ltd., 1955);
Berna3otte e. Schmitt. Some Historians of Modern Europe
University of Chicago Press, 1942)
(Chicago:
5

;

.

describes Toynbee as "probably the most famous historian in
the modern world."

6

Another historian, Roland Stromberg, in

his book European Intellectual History says of the first half
of the twentieth century,

"If the future does not call it the

age of Lenin and Hitler, it may decide to know it as the age

of Toynbee and Sartre."

Toynbee

'

s

M.

F.

Ashley Montagu, albeit one of

most vocal critics, assesses A Study of History as

"undoubtedly the most widely known work of contemporary historical scholarship," and, "One of the most famous and most

widely discussed books of its time."
a

As a reason for editing

major collection of critical essays he advances the argu-

ment that "Toynbee is already, and will be for some time to
come, a power in the world to reckon with."

g

This observa-

tion about the widespread influence of Toynbee has been put
in a more perceptive framework by C. Vann Woodward when he

comments that Toynbee

's

fame is assured by the "disturbance

that he has caused," and by the "distinction of his critics."

9

6 Thomas

W. Africa, Richard E. Sullivan and J. K.
Sowards, Ancient Times to 1648 , Vol. I of Critical Issues in
History , ed. by Richard E. Sullivan (2 vols.; Boston: D. C.
Heath, 1967) , p. 49

Roland Stromberg, European Intellectual History
Since 1789 (New York: Appleton-Century-Crof ts 1968), p.
7

,

Ashley Montagu, ed., Toynbee and History
Preface vii
Porter Sargent Publisher, 1956)

8 M.

(Boston:

F.

,

Vann Woodward, "Outstanding Books 1931-1961,"
American Scholar XXX (Fall, 1961), 628.
9

C.

,

\

6.

4

Whether one takes an admiring or
on Toynbee,

a

hostile position

it is safe to say that he is a major figure in

the history of historical writing in the twentieth century,

and worth considerable attention from this perspective.

One

of the most judicious students of contemporary historical

theory and of the Toynbee controversy, W. H. Walsh, remarks

with regard to the recent spate of work on speculative philosophy of history that "Much of the discussion centres round
the views of Toynbee, a knowledge of which is indispensible
for intelligent contemporary evaluation of the subject.""^

One could accept the argument that a surge of inter-

est in historiography is now valid and necessary, and that
Toynbee has gained considerable fame in the twentieth century

without accepting the argument that we need
bee

'

s

methodological struggles at this time.

a study of

Toyn-

One could argue

along with Harry Elmer Barnes in 1948 that the Toynbee effort
is a dead-end street,

the dying flicker of an older metaphys-

ical and theological tradition in historiography.

But this

view of the Toynbee phenomenon may be regarded more as

a

self-serving hope than as a reasoned analysis of the current
state of affairs.

Barnes tended to see the culmination of

the history of historical writing in his own "New History,"

and he quickly dismisses any deviation or radical departure
10 W. H. Walsh, An Introduction to the Philosophy of
(HereinHistory (London: Hutchinson House, 1951), p. 170.
after referred to as Philosophy of History .)

5

from his own criteria.

Fritz Stern suggests an alternative view of the

resurgence of interest in the broad and comprehensive histories and the philosophies of history that are exemplified
by Toynbee and others.

He points to the sociological pres-

sures on the historical profession in a time of crisis,
just as the historian was getting ready
to become an academic monk, shut up in his
study with his sources, the world about him
sought him as a preacher
,

*

*

.

And this pressure from society is matched by

a

"demand from

within the profession that history must once again become
broader, more inclusive

more concerned with the deeper

,

aspects of human history

.

"

All of which means, according to

Stern, that "we are on the threshold of another period of

reconsidering the purposes and methods of history

x*

Walsh offers a similar description of the forces and
pressures on the historian of the first half of the twentieth century, and seeks to explain Toynbee

'

s

work and popu-

larity as the outgrowth of the need of man who when con-

fronted with the spectacle of history needs to show that the
1
miseries men experienced were not in vain."

It is not my purpose to enter into a discussion of

Stern The Varieties of History (Cleveland:
p. 12
World Publishing Company, 19 56)
13-Fritz

,

,

12 Ibid.

13 Walsh, Philosophy of History , p.

121.

6

the sociological and psychological forces which helped to

shape contemporary historical writing and theory, as valuable
as such a study would be.

It is legitimate to argue that we

are too close to these social and psychological forces to be

able to evaluate the situation properly, but we can begin a

fruitful study of the methodological changes which took place
in the work of one of the very influential historians of the

first half of this century.

There is value and legitimacy in

doing some of the spade work, so that later historians can

hazard the more difficult task of re-constructing the psychological and social world which shaped Toynbee and to which he

himself reacted and contributed.
In this study,

bee

'

s

I

intend to examine changes in Toyn-

methodology by viewing him in relation to the crisis of

methodology that emerges in British historiography in the
opening decades of this century.

As a participant in the

struggle, he has been a catalyst around whom the methodological arguments group and re-group.

Whatever men of the next

century may have to say about the continuing or ephemeral
influence of Toynbee

1

s

views, about the usefulness or unreli-

ability of his "challenge and response," and whether it is

worthwhile or not to consult his Study of History

,

it will

still be important for them to review the methodological
in
quest of Toynbee in order to understand what was occurring

the historical profession and in the nature of historical

7

thought in this century.

Any attempt to unravel the methodological shifts and
changes in Toynbee

1

s

historical thought may easily slip into

oversimplification on the one hand, or obfuscation on the
other.

If one uses a developmental approach,

such as

"early," "middle," and "later" views of Toynbee, the resulting account is mechanical and inaccurate.

Such an approach

would ignore the dynamics of the historian

1

s

struggle and

must deliberately suppress the evidence of recurring "early"
views in the later periods.

In short,

ing view of the working historian

it presents a mislead-

— quite

Marc Bloch urges historians to do.

the opposite of what

He advises them to turn

away from the inhibitions caused by prejudice and false modesty and "to expose the honest gropings of our methods before
a profane public."

14

The truth of the matter is that one

cannot trace a simple change (from an early to a later position)

in Toynbee during the twenty-seven year period in which

he wrote A Study of History

.

Even in his use of the term

"science of history" he goes through a process of defining,

attacking, redefining, repudiating and reinstating which well

illustrates Bloch'

description of the "honest gropings" of

s

14 Marc Bloch,

Putnam (New York:

The Historian's Craft trans, by Peter
Alfred A. Knopf, 1962) p. 87.
,

,

8

the historian.

If,

on the other hand, we use a chronologi-

cal approach which would try to account for Toynbee's every

shift in position, and every doubling back to readopt earlier
views, we would only succeed in reproducing doubts and confu-

sions already existing in the mind of the reader from his

reading of the original text.
We may be able to gain an intelligible view of the

methodological struggles of Toynbee by studying motifs in his
A number of fine scholars working in intellectual his-

work.

tory and philosophy such as Jaeger, Kristeller, Grunebaum and

Dooyweerd have made excellent use of motif studies
in his study of Origen,

.

Jaeger,

states the matter as follows:

If we really want to understand Origen, it will
not help much to measure him by the single dogmatic issues (Trinity, Incarnation, and so
forth) of the following centuries and to ask how
far he has anticipated each of them or to observe
how inarticulate or wrong he appears with regard
Nor is it sufficient to apply
to some of them.
to him the good old-fashioned methods of nineteenth century Quellenanalyse and ask who are the

philosophical authors who have influenced him
Rather, we have to face the structure of his
most.
thought as a whole and to ask what is the function
it has
been to keep track of his themes and ideas throughout the
In the last paragraph of Volume Ten, he expresses his
Study
thanks to his wife for preparing the three indexes to his
volumes, which have given him a "fortifying sense of assurance that, after all, his book cannot be altogether nonsense,
since some sense seems to have been made of it bona fide by a
mind whose critical power is as well known to him as its

^Toynbee himself acknowledges how difficult

.

charity."

Vol. X, 242.

that certain leading ideas have in it.

These critics rightly protest against the common error of

forcing our categories of thought on others, and the need to
let the subjects speak for themselves.-

approach can be found in Kristeller

f

s

An example of this

analysis of the Renais-

sance and in his argument that "a study of the self-inter-

pretation of the Renaissance has shown us

a

way out of the

impasse of the so-called problem of the Renaissance." 17
a

In

motif study of Toynbee we can account for his acceptance

of viewpoints at various points in time and with varying

degrees of acceptance

sporadic advances and abrupt changes

;

rather than the systematic progress which we optimistically
imagine is the norm for a professional historian.

study

,

a

By a motif

tracing of the recurrent thematic elements, we may

be able to account for the existential aspect of his work,
as distinct from the discussions of the coherence of the

inner principles of historical method in his work.

A lead-

ing Dutch historian of this century, Pieter Geyl, whose views

have been tempered by his experiences in the concentration
camps of the second World War, expresses this existential

aspect of historical thoughts
16 Werner Jaeger,

Early Christianity and Greek Paideia
p. 68.
Oxford University Press, 1961)

(London:

,

17

Paul Oskar Kristeller, "Changing Views of the Intellectual History of the Renaissance Since Jacob Burckhardt," in
The Renaissance ed. by Tinsley Helton (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1961)
p. 36.
,

,

9

History is often thought of as a study contentedly
remote from the present, or as a hobby of scholars
who have elected to fly from the world around them
into the dead and gone past.
The truth is rather
that history is an active force in the struggles of
every generation and that the historian by his
interpretation of the past, consciously or halfconsciously or even unconsciously, takes his part
in them, for good or for evil.

Although the critics of Toynbee frequently disagree
about the strengths and weaknesses of A Study of History

,

there is considerable agreement about some of the more gen-

eral aspects of his writing.

Few fail to mention the daz-

zling procession of metaphors and similes which fill the ten

volumes, and for good or ill, seem to be an integral part of

Toynbee

'

s

thought processes.

The problem of style in the

Study is so important that undoubtedly it will draw the

attention of later students of Toynbee, especially those who
are concerned with literary aspects of historiography.

Yet

since our concern is primarily methodological, we will limit

our discussion to those metaphors

19

and descriptive phrases

Pieter Geyl, Debates With Historians (Groningen:
J. B. Wolters, 1955), p. 236.
1

Several contemporary historians have successfully
used a study of metaphors as a clue to the intention or meanH. T. Wade-Gery, a life-long
ing of a particular author.
friend of Toynbee, has a very instructive study of the similes and metaphors in the Iliad Poet of the Iliad as a way
H. Stuart Hughes,
of deciphering the problem of authorship.
argues
in his discussion of Freud Consciousness and Society
that "a thinker is, after all, partly judged on the basis of
figures of speech he uses, and in Freud's case, the thought
never got beyond a fairly simple vocabulary drawn from nineteenth century physics."
(

(

)

)

11

which Toynbee uses to express his own self-consciousness
as
an historian.

When we concentrate on the self-portraits which are

repeated on many occasions, rather than the casual metaphor,
four images come from the Study with enough clarity and

forcefulness for us to say that Toynbee sees his role as
that of an explorer, social scientist, student of life, and

Christian historian.
In the discussion that is to follow, we will devote
a

major section to each one of Toynbee

"

s

self-designations,

prefacing the whole with a brief account of the British historiographical scene of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

CHAPTER

II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN HISTORICAL SCIENCES
IN GREAT BRITAIN FROM 1870 TO 1910

can look forward to some future meeting of
this association when
the most conspicuous
place on the programme will be assigned to some
gifted young historical thinker who
will
propound and explain to the satisfaction of all
his colleagues some new and far-reaching law or
laws of history. » • . "
E. P. Cheyney's Presidential Address to the
American Historical Association, 1923
"I

.

.

.

.

.

.

Before beginning an analysis of Arnold Toynbee

1

s

methodological struggle it is important to consider the
recent English historical trends which form the background
of his life as an historian

.

Toynbee himself does not dodge

the question of environmental influence

,

and indeed uses the

question as the introduction to his Study when he asks whether the influence of the social environment on historical

thought is absolute or can be transcended.
It is difficult to select a defensible chronological

point of entry into recent English historiography.
choose Toynbee

"s

If we

date of birth in 1889 we act arbitrarily

with regard to significant developments in English historical thought, in spite of the fact that 1889 marked a signifi-

^Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History (London:
I, 16.
Oxford University Press, 1934)
,

12

cant era in France with the death of Fustel de Coulanges
(1830-89)
1889)

and in Germany with the death of Doellinger (1799-

Again while it may be of general interest to note the

.

birth of another noted contemporary like Adolph Hitler in
1889, or a more historiographical event such as the coming

into being of the American Church History Society in the same
year, we are still merely chronicling rather than locating
the point at which an intelligible discussion of emerging

trends may take place

.

decade of the 1870'

to find the most reasonable chronologi-

s

It is necessary to go back to the

cal starting point for a survey of the English historiography

which formed the background of Arnold Toynbee's A Study of
History

,

The student of history in the mid- twentieth century
is apt to overlook the fact that historical work in its pres-

ent form is of comparatively recent origin

.

The institution-

alizing of "history" in universities, in seminars, in historical institutes

,

in journals

,

in associations and in congres-

ses is for the most part a product of the late nineteenth

century.

These organs were regarded with considerable skep-

ticism even into the early decades of the twentieth century
by the literary and non-academically oriented historians.

Only when one comes across the complaints of a non-academically oriented historian such as Toynbee, or goes back to the

literary historians of late nineteenth century England can

14

one realize how recent in origin are many of the commonplaces

of modern historical research.

In 1913, G. M. Trevelyan

(1876-1962), who could boast of at least two great literary

historians in his ancestry, inveighed against the institu-

tionalizing of history, although he himself found refuge in
the academy fifteen years later:

The last fifty years have witnessed great changes in
the management of Clio's temple.
Her inspired prophets and bards have passed away and been succeeded
by the priests of an established church; the vulgar
have been excluded from the Court of the Gentiles;
doctrine has been defined; heretics have been excommunicated; and the tombs of the aforesaid prophets
have been duly blackened by the new hierarchy.

Disregarding the complaint of Trevelyan, his recognition of the "great changes in the management of Clio's
temple" provides a useful introduction to our task of iden-

tifying changes in late nineteenth-century English historical
thought*

While one may use the general descriptive phrase

the "institutionalizing of history" to designate these

changes, it should be clear that the last quarter of the

nineteenth century saw the emergence of the modern science of
history and its problems.

By the term science of history, we

mean the emergence of historical studies in its present systematic form, replete with a self-conscious methodology and
some awareness of the structure and limits of its field.

George Macaulay Trevelyan, Clio, a Muse (London:
Longmans, Green and Co., 1913), p. lW.

The
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term includes several methodological subdivisions within
English historiography, embracing primarily all those
historians

who used the term "scientific" in connection with their
method, as a way both to gain the prestige currently being

accorded the natural sciences and to distinguish themselves
from their less scientific fellow historians.
This perspective on English historiography since the
1870' s should enable us to see Arnold Toynbee

proper light.

*

work in its

s

We will not be inclined to dismiss him as a

religious mystic,

a

pessimistic prophet, a manifestation of

twentieth-century crisis hysteria,

a

speculative and charming

journalist, or a disappointed ex-professional historian.

All

of these are possible interpretations of Toynbee, as demon-

strated by the essays and articles of the critics, but they

suffer from a highly selective view of Toynbee*
writings.

s

thought and

It can be said that Toynbee s desire to appeal to

a wide audience,

'

his use of dramatic metaphors and penchant

for predictions, often make these interpretations appear

more plausible than they are.

We begin to move from the

realm of opinion and subjective reaction when we attempt to

reconstruct the historiographical struggles of the time, and
see Toynbee in terms of the developing science of history and

the intense Methodenstreit which necessarily accompanied it.
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The Institutionalizing of History
in the British Universities
The decade of the 1870'

s

may be regarded as the cru-

cial era in the emergence of modern English historiography

because it spans the years when historical science gained
status in the universities, when historical research became

increasingly institutionalized, when leadership began to
move from the amateur to the professional historian, and when

foundations were laid for the later profusion of historical
societies and journals.
The 1870'

s

witnessed a number of educational changes,

some of which had a direct bearing on the development of the

historical sciences.

The Education Act of 1870 inaugurated a

reform of educational practice and institution which was to
have wide effect on the English scene.

Ensor speaks of the

decade as the start of a period which "saw the conversion of
the English as a whole into a school-taught and literate

people

.

3

The Gladstonian reform of the universities in the

"

Religious Test Act of 1871 opened the way for

a

reconsidera-

tion of the purpose and curriculum of Oxford and Cambridge.

Herbert Fisher (1865-1940)

,

Oxford scholar, then lecturer and

historian of Modern European History, and finally Warden of
New College, discussed the Oxford experience in his Unfinished
3

R.

C.

K. Ensor,

University Press, 1936)

,

England 1870-1914 (London:
p.

xx.

Oxford

,
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Autobiography

Commenting on the restriction of the curricu-

.

lum to the classics, mathematics, law, and theology, he notes
the changes of the 1870' s.

Up until the later part of the nineteenth century a
university career had always been regarded as something of a rich man's luxury.
Oxford and
Cambridge
were until the abolition of religious tests in 1871 regarded as nurseries of the
national church, and training-grounds for the landowning gentry.
.

.

.

.

.

.

The fight to throw open the universities to the whole country

irrespective of creeds was led at Cambridge and Oxford by the

younger dons, enrolling such stalwarts as Dicey (1835-1922)
Sidgwick (1838-1900), Bryce (1838-1922),
(1838-1928)

G.

and Henry Jackson (1839-1921).

0.

Trevelyan

These educational

reforms helped to free the educational structure for the

growth of new academic disciplines, although the impetus for

historical science came from a new set of historical ideals
advocated by a rising group of historians centered especially
in Oxford and Cambridge.,

The Oxford situation reveals much about the changes
in English historiography.

While there was official recogni-

tion of the place of history in the curriculum as early as
the establishment of the Regius Professorship of Modern His-

tory in 1724 by George I, this bore little practical result

until the brief tenure of Thomas Arnold (1795-1842)
4

(London?

in 1841.

Fisher, An Unfinished Autobiography
p. XTT7~
Oxford University Press, 1940)

H.

A.

L.

,

Charles Oman (1860-1946) has compiled an interesting and

humorous account of the trials of the Regius Professors at
Oxford, pointing out the chronic problems that afflicted the

political incumbents of the office down to the formation of
the new Honours School of Law and Modern History in 1850.

5

The new discipline did not gain enough strength to stand

alone until the separation of Law from History in 1873.

Leadership for the "New History" was provided by
Stubbs (1825-1901), Freeman (1823-92) and Green (1837-83),
and can be dated with some accuracy by the appointment of

William Stubbs to the Regius Chair in 1866.

Mandell Creigh-

ton's experience at Oxford during the early years of Stubbs'

teaching career offers considerable insight into the changes
taking place.

Creighton (1843-1901) had his earlier train-

ing in the School of Litterae Humaniores

,

but then in 1866

began to read for the School of Law and History.

Examined

by Bruce, Stubbs and others, he became a history tutor and
took the initiative in the organization of the Association
of Tutors in 1868-69.

The changes in those two years

involved the decision to open lectures in each college to
the other colleges, the organization of tutors, and the sys-

tematic arrangement of lectures to cover the various fields
of learning.
5

By 1892, when Creighton had gained considerable

Charles Oman, On the Writing of History (London:
Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1939).

,
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success as professor of ecclesiastical history at
Cambridge,
as editor of the English Historical Review, and
as author of
a

notable History of the Papacy

,

his reflections on English

historical studies included the observation that:
With Stubbs began the scientific pursuit of modern
history, as he impressed his views upon us younger
men.
We worked out among us a scheme of lectures
covering the whole field, and were the pioneers of
the 'Intercollegiate Lectures* which now prevail
at both Universities.
Gooch (1873-1968) calls Stubbs the first trained historian to hold the post of Modern History at Oxford,

7

and

records the enthusiasm with which his work was received on
the Continent as the leader of the "exact school of history"
in England.

What is of great interest to us is his role in

the establishment of the methodological ideals of the German

historian Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886)
graphy.

in English historio-

By his assertion that "I don't believe in a philo-

sophy of history," he tried to clear the epistemological

ground for the historian so that "sovereign impartiality"

might be the basis for his historical views.

The Rankean

ideal as employed by the English historians was largely negative, and expressed itself in boasts such as those made about

Louise Creighton, Life and Letters of Mandell
Creighton (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1904)
pT 61.
,

^George P. Gooch, History and Historians in the Nine teenth Century (2d ed.
London
Longmans Green and Co.
;

1952)

,

p.

318.

s

,

"
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Stubbs that although he was "steeped in clerical and con-

servative principles,
reading his books.

"

no one could tell his politics from

Maitland (1850-1906) credits Stubbs with

doing more to introduce the methods of German scholarship
into England than any other man.

This self-conscious adoption of the pattern of Ranke
led Creighton, one of Stubbs* disciples, to adopt a stance

which was deceptively simple for himself, yet devastatingly
critical of his predecessors.

His wife sums up the "absolute

impartiality" of the bishop in the phrase, "He did not wish
to prove anything,

to maintain any theories,

brilliant generalizations

,

to make any

his aim was simply and straight-

forwardly to tell what happened, to get at the truth

Creighton elaborated his epistemological position in

9

.

a

con-

versation with a student in 1871 when he described historical methodology as the gathering of a number of detached

facts 9 then come the principles which will seem to drive out
the facts, until "finally you will find the facts will begin
to cluster around the principles."

10

York Powell (1850-1904), Regius Professor at Oxford
from 1894 until his death in 1904, expressed this negative

p.

8

Ibid.

9

Creighton, Life and Letters of Mandell Creighton,

226 •
10

Ibid.

,

p.

61.

1
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ideal in his arguments against his predecessor James
Froude
(1818-1894).

He insisted that history be distinguished from

literature and ethics because it is an "absolute science."
In his 1903 address on "A General Survey of Modern History,"

scientific method is described in the following way:

...

it collects and sifts facts, gets them down
as correctly as it can, classifies, them, and then,
making hypotheses, tests and tries these till it
arrives at conclusions that stand every test and
trial it can apply. 1

York Powell shared with his Oxford predecessor, Freeman, an

abhorrence of metaphysics, and a desire to "let the facts
speak for themselves."

12

This version of the Rankean ideal

was passed to his successor in the Regius Chair, Charles

Firth (1857-1936).

Firth's biographers speak of him in

terms of the same negative ideal; as one who avoided judg-

ments, who desired to tell the whole story without comment,
to "let the facts speak for themselves."

Firth is also des-

cribed as one who never subscribed to any school of history
\

and was not concerned with general ideas.

13

James Bryce uses an interesting metaphor to express
the ideal of the "passionless man" in his introduction in
1

Oliver Elton, Frederick York Powell (Oxford:
T.
Clarendon Press, 1906)
II
,

12

Ibid

.

,

I,

,

245.

13 Eleanor Smith Godfrey, "Sir Charles Firth," Some
Historians of Modern Europe, ed. by Schmitt, pp. 146-147.
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1901 to the English translation of Helmolt's History of
the
\

World

.

Comparing the encroachment of theory or presupposi-

tion in a working historian to a "seduction/

"...

is the business of the historian

he says that it

1

to set forth and

explain the facts exactly as they are; and if he writes in
the light of a theory, he is pretty certain to be uncon-

sciously seduced into giving undue prominence to those facts

which make for it."

1

4

Before we shift our attention to the developing

Methodenstreit which serves as an intelligible background
for Toynbee's A Study of History

,

let us survey the career

patterns of the new historians as they relate to this process
of the institutionalizing and professionalizing of modern

historical science.

Richard Lodge (1855-1936), first to be appointed to
the Chair of History at Glasgow in 1894, entered Oxford in
the stimulating decade of the 1870'

s

to study under Stubbs,

and listen to Jowett (1817-1893) and Ruskin (1819-1900).

A

list of student contemporaries helps to indicate the seed-bed

characteristics of Oxford in relation to the rise of modern
English historiography.

With him were W.

Poole (1857-1939), H. Round (1854-1928),

Kerr,

P.
T.

F.

R.

L.

Tout (1855-

1929), A. Toynbee (1852-1883), F. C. Montague (1858-1935),
14

Fisher, An Unfinished Autobiography,

p.

331

0

.

C.

H.

Firth and

G.

E.

Buckle

(

1854-1935)

Lodge's career marks out

a
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pattern that is represen-

tative of many who were trained in the "Oxford School."

After Balliol and the influence of Stubbs, Lodge went to
Vienna University, then returned to Oxford as a don and lec-

turer in Modern European History, and finally secured the
post at Glasgow.

Charles Firth entered Balliol in 1876, then

studied in Germany, returning to Oxford in 1883 for twenty
years of research and teaching in Modern European History
until his appointment to the Regius Professorship in 1904.

William Ashley (1860-1927) entered Balliol in 1878, went to
Germany in 1880,

"83 and

"84

for methodological study, and

returned to Oxford in 1885, where he remained until his

appointment to Toronto and Harvard a few years later.

Andrew

G.

Little (1863-1945), another great name among the

English historians, entered Balliol in 1882, went to Dresden
and Gottingen in 1886 for further study in historical method,
then returned to Oxford for research until his appointment to

Cardiff in 1892.

Several others of equal fame followed the

same pattern with the exception of the continental study.

Thomas Tout had entered Balliol in 1874, studied under
Stubbs, continued in Balliol as chaplain after 1876, then in
1881 he went to St. David's College in Wales to hold the his15 John Davis, "Sir Richard Lodge," Some Historians
of Modern Europe , ed. by Schmitt, p. 201.

,
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tory post for nine years before beginning his famous
career
at Manchester.

His fellow professor at Manchester, and

equally responsible for the establishment of its outstanding
school, of history, James Tait (1863-1944), entered Balliol
in 1884, heard that same day the inaugural lecture of

Stubbs' successor Freeman, attended the Oxford seminars of

Firth and York Powell, and then began his teaching career at

Manchester in 1887.

The same year that Tait entered Balliol,

Herbert Fisher began his studies at New College, became a
Fellow in 1888 along with Gilbert Murray (1866-1957), went to
Paris in 1889, to Gottingen and Dresden in 1890, and returned
to lecture at Oxford in 1891.

We will not follow the careers of other Balliol men

such as H. W. C. Davis (1874-1928)
G.

and

D.
G.

,

R.

H.

Tawney (1880-1962)

Cole (1889-1958), Arthur Lionel Smith (1850-1924)

H.

M.

Young who span the intervening years to 1907.

But

the above pattern of careers sheds a light on the institu-

tionalizing of history and helps us to understand the climate
of historical studies which prevailed when young Toynbee

arrived at Oxford as

a

student in 1907.

While the "Oxford School" under the leadership of
Stubbs, Freeman, and Green was beginning to provide an insti-

tutional framework for the new history in the 1870

"s,

the

necessary organs of publication were also beginning to emerge.
The English Historical Review had its origins in the Oxford

.

circle as the result of the initiative of James Bryce and
J.

R.

Green.

Bryce had finished his undergraduate studies

at Oxford, his continental studies at Heidelberg and had

returned to lecture at Oxford by 1865.
the vicarage of J.

R.

Green (1837-1883)

In an 1866 visit to
,

Bryce and the Rev-

erend William Hunt (1842-1931) had discussed the possibility
of establishing a historical journal with Green.

By 1867,

Green had discussed the matter in a letter to Freeman, and

Bruce had consulted Stubbs and the publisher Macmillan.

But

the financial problems, the matter of competent contributors,
the need for a trained reading public, as well as fear of

competition from the North British Review chilled the enthusiasm of the would-be journalists.

The same factors may be

regarded as signs that the developing science of history was
not yet ready to support a major publication venture.

Throughout the decade of 1870 the project was frequently discussed, culminating in a gathering at Oxford in 1885 of
16

Powell, Round, Tout, Firth and Archer (1834-1902).
ton speaks of a meeting in Bryce

'

s

Creigh-

home in which he, Acton,

Dean Church (1815-90), A. W. Ward (1837-1924), and York

Powell worked out some of the details.

They asked Creighton

to serve as the editor instead of the over-worked Bryce,

with

R.

L.

16 R.

Poole as the sub-editor.

Five months later, in

Poole, "The Beginnings of the English Historical Review," English Historical Review, XXXVI (19 21)
L.

8

January 1886, the first issue was published, and Acton's let
ter of congratulation to the editor noted that,

half the great names are there, and

I

"At least

discern the makings of

sacred band of university workers." 17

a

The twenty years which elapsed from the first pro-

posal of the Review in 1866 to the first issue in 1886

bespeaks the struggle to establish an autonomous science of
history in England and to give the study an institutional
framework and an organ of publication.
enthusiasm, Creighton

"

.

.

.

Even with Acton's

doubted if there was

a

suf-

ficiently large public to take an interest in purely histori
cal questions."

1

His plea to Acton for an article in the

first issue contained a very realistic evaluation:
We must confess that we are not strong in
historical method in England. Our work has
all the advantages and all the disadvantages
of amateur work.
You are one of the
very few persons who can add any novelty.
.

.

.

A glance beyond the English borders will give us an

additional perspective on the English scene.

In America in

1886 the two year old American Historical Association was

engaged in publishing its own new journal
torical Review.

,

The American His -

Ranke, the German methodological lodestar,

Creighton, Life and Letters of Mandell Creighton,
p

a

339.

had been made an honorary member and was invited to
address
the new society.

In Germany, Ranke s illustrious career came
'

to a close with his death in 1886.

One year earlier the

Dutch historians had organized their historical journal,

Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis

German Historische Zeitschrift
1859 by Heinrich von Sybel.

patterned after the successful

,

,

which had been founded in

The Italians to the south had

given organizational status to their historiographical

efforts with the formation of the Istituto Storico Italiano
in 1883.

Returning to the institutionalizing of modern historical studies in England, we find that the entrenchment and

enlargement of the historians' work in the Universities and
in the English Historical Review was followed several years

later by the formation of national associations.

One cannot

suppose that a vacuum existed until the English Historical

Association was formed in 1906.

Local historical societies

and the close ties between the historians provided by English

University life promoted interchange of ideas, criticism, and
research„

The forming of over-arching organizations to unite

geographically separated historians began before the end of
the nineteenth century.

Maitland rallied the historians of

law around the Seldon Society in 1887; church historians

formed the Church Historical Society in 1894.

The early

years of the new century with its series of International

28

Congresses of Historical Sciences in 1903, 1908, and
1913

precipitated the great number of specialized historical
societies like the British Society of Franciscan
Studies of
1907, and the Economic History Society of 1926.

Specialized

historical journals accompanied the new societies, and the
ever accumulating and accelerating research was given some
degree of order with the organization of the Institute of

Historical Research in London in the year 1921.
Turning from Oxford to Cambridge, we find similar

changes occurring in the study of history.
(1834-95)

In 1869 Seeley

succeeded Kingsley as Regius Professor of Modern

History and may be regarded as the transitional figure in
the development of the historical sciences in that Univer-

sity.

Seeley began his career at Cambridge by denouncing

the dominant literary tradition of the "charlatans" Carlyle

and Macaulay, and extolling the careful scholarship of Leo-

pold von Ranke.

He followed the lead of the Oxford dons by

establishing the History Tripos in the University.

But his

own overwhelming interest in politics and political lessons,
his indifference to reforms and to the rising dissatisfaction
of the history tutors, meant that the leadership of the new

science of history would pass from Seeley to Creighton.

See-

ley had been the only professor of history at the University,

but in 1884 Creighton was appointed to the new post of Dixie

Professor of Ecclesiastical History,

Gwatkin (1844-1916),

29

Prothero (1848-1922) and other promising young historians in
the University gathered around Creighton, and worked for the

reforms as embodied in the recommendations of the Board of

Historical Studies of 1885.
By 1888 F. M. Maitland was at Cambridge occupying

the Downing Chair of the Laws of England, and thereby giving
the University a man Acton called the "ablest historian in

England," and Pollard referred to him as "the greatest that

England has possessed."

In 1895 Seeley was succeeded by Lord

Acton as Regius Professor who further enhanced and strengthened the place of historical studies in the University.

As

in the historical school at Oxford, Cambridge witnessed a

similar pattern of developing future strength from the returning history students.

John Clapham (1873-1946) completed his

Tripos in 1895, returned in 1908, and by 1928 had become the
first Professor of Economic History at Cambridge.

land Rose (1855-1942)

,

John Hol-

who entered Cambridge before Clapham,

returned as lecturer and reader to climax his professional
and professorial career in 1914 as the first holder of the
chair of naval history at Cambridge.
1939)

Harold Temperley (1879-

and Denys Winstanley (1877-1947) both had their histori-

cal training at Cambridge under Acton, Maitland and Bury
(1861-1927), then traveled widely and returned as tutors,

house masters, and as in Temper ley's case, University Professor of Modern History.

.

30

If we turn to the situation at Manchester, we
may

again add to our understanding of the late nineteenth
century

historiographical changes.

A chair of history was established

there as early as 1854, but the undifferentiated state of

historical studies is underlined by the fact that the incumbent, Richard C. Christie (1830-1901), was required to teach

history, jurisprudence and political economy.

By 1866 the

disciplines of history and law were separated, and Adolphus

Ward was appointed to teach history.

The school began to

grow under Christie and Ward, although its great reputation
dates from the arrival of two Balliol men, Thomas Tout and
James Tait, who had been strongly influenced by the Stubbs

circle at Oxford.

Tait came directly from his Oxford train-

ing to Manchester in 1887 as lecturer and by 1896 occupied
\

the chair of history.

Tout went to St. David's College in

Wales for nine years before going to Manchester as Ward's

successor in 1890.

Advanced research facilities were estab-

lished, chairs in economic history and modern history added,
and Tout and Tait, "two of the most distinguished medievalists in England,"

20

led a community of historian scholars

which included such men as George Unwin, Ramsey Muir (18721941)

and H. W. C. David (1874-1928).
In the north, James Bryce,
20

p.

32

Powicke

,

an Oxford historian whom

Modern Historians and the Study of History

,

1
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we have encountered in the Stubbs circle, and
in the Man-

chester school as Christie's successor in 1869,
started his

career at Glasgow University.

But his historical interests

could hardly be grounded in this educational experience,
for
he explains,

professor." 21

"History was not taught at all, there was no
But by the year 1894, a chair of history was

established at Glasgow, where a Balliol man, Richard Lodge
(1855-1936)

,

won the appointment.

In the same year, Prothero

of Cambridge won the new post established at Edinburgh Uni-

versity.

A Scottish History Society had been established in

Edinburgh as early as 1886, but its primary purpose was the
discovery and printing of unpublished documents.

By 1903,

the Scottish Historical Review came into being to express the

views and researches of the new science of history.

Flowering of the Scientific School of History in
the First Decade of the Twentieth Century
While we can trace the growth of a science of history
\

in England in the last three decades of the nineteenth cen-

tury, the flowering of that movement occurs in the first

decade of the twentieth century.
The self-confidence or even dogmatism of the profes-

sional historians with their new Rankean tools and their

dominance in the universities comes to expression in many
2

Herbert A. L. Fisher, James Bryce (London:
millan and Co., 1927), I, 25.

Mac-
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places and on many occasions.

Trevelyan's plaintive note in

1913 that "doctrine has been defined; heretics excommunicated;

and the tombs of the aforesaid prophets have been duly
black-

ened by the new hierarchy" may be taken as a fairly accurate

appraisal of the routing of all opposition from the amateur
and literary historians of an earlier era.

Edwin Hatch

1

s

optimism might have been judged some-

what visionary and premature in 1889 when he argued that,
"We may hear, if we will,

the solemn tramp of the science of

history marching slowly, but marching always to conquest.

It

is marching in our day, almost for the first time, into the

domain of Christian history.

.

.

.

In front of it, as in

front of the physical sciences, is chaos; but behind it is

order."

22

But his optimism was reiterated and given a kind

of official sanction and credibility in

Inaugural Lecture at Cambridge in 1902.

J.

B.

Bury's famous

Bury reminds his

audience that a revolution is taking place in the science of
history, and that when Ranke

8

s

dictum "Ich will nur sagen wie

es eigentlich gewesen ist" has been fully implemented "though

there be many schools of political philosophy, there will no

longer be divers schools of history."

23

His concluding

22

Edwin Hatch, The Influence of Greek Ideas on
Christianity (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957)
p. 23
,

23

J. B. Bury, "The Science of History," Selected
Essays of J. B . Bury , ed. by Harold Temperley (Cambridge:
University Press, 1930), p. 12.

remarks bring together his methodological conviction
of the

objective scientific character of history and his
astounding
faith in the effects of this triumph of the science
of history.

... if, year by year, history is to become a more
and more powerful force for stripping the bandages
of error from the eyes of men, for shaping public
opinion and advancing the cause of intellectual and
political liberty, she will best prepare her disciples for the performance of that task, ... by
remembering always that,
she is herself simply a science, no less and no more. '
.

.

.

While Bury could not bring himself to make quite as

extravagant

claim as his French contemporary Fustel de

a

Coulanges', "Do not imagine you are listening to me; it is

history itself that speaks/"

3

nevertheless he expresses the

sense of culmination and triumph that English historians

were experiencing in the first decade of the new century.
It is possible to see in the publication of the Cam -

bridge Modern History

a

clear example of the authoritative

voice of history imagined by the practitioners of the new

science of history.

In 1896 Lord Acton had been invited by

the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press to become gen-

eral editor of a History of the World

.

Here was a possibil-

ity of writing a definitive history, of fact gathering by the
24

Ibid

.

,

p.

25

22

v

John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton, Lectures on Mod ern History ed. by J. N. Figgis and R. V. Laurence (London:
Macmillan and Co.
1950), p. 12
,

„

;

,
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experts, and of producing the absolutely impartial
version of
history.
Acton's letter of direction to his contributors was
sent out in 1898 with the strong admonition:
Our scheme requires that nothing shall reveal the
country, the religion, or the party to which the
writers belong.
Contributors will understand
that we are established, not under the Meridian of
Greenwich, but in Long. 30 deg. W.
that our Waterloo must be one that satisfies French and English,
Germans and Dutch alike; that nobody can tell,
without examining the list of authors, where the
Bishop of Oxford laid down the pen, and whether
Fairbairn or Gasquet, Liebermann or Harrison took
it up. b
.

.

.

;

Acton himself died in 1902 just before the first volume of the Cambridge Modern History was published, but the

work continued on the text until the twelfth volume was published in 1910.

By 1911 the first volume of the Cambridge

Medieval History had appeared, and this series was followed
by the Cambridge Ancient History and the Cambridge History of
the British Empire

.

By 1913, on the eve of the first World War, Gooch had

written the last chapter of the last volume of the Cambridge

Modern History on the topic "The Growth of the Historical
Sciences"

While historical science is thus extending its
conquests in every direction, the philosophy of
history lags behind. 27
2 6stern,

27

The Varieties of History

W. Ward, G.

,

p.

249.

W. Prothero, Stanley Leathes, eds
The Cambridge Modern History (London:
Cambridge University
Press, 1902)
XII
850.
A.

'.

,

.

That same year Gooch concluded his History and
His -

torians in the Nineteenth Century with the identical state-

ment concerning the triumphs of the new history.

He added a

concluding thought that might have given direction to Arnold
Toynbee, then a twenty-four year old historian at Oxford,

who had just returned from a year in Greece to become Ancient

History tutor at Balliol.

Gooch asserted that "though it is

not yet possible to formulate laws explaining the purpose and
the plan of human evolution, every true historian contributes

equally with the student of science and psychology to the

progress of our knowledge of man." 2 8

would soon reach

a

His hope that historians

law-formulating stage may have provided

the challenge to which Arnold Toynbee responded with years of

research and four volumes of his A Study of History in an
effort to elaborate those laws of human history.
It is interesting to hear the same hope more clearly

articulated ten years later in the presidential address of
the American Historical Association.

E.

P.

Cheyney's yearn-

ing for the "gifted young historical thinker who

propound
tory.

•

.

2

tury

,

«

.

ft

p.

29

.

"

29

.

.

.

will

some new and far-reaching law or laws of his-

had some prospect of realization in the work

Gooch, History and Historians in the Nineteenth Cen 594.

Edward P. Cheyney, "Law in History," The American
Historical Review, XXIX (January, 1924), 248.

36

Toynbee was just undertaking in London in the same
decade.
Tensions and Controversies
Among the New Historians

Despite the steady process of the institutionalizing
of historical studies after 1870 in the British
Universities,

and the flourishing of the many historical societies and

journals, seminars and theoretical discussion grew more
slowly.

E.

L.

Woodward, in an address given in 1950 to the

British Academy on "The Present State of Historical Studies,"

recognized the general aversion of British historical scholars to the theoretical aspects of historiography.

As support

for his own refusal to discuss "the fundamental problem of
the nature of historical knowledge," he argues that "I am in

good company if

I

evade a master problem of this kind, since

nearly all English historians have evaded it." 30
His estimate is corroborated by another British his-

torian trained at Cambridge in the early years of the twen-

tieth century.

Sir Charles Webster recalls that when he was

a student there was no systematic study of history, no

research techniques, no "modern history," and no graduate

instruction at Cambridge.

Even though Bury and Westlake were

leading the historical school, and producing monumental studies, the young historian had only "fleeting contact" with

them, and received no systematic teaching in techniques of
30

Stern, The Varieties of History ,

p.

14.

,

historical research.^
When we go back to review the Oxford experience in

historical seminars and theoretical discussion, we find further confirmation of Pollard's complaint of 1904, that,
"There is no real school of research in history in any Eng32

lish University.""

Freeman had attempted a seminar at

Oxford on "Methods of Historical Study."

Firth, in his

inaugural address of 1904 complained that Oxford did nothing
to train historians,

and then spent the next twenty- two years

of his incumbency trying to establish research methods and

technical training there.
of Modern History, H. W.

His successor as Regius Professor
C.

Davis, credited Firth with the

organization of the seminar, remarking that, "he has every
33
right to be called the father of this new development.

Even though the English scene did not witness the
intense methodological debates that were carried on in Ger-

many at the turn of the century by historian-theoreticians
of the stature of Dilthey, Windelband, Troeltsch, Meyer,

Meinecke, and Weber, it would be a mistake to suppose that
the new history did not soon show signs of major methodologi31 Charles Webster,

Fifty Years of Change in Histori cal Teaching (Pamphlet of the Historical Association, lybbj
pp. 36-37.
32
33

Ibid

.

Davis, The Study of History (Oxford;
Inaugural Lecture of H. W. C. Davis, Clarendon Press, 1925),
p.

8.

H.

W. C.

.

cal tensions

The problems which were inevitable in the simplistic

epistemology of the English Rankeans were not immediately
apparent to the sacred band of professional historians who
were beginning to gather around Stubbs, Freeman, and Green at
Oxford, Creighton and Maitland at Cambridge, and Ward, Tait,
and Tout at Manchester*

Yet difficulties lurked just below

the surface in such factual narratives as Creighton*

of the Papacy

s

History

One example is the Anglican bishop's inter-

.

esting interpretation of the Reformation which is not unlike
certain Marxist interpretations of "real history."
ter to Mrs. Green in 1884 he expresses mild

In a let-

mcern about his

own non-idealistic interpretation of the Reformation, adding:
If the Pope could have left off pillaging Germany,
I believe that 'justification by faith only
would
have created only a languid interest.
This is a
very low view.
I know that we ought to believe
that mighty movements always swayed the hearts of
men.
So they have--when they made for their pecunBut I believe that ideas were
iary interest.
always second thoughts in politics they were the
garb with which men covered the nudity of their
practical desires.
1

—

Collingwood observes that "In the main, English historians of the late nineteenth century thus went on their own
way without often pausing to utter general reflections on
their work; on the rare occasions when they did so, as for
example in Freeman's book on The Methods of Historical Study
or here and there in inaugural lectures,
(London, 1886)
nothing worthy of notice came of it." The Idea of History
Clarendon Press, 1946), p. 14T7"
(Oxford:
,

Creighton, Life and Letters of Mandell Creighton
p.

267.

,

For a man who wanted simply to record
what happened in the
historical past, who had no theories to
maintain and no
philosophy of history, this rather surprising
theoretical
discussion emerges in his letters and was
sooner or later to
disclose the hidden postulates of the "neutral
observer"

position of the new school of historians.

Looking back at the performance of this first
generation of English Rankeans one is impressed with
their power
to mesmerize both themselves and their defenseless
amateur-

historian opponents.

G.

P.

Gooch accepts Stubbs' boast that

"no one could tell his politics from [reading] his books,"

and further defines Stubbs'

"remarkable impartiality" with

the explanation that "his political and religious beliefs

never obtruded in his work." 36
in his public

(1880)

Yet this is the same man who

and printed (1887) Lectures on Medieval

and Modern History does not hesitate to describe Turkey as
"the curse of Christendom," and that "it [Turkey] means

nothing, represents nothing but butchery, barbarism and the

vilest slavery."

37

Occasionally the internal methodological strains
became quite evident as in the dramatic Acton-Creighton con36

tury

,

p.

37

Gooch, History and Historians in the Nineteenth Cen~~
"
318.

~

William Stubbs, Lectures on Medieval and Modern
History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1886), p. 275.

40

troversy of 1887.

The "sacred band of university workers"

which Acton discerned in the 1886 founding of
the English

Historica l Review suffered sharp dissension in the
ranks
when Acton wrote a harsh review of Creighton's
Papacy
.

Creighton had received very favorable reviews of his
first
two volumes from Acton.

Historical Review

,

Consequently, as editor of the

he sent Volumes Three and Four to Acton

for what he hoped would be continued favorable reviewing

from the one man in England he considered competent to discuss the volumes.

To Creighton's great dismay, as disclosed

in hurried correspondence to his colleagues, the Acton review

contained a sharp attack on him for refusing to pass judgment on the Renaissance Papacy and the Inquisition.

This

controversy was not easy for the nineteenth century contemporary historians to understand, and has puzzled Acton and

Creighton biographers since that time.

But one needs to

recall the tremendous moral and intellectual struggle through

which Acton had passed as

a

loyal Catholic scholar in the

Papal Infallibility controversies from 1859 to 1870.

Kochan

describes Acton's struggle as the "permanent compromise of
his conscience,"

38

and Butterfield speaks of it as the soul-

shaking experience of opposing and then submitting to the
38

"Lionel Kochan, Acton on History (London:

Deutsch, 1954)

,

p.

27.

Andre

Dogma of Papal Infallibility. 39

it is apparent that Creigh-

ton s discussion of the Inquisition touched
on points in
'

papal history of great importance to Acton.

Creighton

expected praise from Acton for the fact that

a

Protestant

clergyman scholar could handle Catholic historical interpretations in such an "objective" or non- judgmental fashion.
Indeed, Acton had noted the Rankean ideal of objectivity in

Creighton'

s

work:

Nobody should stand better with Mr. Creighton than
Ranke.
The late John Richard Green used to complain that it was from him that he had learnt to
be so dispassionate and inattentive to everything
but the chain of uncoloured fact.
In reserve of
language, exclusion of all that is not history,
dislike of purple patchwork and emotional effect,
their ways are one.
Instead, what emerged from his historicism adopted

by Creighton, Stubbs and many of their contemporaries was an

ethical relativism that was anathema to Acton because it

undermined his concept of progress

— the

growth of liberty.

This passage from Acton's review is an indication of how in

Acton's eyes Creighton 's virtue could by degrees become a
vice, how impartiality could be a mask for moral indifference,

how recording and observing could lead to superficial chronicling.

Of Creighton, Acton says:

39 Herbert Butterfield,
Lord Acton
Association Pamphlet, 1948) , p. 8.

(London:

Historical

^°John Acton, Book review in English Historical
Review, II

(1887), 572.
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He is not striving to prove a case, or
burrowing
towards a conclusion, but wishes to pass
through
scenes of raging controversy and passion with

serene curiosity, a suspended judgment,
jury, and a pair of white gloves. 1

a

a

divided

And he adds at the close:
He describes the things that vary rather than the
things that endure.
The system, the idea,
is masked by a crowd of ingenious
characters.
The inner mind of the papacy has to
be perused.
Without reversing his views,
or modifying his statement, he has yet to dis-'
close the reason, deeper and more interior than
the
corruption of ecclesiastics, which compelled the new life of nations to begin by a con42
.

.

.

.

.

.

vulsion

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

What the Protestant clergyman-historian deemed fair-mindedness in his desire to put the Inquisition in the best possible light, the Roman Catholic historian deplored as appli-

cation of a sliding scale, as a lowering of the standard of
moral judgment.

Acton argued that:

If we may debase the currency for the sake of

genius or success or reputation, we may debase
it for the sake of a man's influence, of his
religion, of his party.
Then history
ceases to be a science, an arbiter of controversy, a guide of the wanderer;.,
it serves
where it ought to reign.
.

,

.

.

.

Creighton*

s

•

.

u

response to the attacks of a man he regarded with

such high respect as a historical scholar, and with equal

bewilderment as
41
42

43
p.

372.

Ibid

a

Catholic historian was the confession that,

.

,

p.

573.

Ibid.

,

p.

580.

,

Creighton, Life and Letters of Mandell Creighton

,

"Perhaps the effort to rid myself of prejudice
has left me
cold and abstract in my mode of expression
and thinking." 44
This controversy offered an early expression
of the

Methodenstreit that was bound to occur as historical
scholars
began to work out the implications of their new history.
In

this case, Creighton and Acton were two of the most
bril-

liant early leaders who agreed on certain basic epistemological principles which had come into English historiography

from the Rankean school.

One can say that the controversy

marked the limits of their theoretical agreement.

Although

they agreed on the negative ideal as a first phase in the new

history as it worked itself out into written history, Acton

recognized the damage it was doing to his other historiographical principles such as his concept of development.

They

had shared an epistemological faith in the "passionless
man"

— that

true history would come from the historian who

divests himself of passion, prejudice, philosophy, and points
of view.

Indeed, Lord Acton's early faith was exemplified in

the "joint-stock history" undertaken in the Cambridge History

series, in the hope that the various authors would not be

visible behind the chapters, that the satisfied reader of any

nationality would not be able to detect where one author left
44 Ibid.,

p.

375.

off and another began. 45
But the shared ideal of Creighton, Acton, Stubbs
and
the growing band of fellow-professionals was primarily
negative, usually expressed in negative terms, and was most

often employed as a polemic against the conventional history

of the nineteenth century English historiography.

The three

editors of the first edition of the Cambridge Modern History
could exult that "the long conspiracy against the revelation
of truth has gradually given way; and competing historians

all over the civilized world have been zealous to take advan

tage of the change." 46

But they seemed as oblivious to the

explosive problems beneath the surface of their new methodology as their contemporaries in statecraft were to the fast

approaching first World War.
In 1913 when Gooch, the first major historian to des-

cribe the rise of the modern science of history in England,

and one who shared in the faith and enthusiasm of the movement, turns from narrative to the evaluation of a given his-

torian, he repeatedly uses a negative criterion of the sort

mentioned above.

Speaking of Ranke's religious views, he

45

Charles Oman, the author of the chapter on Waterloo
in the Cambridge Modern History
later recognized how impossible the negative ideal was, and how the "individualities
peep out" even in the most rigorously objective sections.
On the Writing of History p. 27.
,

,

6

W. Ward,

Prothero, and S. Leathes, "Preface
to the First Edition," Cambridge Modern Historv, vi.
A.

G.

W.

~
45

dismisses them with the judgment, "Though
a thin film of
theology floated on the surface, the main
body of the work
was unaffected." 47 when referring to
the strong views of
Stubbs on the value of Christianity,
Gooch defensively adds,
"But his political and religious beliefs
were never obtruded
48
in his work."
a discussion of Gardiner's political
and

m

\

religious allegiances, he uses the familiar phrase,
"but no
one could tell from his work to what Church or
party he
belonged." 49

Of Acton's Catholicism, Gooch extravagantly

remarks, "He practiced what he preached, and he never
wrote

or uttered a word as Regius Professor which revealed him
as
a

member of one Church rather than another." 50

Mosheim is

admitted to the modern school of history on the same negative grounds of having written "without passion or unction,"

and Gooch notes approvingly that the result of the "winning
of ecclesiastical history for science" at Gttttingen was that
"No one learned at Gottingen to love Church history or to

reverence the saints."

51

Hefele is commended for passing

the negative test at the end of his work on Church councils;
47

tury, p.
48
49

50
51

—

Gooch, History and Historians in the Nineteent h Cen~~
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318.

Ibid
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p.

339.
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p.

362.

Ibid.

,

p.

491.
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for "Looking back on his seven massive volumes
he repeats

that he is not conscious of any bias." 52
The early attacks on modern empirical historiography

did not center on the question of whether it was
indeed possible to carry out the epistemological ideal derived
from

Ranke of the perfectly neutral, objective, reporting of
the
facts.

That is to say, the problem of selecting the signif-

icant facts from the vast number of other facts, the question
of representative facts, and the problem of an inescapable

point of view did not emerge immediately as part of the Englisn Methodenstreit

.

The Creigh ton-Acton controversy had

tended to pose, rather, the problem of the adequacy of the

Rankean epistemological ideal.

It is evident in Acton's

critique of Creighton in which he states that Creighton sees
only the "passing figures," the "life and action," rather
than the "deeper and more interior" reason, the "inner mind
of the papacy.

What troubled the two protagonists was the danger
that the ideal of wanting to show only "what really happened"

might result in an inadequate or superficial view of the
past.

In light of their long struggle to establish the new

methodology and an autonomous historical science free from
the traditional biases of the nineteenth century, it seemed
5

Ibid.

,

p.

505

most disconcerting to find that the victory might end in
intense internal strife.
Upon closer examination of the controversy, one can
see that Acton's challenge to Creighton concerns the second

problem of the working historian
ment to use.

— what

principle of develop-

One might verify empirically some facts, but to

move from simple chronicling to historical explanation

involved some concept of development and, on this issue,
Acton was not content to follow the Creighton view that somehow the facts would tell their own story.

Acton hoped to

avoid the relativism and scepticism which he felt was inescapable in Creighton by holding to an absolute standard of

ethics as a criterion for his concept of development.

In his

Inaugural Address of June 1895, Acton argues that, "All that
we require is a work-day key to history."

53

His description

of the new school in historiography which is controlled by
the "dogma of impartiality," indicates his admiration but

also his growing sense of its inadequacy.

speak of this school with reverence, for the
good it has done, by the assertion of historic
truth and of its legitimate authority over the
It provides a discipline which
minds of men.
every one of us does well to undergo, and perFor it is not
haps also well to relinquish.
the whole truth. 54
I

John Acton , Essays on Freedom and Power (New York*
Meridian Books, 1955), p. 37.
54

Xbid., p. 42.

48

Acton goes on to recapitulate his earlier argument

against Creighton, and his earlier assertion that "it is
the
office of historical science to maintain morality as the
sole impartial criterion of men and things."

Froude

f

s

He reaffirms

declaration that "History does teach that right and

wrong are real distinctions.

Opinions alter, manners change,

creeds rise and fall, but the moral law is written on the

tablets of eternity."

Acton himself had held to the first principle of the

new historical school;

56

to the "dogma of impartiality," but

the more he labored with the second problem of a concept of

development—an Archimedean standpoint that would escape the
relativising of historicism

— the

more he insisted upon the

need and the right of the historian to exercise moral judgment.

In the summary of his Inaugural Address at Cambridge

University, Acton, after acknowledging his divergence from
the then dominant position of Creighton, states his own final

"cardinal proposition.
But the weight of opinion is against me when I
exhort you never to debase the moral currency or
to lower the standard of rectitude, but to try
others by the final maxim that governs your own
lives, and to suffer no man and no cause to
escape the undying penalty which history has the
55 Ibid

.

,

p.

51.

See Herbert Butterf ield
changing view in Lord Acton,

*

s

discussion of Acton's

1

.

49

power to inflict on wrong. 57

Acton was correct, at least, in his first assess-

ment—that "the weight of opinion

is against me."

In the

decades that followed, few English historians were
willing to
assume with Acton that the "first of human concerns is
religion," 5 8 that progress towards freedom is the key to
his59

tory,"

and that this progress is concomitant with the doc-

trine of Providence and rests upon an absolute morality. 60

Few historians were willing to surrender a hard-won sovereign

impartiality for Acton's insistence that "The inflexible
integrity of the moral code is, to me, the secret of the
authority, the dignity, the utility of history.

"
.

.

61

.

But one should not dismiss the Acton attack on the

Rankeans as totally out-dated and irrelevant,,

The question

of the relation of moral judgment to history has become a

major problem to a generation of European scholars who lived
through the second World War.

Meinecke's distress over rai-

son d'etat in his important study Machiavellism:
5

^Ac ton

58

59

60
6

,

Essays on Freedom and Power

,

p

.

the doc-

4 8.

Dalberg-Acton, Lectures on Modern History
Ibid

.

9

p.

12

Ibid

.

r

p.

11.

Acton, Essays on Freedom and Power,

p.

,

336.

p.

8.

50

trine of raison d'etat and its place in modern history 62 and
,

Georg

G.

Iggers'

toricism to

a

recent study of the relation of German his-

nationalistic philosophy of violence 6

are

only two examples of contemporary re-thinking of this problem in historical studies.

It is also important to note the

renewed interest in Acton as a historian, as evidenced by the
recent studies of Himmelfarb, Kochan, Butterfield and Mathew.

While Acton's position does not appear to be gaining many
adherents, his insights into the problems of the Rankeans
were very perceptive and quite in advance of his time.
62

Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism:
the doctrine of
raison d'etat and its place in modern history trans, by
D. Scott (London:
Rout ledge, 1957).
,

63

Georg G. Iggers The German Conception of History
(Middletown Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1968).
,
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CHAPTER

III

TOYNBEE THE EXPLORER
"We have not found the quarry which we are
hunting, but we have fought our way through
the thicket and have come out on the other
side into the open country."
Arnold J. Toynbee in Volume One (1933)

With this survey of British historiography as

a

background we may turn immediately to the work of Arnold
Toynbee in an attempt to understand the formation of his

methodological position and its subsequent changes.
starting point is to focus on Toynbee
cation of himself as an "explorer."

1

s

A good

frequent identifi-

The explorer motif is,

to be sure, subdued in the early volumes of A Study of His -

tory

,

and made quite subordinate to the notion of the his-

torian as social scientist.

Yet it is the startling growth

of the explorer motif that gives a clue to the breakdown of

Toynbee'

s

initial scientific methodology, and enables us to

see his life-long experiences as both a struggle for a proper

historical methodology and

a

religious odyssey.

Therefore,

we will use an examination of the explorer metaphor to clarify and establish the notion of a change.
In Chapter Four we will move backward in time in

order to pick up the earliest evidences of Toynbee

1

s

method-

ological struggle, then follow its formulations in his suc51

52

cessive self-identifications as "social scientist,"
"student
of life," and Christian historian.

Dual Use of the "Explorer" Metaphor

The image of the historian as an explorer has several

variations, but they appear to be minor variations of
eral theme.

gen-

a

Sometimes the traveler is on land, at other

times on the high seas.

On one occasion the explorer may be

cutting his way through the jungle, and then again he may
simply be walking through a "wonderland."

noted in

a

Also, it may be

preliminary way that the image has two major

applications which sometimes blend or merge into one.

Toyn-

bee speaks of his personal role as an explorer of historical

events.

In this usage the jungle or turbulent sea is really

the multiplicity and chaotic appearance of past events.

Occasionally the chaos is enlarged to include the jungle of
interpretations and hypotheses advanced by other scholars.
The second major application of this explorer- image is one in

which Toynbee emphasizes the aimless wandering of Western
civilization
scout

,

.

In this case

or the "Moses

,

"

the historian is the advance

or the navigator in the chart-house

who ought to be proposing
fellow-voyagers.

,

a

new solution to his distraught

In this situation the jungle, wilderness,

or trackless ocean may appear as mankind's moral irresponsibility, or the culmination of his wrong choices, or simply
the vastness of time

;

This dual use of the explorer- image is related to

Toynbee's insistence, as discussed in the next chapter,
that
the historian is at once an impartial observer and a
fellow

human being.

The problem of how to gain detachment from the

bias of one's own time and place, and yet not develop the

sterile intellectualism of detachment, must be numbered as
one of the basic issues in Toynbee's Study

.

Our immediate

concern, however, is to trace the use of this image in Toyn-

bee's work.

Appearance and Meaning of the Explorer Role
in A Study of History
Perhaps the most extraordinary feature of the

explorer role in Toynbee's Study is its infrequent appearance in the early volumes as compared with its repeated use
in the later volumes and essays of Toynbee.

One may argue that the image of the historian-

explorer is implied in the title of the book and in

a remark

made in the Preface to the First Edition (dated sixteenth of
May, 1933)

.

Toynbee calls his work A Study of History and

indicates in a rather modest note that this book "is an

attempt to expound and illustrate a system of ideas,

"
.

.

.

This introductory hesitation is soon set aside in the following four volumes as Toynbee applies his "well-trained empiri1 Arnold

London:

Joseph Toynbee, A Study of History (2nd ed.
Oxford University Press, 1948), I, Preface.
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cal method" to the task of demolishing other systems
of ideas

which are a priori, unscientific, or transcendental, and
in

developing his universal 'laws' which are non-transcendental,
empirical, scientific 2 and demonstrable by an empirical survey

3

There are two instances in Volume One where Toynbee

suggests that the historian works as an explorer.

In the

highly developed simile of the civilizations as mountain
climbers, a simile which appears to be a master pattern in

Toynbee

f

s

original view but is later quietly dropped in his

radical reorientation

,

he says

while we, for our part, may liken ourselves
to observers whose field of vision is limited to
the ledge and to the foot of the upper precipice
and have come upon the scene at the moment when
the different members of the party happen to be
in these respective postures and positions.
At
first sight we may be inclined to draw an absolute
distinction between the two groups acclaiming the
climbers as athletes and dismissing the recumbent
figures as paralytics; but on second thought we
shall find it more prudent to suspend judgment.
.

.

.

,

In the process of developing this simile Toynbee compares the

uncertainty of the explorer with the unknown thousands of
ledges which stretch out in the past darkness of the abyss

from which Life came, and to the finite or infinite number of
2

Ibid.

I,

426.

3

Ibid.

V,

359.

^Ibid.

I,

193.

"

ledges yet to come.

In spite of the fact that the heights

which tower above us are quite beyond our powers of
estimation, 5 and the fact that the other ledges are "outside
our

field of vision,"

Toynbee does not allow relativism to

replace his faith in the availability of an absolute stand-

point from which a rhythm or pattern is discernible.

To

support his argument, Toynbee notes that three other observers, General Smuts, Gerald Heard, and J. Murphy all testi-

fied that such a rhythm is "fundamental in the nature of the

Universe.

7

The second instance of the explorer- image in the

early volumes is found in Toynbee

1

s

discussion of the various

theories purporting to explain the genesis of civilizations.
The major hypotheses of environment and race are compared to

thickets which have hindered the historian's search.
We have now drawn the covert of Environment, and
we have had the same experience as when we drew
the covert of Race.
We have not found the
quarry which we are hunting, but we have fought
our way through the thicket and have come out on
°
the other side into open country again.
.
.

.

This instance could be written off as simply a stylistic

device except for the fact that Toynbee goes on to argue that
5
6
7
8

Ibid

.

Ibid

,

Ibid

,

196o

.

,

197

Ibid.

,

270.

0

this method of examining various hypotheses may
itself be

mistaken.

He refuses to allow the metaphor to be dismissed

as a stylistic device or to be interpreted solely
in terms

the scientist who examines and discards hypotheses.

A new way of knowledge is needed by the explorer
in order to get out of the riddle of conflicting
theories.
In making a final attempt to solve
the riddle that has been baffling us, let us
follow Plato's lead and try the alternative
course.
Let us shut our eyes, for the moment,
to the formulae of Science in order to open our
ears to the language of Mythology. 9
However, it is not until we reach the all-important

turning point in Volume Five that the explorer- image begins
to be used more freely.

In the preceeding volumes Toynbee

had worked out very carefully the "intelligible field of
historical study,"
In the preceeding investigation we have established the existence of societies which (unlike
their articulations called states) are independent entities in the sense that each of them
constitutes by itself an 'intelligible field of
historical study 1°
.

'

He had confidently set out to collect all the species of

these "social atoms."

History appeared to be

a

fairly

straight-forward pursuit once the parochial elements like

nationalism had been properly removed from the historian's
method and vision.
9

Ibid.

,

271.

10 Ibid.„ 51.

c
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In the light of these conclusions on matters
of
historical fact, we can draw certain other conclusions regarding History as a humane study.
Its true concern is with the lives of societies
in both their internal and external aspects. 11

Now however, in Volume Five

r

the whole attempt is

suspect because it appears as though "our approach to the

identification of our twenty-one representatives of this
species of societies was subjective as well as empirical." 12

Parochialism has corrupted the whole process, and the nation
state which was the historian's earlier unit of intelligi-

bility was not completely discarded, but was simply replaced
by civilizational myopia.
By enlarging our field of operations from the
nation to the civilization of which the nation
is a fragment, we have found it possible to
make a study of History in terms of civilizations and their careers—from genesis to
growth and from breakdown to disintegration.
But the 'relativity of historical thought'
has now caught us out in our turn, as we have
seen it catch out the historians who have
allowed their horizon to be determined by the
narrower frontiers of some single national
1
community or city-state
;

.

.

.

Although Toynbee hastens to assure the reader that this mistake was necessary because we could not start our study

except from within "the prison-house in which our modern
H

Western souls are incarcerated,"
1:L

Ibid

.

,

46.

12 Ibid

.

,

V,

1 3 ibid

.

14 Ibid.

373.

A

he well realizes the

58

implications of the new starting point.
This point about the study of 'higher religions'
is simple and self-evident; but— all the more
imperative on that account it compells us to
make a radical new departure; for it requires us
to relinquish the basis on which this Study has
so far been built up. 1 ^

—

Toynbee is at the half-way point in his projected
ten volume Study and the realization that 'history' may
be

something other than

a "true

concern with the lives of soci-

eties" now makes the remainder of the Study quite speculative

.

The best that we could do was to peer over the
battlements and extend our field of vision,
beyond the imprisoning walls, as far as the eye
could reach.
But we have come now to a parting
of the ways in this mental voyage of exploration.
In this crucial discussion about the change of standpoint,

Toynbee repeatedly calls upon the explorer- image to explain
the transition.

The "parochial standing-ground" 17 upon which

he has so far worked is compared to the "squat battlements of
a

national prison-fortress." 1

Then the metaphor is expanded

to include the "falling walls of Jericho"

(describing the

failure of contemporary historical method)

,

and the argument

that the historian should emulate St. Augustine by springing
15 Ibid
16

17
18

.

,

372.

Ibid

.

,

374.

Ibid

.

Ibid.„ 375.
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out "of the shattered prison-house of the City
of Man into
the infinite liberty of an inviolate and
inviolable City of
19
God."
in order to strengthen the contrast
between the old
parochial and the new oecumenical standpoint which he
wished
to adopt, Toynbee puts himself back in the position
of a

national historian, a position which he had long labored
to

discredit in Volume One.

Contrary to the boast of Volume One

that this Study was not to be limited by the nationalism that

had afflicted contemporary historians, and was to be a universal history, it now appears as though all this time Toynbee himself has been a nationalistic historian.

—

—

The mental or rather spiritual
feat that is
required of us is to burst the cramping bounds
of our English or French or German or American
social prison-house whichever of the nationalisms it may be that has been holding us hidebound and to re-occupy the place that belongs
to us in a greater kingdom which was Augustine's
by right of spiritual conquest and is still ours
today by privilege of cultural inheritance.
If
once we can escape from the parochial standpoint
of an American or German or French or English
member of a Western brood of nations. ... 0

—

—

The illusion under which the first four volumes was

written is now clearly revealed, for the single civilization
which "has worn the appearance of a fully intelligible field
of study," shrivels up, in its turn, into an unintelligible

fragment of some far larger whole. 21
19 Ibid .

20

Ibid

.

21 Ibid.

,

374.

,

375.

Now the place of obser-

vation is not a ledge upon which the climbers have
fallen,
but is the "mountain-heights of one of the higher
religions." 2 2

And it should be observed in this changed simile

that Toynbee is not merely shifting the actors in the mountain climb from civilizations to universal churches or higher

religions.

This new use of the simile borrows only the lan-

guage of the old master simile.

The higher religions are not

climbers but are the mountain-heights themselves.

The higher

religions provide the escape from the relativity of any parochial institution to the objective universal standpoint.
To round out the imagery of the historian as an

explorer, there is a corresponding epistemological shift as
the historian moves into the new territory and sees the past

and present with a wider vision.

The new standpoint does

more than merely add in a quantitative way to the territory

under surveillance; the mental voyage of exploration and the

mental feat of shifting standpoints involves a "spiritual"
feat.

This shift in the historian's epistemology is compared

to the adding of a new spiritual dimension to life, and is

surprisingly enough accomplished "almost without noticing

what we have been doing."

The culmination and summary of

this amazing tour-de- force in Toynbee 's spiritual voyage is

best conveyed in his own words
22

Ibid.

61

In. a mental voyage of discovery which takes its
departure from a church and not from some parochial political community, it is evident that
the 'intelligible field of study* will be of an
altogether higher order of magnitude than that
of the single civilization which has sufficed
us hitherto.
Possibly we shall find that our
new field also extends into a different spiritual dimension but this is a possibility which
we can now examine at our leisure; for, almost
without noticing what we have been doing, we

—

have chosen and taken our course. The Pillars
of Hercules are behind us, and the sea on which
we are sailing, is no longer the familiar landbound Mare Nostrum. 3

In Volume Six Toynbee introduces the imagery of the

historian as a sailor who plots a course. 24

On this occasion

the "course" is not identified with the historian's work as a

historian but refers to the action of the whole society in

which the historian functions.

Here again the limitations of

the historian because of his standpoint are clearly empha-

sized.

Every historian is on a particular ship.

He cannot

predict the present position nor future fortune of the ship
in any accurate and comprehensive way because he is limited

by the fact that he lives within her gunwales.

The relativ-

ity of time and place, implied in this metaphor, however,

cannot have the final triumph and Toynbee turns to the task
of explicating those patterns and rhythms which seem to be a

fundamental part of the nature of the universe.
23
24

Ibid

•

9

pp.

375-376.

Ibid

•

9

VI,

313.

may there not be some rough-and-ready means
by which even we, here and now, can reckon,
within a margin of error that will not be excessive for practical purposes, approximately where
we stand? And may not a clue have been put into
our hands by the acquaintance with the standard
run of the disintegration-rhythm that we have
Z5
gained.
.

.

.

.

.

.

Although the point will be discussed in another connection,
it is obvious in this passage that Toynbee hesitates ro

apply his empirically established conclusions to Western
Civilization.

Whenever it would appear that the rhythms of

disintegration are at work in Western Society, Toynbee avoids
the normal conclusion of his premise and analysis by advan-

cing the belief that an entirely new situation could develop
and Western Civilization might yet be granted a reprieve.
In Volume Seven Toynbee

!

s

inquiry turns from the

more prosaic comparative study of civilizations to the "necessary yet hazardously speculative quest" of investigating the

relation between churches and civilizations.

The explorer-

image is again appropriate because of the uncertainties

involved in the task.

Toynbee reminds himself that "error

lay in wait here to ensnare observers born into this genera-

tion."

27

There is not only the limitation of time that ham-

pers the historian at this point? there is the difficulty of
25 Ibid .

,

pp.

,

VII,

27 Ibid.,

507.

26

Ibid
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313-314.
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"reading the significance of the Churches'
28
past."

This, of

course, involves the historian in a judgment
of value and
allows him to make only an "inevitably
tentative judgment." 29
By looking for the "significance" of past
events, the historian must go beyond the limits of an empirical
approach, so

again Toynbee uses the explorer-image to describe
the historian's search for the spiritual dimension in history.
Both

Head and Heart must be persuaded to concur in this
reading of
the significance of the Churches' past.

At this point, Toyn-

bee no longer appeals to empirically verified conclusions but
seems to appeal to certain extra-rational considerations

which would make it possible for him to proceed to the last
part of the Study

.

If a generation born into the twentieth century
of the Christian Era might dare to look forward
to a day when Heart and Head would have been
reconciled by a unison of charity, insight, and
faith, they might also hope to persuade Heart
and Head to concur in a reading of the significance of the Churches' past; and if our findings
on that point were agreed, they would provide a
starting-point for entering on the last stage of
our inquiry into the relation between churches

and civilizations.

9

One other use of the explorer-image in Volume Seven
is of great importance in our attempt to understand Toynbee 's

28 Ibid.
29

506.

Ibid.

507.

Ibid.

506.
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in an annex discussion of the place
of the Bible in

Study_.

higher religions, Toynbee and Martin Wight
become involved in
one of their footnote battles.
Toynbee quotes and seems
to

assent to an argument by Edward Meyer to
the effect that the
contents of sacred books are a matter of complete
indifference to any fully developed religion and that
"any book in
the world may become a sacred book through
some freak of

chance." 31

Wight argues that this scepticism if adopted by

Toynbee would be inconsistent with other assertions about
the
value of revelation in Christianity.

Toynbee

•

s

retort is a

lengthy "so what if it is!" in which he again employs the

picture of the historian-wanderer.

This tension between Head

and Heart is a necessary part of the historian's quest, for
"the painfulness of a tension between unreconciled dictates

of Heart and Head gives Dipsychus no warrant for evading the

pain by opting exclusively for one or the other of these two

conflicting masters, so long as the price of thus cutting the
knot is the deliberate sacrifice of sincere convictions." 32

Toynbee

•

s

basic uncertainty is heavily underlined by an elab-

oration of the explorer metaphor.

The explorer-historian is

compared to Moses who consummated a lifetime of toil and
frustration with only
31
32

\

Ibid

.

Ibid.

„

a

glimpse of the Promised Land.

Annex, 754.

Here

Toynbee equates his own methodological dilemma with
the
spiritual dilemma of Western Man in the twentieth
century and
seems to suggest that his role as an historian is
inextricably tied up with the task of finding a way out of the
House
of Bondage for his contemporaries.

Volume Eight contains a sustained use of the explorerimage by Toynbee in which he tries to harness the role of the

explorer with the labor of the scientific historian.

This

section in the Study deals with encounters between contemporary civilizations, and their complicated relationships seem
to the historian to be a "formidably intricate maze of his-

tory." 33

Indeed the thicket is so dense because of the large

number of encounters to be surveyed that Toynbee searches for
some favorable point of entry.

He finds this point of entry

in the recent experience of Western Society,

for "this liter-

ally world-wide impact of the West may serve our turn as

'bulldozer

1

'

a

for forcing an entry into the historical jungle

of intertwined cultural entanglements which we have set our-

selves to explore,

.

.

,

"

34

With this bulldozer the tangled

terrain could then be broken up into manageable tracts, and a

general map of the landscape could then be constructed. 35
33 Ibid .
34

35

,

VIII, 106.

.

,

116.

Ibid.

,

114.

Ibid

So

at this point the mere fact of the vast
numbers of events

does not prohibit an empirically verifiable
survey being
made.

The element of uncertainty that does intrude
itself in

the process however, is the knowledge that this
"preliminary

survey of the facts" will be of less avail for our
purpose

when we move from arrangement of facts to the "ulterior
purpose of attempting to analyze first the plot of the play,
and
then the process of psychological action and reaction
in the

relations between the actors." 36

Here is then

need for an

a

explorer-historian who will go beyond the prosaic ascertainment of fact to the deeper questions of the meaning and significance of history.
There is another curious and complicated use of the

explorer-image by Toynbee in Volume Eight when he debates the
question of the "Relativity of the Units of Classification"
with Prince Obolensky.
Toynbee

•

s

The issue was not at all settled by

heroic first volume attempt to find

a

unit of study

which would not be subject to the relativisms of place and
national consciousness.

The criterion of intelligibility

seemed to resolve itself into the question of whether a unit
in history appeared to be independent and self-explanatory to

the mind of the historian observer, or dependent on a larger

whole.

Toynbee sayss

"In the preceeding investigation we

have established the existence of societies which
36 Ibid.

,

116.

.

.

.

are

independent entities in the sense that each of them
constitutes by itself an 'intelligible field of historical

study.'"

Not only did this attempt at classification
come in for sharp
criticism by contemporary critics like Sorokin, but
Toynbee

himself disclosed its weaknesses at crucial points in his
later volumes.

The question of the significance of one of

these "social atoms/

9

a

matter of utmost importance to Toyn-

bee, did not appear to have an answer unless the historian

could find

a

greater unit of classification to serve as a

criterion for these civilizations.
a

Thus the significance of

civilization was measured in terms of its contribution to

the advance of higher religions in history. 37

The appearance

and disappearance of the social atoms in past time did not

suggest pessimism to Toynbee, indeed, "the shuttle which
shoots backwards and forwards across the loom of Time in

a

perpetual to-and-fro is all this time bringing into existence
a

tapestry in which there is manifestly

an end'

a

a

progress towards

and not just an 'endless repetition' in the likeness

of the shuttle's own action."

38

Toynbee had also raised doubts about the usefulness
of these units of classification when in Volume Five these

civilizations which were so proudly 'intelligible fields of
study

fl

now shrivel up in their turn
37 Ibid
38

.

IX, pp s

Ibid., IV, 34.

410-411.

"

into an unintelligible

68

fragment of some far larger whole.

.

.

.

"

39

Hence, it is

not a complete surprise to find at the end
of Volume Eight an
annex devoted to the relativity of these units
of classification.

Prince Obolensky and

B.

H.

Sumner have challenged

Toynbee's division of Christendom into three separate civilizations:

Russian Orthodox Christian Civilization, the main

Orthodox Christian Civilization, and the Western Christian
Civilization.

The arguments as to the limits of these par-

ticular units are not our immediate concern but Toynbee's

response with the explorer- image is important.

The explorer

role is combined with the scientific role in this dual picture of the resourceful researcher exploring the "wonderland
of History."

The lesson appeared to be that all such classifications analyses, and dissections were keys which
were useful in so far as they served the practical
purpose of opening locks. Any one of them would
have proved to be a genuine key if it did effectively unlock a door; and some of these keys were
good for opening more doors than one; but there
did not seem to be any master key that rendered
all its fellow keys superfluous by unlocking all
doors alike; and therefore a resourceful researcher
who had been moved by his curiosity to explore the
wonderland of History would keep on adding to the
bunch of keys on his key ring. Whenever he ran
into a closed door barring the way to further progress in his intellectual quest, his first recourse
would be to try whether any of the keys already on
his ring would turn this next door's lock; but, if
none of them proved to fit, he would neither try to
force the door nor despair of succeeding in opening
it, but would set about casting a new key to fit a
t

39 Ibid.

,

V,

375.
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lock that had been proved by experiment
to be
one of a novel structure. 40
In this imagery the "key" refers to the
method of the his-

torian.

Toynbee seems to be arguing that history has

a

cer-

tain order and regularity to it (in this case
the historian's

problems are doors and not jungles) and that his
empirical
method has limited applicability. The novel or
uncertain

elements in the historian's task are accounted for by
the
reference to exploring "the wonderland of History" and the

possible need for "a new key."
Toynbee the explorer-historian is very much in evidence in the Volume Nine inquiry into the "Prospects of the

Western Civilization."

Again the "exploration" has bearing

on the problem of asking questions about a civilization which
is still alive and therefore not accessible to the usual

techniques of the historian.
Thus in A. D. 1950 an intellectual prospector
could enter on a mental exploration of the
Western Civilization's future with rather more
confidence than that he could have felt in
A.D. 1929?
and the writer's own distaste
for his present subject ought therefore to have
been appreciably diminished by the intervening
passage of two enlightening additional decades
of history if it had been merely a recoil from
the risk of a hazardous intellectual adventure.
.

.

.

^

But Toynbee goes on to argue that his uncertainty is not

caused by the unpredictable nature of history, but by the
\

4Q Ibid . VIII,
41

Ibid.

,

IX,

673.

pp.

409-410
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fact that his definition of what a historian
is might be

invalidated if he attempted to make predictions
about the
future of Western Civilization.
The historian-pilgrim had
been fleeing from the parochialism of his fellow
historians
for the two decades he had spent on this Study

.

The pilgrim-

age had taken him from the "naively vulgar native
Western

egocentric prejudice" 42 on a voyage of intellectual
revolt,

which was also a spiritual discipline/ 4 to the

place where he hoped to "catch and communicate even
of the truth." 45

glimpse

a

The pole star for steering the author on

this intellectual and spiritual journey was the axiom "that
all the representatives of any species of human society are

philosophically on

a

par with one another." 46

Toynbee is

convinced that his pilgrimage has been a success even though
the axiom was later proven to be false when these civiliza-

tions were discovered to be "unequal as a matter of historical fact on the evidence of an assay in which the touchstone

had been the part played by the breakdowns and disintegrations of civilizations in the history of Religion.
42

43
44

45
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We seem to have reached another one of
those places
in the Study where even Toynbee has a
difficult time in keep-

ing his value judgments from erupting through
the facade of
his empirically-established views of history.
The imagery of
the explorer seems to be used to convey the
impression that

Toynbee is

a

researcher who has been forced to make these

normative statements by the inescapable logic of his long
mental exploration.
In the brief but important tenth volume of the study

,

Toynbee attaches the explorer-image to the question of

methodology.
"catch-all*"

While this volume might be dismissed as a
for items which were irrelevant to the main body

of the text, the discussion of the "Inspiration of Historians" has a great deal of relevancy for this investigation

into methodological and procedural problems.

are of special interest to us.

Two sections

In the first reference Toyn-

bee carries out a distinction hinted at earlier in the Study

.

He divides the historian's task into two discrete functions

with corresponding methods of obtaining knowledge.

The task

of assembling the data belongs to the historian as social

scientist

„

and the task of ascertaining the meaning behind

the facts belongs to the explorer-mystic.

While the methods

of the scientist may be adequate for the gathering of the
data, the higher method of poetry is necessary because:

"the

meaning behind the facts of History towards which the poetry

72

\

in the facts is leading us is a revelation
of God and a hope
48
of communion with

Him."

At this point Toynbee sees his earlier intellectual

difficulties of correctly reading the vast complexity of
past
events as a spiritual infirmity of trying to read history
from a "disillusioning anthropocentric angle of vision." 49
One can say that the methodological problems of the youthful

Toynbee are only solved in this "quest for
Vision." 50

a

Beatific

This quest for an ever wider angle of vision has

left far behind the superfluous appearance and disappearance
of civilizations like the West which to Toynbee turned out to
be "a vain repetition of the heathen,"

voked the sharp attack by Toynbee

Western attitudes. 52

*

s

and in turn has pro-

critics on his anti-

in this connection one may recall

Geyl's charge of blasphemy 5 3 or Sorokin's criticism of Toynbee as the "undertaker of history." 54
48
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53 Pjeter Geyl, "Toynbee the Prophet," Journal of the
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The last use of the explorer- image in
the Study
appears in the "Acknowledgements and Thanks"
section of Volume Ten. 55

m

this passage he directs his thanks to
Plato

who taught him that he could go beyond the
limits of Reason
by using other faculties of the human
personality.
it might
correctly be interpreted as expressing thanks to
Plato for

showing him

a way

to escape the relativism with which his

contemporaries were afflicted, the blindness of an early
twentieth century Western Zeitgeist

.

Appearance and Meaning of the Explorer Role
in His Post- Study Writings
When we turn to the lectures and writing of Toynbee
since the completion of the major volumes of his Study

,

the

evidence points to a continued and more emphatic use of the

explorer-image
A Study of History was completed on June 15, 1951 (at
8:25 p.m. according to Toynbee

'

s

precise notation) but the

publishing of the last four volumes had to wait until October, 1954.

In that same month Toynbee wrote an article for

the Royal Institute of International Affairs to be published
in the journal International Affairs

.

The title of the arti-

cle was provocative and certainly relevant for he called it
"A Study of History, What

I

Am Trying to Do."

The leading

argument is in harmony with the explorer- image and seeks to
55 Ibid.

emphasize the modesty, and the tentative
nature of the conclusions of the massive study
.

...

we find ourselves moved, in our time,
to
take a new look at the new face of history'
as
a whole.
This is the origin of my book A Study
of History.
It is one person's impression of
history
the new light in which we can now
see it; and of course a number of other
people
have been tempted, by the same opportunity, to
take their look and form their impressions.
Each of these individual views will show the
new picture in a different perspective; and
since it has only lately become possible to
take this panoramic view of history, the first
attempts (of which mine is one) are sure to be
revised and corrected and superceded as time
goes on and as more people turn their minds to
this exciting intellectual enterprise 56

m

.

But despite this elaborate disclaimer, Toynbee notes that at
least one of his conclusions will "continue to hold good."
The conclusion is that the Late Modern Western view of his-

tory has been wrong.
a

57

it is wrong because it was founded on

Jewish-Christian-Muslim view in which history "had appeared

to be an act of God beginning at the Creation and destined to

end in the Last Judgment, while Israel {or Christendom or
Islam)

had been singled out as being the people chosen by God

for carrying out His purposes." 58

This view of history had

been appropriated by historians of the eighteenth century to
the present day with but two changes.

The successors of Bos-

56

Arnold J. Toynbee, "A Study of History: What
Trying to Do," International Affairs XXXI, pp. 1-2.
,

57 Ibid

.

58 Ibid.

,

p.

2.

I

Am

.

suet had eliminated God from the picture and
had transferred
the role of "Chosen People" to their own
particular West

European nation.

Toynbee argued that this view was now obso-

lete and a new view had to be introduced.

The old view, "the

beanstalk pattern of history/' must give place to
the new
view, "a tree pattern, in which the civilizations
rise, like
so many branches, side by side." 5 ^

This argument of clearing away an old view led Toyn-

bee to a discussion of the comparative treatment and
allowed

room for a review of the use in the Study of his "well-tried

empirical method."

It would seem that this comparative view

Toynbee has proposed is the new view needed for, "This com-

parative treatment can be extended to the whole of history;
and it is, in fact, the method of the human sciences." 60
Thus the new comparative treatment avoids the parochialism of
the "Chosen People" view and allows room for all civiliza-

tions to be examined.

Toynbee argued that "the human sci-

ences, like the natural sciences, make a comparative study of

their data in order to discover the structure of the facts
and the events." 61

At this point in the article the argument

developed in quite a deceptive, or at least very misleading
manner.

If one takes the paragraph at face value, Toynbee
~*^
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Ibid

.

Ibid.

61 Ibid.

,

p

e

3

76

has now committed himself to the comparative
method and he

uses the present tense to emphasize his faith
in it.
not as though he argued that:

"I

it is

once thought that the com-

parative treatment could be extended to the whole of
history;
and it was, in fact, the method of the human sciences."
My argument is that in this case Toynbee is trying
to

gloss over a basic shift in his methodology by talking as

though he is using the comparative treatment, which in fact
he had relinquished earlier.

The attempt to gloss over the

shift in viewpoint is located in the verbal footwork of the

passages in which Toynbee implies that he has used the com-

parative method successfully except in a few dark corners of

historical study where he has had to go

empiricism by means of imagination.

a

little beyond

For example, this is the

implication of the succeeding passage when he says that, "One
of my aims in A Study of History has been to try out the

scientific approach to human affairs and to test how far it
will carry us

.

62

It would seem that Toynbee cannot argue both of these

positions at the same time.

On the one hand he argues that

the "tree pattern" or the comparative method is the way to

escape from the weaknesses of the old beanstalk pattern and
that this pattern "is suggested by" the fact that in this age

^

.

77

our Western civilization has collided with
all the other
surviving civilizations all over the face of
the planet. 63
On the other hand he argues:
My own belief is that there are some things
in
human affairs that have no pattern because they
are not subject to scientific laws.
One such
thing, I believe, is an encounter between two
or more human beings.
I believe that the outcome of such an encounter would not be predictable, even if we had a complete knowledge of
all the antecedent facts.
I also think that
the poetry and the prophetic vision that well
up out of the subconscious depths of the human
soul are not amenable to law.
I think, in
fact, that here we are in the presence of genuine acts of creation, in which something new is
brought into existence, and this leads us back
°*
towards the Biblical view of history.
.

.

.

If an encounter between two or more human beings has no pat-

tern the question arises, "why should an encounter between

civilizations have a pattern and be subject to
approach to human affairs"?

a

scientific

Toynbee ruled out the validity

of this distinction by his original definition of a society
to the effect that,

"the Macrocosm [the Society]

is appre-

hended and acted upon by the Microcosm? and the action which
is the theme of human history is the action of individual

human beings on that common ground of their respective fields
of action which we call a society?"

With a trace of cynicism one might note that the
63 Ibid.
°4

Ibid.

,

p.

4

65 Toynbee, A Study of History VI, 230
,

78

argument now comes round full circle from the
old "beanstalkapproach of the Jewish-Christian-Muslim pattern
of history
through the tree pattern and its comparative
method of study
and back to the beanstalk approach with a few
modifications.
Or can some other interpretation be given to his
concluding

remark that "this leads us back towards the Biblical
view of

history which was accepted in the West from the fourth century till the end of the seventeenth." 66

In its simplest

form the methodological situation could be expressed in the

question:

"Can Toynbee reconcile the beanstalk pattern of

history with the tree pattern"?

It would seem that Toynbee

clearly adopted the beanstalk approach when he discarded the
"axiom that all representatives of any species of human society are philosophically on a par with one another" 67 for the

counter-position that the "value of the civilizations known
to have existed up to date had been found to be unequal as a

matter of historical fact on the evidence of an assay in

which the touchstone had been the part played by the breakdown and disintegrations of civilizations in the history of
Religion." 68

W-aw

Gftpor^W

It would be unfair to the whole argument not to
66 Toynbee,

Do," p.

"A Study of History:

What

I

4.
67

Toynbee, A Study of History , IX, 410.

68 Ibid.

Am Trying to

.

acknowledge the change Toynbee makes in the
Jewish-Christian
Muslim beanstalk pattern. He tries to
preserve his original
pose as the neutral observer by stressing
that the religious
position he has now adopted is not the narrow-minded
Jewish-

Christian-Muslim standpoint but the broad-minded "Indian
standpoint."

He seeks to equate the "Indian standpoint"

epistemologically with the comparative method of the early
volumes of the Study by arguing that the Indian religions
.

"allow for the possibility that there may be alternative

approaches to the mystery of Existence." 69
If this is the implication in the last paragraph of

Toynbee

's

explanation of "What

course a specious argument.

I

Am Trying to Do," it is of

The touchstone of the value of

the civilizations is still "higher religions," and the

change is simply from the Jewish-Christian-Muslim beanstalk
to the Jewish-Christian-Muslim-Indian beanstalk.
In a published lecture given at the University of

Minnesota on November

6,

1955, Toynbee proposed to deal with

very live issues for today's historians.
entitled:

The lecture was

"The New Opportunity for Historians." 70

After

introductory remarks about the distorting influence of time
upon any student of the past, he comes to the crux of the
69 Ibid.
70

Arnold J, Toynbee, "The New Opportunity for Histori
ans," Printed by the University of Minnesota, (1956)

discussion when he argues that:

"This new possibility of

studying human life as a unity ought to enable
us to embark
on mental voyages of discovery that have
hardly been practicable in the past." 71 To indicate that this
use of an old and
familiar figure of speech is not accidental, the
two sentences following this quotation speak about "one
of our first

enterprises" as acts of exploring and discovering.

Toynbee

seems to be thinking of himself as an explorer in two
senses
in this curious essay.

He is an explorer first in terms of

methodology of history and then as

a

healer of the nations.

As is customary he distinguishes himself from the more pedes-

trian historians of the present when he declares that:

"For

the first time in history, we now have a chance of seeing two

things.

tions

.

We can now begin to see the history of the civiliza.

.

as a whole,

instead of being limited, as our pre-

decessors were, to a partial vision of bits and patches of
it.

1,72

These historians who are interested only in the

"academic exercise of disinterring apparently long-since dead
and buried national histories

but are actually dangerous.

73

..."

are not only obsolete

After a passing reference to

the guilt of historians whose act of disinterring national
71^
72

73

Ibid

.

Ibid

.

,

p.

Ibid., p.

12

14.

5

histories "was one of the major causes of the
eventual breakup of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy," 74 Toynbee
poses the

rhetorical question:

What are these particularist-minded nineteenthcentury historians' grandchildren going to do
for us in our generation? Are they going to
drop on us intellectual bombs that will blow up
the whole world, as the Hapsburg Monarchy was
blown up by the academic activities of some of
their grandf athers? 7 ^
If then Toynbee is not willing to be numbered among

those historians who formerly were just obsolete and paro-

chial but have become dangerous to the future of Mankind, he

must break out a new path for historians.

The "new history"

is "to see all aspects of human life as so many facets of a

unitary human nature, instead of having, like our predecessors, to approach the study of Man departmentally

,

by break-

ing it up artificially into a number of separate 'disciplines':

history, sociology, economics, psychology, theology

and the rest." 76

This declaration seems to be an open

acknowledgment by Toynbee that he is in favor of
change in the classical discipline of history.

a

major

It represents

the culmination of a dissatisfaction which was revealed in
the early writings of Toynbee, and which was expressed in his

view of himself as the explorer-historian.
74 Ibid.
7

Ibid.

,

p.

15.

76 Ibid.

,

p.

12.

Although we have not yet treated systematically
the
sources of Toynbee

's

dissatisfaction, we have pointed out

that the general area of uneasiness centered around
the prob

lem of the standpoint of the historian.

In this particular

essay he argues that the new methodology he employs is
"four

dimensional

.

When the parties to the encounter are not individuals but are societies, this four dimensional
picture has to be provided by the historians;
and at this critical moment in history, much may
depend on the pictures that the historians are
going to draw for us .
and on the prospects
for the future that they are going to open out
before our eyes. 77
.

,

The "fourth dimensional" view is also called a "spiritual

dimension" in the essay and involves us in the nagging seman>
tical problem of Toynbee.
We noticed earlier 78 that the "mental voyage of

exploration" was frequently described as
indeed as a flight beyond reason.
tical indecision remains.

a

spiritual quest,

In this essay the seman-

Even though the exploration is

described as an intellectual pursuit, it involves faculties
of the soul, and must depend upon both poetry and religious

inspiration.

79

The second sense in which Toynbee functions as the
77 Ibid

78

.

,

p.

14.
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s

83

explorer-historian is in the relationship and
obligation he
bears to his own society. The historian has
the possibility
open to him of spinning "mental webs that
will weave
the

tribes of Man together into a single worldwide
80
family."

On

the other hand, the historian's work may
"heighten our inher-

ited sense of being mutual strangers.

.

.

.

»

81
,

a

situation

so dangerous as to be compared with the dropping
of an intel-

lectual bomb "that will blow up the whole world." 82

One

might conclude that Toynbee had finally capitulated to the
relativism of "every man his own historian."

Is it true that

one should "write up" the past in terms of its good or bad

influence on one's contemporaries?

Even though Toynbee

'

overpowering desire for the vision of one world makes this
capitulation a strong temptation, he does attempt to limit
the relativism of the historian's judgments to the area of

emphasis.

In this mental web that the historian spins in

order to bind man together, the facts are not to be tampered

with in order to construct the web but the historian has a
personal choice of emphasizing one or another trend in the
past.

The historians can emphasize past divergences
and can present these as precious heritages
80

82
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which ought to be preserved, even at the price
of heavy sacrifices; or, alternatively, they
can emphasize present convergences and can
commend these to us as valuable innovations
which ought to be fostered and promoted, even
at the cost of considerable risks. 8 3
•

One can sympathize with Toynbee'

s

hope that the general

effects of historians' work will ultimately be beneficial to

international understanding, but the distinction between
"facts" and "emphasis" does not appear to be a clarifying or
a

fruitful one to make.

In summary, a reader of this essay

might well conclude that if he follows Toynbee in his exploration of a new historical methodology, he will likewise
become a great benefactor to mankind as one of mankind's

explorers in the universal search for unity.
In a more recent discourse on the problems of histor-

ical methodology Toynbee discusses "The Limitations of His0
torical Knowledge." 84

It may be that the horde of "captious

critics" has evoked this kind of response from the author of
the Study , or may simply be the continuation of his previous

attempts to overcome the problems of relativism.

The format

of the article makes it clear that the explorer role of the

historian is of key significance for it is the culminating
picture in the discussion.
83
84
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Arnold J. Toynbee, "The Limitations of Historical
Knowledge
London Times Literary Supplement #2810,
January 6, 1956, p. 37"

various limitations of the contemporary
historian.

One by

one he identifies the items; the development
of better tech-

niques which have opened up vast new fields
of research, the
expansion of the historian's vision to include
unlimited
social and non-political areas of experience,
and the overwhelming wealth of new material from the archives
of govern-

ment and business.

These difficulties might have a solution,

Toynbee argues, if the historian could use team work
as

devised by the natural scientists, or the computing machines
in order to "read the secrets of human minds and hearts." 85
If the historian tries to understand an historical

event without being able to understand the thoughts and
feelings of the participants, he is divorcing it from its

historical context and hence making it unintelligible.

But

to comprehend the thoughts of the participants is virtually

impossible for:
a

"If the thoughts and feelings that occur in

single soul in a single moment could be recorded in full,

the record might surpass, in quantity, all the documentation

that has been manufactured since civilization began." 86

Eventually the historian is face to face with infinity
because "below that circumscribed documentary surface there
opens up an unfathomable psychic abyss." 87
85 Ibid
86

87

Ibid
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Into this situa-

86

tion where the historian's ignorance is
incurable because it
is infinite, Toynbee reintroduces the
explorer-historian.

What is the moral that we historians should
draw?
It is, I think, that we should feel humble
and at
the same time be bold.
We should feel humble in
face of the revelation of the radical imperfection of our intellectual powers.
We should be
bold in continuing, nevertheless, to ask the perennial questions that historians are always trying
to answer for the benefit of their fellow-men.
There is always a need for all of them, for all of
them are necessary operations in mankind's neverending task of trying to take its bearings in a
mysterious universe.
In full consciousness of the
infinity of our ignorance, we must have the audacity to go on questioning. 88
.

Even though the explorer-image has on occasion been made to

suggest that the explorer is somehow reaching universally

valid conclusions, in this case, "empirically justified conclusions" are seriously disavowed.

According to Toynbee,

"The kind of question on which each historian concentrates
in his own work will be determined by his personal tempera-

ment and cast of mind." 89
This modesty in the face of an "incurable ignorance"
is difficult to reconcile with the assured tone of Volume One

where Toynbee seemed to know the correct questions to ask.
Our method in this study is empirical; ...
In
our survey of societies, we have spent some time
and trouble in rounding up twenty-one representatives of the species? and now that we are going
to put our mustangs through their paces, are we
Ibid

.

Ibid.

87

to disqualify nearly half the stud
before we
have seen how they run? We prefer to let
them
alone and go ahead. yu

Nor can this statement that the "kind of
question on which
each historian concentrates in his own work
will
be deter-

\

mined by his personal temperament and cast of mind,"
be
brought into harmony with Toynbee's insistence in
Volume Five
that the questions he was asking were genuine and
universal.

These questions did not depend on the temperament of
the

historian but were somehow present in the nature of the historical experience.
At that point we found ourselves contrained to
pause in order to consider whether we were setting ourselves a genuine problem. ...
in
this previous case we found that our impulse to
dismiss a problem summarily on the strength of
an abstract argument a priori was checked as
soon as we took our customary precaution of
exploring the ground empirically by an immediate discovery of concrete evidence which
showed, in the mere fact of its palpable existence, that our problem was not an empty formality after all.
The problem of the growths
of civilizations was found to be raised in
practical terms by the enigmatic but substantial presence, in the historical landscape, of
five arrested civilizations,
.
.

—

—

.

While one can trace in this essay on the "Limitations
of Historical Knowledge" the arguments that Toynbee has used
to convince himself of the hopelessness of the scientist-

historian's task, it is interesting to note that there is a
90
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suggestion that an objective historical view might
yet be
obtained.

Even though the questions asked by individual
his-

torians reflect the subjective temperament of those
historians, Toynbee seems to suggest that in the totality
of the

questions asked by the historians of different temperaments,
there might emerge an objective view.

After stating that the

specific questions are subjective, he adds the argument that:
It is fortunate that people's characters and

intellectual interests vary, for this insures
that historical questions of all the various
kinds will continue to be asked.
There is
always a need for all of them, for all of them
are necessary operations in mankind's neverending task of trying to take its bearings in
a mysterious universe. 2
In following the imagery used by Toynbee to describe

himself as an explorer and traveler, we have
to consult.

Religion

93
.

a

final source

It is his book, An Historian's Approach to

Up to this point, we have tried to follow as

closely as possible the chronological order of Toynbee 's

writings in order to watch the comparative importance of the

explorer role in Toynbee

1

s

thinking.

the chronological development.

This source complicates

The frontispiece (Title page)

indicates that the book was "based on Gifford Lectures deliv-

ered in the University of Edinburgh in the years 19 52 and
1953."

The preface indicates that these lectures in turn
92 Toynbee,
93

"What

I

Am Trying to Do,"

p.

4.

Arnold J. Toynbee, An Historian's Approach to
Religion (London: Oxford University Press, 1956)

89

were based on some of the material covered in
A Study of His tory.

According to the footnotes attached to the chapters
of
the book, chapters three, four, five, six, seven,
eight, and

nine are based on the more detailed work in A Study
of His tory.

This information raises a question as to the formula-

tion of the views in chapter one, which is the chapter per-

tinent to our present inquiry.

Its composition falls some-

where between the Gifford Lectures of 1952-1953 and the completion of Toynbee's manuscript for the book An Historian's

Approach to Religion which he has dated as December 1955.
The argument of chapter one has a studied inconclu-

siveness about it that probably reflects Toynbee's continued

perplexity as to the historian's role and method.

The trav-

eler or pilgrim image is asserted at the two pivotal points
of his discussion on "The Historian's Point of View."

In the

first stage of the argument Toynbee deals with man's place in
the universe which he describes as follows:

every living creature is striving to make
himself into a centre of the Universe, and, in
the act, is entering into rivalry with every
other living creature, with the Universe itself,
and with the Power that creates and sustains the
Universe and that is the Reality underlying the
fleeting phenomena. ^4
.

.

.

The self-centeredness that is a necessary penalty of being

born in space and time is in Toynbee's view also a moral
94 Ibid.

,

p.

4.

5

90

error.

"every living creature finds itself in
a lifelong quandary." 95
So,

This dilemma of every living creature
is not made the
basis for a profound pessimism by Toynbee
for he hopes to

escape that conclusion by attaching the dilemma
to the traveler motif.
Even though we are in this life-long quandary
there may be hope in the deliverance of time.

notice parenthetically that Toynbee'

quotation is

T.

S.

s

choice of

Eliot's enigmatic phrase:

time time is conquered."

One might
a

title-page

"Only through

But to return to the use of the

motif of a traveler, Toynbee declares?
A living creature can keep itself alive only in
so far, and for so long, as it can contrive to
steer clear both of suicide through self-renunciation and of euthanasia through self-renunciation.
The middle path is as narrow as a razor's
edge, and the traveller has to keep his balance
under the perpetual high tension of two pulls
towards £wo abysses between which he has to pick
his way.
The pilgrimage of mankind in this simile is described as "Man
in Process of Civilization."

This phrase is not new in the

Toynbee corpus and was, in fact, the commonly used phrase in
the early volumes of the Study

.

But its appearance in his

post- Study book on religion is surprising.

To examine the

reasons for the shift in phraseology about mankind's pilgrimage would at this stage be premature and would also tend to
9

Ibid.

96 Ibid.

,

p.

5

91

sidetrack the primary investigation of this
chapter, but it
is relevant to take notice of the shifts
in the pilgrimage
simile.
The initial volumes of A Study of History
had many
references to "Man in Process of Civilization"
and the major
similes were those of the climbers on the side
of the mountain,'9 7 and the motor-cars on a one-way street. 98

As long as

Toynbee was convinced that civilizations were an
intelligible
unit of study, and that a higher religion was the chrysalis
out of which new civilizations could be born, the description
of "Man in Process of Civilization" was adequate.

Up to this

point the process of civilization was significant and had a
legitimate goal.
Yet the shuttle which shoots backwards and forwards across the loom of Time in a perpetual toand-fro is all this time bringing into existence
a tapestry in which there is manifestly »a progress towards an end' and not just an 'endless
repetition' in the likeness of the shuttle's own
action.
This we know from our empirical study
of the outcome of Yin-and-Yang and Challengeand-Response and Withdrawal-and-Return in the
histories of civilizations."
Once "civilizations" become no longer intelligible as

fields of study, the use of the term "Man in Process of Civilization" loses its right to be a descriptive term for Man-

kind's pilgrimage.
97

98

At first Toynbee concludes that any fur-
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ther pursuit of civilization is merely vain
repetition.
If civilizations were the handmaids of
Religion
and if the Hellenic Civilization had served
as a
good handmaid to Christianity by bringing this
higher religion to birth before that civilization
had finally fallen to pieces, then the civilizations of the third generation would appear to be
•vain repetitions of the heathen. 100
1

Once Toynbee turned to this standpoint, "civilizations"
as a
goal of man's pilgrimage soon became not only superfluous
but
a tragedy.

It would be a supreme tragedy, on the face of it,
if a fully-fledged higher religion were to compromise its own future for the sake of bringing a
civilization of the third generation to birth,
because it would be sacrificing itself to secure

the reproduction of a secular institution which
was not only intrinsically inferior to its religious chrysalis but was now also superfluous.

So the argument moves from the discovery that any civiliza-

tions beyond the second are meaningless repetitions, to the

position that these civilizations are actually destructive of
the real goal of history.

If "Man in Process of Civiliza-

tion" continues in this search in preference to what Toynbee

might call "Man in search of religion," then he is involved,
in Toynbee s own words,
'

in a "second Fall."

Both the need and the opportunity for the epiphany of the higher religions had sprung from the
failures of Fallen Man's mundane civilizations
of the first and second generations, and Man's
subsequent abandonment of his allegiance to a
100

Ibid.

VII,

101 Ibid.

447.

445.

saving higher religion in order to go a whoring
after a mundane civilization of the third generation wore the aspect of a second Fall. 102

Toynbee concludes the argument with an attempt
to

distinguish between civilization as

a goal of

grimage and the Commonwealth of God.

mankind's pil-

He sees a "great gulf

fixed between 'the open society' of the Commonwealth of God

and 'the closed society' that is exemplified not only in

primitive societies but in civilizations,

.

.

is a serious distinction in Toynbee s system,
'

.

"

103

if thi s

then it is dif-

ficult to understand why he reverts in his latest volume on
An Historian's Approach to Religion to the descriptive phrase

"Man in Process of Civilization."
In summarizing the first stage of the argument in An

Historian's Approach to Religion we have seen the importance
of the explorer-image to Toynbee

's

whole scheme of History,

for mankind is caught in a cosmic quandary and his only hope

of escape is to live and move as a pilgrim in the constant

tension of two pulls towards two abysses.

The second stage

of the argument is the identification of the historian as a

pilgrim through this constant tension of all mankind.

The

historian is the leader in this attempt to break out of an
inherited self-centeredness because "the historian arrives at
his professional point of view by consciously and deliber1Q2
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103 Ibid., 510.
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ately trying to shift his angle of vision
away from the initial self-centered standpoint that is
natural to him as a
living creature." 104
The constant tension which the historian
shares with
the rest of mankind is expressed in the
statement that while

the historian's goal is unobtainable, yet he
can make some
gain.

The self-correction through self- transcendence
which is the essence of his profession, no
doubt always falls short of its objective? yet,
even so, it is something to the good; for to
some extent it does succeed in shifting the
mental standpoint, and widening the mental
horizon, of an innately self-centered living
creature 105
.

When we translate this conclusion into the language
of the earlier discussion, we can say that Toynbee's faith,

that he has discovered the rhythm of history which was some-

how in the very nature of reality, has been badly upset by
the evidence that the "shimmer of relativity" is not merely
in the foreground.

This shimmer of relativity, after more

than twenty years of study, has now become an inescapable

"human plight."

When a human being looks at the Universe, his
view of the mystery cannot be more than a
glimpse, and even this may be delusive. The
human observer has to take his bearings from
the point in Space and moment in Time at which
Toynbee, An Historian's Approach to Religion
105 ibid.

,

p.

4.

he finds himself; and he is bound to
be selfcentred; for this is part of the price of
being
a living creature.
So his view will inevitably
be partial and sub jective 106
.

Consequently Toynbee

'

s

faith has been narrowed to the

modest hope that "by comparing notes and putting
individual
and professional experiences together, the
Collective Human

Intellect can widen Man's view

a little,

for the benefit of

each and all. " 107
There is a strong similarity between this argument

and the one used by Toynbee a year later in the article on
"The Limitations of Historical Knowledge."

As noted in an

analysis of the explorer-image in that essay, Toynbee greatly

strengthens and elaborates the arguments for relativism and

subjectivism in historical studies in this ignorance which
is "incurable because it is infinite." 108

But he reserved,

at the conclusion of the essay, the right to hope that

because there are all types of people that "this ensures that

historical questions of all the various kinds will continue
to be asked.

There is need for all of them, for all of them

are necessary operations in mankind's never-ending task of

trying to take its bearings in a mysterious universe." 10 ^
106 Ibid.
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p.
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Ibid.

One other statement of his methodological
dilemma

ought to be noted in this survey of the
explorer role in
Toynbee.
It is found in the closing arguments of the
chapter
on "The Historian's Point of View."

The explorer-historian

must choose between two alternative ways.

These alternatives

are views of history corresponding to the two abysses
which

confront mankind.

The one view is the Buddhaic-Hellenic

approach to history which "assures that the apparent rhythm
of the stellar cosmos is the fundamental rhythm of the Uni-

verse as a whole." 110

History "provides

a

To choose the astronomical view of

radical correction of the bias toward

self-centeredness that is innate in every living creature."
This would seem to be the answer to Toynbee

1

s

life-long

search to become "an impartial Western observer." 111

It was

expressed in the conviction of his early volumes that "all
civilizations are philosophically equal" and the historian's
task was to look for patterns or rhythms in the histories of

these social atoms.

When the crisis was reached in this

search for the patterns of disintegrating civilization, Toynbee introduced the touchstone of religion by which the his-

torian could evaluate the progress or regression of
zation. 112

This turning point in Toynbee would appear to

110 Toynbee, An Historian's Approach
to Religion
111
112

civili-

a

Toynbee, A Study of History
Ibid., IX, 410,

,

VIII, 259.

,

p.

10
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allow personal values to enter into the historian's
task but
Toynbee hoped to outwit the charge of subjectivism
by arguing
that he was open to any religious revelations
which did not
claim to be exclusive. He thought this could be done
by

adopting the "Indian standpoint" which allowed "for the
possibility that there may be alternate approaches to the
mystery of Existence." 113
It is obvious that this argument of the "Indian

standpoint" cannot be seriously advanced by Toynbee to convince the reader that he is still proceeding on an empirical
basis.

Although there is a superficial similarity between

the position of "philosophic equality" adopted in the first

four volumes and the opening of the mind to the possibility

of truth in several religions, Toynbee is really saying in
the second case that he will be open-minded to any religion

which holds his values of the unity of mankind in the fellowship of God, and which denies any divisive or exclusive
claims.

But whether it be the Buddhaic Hinduism, Mahayana or

the Himayana it has assumed certain values for life and for

history past. 11

'*

If this description is a correct descrip-

tion of what went on in the massive A Study of History

,

then

the following statement by Toynbee must be considered as a

summary of the conclusions he reached at the end of the Study
\

113
114

Toynbee, "What

I

Am Trying to Do,",

Toynbee, A Study of History

,

IV,

p.

224.

4.

.

.
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This astronomical view of History provides a
radical correction of the bias towards selfcentredness at the price of taking the significance out of History— and, indeed, out
of the Universe itself. 115

The other choice which the historian could make
was
to adopt the Judaeo-Zorastrian view of history.

argues:

"...

As he

on this view the fundamental rhythm of the

Universe as a whole is assumed to be identical with the rhythm in the career of an individual human being.

assumed to be
is

a

It is

drama that has a beginning and an end, that

punctuated by crises and by decisive events, that is ani-

mated by challenges and responses, and that unfolds a plot
like the plot of a play." 116

This view of history promises

to give significance to past events and thus the societies

which have held this view have rated the study of history at
a high value.

But the Judaeo-Zorastrian view offers us an

"escape from one evil at the price of involving us in

another." 11 ^

The abyss which opens up for the historian who

adopts this view is to relapse into self-centeredness

Although two secondary views of history are proposed,
discussed, or dismissed by Toynbee, he leaves the methodological dilemma unresolved and reiterates the theme of the
115 Toynbee, "What

116 Ibid

.

il^ibid.

,

p.

13.

I

Am Trying to Do,"

p.

10.

.
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explorer-historian who must find a way between the
two
temptations

Confronted with a choice between these two
alternatives, we may find ourselves shrinking
from choosing either of them when we have
observed the sinister side of each. Yet these
are the two fundamental alternative views that
have been accessible to human souls so far;
and today a majority of Mankind holds either
one of these two views or the other.
The dilemma presented by the choice between them will
haunt us throughout our inquiry. "8
Summary of the Usages of the Explorer Role
in the Changing Methodology of Toynbee
To summarize, let us recall our initial purpose of

tracing the self-awareness of Toynbee in his historical works
as he describes himself in the role of the explorer-historian.

The use of this imagery in the early volumes was infrequent

and highly tentative.

Toynbee thought of himself as an

explorer in the sense that he was breaking out of obsolete
historical methods which were inadequate, a priori, and subjective.

As an explorer-historian who now possessed "intel-

ligible fields of study" the old parochial and nationalistic

limitations could be broken.

The "shimmer of relativity"

could be pierced by the empirical method to enable the historian to grasp those rhythms or patterns of history which

were in the nature of things.

But as we traced the explorer-

image we found Toynbee using it much more frequently and
Ibid.

,

pp.

13-14.
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significantly as the arguments for relativity appeared
to
grow stronger in Toynbee's thinking.
As the axiom for philosophic equality of civiliza-

tions is reluctantly surrendered for the criterion of
religion, the explorer-historian now must employ a four-dimen-

sional view of history and the work of the historian becomes
a

highly speculative quest.

The historian must go beyond the

task of the social scientist who assembles the data, to the

task of searching for the meaning behind the facts.

To

ascertain "meaning" involves poetry which comes from the
heart rather than the head of the historian.

The difficul-

ties of the explorer-historian are increased by the dangerous results that may follow from the historian's published
study.

So the explorer-historian ought to emphasize those

things which will bind men together with a mental web.

Finally, the explorer-image becomes dominant in the

most recent of Toynbee's essays as he is confronted with the

haunting dilemma of choosing between the two views, both of
which offer an escape from one evil at the price of involving
him in another.

The problems of relativism from which the

early Toynbee was confident he could escape are now discovered to be part of the existential or ontological situation-it is an incurable, infinite ignorance.

the price of being a living creature.

It is now part of

This is not to say

that the later Toynbee is pessimistic about this methodologi-

101

cal dilemma.

He seems to have the hope that even though
the

historian is a prisoner of time and space, somehow the
"collective Human Intellect" will find a universal view
of the

past and present.

Or, as it might be expressed,

if all of

the historians continue to ask all of the questions
which in

themselves are determined by personal temperament and cast of
mind, the totality of the subjective questions might produce
an objective answer to mankind's task of taking his bearings
in a mysterious universe.

In the light of Toynbee's first volume observation

that he was pitting an English empiricism against Spengler's

German transcendentalism, 119 it is interesting to notice the

transition in Toynbee as he pushes his methodological problem
back to a problem of Head and Heart in the historian and

finally back to a dilemma which resides in the nature of the
universe.

His hope rests now in some form of "self-tran-

scendence."

In its simplest form the "egocentric illusion"

of Toynbee's fellow historians in Volume One, which he so

strongly repudiated, has come back to haunt Toynbee himself
who now declares that the historian is "bound to be selfcentred; for this is part of the price of being a living

creature." 120
119 Toynbee, A Study of History

,

III, 382.

120 Toynbee, An Historian's Approach to Religion

,

p.

3

CHAPTER

IV

TOYNBEE THE SOCIAL SCIENTIST
"In the light of the political laws which we
have analyzed above, we can see objectively
that this ['dwarfing' ... of Europe] is the
natural and indeed the inevitable result.

..."

Arnold

J.

Toynbee in Volume Three (1934)

Use of the Term "Social Scientist"
as a Self-Characterization

Our attempt to understand the historical methodology
of Arnold Toynbee through the metaphors and descriptive

phrases by which he clarifies his own role, leads us to a
second image

— that

of the "social scientist."

In the first

image of "Toynbee the explorer/' we followed the passages in

which he saw himself as a traveler in new methodological territory, and in which he emphasized the uncertainty and limit-

lessness of the data handled by an explorer-historian.

In

this new phrase we move to a discussion of Toynbee 's specific

objections to traditional historical methodology and to the

new methodology which he proposes under the title of

a

"sci-

ence of human affairs."
Even a casual glance at Toynbee

's

major work is suf-

ficient to recognize the duel carried on in the text and

footnotes between Toynbee and a variety of historians past
and present.

This duel, initiated by Toynbee, has been
102

103

enthusiastically continued and intensified by
the historians
who have been able to respond, as well as by
several regiments who were not at first so engaged.
Some of the major engagements were with H.

Oswald Spengler,

2

R.

G.

Collingwood,

Edward Gibbon, 5 and Mart i n Wight.

6

3

H.

A.

L.

G.

Wells, 1

Fisher, 4

But these conflicts are

hardly comparable with the skirmishes in which
Toynbee challenges whole armies of historians.
The parochial historians,

national historians, neo-pagans, Late Modern Western rationalists, antinomian historians, pedestrian historians, modern

liberals, and humanists are one and all the object of attack
in the course of the Study

Indeed, the struggle does not

.

always continue in an unemotional atmosphere, for on several

occasions Toynbee turns on his critics with such thrusts as
"a chorus of derisive voices assails our ears" 7 and "an

arrogantly hypercritical school of latter-day "Western historians" 8 and "these notoriously captious critics."
1
2
3
4

5
6

7
8

Toynbee, A Study of History
Ibid.
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IV, pp.

Ibid.

,

VIII,
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After the completion of the ten major volumes,
the
controversy tended to increase rather than decrease.
Few

figures in the academic world have aroused
controversy in so
many and so varied quarters as he. Toynbee found
responses

not only in the historical but also the philosophic,
sociological, religious, anthropological, scientific and
popular

journals as well, to say nothing of the many public debates

occasioned by his publications.
There is some evidence that Toynbee was surprised at
the vehemence of the response to his challenge, but he philo-

sophically accepts it in his post- Study reflections by

regarding the response as the necessary consequence of his
radical methodological innovations.
the first attempts (of which mine is one)
are sure to be revised and corrected and superseded as time goes on and as more people turn
their minds to this exciting intellectual enter.

.

.

prise
There is though, one negative observation
that will, 1 believe, continue to hold good. As
soon as one looks at the new panorama of history,
one sees that it bursts the bounds of the current
framework within which our Western historians
have been doing their work for the last 250 years.
.

,

The question of vital importance iss

how does Toyn-

bee in the role of a student of the "science of human

affairs" propose to "burst the bounds of the current frame-

work" of Western historians of the last two hundred and fifty
9

Toynbee, "What

I

Am Trying to Do," p.

2.

"

.

105

years?

Even a casual reader of the Study is likely to
be

impressed with the scientific apparatus, tone and proof
that
is offered in these volumes.

first impression of Toynbee
a

•

Our task will be to verify this
s

work, find out what he means by

"science of human affairs/' and then observe him in action

with this "sovereign methodological clue."
Recognition of Toynbee' s "Scientific" Claims
by the Critics
Not only is the role of the "social scientist" so

prominent that the casual reader is greatly impressed, but
the critical reviews and essays on Toynbee

'

s

work deal fre-

quently and at length with some aspects of this role.

For

example, Pieter Geyl has made a persistent attack on the

"pretense" of empirical investigation in the Study

.

Repeatedly he returns to a methodological criticism which he
believes is fundamental to any consideration of Toynbee

!

s

effort.

Geyl speaks of "the pretense of a scientific argu-

ment,

or "the pretense of an empirical investigation,

that Toynbee "has pretended to investigate the phenomena of

communal life." 12

Geyl

charge of hypocrisy.

'

s

criticism comes close to being a

On one occasion he says that "Toynbee

10

Pieter Geyl, Debates With Historians (London:
B. T. Batsford, 1955)
p. 158.
,

''''"Ibid.

,

p.

159

's
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refreshingly frank confession now implies agreement
with that
view [Geyl's argument that the Study cannot
supply us with
forecasts having universal validity].
I say
'implies' for in

spite of his refreshing frankness he does not
go so far as to
admit that his work is not really the scientific
investigation for which he has all along tried, and is in the
face of
his change of front still trying, to pass it off." 13

Another critic of the Study hinges his discussion on
Toynbee's claim to have developed a scientific view of civilizations.

Like Geyl his criticism is that Toynbee's claim

to scientific objectivity is not substantiated in the text.

In concluding his analysis he observes that:

Perhaps the lasting significance of Toynbee's
study will be found in the stimulus it may
provide, whether as science or fiction, for a
creative response to our present challenge.
Nevertheless, for want of recognizable modern
miracle workers, the average human must work
out his destiny with the best equipment at
hand.
It will not help him in meeting the
present challenge if he guides his response by
generalizations based on confusion, in the mistaken belief that they have been objectively
and scientifically established. 1 ^
The same question of the validity of Toynbee's scien-

tific method becomes the focal point of the criticism in the

Times Literary Supplement of October 22, 1954, when the
13 Ibid .

,

p.

165.

14

John William Blyth, "Toynbee and the Categories of
Interpretation," The Philosophical Review LVIII (July, 1949),
,

370.

.
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critic observes, "Such a diversity of
explanations might not
be unsuitable to a disconnected series
of impressionistic
essays, where they could be valued for their
suggestiveness
rather than their validity. But in a work
that purports to
be systematic, comprehensive and empirical
the effect on the
reader can only be one of bewilderment." 15

The same anony-

mous critic observes that "when we attempt to evaluate
Dr.

Toynbee's central thesis and to test its empirical validity,
we find that we have set ourselves an impossible task." 16
If these excerpts from the critics are sufficient to

indicate that this is a major issue in the study of Arnold

Toynbee's methodology, it is important to give close attention to Toynbee's claims to write history in a scientific

fashion

Definition of "Scientific" History
Any study of Toynbee's methodology is faced with the

problem of gaining a precise definition of the terms he uses.
One must not move too rapidly from the appearance of the word

"scientific" to the conclusion that the meaning of the term
is self-evident.

The first and perhaps most innocuous use of

the term "scientific" is to link it with an attitude or
15 Montagu,
x6

Ibid.

,

p.

Toynbee and History
105.

,

p.

104

8
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spirit.
a

Certainly Toynbee would wish to qualify himself as

scientific scholar in this general sense of the word.

For

example he states in Volume One that "our attitude should be
not fanatical but scientific, and our method not dogmatic but

empirical."

17

Again late in the Study he uses the word

"scientific" in the same modest way to describe his spirit or

approach to history.

Replying to the objection of his anti-

nomian colleagues that the empirical method is unsuccessful
because the data is insufficient, Toynbee says of himself,
"an importunately scientific-minded student of history might

have found himself constrained to admit that an unconditional

surrender was the only honest response to an agnostic-minded

historian's challenge if this had been delivered
four hundred years earlier." 1

.

.

.

some

It would seem that although

Toynbee might agree with historians such as Herbert Butterfield who emphasize the value and importance of the scientific attitude, 19 he himself would apply the term scientific
to a particular method for the historian.

As can be noticed from the Volume One excerpt above,

Toynbee links together the terms scientific and empirical.
On several occasions he speaks of "science's empirical method
17 Toynbee, A Study of History
,
18 Ibid

.

,

I,

246.

IX, 213.

19 Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations
Collins, 1952), p. 157.
(London:
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of inquiry by a process of trial and
error." 20

The multi-

volume Study abounds with references to
his favorite method.
At first it is simply "our empirical
method" 21 but in the

process of the study it becomes "our well-tried
empirical
method." 22 The regularity of its appearance 23
is certainly
part of the explanation why Professor Geyl
reacts with such
obvious emotion to the "pretense of an empirical
investigation."
We have not yet reached a clear understanding
of

Toynbee

scientific method simply by noticing its close

"s

relationship with "empirical."

To define "empirical" or

"scientific" as objective observation in opposition to subjective a priori is certainly implicit in Toynbee

hardly exhaustive.

•

s

view but

There are passages in the Study in which

Toynbee seems to define a scientific historical method much
as it has been described in standard texts such as Langlois

and Seignobos.
Thus the domain of history was greatly enlarged,
and scientific, that is, single and objective,
exposition began to compete with the rhetorical
or sententious, patriotic or philosophical ideals
20 m

Toynbee, A Study of History

21
22

23

Ibid

.

,

JI|

Ibid

.

,

101.

,

VII,

489.

18.

See IV, 126; V, 1; VI, 261; VII, 2; VIII, 2; IX, 440
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of antiquity. 24

Toynbee occasionally uses the term empirical in the
sense of merely "observing."

For example, he asks his

readers in Volume One to content ourselves, "with observing,

empirically, the phenomena of Challenge-and-Response in each

particular instance, without postulating uniformity or

expecting to discover

a

scientific law." 25

On another occasion he attacks Collingwood

*

s

views of

the Renaissance by turning to empirically-minded historians

like J. B. Bury.

In this case the word "empirical" is used

in the sense of "factual" as opposed to dogmatic or a priori

historical thinking.

Toynbee says he agrees with the view

of Spengler rather than the view of Collingwood but that,
"this will not be because we have taken the hierophant's

oracular dicta on faith; it will be because we have been convinced by the reasoning of soberly empirical-minded historians who have not disdained to argue their case by appealing
to the relevant facts."

26

There are other cases in which Toynbee uses the word
"empirical" in the sense of observing facts or events.
24

Ch.

V.

Seignobos, Introduction to
trans, by G. G. Berry (New York:
Henry

iianglois and Ch.

the Study of History ,
Holt & Co.
1898) , p. 300.
,

25 Toynbee, A Study of History
I,
,
26

Ibid.

For

IX,

67.

302.

Ill

example he seems to divide the historian's method
into the
"findings" and the "interpretation" of the findings,
and in
this case the term "empirical" is attached to
the first step.
On another occasion he says, "In any case, however
cautiously

and conservatively we may feel it wise to interpret
the findings of the empirical survey that we have just been
attempt-

ing to make,

"
.

.

.

27

One final illustration of this use of the word scien-

tific or empirical may be sufficient.

Occasionally Toynbee

uses the term empirical as the antithesis of dogmatic or
a priori

see.

when he answers his critics by saying, "Wait and

Our method in this study is empirical; and there is no

particular reason at this point for proceeding
But Toynbee

s

s

a priori." 28

definition of "our well-tried empirical

method" goes far beyond these occasional references to a

scientific spirit or a method of observation, and it is only
on this deeper level of definition that one can understand
his whole polemic against traditional historiography.

significant sections of the Study contain Toynbee
about the use of a scientific method.

*

s

Two

arguments

In Volume One and Vol-

ume Nine he combines and explains the role of explorer and

social scientist*

The explorer-historian discards tradi-

tional historical methodologies and the social scientist
27 Ibid

,

V,

8.

28 Ibid.,

I,

146.

.
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supplies a new and more effective law-making
technique for
the modern historian.
In the Volume One discussion he characterizes
the

contemporary historiography which he is discarding
as the
popular view, 2 9 and as the antinomianism of modern
historians. 30

Toynbee describes it as a nineteenth and twentieth

century view which grew out of eighteenth century philosophy.
for the subsequent evolution of the film
of a Late Modern Western Weltanschauung brought
on to the screen the spectacle of nineteenth and
twentieth century Western historians still clinging, in the name of Science, to the eighteenthcentury philosophers' tenet that History does not
make sense, Ji
.

.

.

In a further description of traditional historiography, he

labels it as "Late Modern and post-Modern

,

"

and applies it to

the "predominant" school of modern historians.

General statements, such as this and those that
follow, about the tenets, views and attitudes
of Late Modern and post-Modern Western historians
are, of course, merely descriptions of what, as
the present writer saw it, was the predominant
school of thought among them? and therefore these
statements, even if they were found to be correct
in the main, would never be more than approximately accurate in the sense of being all embracing.

2

Despite Toynbee
29

Ibid.

,

441.

30 Ibid.

,

IX,

,

183.

31

Ibid

.

32 Ibid.

!

173.

s

modest claim to be describing only

"

113

the "predominant" school of modern historians,
he manages to
\

include a high percentage of historians among the
traditionalists.

It would seem from his hypothetical case, a few

pages after the above disclaimer in Volume Nine, that
most
of the professional or academic histories are to be numbered

among his opponents.
It might be added that, in all Western universities
mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era, officially established chairs of Logic/
Psychology, Anthropology, Political Economy, and
Sociology were to be seen 'parked' side by side
with no less officially established chairs of History, without any apparent recognition of the academically awkward fact that, if the intellectual
creeds of either the professors of History on the
one side or the professors of the Sciences of human
affairs on the other side were to be taken at all
seriously by the academic authorities, a decent
regard for intellectual integrity would constrain
them to rase from the parquet of their aula either
one or the other of these two rows of professorial

cathedrae 33
.

This frequent mention of the sharp antithesis between his

work and modern Western histories in general is most noticeable in Volumes One and Nine.

In the Volume One discussion

of the very grave effects of the environment on modern his-

torians, Toynbee sharpens the distinction when he says "This

thesis of 'the Unity of Civilization' in this sense is a mis-

conception into which our modern Western historians have been
led by the influence of their social environment on their

thought.
33 Ibid.

,

189.
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Also in Volume One Toynbee relates the story
of

a

"meeting of the Board of Studies in History of
a prominent
and cosmopolitan Western University."

He stresses the promi-

nence of the University on the one hand and the
parochialism
of the subjects offered and accepted for research
on the

other.

The meeting was suddenly lifted from an insignifi-

cant to a symbolic incident for Toynbee when the
Secretary
read out a proposal to investigate the social and political

conditions of India in the age of the Guptas.
This train of thought, which went through my mind
in a flash, was cut short by a titter which ran
round the Board.
'May we ask the Secretary to
read that name again?', said a member on my left;
and, at the repetition of the word 'Guptas', the
titter turned to loud laughter.
I found that I
was laughing too at the laughter of my colleagues-and, glancing round the room, I caught the eye of
an Orientalist, sitting opposite.
Silently we signalled to each other that we were enjoying a private
joke of our own. 34

—

The "private joke" between Toynbee and the Orientalist served
to emphasize Toynbee

?

s

sense of opposition to the traditional

and academic view of the majority of contemporary historians

who have been subject to the "egocentric illusion."
Added identification of traditional historiography
comes from a comparison of passages in Volumes One and Ten.
On this occasion the descriptive term is "encyclopaedism" or
"the pedestrian historian."

The mistake of the Modern West-

ern historian is to apply the analogy of a post-industrial

,

Western factory to the task of historical research.

He works

then by "piecing together scraps of information,
produced by
a

division of intellectual labor, in an intellectual assembly

plant

..." 3 5

The great illustration of this contemporary

historiography is, of course, the Cambridge History series,
a symbol

to Toynbee of the "industrialization of historical

thought." 36
A final characterization of the representatives of

contemporary historiography is that of "parochial" or
"nationalist historians."

Again the mistake of traditional

historiography is the result of environmental influences.
The Modern Western historian shares the egocentric illusion
of his time, for "In the Western World of our day, almost

every Englishman, Frenchman, Czechoslovak, and Lithuanian is

influenced in his political feelings, thoughts, and actions
by the irrational assumption that his own national state is
a more precious institution than his neighbor's."

37

An interesting corollary of this argument that the

Modern Western historian has been led astray by dominant
tendencies of our time

,

is the hopeful note sounded in the

first volume that because the tendencies of our times are
again changing "we may expect to witness in the near future
35 Ibid.
3

^Ibid.

37

Ibid.

,

X,

28.

I,

5.

160.

116
a

change in the outlook and activities of Western
histori-

ans."
a

38

The change that he professes to see is a
change from

dividing nationalism to a unifying ecumenicalism.

A critic

looking for regularities in the Study might put
this opti-

mistic prediction alongside a whole list of the author's

once-mentioned predictions.

Certainly this initial optimism

that Toynbee expresses—the opening of a new era by
means of

his exploratory methodological journey--has been dissipated
by the time he writes the ninth volume and sourly describes
"the majority of his fellow historians as an arrogantly

hypercritical school of latter-day Western historians." 39
Toynbee identifies specific representatives among the parochial, national, pedestrian, encyclopedic and antinomian his-

torians.

To him traditional historiography in its encyclo-

pedic and manufactured aspect is represented by Ranke
sen, 40 and Lord Acton. 41

38 Ibid.

9

14.

Ibid.

9

IX,

Ibid.

9

1/

Ibid.

9

46.

42 Ibid.

9

11.

39

40
41

Momm-

In its nationalistic aspect it is

represented by Monsieur Camille 42 and
among many others.

,

H.

W.

V.

Temperley 43

In its antinomian aspect, traditional

19.
4

»

historiography has two great spokesmen,
R.

G.

H.

A.

L.

Fisher 44 and

Collingwood. 45
There appear to be three reasons for the peculiar

characteristics of the predominant school of modern Western
historians.

First Toynbee offers a psychological explanation

In the case of the parochial historian, Toynbee says
that his

Western misconception has psychological roots which are
deeper than the temporary influence of a particular social
environment.

He argues that "at bottom, the misconception is

founded on an egocentric illusion which is always and every-

where ingrained in human minds."

While this statement may

sound like the conclusions of a convinced relativist, in context it is greatly modified.

What Toynbee apparently means

in Volume One is that everyone has an ingrained tendency

toward an egocentric illusion.
bee

1

s

This interpretation of Toyn-

statement is justifiable on the basis of the contextual

argument in which he himself says that "we have learnt to
overcome this illusion in our Study of the stellar universe."

4 f>

His argument continues, "We have taught ourselves

to discount the false appearances arising from our accidental

point of observation"; and a little later, "Again, in our
personal relations with other human beings, we have learnt,
44 Ibid

.

,

V,

45 Ibid

.

,

199.

46

414;

Ibid., I, 160.

IX,

195.
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if not to overcome the illusion, at least to be on
our guard

against it."
In Volume One

(1927)

Toynbee is rather confident that

the egocentric illusion can be dispelled by exposing its

ridiculous assumptions, and by showing how the fallacy first
developed.

Toynbee devotes several pages to ridicule, intro-

ducing his samples by saying, "The best cure for such insanity is ridicule, and we can apply it by observing how exqui-

sitely ridiculous our 'Anglo-Saxon' attitude looks when it is
struck by other people."' 47

But he rests his strongest hope

that this egocentric illusion can be conquered on

toriography.

a

new his-

It can be said that his primary motivation for

the lengthy study is his conviction that the "shimmer of

relativity in the foreground" of all traditional historical
thinking can be dispelled by

a

more rigorous application of

the scientific method.

Toynbee'

s

second explanation for the views held by

contemporary historians is that these men have unwittingly
absorbed strong elements of nationalism and parochialism from
the two dominant institutions of the Western world

Industrial System of Economy and Democracy.

4

ft

°

— the

But this argu-

ment that contemporary historiography takes its impress from
two dominant institutions of the modern western world is
47 Ibid.

,

161.

48 Ibid.

,

16.

.
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double-edged, and hence is difficult to reconcile with the
third explanation of Toynbee as he develops it in Volume

Nine

•

Here one must realize Toynbee is dealing with the

philosophical roots of traditional historiography.

He is

trying to account especially for the antinomian aspect of it.
The explanation begins with a discussion of the inadequacies
of eighteenth- century philosophy

Late Modern Western minds that had risen in
rebellion against the alleged arbitrariness of
God now found Man usurping a prerogative that
the Deity was deemed to have forfeited; for, if
this was Reason's hour, it was also the power
of Darkness
Even these ingeniously rational
minds had not the wit to make the sovereignty
of Nature affective in every nook and corner of
a Universe throughout which they had now abrogated the sovereignty of God; and one of these
newly created residual Alsatias which eighteenthcentury Western philosophers ruefully found themselves compelled to abandon to the anarchy of
Chaos and Ancient Night was the field of human
history* . . •
.

-

Toynbee argues that an inadequate ontology in the eighteenth

century led to a defective epistemology

,

and this in turn

made it virtually impossible to do anything with the study of

history other than to dismiss it as unintelligible chaos.
but the Late Modern Western philosophers
had now swept off the altar of Destiny a living
cloth woven on a divine pattern; and, in hastily
setting themselves to cover a shockingly denuded
surface with their own blue-print of 'the laws
they were disconcerted to find this
of nature*
.

.

.

,

49 Ibid.

,
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paper substitute could not be stretched, however
mercilessly they might rack the scientific imagination, to extend over the particular field of
events that concerned Man more than any other in
virtue of its being in the field in which Man's
own life was at stake. 50

After completing this discussion of the philosophical

background of the eighteenth century, Toynbee describes the

nineteenth and twentieth-century Western historians as men,
"still clinging, in the name of Science, to the eighteenth-

century philosophers' tenet that History does not make
sense." 51

This third explanation, so difficult as we noted

above to reconcile with the earlier explanations of Volume
One,

turns on the assertion that the quaintness of the tra-

ditional Western historians "lay[s] in their apparently

weather-proof imperviousness to the influence of a number of
radical nineteenth-century and twentieth-century changes in
the climate of thought in their own Western intellectual

milieu." 52
The two explanations thus pivot on rather contradicIn the Volume One explanation traditional his-

tory charges.

toriography is at fault because it mirrors the general conditions and tendencies of the modern West, the Industrial
System, and Democracy.
50 Ibid

.

51

Ibid.

52

Ibid.

,
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,
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a supremacy according to Toynbee "at the close
of the age
preceding our own/' 53 which is designated in the footnotes
as

the two decades between 1860 and 1880.

Thus, the "industri-

alization of historical thought" 54 and the "spirit of

Nationality" have combined to make the historian the "slave
of his clay," 55

It should be understood in this "explana-

tion" of Volume One that the "industrialization of historical

thought" is equated with the application of "modern Western

scientific thought" to

a

study of human activities.

The same method, however, has latterly been
applied in many realms of thought beyond the
bounds of Physical Science to thought which
is concerned with Life and not with Inanimate
Nature, and even to thought which is concerned
with human activities.
Historical thought is
among these foreign realms in which the prestige of the Industrial System has asserted
itself; and here in a mental domain which has
had a far longer history than our Western Society and which is concerned not with things but
with people there is no assurance that the
modern Western Industrial System is the best
regime under which to live and to labor. 5 °

—

—

—

In brief this application of the "scientific method of

thought" to historical thinking is best demonstrated by the

work of historians, who, patterning themselves after Mommsen
and Ranke, "have given their best energies to the "assem53 Ibid.

54

pp.

Ibid.

I,

55 T ,,
Ibid.

7.

56 Ibid.

3.

.
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blage' of raw materials

like— in 'corpora'

— inscriptions,

documents, and the

es and periodicals; and, when they
have

attempted to 'work' these materials 'up' into
'manufactured'
or 'semi-manufactured' articles, they have
had recourse, once
again, to the Division of Labour and have
produced synthetic

histories like the several series of volumes now in
course of
publication by the Cambridge University Press." 57
A further explanation of what it was to employ the

"scientific method of thought" to historical thinking is

indicated by Toynbee's description of the seminar or 'laboratories'

in which the major task is the "discovery or verifi-

cation of some fact or facts not previously established." 58

Toynbee's cure for traditional historiography as
given in his opening volume is to discard somehow the impress
of nineteenth and twentieth-century tendencies on historical

thinking.

Hence Toynbee's argument "has been leading us up

to the point of calling in question the analogy between his-

torical thought and industrial production altogether." 5 ^
This faulty analogy has been most dangerous in the area of
method, so Toynbee declares
In the world of action , we know that it is disastrous to treat animals or human beings as

though they were sticks and stones.
57 Ibid

.

,

4.

,

7.

58 Ibid .
59
D

*Ibid.

Why should

"

123

we suppose this treatment to be
any less mistaken in the world of ideas? Why
should we
suppose that the scientific method
of thought—
a method which has been devised
for thinking
about Inanimate Nature— should be
applicable to
historical thought, which is a study of
living
creatures and indeed of human beings?
When a
professor of history calls his 'seminar'
a
laboratory', is he not wilfully expatriating
himself from his natural environment? 6 0

Toynbee's objection is further specified in
his argument that, "No practical man, however, would
think of conducting a nursery garden on the principles of
a factory or

a

factory on the principles of a nursery garden;
and, in the

world of ideas, the corresponding misapplications
of method
ought to be avoided by scholars." 61 Another term for
this

misapplication of the scientific method to historical thought
is one suggested to Toynbee by Bergson,

"the mechanism of our

intellect.

All of this activity of the traditional historian

laboring under the misapplication of methods to his field is,
however, to entitle the historian in his own eyes to the hon-

orable banner of "scientific historian."

Indeed it is this

very drive to earn the title which opens the door for the

nationalistic spirit.
To grapple with 'Universal History' on industrial
principles is so evidently beyond the compass
even of the most gifted and the most vigorous
individual that, for a scientific historian, the
50 Ibid.

61 Ibid.

,

8

2
3
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admission that unity could not be found in anything short of 'Universal History' would be
tantamount to removing unity of vision altogether.
if, however, he could seize upon
a unit of historical thought which was
of more
manageable proportions
and such a solution appeared to be offered by the Principle of
F
Nationality. 62
.

.

.

.

.

.

The explanation of Volume Nine rests on another

charge against traditional historiography.

If in Volume One

traditional historiography is at fault because it mirrors too

closely a nineteenth and twentieth-century social environment, in Volume Nine traditional historiography is at fault

because of its "apparently weather-proof imperviousness to
the influences of a number of radical nineteenth-century and

twentieth-century changes in the climate of thought in their
own Western intellectual milieu.
In fact the charge is not merely that historians are

"impervious" to the radical changes going on around them, but
that they do not even observe these changes.

The revised

version of the plight of modern historiography is stated in
this fashion:

From this antique base, between the opening of
the nineteenth century of the Christian Era and
the middle of the twentieth, Western conquista dores [Late Modern Western Scientists! whose warcry was the vindication of Nature's legitimate
rights had already reclaimed and annexed at
least four further polders from the Modern
6
6

Ibid.

,

10.

Ibid.

,

IX, pp.

183-184.

125

Western no-man's-land of human affairs without
being challenged, or perhaps even observed, by
contemporary Western listeners. 64
If the two analyses or explanations for the
short-

comings of traditional historiography are based on
the alternate charges of "too much influence/' from the present,
and
"too little change" from an antiquated past, is the situation
the same in the remedies Toynbee proposes in Volumes One and

Nine?
In Volume One Toynbee protests against the misap-

plication of the scientific method of thought to the world of
ideas.

In Volume Nine the remedy for the ills of modern his-

toriography is quite different.

Here Toynbee asks the his-

torian to follow the lead of anthropology.

If anthropology

had been so successful then "a scientific method of ascer-

taining laws of human affairs that had justified itself

empirically by proving to be valid in this field of ex-primitive culture would also be, to say the least, a promising

line of scientific attack upon the study of societies of the

species, known as civilizations.

„

.

.

^

Unlike the Volume One situation in which Toynbee

expressed the confidence that the dominant note of our new
age

— the

sense of being part of some larger universe, would

bring about a change in the activities and outlook of the
64 Ibid .
65

Ibid.

,

185.

,

186.
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Western historians, by Volume Nine these historians
appear to
be beyond help.

Mid-way through the twentieth-century of the
Christian Era, most Western historians seemed
still to be contriving to turn as blind an eye
to the social scientists' successive trespasses
on the historians' pointedly placarded preserve
as a Neville Chamberlain had turned in A. D.
1938 to the Third Reich's successive aggressions
in the Western World's political arena.
In an
era of appeasement the historians were allowing
the economists to rob the Antinomian World of an
Austria, and the sociologists to rob it of a
Czechoslovakia, from under the Antinomians' eyes,
without betraying, by even the flicker of an eyelid, any consciousness of these impudent depradations that were being committed at the historians'
expense 66
,

So Toynbee concludes that the typical antinomian latter-day

Western historian is a relic of an old-fashioned- looking

eighteenth-century Western intellectual environment, who
ought either to "retire from the field or else change
sides

If he were to change sides he would begin by

.

"

entertaining the contemporary Western scientists' hypothesis
that "there are

9

laws of Nature* governing the history of Man

in Process of Civilization,"

68

The way of remedy is for

individuals not to hug technological chains but to follow the
example of the social scientists
66 Ibid .

,

193.

67 Ibid

.

,

201.

.

,

202.

69 Ibid.

,

209.

68

Ibid

.
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traditional historiography for the real battle
has already
been fought and won.
The culminating and crucial passage in
the argument of Toynbee as to the remedy is
the last para-

graph of the section in which he attacks the
dominant school
of modern Western historians.

Thereafter, in the present writer's view, the
intellectual battle on this field had been won
for Science by the intervention of the archaeologists in the long-since-combatant orientalists' support.
As he saw it, the archaeologists
had played here the decisive part that the Prussians had once played on a military battlefield
on which their British allies had been bearing
the heat and burden of the day.
At Waterloo an
Anglo-Prussian conjunction of military forces
had proved irresistible, and the united intellectual forces of the orientalists and the
archaeologists had similarly put the historians
to rout.
Under a twentieth-century spectator's
eyes, these picturesque antinomian warriors had
gone down to as ignominous a defeat at the hands
of the disciplined champions of Science as their
prototypes the Egyptian Mamluks had suffered on
the 21st July, 1798, in the Battle of the Pyramids, when they had been mowed down by the welltimed fire of Napoleon's efficiently manoeuvring
Janissaries.
The impression made on the writer
by the spectacle of this decisive intellectual
battle was the experience that had moved him to
attempt a study of History; and his answer to the
challenge of the agnostics is presented, not
solely in the present passage, but throughout the
present work. 7u
We have deliberately sharpened the contradictory

aspects of the two explanations of traditional historiography
as found in Volumes One and Nine in order to clarify one of

the methodological ambiguities of the Study
70 Ibid.

,

216.

.
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tion appears to have two parts.

It involves a contradictory

historical explanation and a contradictory remedy
for the
dilemma of traditional historiography. The
first contradiction may be partially resolved by seeing Toynbee
s analysis
as an explanation on two levels; one a
psychological and the

other a philosophical explanation.

The second contradiction

concerning the remedy for traditional historiography, a contradiction which revolves around Toynbee

"

s

"scientific" pro-

posals, is in our view largely a semantical difficulty which

can be obviated by a more careful analysis.
One may notice that the two explanations for the

errors of traditional historiography are reducible to the

charges that

(a)

traditional historiography mirrored, or bor-

rowed, the scientific ways of the dominant institutions of
the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries? and

(b)

that

traditional historiography has been impervious to the influence of a number of radical nineteenth-century and twentieth-

century changes since accepting in the eighteenth century

a

false distinction between the "natural" and the "accidental"

events in life.

The contradiction may be reduced in part by

observing that "a" is in the nature of a psychological
account of traditional historiography while "b" is an explanation in terms of the philosophical roots of traditional
historiography.

But some contradictory aspects remain when

the matter is posed as a question,

"If historical studies do
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reflect their social environment,

(which was the axiom for

explanation "a") why then are the traditional
historians of
explanation "b" so obdurate, blind and impervious
to the

influence of the radical changes of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries?" While it seems impossible to
adjust the
two accounts in order to harmonize them, it may be
possible
to offer an explanation of their presence.

The first account

depends upon a derived motif which appears only in Volume
One, and is there employed twice.

It does not find a full

flowering in the Study and gives place to the major motif of
Toynbee'

s

Study

— the

application of scientific method to the

history of civilizations.
The two occasions on which Toynbee expresses opposi-

tion to the scientific tradition and a rejection of the

scientific method have been quoted in an earlier chapter.

In

both cases he relies on insights from Bergson in striking out
at the application to historical thought of the "scientific

method of thought

—a

method which has been devised for think-

ing about Inanimate Nature.

..."

On the first occasion he

observes that we have picked up this fallacy from an industrial environment, and warns himself against falling victim
to it.

ume One.

This warning was part of the initial chapter of VolOn the second occasion, late in Volume One, Toynbee

revives his warning and then asks the question, "Have we not
been guilty of applying to historical thought, which is a
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study of living creatures, a scientific method
of thought

which has been devised for thinking about Inanimate
Nature?"
It seems apparent that Toynbee does not
intend to

develop a full scale antithesis between science and
history.
He opposes the scientific method if it means
dissection,

mechanicalness, and fragmentary treatment in place of the
romanticists' emphasis upon synthesis, life, and unity of
vision.

Casting around in the immediate environment for an

explanation of its origin he finds it in the contemporary
industrial environment.

Later on he quietly drops the theory

of environmental influence on traditional historiography in

favor of the philosophic explanation.
The second part of the contradiction between the Volume One and Volume Nine explanation of traditional histori-

ography is considerably reduced when one realizes that the
term "scientific" is defined in several ways in the Study

.

Toynbee objects to the scientific method as employed by traditional historians because they wish to limit it to "the
idea of ascertaining the facts of Nature" while he sees a

proper scientific method as capable of inferring the laws of
Nature from an unprejudiced, accurate, and exhaustive study
of the facts.

Hence the bandying about of the term "scien-

tific" on opposing views of the remedy should not mislead one
into supposing that an ultimate contradiction exists, when a

further analysis of the definitions of "scientific" can

.
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resolve the difficulty.
The New Methodology Based on the Role
of the Social Scientist
It is possible to see what Toynbee's new methodology

will be by following his direct assertions on the role
of the
social scientist, and by observing his use of metaphors which

describe the functions of the historian-social scientist.
The annex of Volume One contains a crucial discussion of the

new science of history that Toynbee is seeking to implement
and exemplify in the Study

The lengthy argument, drawn

.

largely from Teggart as will be subsequently noted, is

directed against the "popular view" that historians are
objective and scientific because they deal only with the
facts as they are

Our survey has perhaps sufficiently disproved
the accuracy of the popular equations between
the employment of certain literary techniques
and the study of certain phenomena of human
lif e
Each of the three techniques the ascertainment and record of 'facts
the elucidation
and formulation of laws
and the creation of
'fiction
is employed on occasion in each of
the three studies
in the study of social life
in civilizations which is popularly called
'history
in the study of social life in primitive societies which is the province of
anthropology, and in the study of personal
relations in the branch of literature which
This
comprises plays novels and biographies
shows that there can be nothing in the intrinsic nature either of the studies or of the
techniques to equate any one study with any one
technique a priori.

—

.

1

,

?

'

1

,

—

:

1

,

,

9

H
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Using this scale of three stages, Toynbee argues that
anthro-

pology has now left the fact-gathering stage for the second,
that of "law-making,"

Now six or seven hundred instances of a phenomenon, while far from necessitating the employment of the technique known as 'fiction', are
just enough to enable students to make a beginning in the elucidation and formulation of
general laws; and this is, as we have seen, the
stage which the infant science of anthropology
has reached today. 2
The question then arises, has "history" moved out of the

fact-gathering to the law-making stage?

To this question

Toynbee answers:
We have discerned that this smallness of the
quantity of the integral 'data' that are to
be found in this field up to date will account
for the fact
that in the study of civilization hitherto the technique of fact-finding
has been predominantly
employed. 7 ^
.

.

.

.

The future in Toynbee

.

'

.

s

eyes is fairly promising, for

to the question "In the study of institutional relations in

civilizations, where the known number of integral facts of
the highest order has not yet risen above the modest figure
of twenty-one, can we seriously hope to apply the comparative

method without having to stultify our efforts by eliminating
all certainty from our results?", Toynbee answers, "Wait and
see.

At our own peril, we intend to hazard the attempt. "^^
72 Ibid.

455.

73 Ibid.

458.

74 Ibid.

459.
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In thus bringing together the role of explorer and

the role of the social scientist, Toynbee manages to give
a

note of tentativeness to his methodology, but it is a tenta-

tiveness based not on a feeling of doubt about the validity
of the scientific method but on the question of whether or

not the study of civilizations is quite ready for the law-

making technique/

The proof of this assertion is in the

argument which follows the suggestion of tentativeness in the
"wait and see."

He says that if the quantity of 'data

1

available for the study of civilizations grows beyond the

present modest figure and accumulates ad infinitum

,

it will

"not only become possible, without question, to employ in
this study the comparative law-making technique; it will

eventually become patently impossible to employ any technique
except that of fiction." 7 ^
Before passing to later assertions about the use of
the law-making technique in the study of history, it would be

well to note the arguments Toynbee uses to support the new
methodology.

He argues by means of analogies with other

studies that it is possible to begin a "science of human
affairs.

makes

a

1

"

For example he points out that, "a science which

comparative study of primitive societies exists under

the name of Anthropology; and no one doubts that primitive

societies are really susceptible of being studied in this
75 Ibid.

:,
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way."

/D

From this basis he goes on to argue that "the onus

of proof surely lies with those who assert that the 'facts
and 'events'

of Life

— the

1

in the histories of one particular manifestation

species of societies called civilizations

— are

exceptions to the prevailing rule in being incomparable not

merely in some respects, but in all respects whatsoever." 77
In the same context, and arguing by analogy, Toynbee

introduces an argument that has evidently been very forceful
in fixing his enthusiasm upon the law-making technique.

The

argument appears in Volume One only in the briefest form, and

with the most emphatic and enthusiastic conclusion drawn from
it.

He argues

While our Western historians are disputing the
possibility of making a comparative study of
historical facts, our Western men of business
are all the time making their living out of a
comparative study of the facts of life around
them.
The perfect example of such a comparative study for practical ends is the collection
and analysis of the statistics on which the
business transactions of insurance companies are
collected and averages are taken for the purpose
of making forecasts, is at the basis of almost
all profitable business enterprises in the Western World nowadays. Now if, in practice, a
comparative study of the facts of life in a
civilization is being made with such effect that
business transactions based on it yield profit,
while business transactions that neglect to make
it are apt to result in loss, this is surely
conclusive and indeed superabundant proof that a
comparative study of such facts is theoretically
76

Ibid.

179.

77 Ibid.

180.
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possible
and in this adventure, at any
rate, we need not hesitate to follow the lead
of our latter-day masters. ?8
.

.

.

It should be observed that this argument runs counter

to the three-stage development which supposedly distinguishes

the three possible techniques.

Toynbee had insisted that the

only distinction which marked out the correct method to be

used in the study of the phenomena of human life was that of

quantity of data.

History might differ from anthropology

simply because it did not as yet have enough data to provide
an accurate basis for the elucidation and formulation of
If it picked up enough data, it could then move to the

laws.

law-formulating stage*

However, if the data continued to

pour in, the subject of History would move out of the lawAs he expres-

making stage into the technique of "fiction."

ses it, "The form of artistic creation and expression known
as

'fiction

9

is the only technique that either can be

employed or is worth employing where the "data
able." 79

9

are innumer-

Encouraged by this theoretical analysis, Toynbee

does not hesitate to draw the conclusion that, "without question

•

.

o

it will become patently impossible to employ any

80 if the quantity of
technique except that of 'fiction/"

data available for the study of civilizations continues to
78 Ibid.

179.

Ibid.

452.

80 Ibid.

459.

136

grow.

Toynbee tries to carry off this theoretic analysis by
the hypothetical case of a future historian who had specimens

of civilization to the number of 1,743,000,000.

The conclu-

sion is that "In this situation, the integral, intelligible

facts in the histories of civilizations would really have

become as unmanageably numerous as our present historians

.

„

.

erroneously suppose them to be now."

ing part of the argument then follows;

o

i

The clinch-

"To require a special-

ist in universal states to identify our actual Roman Empire

among the 1,743,000,000 extant specimens of the institution

would be to set him Psyche's task.

To ask him to formulate

the laws implicit in the workings of universal states would

be to assume him capable of a synoptic vision beyond the

capacity of human intelligence." 82

Perhaps at this point in

the exposition even Toynbee, who is obviously greatly enam-

ored with the theory of three stages and the quantitative
distinction, began to see that quantity of data does not have
a fatal

effect on "law-making technique."

So the argument

almost imperceptibly shifts to hitherto unannounced conditions.

From the statement that it would be impossible to

formulate the laws implicit in the workings of universal
states

[if the historian had 1,743,000,000 cases under

81 Ibid
82

,

463.

Ibid.,

464.

.
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review]

Toynbee shifts to the question, "Then by what tech-

,

nique could this hard-driven latter-day historian communicate
the results of his studies to his contemporaries' minds?"

And Toynbee supplies the answer to his own question, which

curiously enough fills out perfectly his theoretical three
stages; "only, perhaps, by the technique called 'fiction'

which our dramatists and novelists employ.

.

.

.

"

83

shifted from the quantity of data needed "to study"

He has
a

phenom-

ena of life to the quantity of data involved in "communicating" it.

This surely is an odd conclusion to reach—that "history" will someday become "fiction" because of the unnumer-

able data.

It would seem from other references that Toynbee

at this point is caught in the machinery of his own theory.

He grinds out an answer to protect the theory even though in

other passages where the theory is not at stake he draws no
such radical conclusions.

A situation of the other sort in

which he is not trying to protect his theory is his use of
the analogy of the businessman to the historian.

Toynbee

argues that if a businessman can formulate laws from his
study of business affairs, then certainly

the,

historian ought

to be able to formulate laws in his field.

According to his theory of the three stages, the
83 Ibid.
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businessman should be dealing with highly fictional situations, but instead of that conclusion Toynbee argues that the

data can be handled by statistical studies.
In embarking on our survey of apparent evidences
of an amenability of human affairs to
laws of
Nature
it might be convenient to take our
first soundings in the ordinary affairs of private people, since in this tract, in which fishing rights had been venturesomely claimed and
1

1

,

profitably exercised by latter-day Western historians, the number of the data was apt, as we
have noticed to run into comparatively high
figures, rising from thousands to hundreds of
millions, and figures of these orders of magnitude are high enough, and at the same time not
too high to allow of accurate and subtle statistics
Statistically established uniformities and
recurrences are capable not only of being visualized in mathematical curves, but also of being
verified by being put to the test of being taken
as bases for prediction?
•
,

,

.

,

•

•

In the important preface to Volume Seven, Toynbee links

together the work of the first two batches of the Study with
the third and final group of volumes.
a

The occasion calls for

reference to the method followed in the first six volumes,

which Toynbee produces in this fashions
And happily in this case we are in a position
to proceed straight from the formulation of our
question to an attempt to answer it, without
having to go through the laborious process of
seeking, sifting, assembling, and comparing
those historical facts that are indispensable
raw materials for the empirical method of
investigation that we are following in this
Study Q 5
.

Ibid.

,

IX,

5 Ibid.

,

VII,

220.
2
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This description of what he has been doing might

appear to be the sort of process he has condemned in his initial attack on traditional historiography in Volume One.

There he condemned as the "industrialization of historical
thought" historians who "have given their best energies to
the 'assemblage of raw materials

— inscriptions,

documents,

and the like--in 'corpus' es and periodicals? and, when they

have attempted to 'work' these materials 'up' into 'manufactured' or 'semi-manufactured' articles, they have had

recourse, once again to the Division of Labour and have pro-

duced synthetic histories

.

.

.

"

86

The difference between

the process which Toynbee adopts and the one he condemns as

"industrializing" historical thought, is found in the phrase
"and comparing those historical facts."

If he had followed

Dilthey in this Volume One attack on the scientific method

beyond the irritation he shares with Dilthey over the treatment of historical facts as though they were "raw materials,"
he would never have been able to describe his method in Volume Seven as the "process of seeking, sifting, assembling and

comparing

.

.

.

the raw materials."

Instead he would have

sought some method by which he could get inside the facts
through "an intimate communion of the self with the mind of
87 or through a re-enactment of the
the individual studied"

8

Ibid.

,

I,

4.

87 William Klubock, Wilhelm Dilthey' s Philosophy of

History (New York:

Columbia university Press,

±yr>b)

t

p.

80.

;

:

,
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thoughts of the past in his own mind. 88

However we have

argued that the Dilthey influence is a derived motif which
Toynbee briefly considers but never allows to flower in his
own methodology.

Toynbee

1

s

romanticism is channeled by

Bergson into an attempt to find the "laws of Nature

evolutionary framework rather than

a

8

in an

mechanistic, life-less

chain of laws.
In Volume Eight Toynbee provides a fairly clear-cut

description of the way in which he sees himself functioning.
The reference is located in an opening section called, "A

Plan of Operations/

1

under the sub-heading, "A Survey of

Encounters Between Contemporary Civilizations."

As he sur-

veys the data to be used in this investigation, Toynbee asks

himself whether or not the modern West would provide
specimen for

a

comparative study

.

a

good

He observes

On this showing, a twentieth-century student of
human affairs might expect to find the history
of the encounters between the Modern West and
its contemporaries comparatively un illuminating
for the same reason that had condemned the
domestic history of the Western Civilization to
be comparatively un illuminating for a study of
the species of societies of which it was one

representative.
Then follows the "social science" characterization
An imperfect specimen is manifestly not the best
choice for the purposes of scientific observation
and research; and, in the science of human
affairs, there is this blemish of imperfection in
88 R.

Collingwood, The Idea of History (London:
Oxford University Press, 1946)
pp. 282-283.
G.

,

:
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any historical episode in which less than the
whole story is within the historian's knowledge. 89
In Volume Nine the argument about the feasibility of the

application of the "law-making technique" is reintroduced,
and serves to underscore Toynbee

1

s

conviction that he is

developing a "science of human affairs."

The reference

reads
In thus establishing a third kind of contact
between one civilization and another, the Modern

Western archaeologists had done contemporary
Modern Western historians the invaluable service
of raising the number of known civilizations to
a figure at which it had become just feasible to
make this species of human society a subject of
comparative study 9 0
.

The question of how much data the historian needs to

cross the boundary between the fact-finding stage and the

law-making stage goes through several rounds of inquiry.

Volume One Toynbee was not sure but that "students of

In

a phe-

nomenon of which only one dozen or two dozen instances are
known can hardly do more than tabulate the facts." 91

By Vol-

ume Nine, his doubt on this issue seems to have been allayed.

Toynbee is sure that "history" had passed from the fact-

gathering stage to the "law-making technique":
In the present writer's personal judgment, a
stock of twenty-one significant data was just

"Toynbee, A Study of History
90 Ibid

.

,

IX,

118.

91 Ibid., I, 455.

,

VIII, 124.

sufficient to warrant a search for 'laws of
Nature' in the history of Man in Process of
Civilization; and, twenty years after the
publication of Sir Llewellyn Woodward's book,
this judgment had been fortified by the authority of Sir Charles Darwin. 92
The comforting assurance of Sir Charles Darwin was that "a

number no higher than ten would prove sufficient for a comparative study and for the induction of 'laws of Nature .'" 93
The assurance bolsters Toynbee's confidence to such a degree

that he is able to mark out the year and the day on which the

battle was won

— the

day on which "history" could have moved

from a fact-gathering to a law-making study.

His point is

that the agnostic historian might have had a chance of win-

ning the battle "as late as A.D. 1798, if his book had been
out of the printer's hands before the 2nd July of that intellectually momentous year."
The opportunity of the agnostic after that day was
lost, for, "Thereafter, in the present writer's view, the

intellectual battle on this field had been won for Science by
the intervention of the archaeologists in the long-since-com-

batant orientalists' support." 94
In Volume Ten Toynbee includes a long list of

"Acknowledgements and Thanks" and at this time tries to
92 Ibid.

,

IX,

216.
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account for the origin of his science of human affairs.

The

most arresting note for this study of the role of the social
scientist in Toynbee
influence of

F.

'

s

methodology is the recognition of the

Teggart.

S.

While the entry is brief, and

comparatively obscure in a long list of acknowledgments, it
can hardly be overestimated in terms of a methodological
study.

Two aspects of the acknowledgment are important.

First Toynbee speaks of Teggart as the one who rescued him
from an initial methodological wilderness.
gart"

s

He says of Teg-

Theory of History that "it showed me where to find the

entry into my subject after

I

had been groping for it without

succeeding in discovering it by my own native lights.'

QC

In

a footnote reference to this period of "groping" Toynbee

speaks of the original method that he tried in the summer of
1920 as a "false move" and a "failure."

According to his

description this failure was an attempt to cast his ideas in
the form of a commentary on the second chorus on Sophocles'

Antigone

„

Teggart

v

contribution was methodological in nature,

s

"The baffling obscurities in my initial

as Toynbee recalls,

problem of method and procedure were illuminated for me by
Teggart'

s

dicta.

9 5 Ibid .

,

9,96
.

X,

.

.

It is sufficient at present to

232.

96ibid.

/

,
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notice that the method supplied by Teggart "proved to be

a

sovereign clue which has not only initiated me into my subject but has piloted me through it."

Further discussion of the Teggart influence can best
be undertaken in its own integral argument later in this

chapter.

A look outside the Study tends to confirm the assertion that Toynbee constructs his break with traditional his-

toriography around the role of the social scientist and the
law-making technique.

In the essay "What

I

Am Trying to Do,"

Toynbee observes that:
This comparative treatment can be extended to
in fact, the
the whole of history ; and it is
the theory of
method of the human sciences:
knowledge psychology anthropology sociology
economics
The human sciences like the natural
sciences make a comparative study of their data
in order to discover the structure of the facts
and the events; and I believe that here the historians ought to take their cue from the scienThe academic diversion between history
tists.
and the social sciences is an accidental one
which is an obstacle to the progress of underWe need to break down the traditional
standing.
partition, and to throw history and the social
sciences into a single comprehensive study of
human affairs Q 7
f

,

,

,

,

.

9

'

.

Perhaps this sequence of claims will serve to demonstrate the frequency and constancy of the role of "social

scientist" in Toynbee

•

s

thinking, and at the same time serve

to sharpen the methodological trail-blazing that he envisages

Toynbee, "What

I

Am Trying to Do,"

p.

3.

:
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himself as accomplishing in

historical world dominated by

a

traditional historiography.
In order to see whether the argument for the science

of history as a law-making technique is more than a temporary

polemic or

a

minor theme it would be well to explore the

Study for examples of the new methodology in actual practice.
At the conclusion of a lengthy inquiry in Volume Two

into the reason for the growth of a civilization, Toynbee

summarizes
We have reached a point at which we can bring
our present argument to a head. We have ascertained that civilizations came to birth in
environments that are usually different and not
unusually easy; and this has led us on to
inquire whether or not this is an instance of
some social law which may be expressed in the
formula
the greater the challenge
the
greater the stimulus.
We have pursued this
inquiry by our customary empirical method. ^8
1

:

,

8

A little later
comments

,

while on the same line of questioning

,

he

s

After finding, by our empirical methods of study,
that, in diverse instances and variations of the
the greater
movement of Challenge-and-Response
the challenge the greater the response" appeared
we then set out to discover
law
to be a working
whether this law which we had traced inductively
99
were valid absolutely
,

1

*

?

'

,

B

,

„

«

.

In Volume Three the topic of inquiry is the criterion

of growth.

Toynbee discards the notion that the criterion of

98 Toynbee,

99 Ibid.,

A Study of History

393.

,

II, 259.

"

growth is the geographical expansion of a "civilization," and
in the process he develops a law which relates geographical

expansion to social disintegration.

He argues that:

"This

is perhaps the explanation of the law, which we have inferred

from empirical observation, that social disintegration is a
more favorable condition than social growth for geographical

expansion.

Dealing with the reverse side of the coin, in an

investigation of the dis integration of civilizations

,

Toynbee

again refers to the law that he has found by an empirical

method;

"

and this accounts for an apparent

9

law" --which has

been revealed in another context by an empirical survey

— to

the effect that the geographical expansion of a civilization
is apt to go hand in hand with its social disintegration."

1

^

Later in Volume Five two laws emerge from an empirical survey of the process of disintegration*
of the investigation reads

The conclusion

z

It will be seen that this history of Islam is a
special case which does not invalidate the
In general we
general results of our inquiry.
are evidently justified in concluding from an
empirical survey that, for external proletariats
and for dominant minorities alike an alien
101
•
inspiration is a curse
9

,

•

«

The footnote to the above passage more precisely identifies
100 Ibid.

,

V,

200,

:
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the "general results" as social

'

laws

1

,

for in the words of

Toynbee, "The history of Islam is also a special case in

respect of another social 'law

8

to the effect that religions

bring ruin on themselves by going into politics."
In the annex of Volume Five which contains supple-

mental studies on the above inferred laws

,

he comments at

greater length on the relation of religion to politics.

Without entering into the merits of the argument it is still
possible to observe Toynbee

1

s

intention of bringing a "rule"

or proposition or social law from the empirical survey.

He

says
The diversity in the fortunes of the several
fractions of the Western Christian Church in
the Modern Age of our Western History is a
piece of evidence which would appear to complete our empirical proof of the proposition
that a religion stands to lose far more than
it can hope to gain by asking f or or submitting to, the patronage of the civil power.
There is, however, one conspicuous exception
to this apparent rule which will have to be
accounted for before the rule can be allowed
102
to pass muster?
,

<>

An additional methodological note in the same discus-

sion emphasizes the intention of the author to develop a rule

without exceptions.

After laboring through an extended

explanation of why Islam appears to be an exception to the
social

?

law

v

,

he concludes that in reality it is not, "If the

facts that have now been set forth may be considered to
1Q2 Ibid.

,

672
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account satisfactorily for the exception which Islam might
appear at first sight to present to our empirically established general rule,

.

.

.

«103

The Volume Six investigation of the process of dis-

integration leads to a further formulation of the laws of
history.

With regard to the attempts of "would-be saviours"

to rescue their disintegrating society by means of a program

of Archaism or Futurism, Toynbee enters into a long survey,

with the following results:
After this review of would-be saviours with the
"time-machine who have taken the direction of
archaism, we must complete our present survey
by reviewing their futurist counterparts
.
To begin with we have seen that it is in the
very nature of Archaism to defeat itself by
breaking down into Futurism; and we have just
been giving ourselves an empirical demonstration
of the working of this historical 'law' in our
1

;

.

•

,

survey,

.

.

.

In the discussion of the attempts of the Futurist to borrow

some cultural element from another civilization in order to
save his own society, the distraight Futurist is face to face

with another law already examined by Toynbee.
The impossibility of borrowing this or that
element of an alien culture at choice, without
eventually making an unconditional surrender
is a fundamental
to the intrusive alien force
law of the contact of cultures which is examIn the
ined in this Study in other places.
present context we are only concerned with this
'law* in so far as it throws light upon the
,

103 Ibid., 679.
104 Ibid.

,

VI, 228.

,

149

cause of the change of orientation from Archaism
10 5
to Futurism
.

.

.

The footnote to this passage refers to an earlier

survey in which Toynbee felt he had discovered another his-

torical law.

The note reads, "For the particular operation

of this law in the intercourse between an external proletar-

iat and a dominant minority across the stationary frontier of
a

universal state see

.

.

.

Vol. V, pp.

459-80.

"
.

.

106

.

In a Volume Seven discussion of the causes of regres-

sion from a higher religion to a secular civilization, Toynbee again tries to frame the results of his survey in terms
of historical laws.
s

We have noticed that the successive milestones
in Man s spiritual advance that are inscribed
with the names of Abraham, Moses the Prophets
and Christ all stand at points where a surveyor
of the course of secular civilization would
report breaks in the road and breakdowns in the
traffic; and the empirical evidence has given us
reason to believe that this coincidence of high
points in Man's religious history with low
points in his secular history may be one of the
If so we
"laws' of Man's terrestrial life.
should expect also to find evidence of the working of a converse 'law" that the high points in
secular history coincide with low points in
religious history.
'

,

The issue of behavior in a disintegrating civiliza-

tion is raised once again in Volume Eight.

The context of

the discussion is the question of the consequences of encoun105 Ibid.

,

229.

iOSlbid.
107 Ibid., VII, 551.
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ters between civilizations.

encounters

a

When an aggressive culture

civilization in the process of disintegration,

it stimulates various kinds of responses, among which,

according to Toynbee

1

s

calculations, are the Zealot and Her-

odian types of responses.

Toynbee now begins a survey of the

Zealots and Herodians similar to his Volume Six survey of

would-be saviours.

In the course of the survey he makes

references to an "empirically established social law" of an

earlier investigation.

The substance of the argument is

interesting but not relevant to the present task.

As part of

the argument he seeks to gain Owen Lattimore's concurrence in
the judgment that "the latter-day Japanese importers of West-

ern cultural wares were deceiving themselves in so far as

they seriously expected to succeed, by the sophisticated

means of

a

nicely calculated and strictly regulated dole of

cultural rations,, in eluding our empirically established
social

9

law'

that, when once a society's defences have been

penetrated by the radiation of an intrusive alien culture,
'one thing leads to another'

inexorably until, willy nilly,

the assembled party has to resign himself to adapting the
108
assailant's way of life in to to ."

It may be instructive also to observe that these his-

torical laws are reflections of the workings of law in the
108 Ibid.

,

VIII, 594.
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realms of Physical Life and Inanimate Nature.

The identifi-

cation is made in the same discussion examined above, when

Toynbee sets out a plan of operation.
It will be convenient to examine the working of
these two apparent 'laws' of cultural radiationand- reception in the order in which we have just
introduced them; and in considering first the
'law' that a culture-element which has been harmless at home is apt to work havoc if it is isolated and exported, we may begin by observing
that the operation of this law is familiar to us
in the realms of Physical Life and Inanimate
Nature. 109

The examples of this law in the realms of Physical

Life and Inanimate Nature are poorly chosen, and only super-

ficially analogous to the laws of the social structure.

For

example Toynbee sees in the splitting of the structure of the
atom an illustration of the law that "one man's meat is

another man's poison."
social 'law

1

In the matter of civilizations the

comes into effect when the besieged society

"borrows" an element from the besieging society.

In the

illustration from nature as given by Toynbee there is the

possibility of comparing the social situation to the explosion of the atomic bomb over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in which
case one would have to argue that the Japanese "borrowed" one

element of a "hitherto innocuous substance" and therefore
"our meat became their poison."

The other possible analogy

is to think of the integral atom as the "elixir of Life" as

109 Ibid.

,

530,
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long as it remained in its structural pattern— in an equili-

brium of forces; but as

a

Pandora's box when the latent

physical energy was released through the splitting of an
atom.

Both of these possible explanations of Toynbee

social-natural law are difficult to accept.

1

s

In the first

case the splitting of the atom can be either disastrous or

beneficial, whether the splitting is done by the Japanese or
the Americans.

It can hardly be the working of a law to the

effect that what is one man's meat is another man's poison.
In the second case the same antithesis of "meat" and "poison"

breaks down.

If society is like the structure of an atom,

and if the splitting of the atom is disastrous for itself as

well as anything in the neighborhood
a

then it follows that if

,

neighboring society "borrowed" an element from an intact

society it would blow up both the besieged and the besieging
societies.

The splitting of the atom in this case is "poi-

son" for both.

One final instance of Toynbee

9

s

search for historical

laws by means of an empirical survey may be found in Volume

Nine.

In the "Plan of Operation" section the usual methodo-

logical explanation is stated as follows?
Let us first see how many instances we can collect
of renaissances within the meaning of the term as
we have now defined it, and then let us go on to
use the results of this survey as the basis for an
analytical study of this species of encounter by

1
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means of the comparative method of investigation

.

HO

In this attempt to test the full meaning of
Toynbee's

role as a social scientist, it is relevant to
examine not

only the direct assertions of his "scientific" methodology

but to look at the series of metaphors Toynbee uses to
describe his fact-gathering and law-making technique.

An approach to these scientific "images" may well be

made through an attack which Toynbee launches on contemporary

Western historians.

He explains that the "distracted latter-

day Western historians" are so badly off because they are

prisoners of an obsolescent technique and

a delusion.

The

situation is simply that the historians think they have too

many facts.

In Toynbee's words, "The more confident they

became of their technical ability to handle the facts, the
less confident they remained of their intellectual ability to

apprehend these facts, not to speak of making any sense out
of themj and these two conflicting psychological forces found
their resolution in a concentration on professional technique

both as an end in itself and as a mental city of refuge

.

"H

The close relationship between the illusion of the modern

historian to the effect that he was confronted with a "universe of an incomprehensible complexity" and the old method-

ology of "fact-gathering" is explained by Toynbee.
11Q Ibid

.

,

IX,

111 Ibid., 208.

6
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,
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the obscurantist technique seems to be the cause
of the con-

temporary antinomianism.

This is expressed rather plainly in

the statement that:

The nightmare vision of Reality from which they
were seeking shelter in the sand-heap of technique was an illusion generated by this obscurantist technique itself.
The apparent dissolution of a once stable world into a Protean chaos
of inf initesimally small vagrant electrons,
which would re-form into an infinitely complex
universe if they were ever to re-form at all,
was not the apocalypse of an appalling Reality?
it was the illusory optical effect of a distortingly diffractive lens. 112

Against this distortion and delusion of traditional histori-

ography Toynbee posits a "single" solution.

In his words,

"the nightmare could be dispelled in an instant by the single

salutary act of dropping this delusively sophisticated apparatus and reverting to the effective use of the naked
eye." 113 One would like to believe that it were this simple,

but of course the antithesis in the passage is largely rhetorical.

What Toynbee evidently refers to is not the adop-

tion of some extreme form of naive realism, but that the his-

torian ought to look for the integral fact rather than the

complexity of numberless events.

Agreement on the "integral

fact" is assumed by Toynbee in this recommended solution for

the distraught Western historian.

Throughout the Study this

"simple salutary act" of "reverting to the effective use of
112 Ibid.

Ibid.

209.

.

.
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the naked eye

11

is employed in a number of interesting
method-

ological metaphors
One of the first to appear is a comparison of civili-

zations with mustangs in a performance test.

The historian

in this instance is an observer and the image carries the

clear implication that objectivity and law-making are natural
results of observation.
In our survey of societies, we have spent some
time and trouble in rounding up twenty-one
representatives of the species; and now that
we are going to put our mustangs through their
paces, are we to disqualify nearly half the
stud before we have seen how they run?
Whatever may happen, we shall learn more about
horseflesh by watching each and all of them in
action, seeing how they shape, and comparing
their performances than we can expect to learn
if we make an arbitrary selection beforehand
on points. 114
.

.

.

The use of this social science imagery suggests that
the new historiography is not concerned with the gathering of

facts about the mustang as an individual animal

„

but rather

in a comparative study or "law-making" study about mustangs

in general*

Of course the assumption that civilizations are

the true "integral facts" and are therefore as comparable as
a herd of

mustangs underlies the whole passage

A second interesting simile of the social science
variety is located in Volume One.

The simile is introduced

in order to avoid value judgments in assessing the worth of

114 Ibid.,

X,

146,

:

civilizations.

"Value," to Toynbee "is intrinsically
sub-

jective," 115 and he wishes to avoid any form
of the egocentric illusion.
His escape from this egocentric illusion
is

gained by turning to the comparative method.

He reasons that

"In order to obtain a value-scale for civilizations
which,

instead of being simply relative, is in some sense
absolute,
we must compare them in respect of value, not only
with one

another, but also on the one hand with the common goal of

their endeavors, and on the other hand with the primitive

societies from which they are distinguished by a common spe-

cific difference." 116

The simile which expresses this com-

parative study, again implies that the historian need only
observe and compare the respective performances of the "integral facts" of the past.

In this case the civilications are

pictured as motorcars on a "one-way street."

The comparison

follows
If we apply this simile to our twenty-one civilizations, we see that none of them to our knowledge, has ever yet succeeded in travelling over

the whole length of the street and passing out
through the exit; and that fourteen of them have
come to grief by reversing, in defiance of the
rule, before they had completed their transit
and then either colliding with one another or
being warned off the road as dangers to the public. 117
115 Ibid

.

,

175.

116 Ibid

.

,

176.

117 Ibid.
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The assumption implicit in this
simile is that the "common
goal of civilizations" is somehow
empirically determined and
universally agreed upon. In the light
of Toynbee s later
•

radical reversal of view that
civilization's raison d'etre is
to give birth to higher religions
and then to disappear,
this

early view about his ability to avoid
value judgments is
somewhat optimistic and naive.
A third simile of methodological
significance is

introduced in Volume One and developed in
Volume Three.
line with the two common features of these

In

similes, as noted

above, Toynbee expresses the objectivity
of the scientific

observer, and the hope of developing a comparative
study of
civilizations in the simile of the rock-climbers.
The simile
has many applications for the author of the Study
which are

not relevant to our methodological interests.

It is impor-

tant to notice the relation of the "observer" to the
civili-

zations rather than the action of the civilizations themselves.

The simile is as follows:

Primitive societies, as we know them by direct
observation, may be likened to people lying
torpid upon a ledge on a mountain-side, with a
precipice below and a precipice above; civilizations may be likened to comparisons of these
'Sleepers of Ephesus who have just risen to
their feet and have started to climb on up the
face of the cliff; while we, for our part, may
liken ourselves to observers whose field of
vision is limited to the ledges and to the foot
of the upper precipice and who have come upon
the scene at the moment when the different members of the party happen to be in these respec'

158

tive postures and positions

.

H8

This simile is in most respects a companion to the "one-way

street" simile, especially with regard to the relation of the

historian to his history, for as Toynbee comments, "We are
watching, here, under a new guise, the same spectacle that we

watched before when we saw civilizations in the likeness of
drivers seeking to pass out through the exit from

a

one-way

street." 119
In Volume Three the rock-climber simile takes even a

stronger methodological turn.

Here it is employed to stop a

trend toward relativism which has been developing throughout
the section on "Differentiation Through Growth."

Toynbee had

been bringing together in this section numerous instances of
120
variety in the experience of different civilizations.

Turning from the varieties of historical studies to the varihe
ety of artistic styles in the different civilizations,

Society
finds himself in agreement with Spengler that "every

and unmistakable
in process of civilization creates a unique

artistic style of its own."

Toynbee finds it difficult to

"maintains
resist the surging relativisms of Spengler who
the domains
that the relativity which we have recognized in

recognizable in the
of Art and of Historical Thought is also
118 Ibid

.

,

pp.

11 9 ibid

.

,

193.

120 Ibid., Ill,

192-193.

378.

,,

:

domains of Mathematics and of Physical Science; and he even
imports his dogma of relativity into the Kantian Categories
of Thought in general, and into the realm of Ethics into the

bargain." 121

The counter-attack is directed against Speng-

ler's claim that civilizations have an absolute qualitative

difference, a position which would wreck the foundations of
Toynbee'

s

"'comparative,

law-making technqiue."

So Toynbee

checks the "magnificent logic" of this "formidable antagonist" with the assertion of his own position
If a civilization is a movement from one kind
of being to another, and it is not a thing in
itself, then surely, again, it cannot be
absolutely unique
Logic or no logic we cannot
follow Spengler as far as this. 1 22
*

r

Toynbee concludes Volume Three, which was published with Volumes One and Two as the first major installment of the Study

,

with a statement of confidence in his scientific methodology.
,

123

His optimism in the opening chapter of Volume One to
the effect that there must be "some constant and absolute

object of historical thought" behind the "shimmer of relativity," is reintroduced by an expression of the same hope of

outwitting relativity through the law-making technique

0

introduces the simile of the rock-climbers with the pleas
121 Ibid.

380.

122 Ibid.

383.

123 Ibid.

390.

He

.
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Yet if we were merely to dwell on this point
once again, [that the study of history is
governed by the dominant tendencies of time
and place] we should be ending this part of
our Study on a false note; for, as we have
observed in our critique on the concept of
Race, the variety that is manifested in Human
Nature and in human life and institutions is
a superficial phenomenon which masks, without
impairing, an underlying unity.

Then he launches immediately into the simile of the rock-

climbers

:

We have compared our civilizations to rockclimbers; and on the showing of this simile
the several climbers, though they are certainly
separate individuals, are also representatives
of a single species and are all engaged upon an
identical enterprise.
They are all attempting
to scale the face of the same cliff from the
same starting-place on a ledge below towards
the same goal on a ledge above
The underlying
-^4
unity is apparent here;
-

.

.

.

Even though we are engaged at this point primarily
in an elucidation of the "Social Science" role in the Study
a

passing criticism of this simile may be in order.

,

The sim-

ile is quite misleading if it is supposed to make "apparent"
the "underlying unity."

The notion of unity is really con-

veyed by speaking of civilizations as "people."

Once having

made this assumption, then one can argue by analogy that just
as the variety of races is a superficial masking of the

underlying unity of humanity, so the variety of civilizations
masks the underlying fact that they are all of one mankind.
124 Ibid
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It is strange to find Toynbee using this
argument by analogy

because he repudiated it in an earlier context when
he
refused to go along with Spengler's organismic view
of culture

.

The other basis of "underlying unity" is the common

goal or "identical enterprise" of this single species of
civ-

ilizations.

Once again it is worth noticing that this

un examined assumption of a common goal is severely criticized
an d rejected by Toynbee in the course of his later re-evalua-

tion of civilizations. 126

Using the value scale of higher

religions, the civilizations prove themselves to be of three
species.

Only civilizations of the second generation are

chrysalises of the higher religions, and civilizations of the
third generation are "vain repetitions of the heathen." 127
\

Thus the "common goal" can hardly serve as a basis of "under-

lying unity" on Toynbee

's

own showing.

There is a third methodological metaphor that Toynbee
uses on four occasions in the Study

.

Perhaps even more than

in the metaphors of civilizations as motor-cars and civiliza-

tions as rock-climbers there is in the metaphor of the

reviewing stand a strong emphasis upon the historian's comparative and law-making technique.
125 Ibid.

,

230.

126 Ibid

,

V,

.

371.

127 Ibid., VIII,

87.

.
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In Volume Five,

the attempt to trace the process of

disintegration has led Toynbee to a consideration of "Schism
in the Body Social."

"m

the course of a long empirical sur-

vey, ..128 he concludes that the disintegrating civilization

splits itself into three fractions— a Dominant Minority, and
an Internal and External Proletariat.

Narrowing his search

to the Internal Proletariat, he concludes on the basis of

another survey that the Internal Proletariat display their
creative power in the creation of 'higher religions' and of

universal churches.

In order to find the source from which

the inspirations of these creative works are derived, Toynbee

calls together all of the higher religions for a march in
front of the reviewing stand.
It will be seen that our assembly of religions
with an indigenous inspiration remains singularly
small, even when we have brought in the stragglers
from the highways and hedges.
If we now inspect
our recruits, we shall find that two of them
really belong to the 'alien' class after all,
.

What Toynbee is attempting here is not

a

.

.

"history" in the

usual sense, but a comparative study to determine the laws

which are in operation during the process of disintegration.
In this specific case, Toynbee argues, our empirical Survey

has led us to the conclusion that an alien origin is a help

and not a hindrance to a 'higher religion' in winning con128

Ibid

129 Ibid.

V,

338.

369.

.

verts .130
The next instance of the "reviewing stand"
metaphor

has a particularly interesting emphasis upon
objectivity.

Toynbee wishes to find the pattern of action which is
common
to the various "saviours" of

mankind— a task which might well

deter the most courageous historian.
a

However the concept of

reviewing stand, of surveying according to performance

seems to provide an objectivity similar to the judgment of
the distance the rock-climbers had advanced, or the motor-

cars had progressed along the one-way street.

In all three

cases the criteria of development were not established by the

historian but were somehow in the very nature of things.

As

the historian watches objectively from the reviewing stand

The first to march past will be the tragic battalion of would-be saviours with the sword who
have slashed with blades as futile as the Danaids' sieves
at the welling wars of a 'Time of
Trouble

—
—

'

As Toynbee has already pointed out, even the parade arrange-

ments have not been subjectively settled upon by the historian in order to give an advantage to one contingent as over

against another, for:
The association between the histories of universal
states and the careers of would-be saviours with
the sword does not merely testify in a general way
to the inefficacy of force as an instrument of
salvation:
it enables us to survey the evidence
empirically by giving us a convenient clue for
130 Ibid.

,

366
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sorting out the would-be saviours of
this kind
and marshalling them in an order
in which
becomes possible to pass them in review. 131it
The would-be saviours with a sword
are living with a hope

that is an illusion, concludes the reviewer
of the parade,
"for it is only in fairyland that swords
cut Gordian knots
which cannot be untied by fingers. "132 The
reviewers vantage point in the stands gives him the ability
to formulate
the results of the performance in definite
fashion, for as he
1

sees it, "'all they that take the sword shall perish
with the
sword'

is the inexorable law of real life. "133

0r in summary

fashion the reviewer may write down:
This ultimate failure of all attempts to win
salvation with the sword is not only proclaimed
in poetry and myth and legend; it is also demon134
strated in history;
.

.

.

In Volume Eight the methodological imagery of "pas-

sing in review" the civilizations, or institutions, or
leaders of society, is employed twice.

The first problem is

to survey the principal alternative types of reaction which

could take place in the encounters between civilizations.

Calling the reviewing-stand metaphor back into operation,
Toynbee sayss
131 Ibid.

,

VI,

132 Ibid

.

,

178.

133 Ibid

.

,

179.

Ibid.

182.
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In surveying the alternative types of
reaction
it may be convenient to begin with those
that
are retorts in kind to the action by which
they
have been evoked, and to pass the rest in
review
an ascending order of degree of their
difference in character from the challenges to which
they are responses. 135

m

What surprises a reader of this "parade" metaphor
is
the change which takes place between the announced
purpose of
the "passing in review" technique, and the announced
results

after the parade is over.

From the introductory paragraph

one would suppose that Toynbee intended to mark out the types
of response that are made under specified conditions.

His

division of the section into "(a) Agents and Reagents"; "(b)

Alternative Possible Reactions"; and "(c) Alternative Possible Denouements" further emphasizes that the "passing in

review" of Part

(b)

is a "scientific" testing procedure in

order to establish certain regularities of behavior on the
part of these civilizations.

But at the end of Part

(b)

we

find the results of the review phrased in terms of the "relative efficacy of divers types of reaction," and we are thrown

right into the middle of a problem of values.

The switch

from a search of possible types of reaction to

a

question of

good or bad reactions comes in the concluding paragraph:
in this account, we leave the epiphanies of
higher religions out of our reckoning in reviewing
the alternative possible reactions to an initiative
taken by one of the characters in a play in which
the dramatis personae are civilizations, we can
If,

135 Ibid.

,

VIII, 466
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perhaps arrive at the following conclusions concerning the relative efficacy of divers types
of
reaction as alternative methods of wrestling the
initiative out of the original agent's hands.
We may conclude that the least effective reply
is the retort in kind, particularly when it
is a
retort to force by force; that the negative retort
of isolationism is less effective than positive
retorts on either the economic or the cultural
plane; and that, of the divers alternative possible cultural retorts, a pliant receptivity to
the culture of a militarily or politically dominant aggressor is of less avail than the resiliant
spirit that turns the tables on the military conqueror by taking him culturally captive. 136
On the basis of Toynbee s previously announced deci'

sion to use the "touchstone of religion" as his source of

value judgments, the question of the efficacy of military,

political and economic reactions appears to be quite irrelevant.

As he expresses it in Part

(c)

,

the outcome of a

cultural conflict between Hellenism and the contemporary
Oriental civilizations was
ence. 137

a

matter of spiritual indiffer-

However Toynbee maintains the fiction of going

through an objective and significant review of the evidence
by the ambiguous statement at the close of Part

(c)

that we

seem to have two dramas in two different languages.
It will be seen that our religious and our secular
dramas are written in two different languages
which each defy translation into the other. From
the religious standpoint of the preachers of
spiritual salvation the secular drama is a vanity
of vanities; from the secular standpoint of the
136 Ibid., 476.
L37
J/

Ibid., 480.
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parties to an encounter between civilizations
the religious drama is unto the Jews a stumblinqblock and unto the Greeks foolishness. 138
A second instance of the "reviewing stand" metaphor
in Volume Eight is rather highly developed.

The occasion for

its use is a discussion of the "consequences of
encounters

between contemporaries."

When in the course of encounters

between civilizations the assailant is successful, the

assaulted party undergoes severe schisms, and forces upon the
individual members of its society the need for personal
response.

In an examination of the types of response open to

individuals, Toynbee turns to a metaphor which expresses a
"scientific" attitude toward the facts, and the anticipation
of reaching beyond appearance to regularities or laws of history.

The metaphor is introduced by saying:

If we now proceed to take stock of the impressions
left on our minds by the spectacle that we have
just been watching, we may find that these impressions are confused and that our minds are correspondingly bewildered. As we took the salute from
the mixed force under review, the Zealot and the

Herodian components of these motley troops both
made a parade, as they presented arms in passing
the saluting point, of the distinguishing marks
blazoned on their respective accoutrements. In the
conspicuousness of these badges and the emphasis of
these gestures alike, they were insisting with one
accord upon their diversity from one another; yet
this unanimous assertion of theirs was being contradicted all the time by the evidence of our own
observant eyes?
.

138 ibid.
139

Ibid., 610.

,

.

.
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The results of this empirical maneuver
is not expressed in
terms of the social laws of the early
volumes, but in general

references to uniformities of behavior.
It would be superfluous to call up again
the rest
of our muster of Zealots and Herodians
to demonstrate that the same pair of psychological
reactions resulted in the same failure in all
other
encounters between an assaulted society and an
assailant culture in which the tragedy had
already been played out to its conclusion by the
time of writing; for these repetitions of Jewry's
classic experience stand on record in this work
in our foregoing survey of encounters between

contemporaries 14 0

Or again, the conclusion is drawn in terms of the
question,
"Was this uniform self-defeat of Zealotism and Herodianism
the last word that the oracles of History and Mythology
had
to speak when asked for light on the spiritual consequences

of encounters?"^-'-

While the above methodological figures of speech are
the most frequently employed, several others make their

appearance in the Study

.

Toynbee stresses the objectivity of

his approach to the data, along with the hope of discovering

uniformities of action when he describes himself as an interrogator of the civilizations in a court-room metaphor.
In a treatment of renaissances,

he states in the

preface that, "We shall also put into the witness box, one
after another, all the other civilizations of third genera140 Ibid.

,

622.

141 Ibid., 623.
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tion that have come within our cognizance—
and these are all
that come into question in our present inquiry,
since these
alone had been en rapport with their predecessors
on the

comparatively intimate terms required for making the
feat of
evocation a possibility." 142
The united testimony of the witnesses in the
witness

box yields for Toynbee certain uniformities and
regularities.
In spite of the differences observable in the
renaissances,

there is a standard pattern.
The necromancer's feat of evoking ghosts from
the dead pasts of extinct civilizations has been
found to have different effects in these diverse
departments of a living social milieu; but there
is one feature, of a geographical order, that is
common to all the cases that we have reviewed so
far.
Whatever differences these divers kinds of
renaissance may display in other respects, they
all uniformly manifest themselves in changes in
the life of a living society that take place
within the limits of the society's native geographical habitat. 143

Before leaving this survey of methodological figures
of speech in Toynbee, it might be useful to observe that

these dominating similes and metaphors are strong evidence

that the hostility which Toynbee expresses in Volume One to
the historians' scientific method understood as fact-gather-

ing does not lead Toynbee into the Collingwood or Dilthey

anti-positivistic position.
142 Ibid.

143

,

IX, pp.

Ibid., 96.

6-7.

It is evident that the metaphors
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in which Toynbee depicts his role as
historian are strongly

anti-Collingwood and anti-Dilthey
noted Toynbee

»s

.

For example, we have

insistence that he was a spectator to the

events of history.

Again and again he attempts to put him-

self as an observer over against the facts
of the past.

This

was the thrust of the imagery of "inspecting
recruits," of

"passing in review," of "sitting in the reviewing
stand," of
putting the civilizations "in the witness box," of
"reading
the map from a non-Western point of view," of "Putting
the

mustangs through their paces," and of observing rockclimbers.

This methodological procedure is, of course, the

very antithesis of Collingwood

'

s

approach, and he never tires

of attacking historians who, like Toynbee, regard "history as
a mere spectacle,

something consisting of facts observed and

recorded by the historian, phenomena presented externally to
his gaze, not experiences into which he must enter and which
he must make his own." 144

Similarly when Toynbee addresses himself to the task
of "sifting, assembling, and comparing those historical facts

that are indispensable raw materials for the empirical method
of investigation," 145 he can hardly be accused of agreeing

with the Collingwood attack on the treatment of historical
facts as though they were "raw materials" from which one
\

144 Collingwood, The Idea of History

,

p.

145 Toynbee, A Study
of History , VII, 2.

163.

could discover the causal connections. 146
Roots and Motivation of the
New Scientific Methodology

This chapter on "Toynbee the Social Scientist"
would

not be complete without a treatment of the question
of why

Toynbee turned to a scientific method.

We have observed var-

ious reasons in his attack on traditional historiography,
and
in his choice of the role of an historian-explorer.

But it

is necessary to trace the early methodological struggle
of

Toynbee in order to understand how he arrives at

a

"science

of human affairs," and how he values it as the sovereign clue
to the meaning of history.

As an opening observation, it is important to note

that Toynbee developed his "science of human affairs" in con-

junction with his major contribution to historical thought,

A Study of History

.

This work was not his first effort to

write history, in fact it was preceded by
and essays on history and current events.

a

number of books
As early as 1913

he had written an article on "The Growth of Sparta" for the

Journal of Hellenic Studies 147 while studying and teaching at

Oxford

c

Shortly thereafter he had entered government ser-

vice, working in the Political Intelligence Department of the
146 Collingwood, The Idea of History
p.
,

147 Arnold

128.

Toynbee, "The Growth of Sparta," Journal
of Hellenic Studies, XXXIII (1913).
J.

.
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Foreign Office.

As a student of Turkish affairs, he was

commissioned by Lord Bryce to investigate and publish the
documents relating to The Treatment of Armenians in the Otto man Empire. 148

The volume contains a 60-page historical sum-

mary of the antecedents of the Armenian people, and is, in
general, framed in the traditional style of the national historians.

There is one introductory passage which catches the

attention of anyone studying the problem of method in the
Toynbee of the Study

.

The passage cannot be considered as a

significant harbinger of the "law-making technique" that
Toynbee later seizes upon as his "sovereign methodological
clue," but it does indicate an important psychological preparation for his later discovery.

The brilliant style and the

dramatic touch of the Study are noticeably present here,
although one's attention is primarily drawn to the early

appearances of historical pessimism in this essay of 1913.
Such a relation has suddenly been created between
us by the War, and it is one of the strangest
ironies of war that it fuses together and illuminates
the very fabric it destroys
The civilization in
which we lived was like a labyrinth, so huge and
intricate that none of the dwellers in it could
altogether grasp its structure, while most of them
were barely conscious that it had any structural
design at all.
But now that the War has caught it
and it is all aflame, the unity and symmetry of the
building are revealed to the common eye. As the
glare lights it up from end to end, it stands out in
its glory, in matchless outline and perspective; for
.

148 Arnold J. Toynbee, The Treatment of the Armenians in
Sir Joseph Causton and Sons,
the Ottoman Empire (London:
Ltd.
1916)
,
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the first time (and possibly for the last)
we
see its parts simultaneously and in proper
relation, and realize for one moment the marvel
and
mystery of this civilization that is perishing—
the subtle, immemorial, unrelaxing effort that
raised it up and maintained it, and the impossibility of improvising any equivalent structure
in its place.
Then the fire masters its prey;
the various parts of the labyrinth fall in one
by one, the light goes out of them, and nothing
is left but smoke and ashes.
This is the catastrophe that we are witnessing now,
.

.

.

One might simply write off this dramatic and evi-

dently intense emotional shock that Toynbee describes, as
"war reaction" or as a pessimism natural to a reading of

documents filled with unrelieved suffering and brutality,
but this would be an inadequate explanation.

The sense of

impending catastrophe, of the tragedy of impermanence

,

been expressed by Toynbee at least three years earlier

had

— two

years before the outbreak of the War.
As early as the 23rd May, 1912, while Toynbee was on
a

walking tour of Greece, and just prior to his return to

Oxford as a tutor in ancient history, he had had an "authentic minor personal experience," like Gibbon's in the ruins of

Rome and Volney's in the ruins of Palmyra.

Near the site of

ancient Sparta, Toynbee came across a sight which "convicted"

him "of

a

horrifying sense of the sin manifest in the conduct

of human affairs."

Speaking of himself, Toynbee says:

The sensuous experience that activated his
Ibid

.

,

p.

593.

.

historical imagination was not a sound
of liturgical chanting; it was the sight of
the ruins
among which he had wound his way
upwards to the
peak; and this spectacle had been
appalling; for,
in this shattered fairy city,
Time had
still since that spring of A. D. 1821 stood
in which
Mistra had been laid desolate,
Needless to say, the writer of this Study had
made no progress towards reading the cruel
riddle
of Mankind's crimes and follies by the
time when
he was forced down from the heights of
Mistra by
the twofold pressure of hunger and nightfall 15u
.

The experience of Toynbee at 23 years of age,
"as he brooded

over the catastrophe," was significant in his
preparation for
the Study,

for he had "won from the Laconian landscape an

intuition that was the germ of the present work. 151

in the

same section he seems to identify this germinal intuition
as
two lasting lessons made on his mind by the impact of the

Laconian landscape

— "one

concerning the historical geography

of Continental European Greece and the other concerning the

morphology of the history of civilizations." 152
A second example out of the four recorded experiences
of Toynbee in the year 1912, is the experience of rounding
the shoulder of a mountain on the east end of the Island of

Crete on the 19th of March. 153

Like an earlier "unbearable

spectacle" from which the "harrowed participant from another
150 Toynbee, A Study
of History

151 Ibid.

,

109.

152 Ibid.

,

110.

153 Ibid., 136.

,

X,

108.

s

.

world" averted his eyes, this experience too
has a strong

effect on the youthful Toynbee.

From the three accounts of

the story 154 the second contains the clearest
reference to

methodology.

Leaving out the irrelevant geographical descr

tions the story reads:
The present writer received his first intimation
of the mortality of the Western Civilization in
an experience ... on the 19th March, 1912.
Rounding the southern shoulder of a mountain, he
was startled at suddenly finding himself face to
face with the ruins of a country house.
What was startling and disturbing for a Western
observer in A. D. 1912 was to see a piece of
architecture which, in his mental picture of his
native country, was associated with the living
world of his own generation standing here in
Crete as starkly dead and deserted as the monuments of an Hellenic architecture.
This
inevitable comparison awakened his imagination
to the truth that, on this island, a civilization
which was his own, and which on his own island
was then still self-conf idently alive, was already
as dead as the civilizations that had come and
gone in earlier generations of this species of
society. "5
.

.

.

.

.

.

The sense of impending tragedy is emphasized in Toynbee

first use of the story.

'

The sight of the desolate habita-

tions reminded him of an English poet's lines.
He reflected that the four and a half centuries
for which Venice had been mistress of Crete were
a longer span of time than the present age of his
own country's rule over the earliest acquired of
her overseas dominions; and his ears seemed to
catch an echo of Galuppi's music among the Cretan
crags
154 The account found in IV,
282; IX, 431; and X, 136.
155 Ibid.

,

IX,

431 and footnote.

'In you come with your cold music till
creep in every nerve'. 156

I

These "intuitions of the mortality of the
Western

Civilization" which were so intense that Toynbee is
able to
repeat them in detail more than thirty years later,
are

strongly reinforced by his subsequent war experiences.

From

his travels in Greece, Toynbee returned to Balliol College
to
take up a tutorial fellowship in the autumn of 1912.

His

study and teaching up to the time of his entrance into gov-

ernment service in 1915, led to the publication of the article noted above on "The Growth of Sparta."

Although there

are certain overtones of the Study which can be found in the

article, such as a reference to the inadequacy of the small

political units, and the use of the metaphor of growth, there
appears to be very little suggestion in the article of the

Toynbee who repudiates traditional historiography in favor of
the law-making technique.

One would be more inclined to see

in it the first evidence of a young scholar working along

traditional lines to advance the research of a particular
segment of parochial history.

1

S7

Along with this study of early Greek history, Toynbee
maintains an interest in recent Greek history, to the extent
that the article on Sparta is followed a year later by a
156 Ibid

.

,

IV,

282.

For a critique of Toynbee 's essay by a contemporary
classics scholar see W. den Boer's "Toynbee and Classical History," in Toynbee and History p. 223.
9
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pamphlet on Greek Policy Since 1882 158
.

This thirty-five

page essay gives the background of the contemporary
Greek

struggle for liberation and concludes with an
estimate of the
future of the modern Greeks.

He predicts that, "We are here

in the presence of one of the most interesting
tendencies of

the present age:
it;

.

.

.

she has found a new spirit to inform

the Hellenism that inspired the nineteenth century will

insensibly yield place to the "Americanism" that is destined
to be characteristic of the twentieth,

..."

But again a reader in search of the roots of the

methodology of the Study finds little of significance in this
type of journalistic writing.
In the year that Toynbee enters government service

and begins to produce the series of atrocity studies, a book

comes from his hand entitled Nationality and the War 159
.

This five hundred page study has certain arguments and illus-

trations very familiar to a reader of the Study

.

But again

we look in vain for the methodological roots of the later

Toynbee,

What we do find is a psychological preparation,

a

receptivity or mental conditioning which helps us to understand Toynbee

affairs."

'

s

later delight in the "science of human

Nationality and the War is an attempt to review

^ 58 Arnold

J.

Toynbee, Greek Policy Since 1882

(London:

Oxford University, 1914)

Arnold J. Toynbee, Nationality and the War (London:
J. M.

Dent, 1915)

.
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problems of Nationality in the area affected
by the War,
according to his preface. He speaks of
himself as a "professional historian" and mentions the fact that
he will not confine himself to "narrative" altogether. 160
Aside from these

fragmentary notes on method, we do find

a

repetition of the

"Intimation of mortality" that had already formed the
thinking of the traveling historian in 1912.

In the preface a

familiar phrase expresses this note of pessimism, "we
are

walking in

trance across the ruins."

a

The war is described

as a "revaluing of all our values," and the present
predica-

ment as an "affair of life and death." 161

The opening tone

of chapter one is abrupt and dramatic; "For the first time in
our lives, we find ourselves in complete uncertainty as to
the future."

Towards the end of Nationality and the War

the same sense of impending disaster is expressed in the

explanation, "The old Europe is dead, the old vision vanished, and we are wrestling in agony for new inspiration.

That has been the narrative of this book." 163

And the con-

cluding words of the volume equates the catastrophe of the

present with the fate of the Greeks.
160 Ibid

.

,

Preface v.

,

p

161 Ibid.
162 TK

.,
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.

163 Ibid.,

.

p.

1
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.
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If they can profit by the present crisis
to
erate their energies for higher ends, then libthe
Kingdom of Heaven is at hand: if inspiration
fails them in this hour, then we are witnessing
the beginning of great evils for Hellas;
and the
Sovereign Nations of Europe are doomed to the
same destruction as the Sovereign Cities of
Greece 104

The series of "atrocity" accounts which flow
from the

pen of Toynbee at the Foreign Office in the next
five years
are fairly unimportant as far as revealing "our
well-tried

empirical method" of the Study

.

They indicate an author who

tries to adopt a "straight narrative account" breaking into
the account occasionally with judgments as to which witness
is telling the truth. 165

These accounts covered The Treat -

ment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 166 and The Destruction of Poland 167 in 1916; and in 1917, The Murderous Tyr anny of the Turks , 168 The Belgian Deportations , 169 The German
164 Ibid
ire

London:
166

.

,

500.

Arnold J. Toynbee, The German Terror in Belg ium
Hodder and Stoughton, 1917), preface.
Toynbee, The Treatment of Armenians

16° 7'Arnold

don:

p.

.

Toynbee, The Destruction of Poland (Lon~
T„ Fisher Unwin, 1916)"!
J.

168 Arnold J. Toynbee, The Murderous
Tyranny of the
Turks (London:
Hodder and Stoughton, 1917).
16 9

don:

"^Arnold J. Toynbee, The Belgian Deportations (LonT. Fisher Unwin, 1917).

180

Terror in Belgium, 170 The German Terror in
France 171 and
Turkey:
a Past and a Future 172
.

.

Apart from direct methodological notations, the
atrocity accounts must be observed as indicators
of Toynbee
compelling interest in the future of the West, and

1

s

of his

deeply-rooted sense of the impending perils of Western Civilization.
fire,

The graphic description of "our civilization" on

the references to its remains as "smoke and ashes"
that

introduced the Treatment of the Armenians

Destruction of Poland.

,

is echoed in The

Witnessing the action of the German

barbarians, as he had the action of the Turkish barbarians,

Toynbee gloomily predicts that:

"The present fate of Poland

foreshadows with inexorable clearness the fate that such a

settlement could bring upon us all.

.

.

.

The triumph of

German organization would not bring the millenium? it would

bring darkness and the shadow of death."
It was during the opening days of the first World War

that Toynbee began to draw comparisons between the destructive wars of the West and the breakdown of the Hellenic society.

"•'"Toynbee, The German Terror in Belgium

.

171
x/
-"-Arnold J.

don:

Toynbee, The German Terror in France (LonHodder and Stoughton, 1917)
.

172

York:

Arnold J. Toynbee, Turkey;
George Doran, 1917).

a Past and a Future

(New

181

The general war of 1914 overtook one reading
for
Literae Humaniores , and then suddenly my understanding was illuminated.
The experience that we
were having in our world now had been experienced
by Thucydides in his world already.
I was rereading him now with a new perception—perceiving
meanings in his words, and feelings behind his
phrases, to which I had been insensible until I,
in my turn, had run into that historical crisis'
that had inspired him to write his work. 173
The sense of catastrophe in the West which one can

trace in Toynbee

»

s

pre- Study days, and the identifying of

that doom with the disaster of the Greek breakdown, is made
more explicit in a Volume Ten discussion of the effects of

catastrophic events on historians.

Using himself as an exam-

ple of the intellectual inspiration that comes to a historian

from contemporary tragic events, he recalls the psychological

effects of the first World War upon himself.
He could not live through the experience of the
outbreak of war in A. D. 1914 without realizing
that the outbreak of war in 431 B. C. had brought
the same experience to Thucydides.
As he found
his own experience revealing to him, for the first
time, the inwardness of Thucydidean words and
phrases that had meant little or nothing to him
before, he realized that a book written in another
world more than 2,300 years ago might be a depository of experience which, in the reader's world,
were only just beginning to overtake the reader's
own operation. 17 4

This preoccupation with the fate of the West, this "intuition
of mortality" which had begun to plague Toynbee from the time
1 7
-'-'-'Arnold J.
"i

Toynbee, Civilization on Trial (New Yorks
Oxford University Press, 1948)
p. T.
,

174
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,

X,

94.
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of his traveling experience as a graduate student
in 1912, is

intensified by the course of the war.

Even after his

accounts of atrocities are behind him, and the war is
nearing
its end, he is gravely troubled about the "common
ruin of

civilization."

Toynbee discusses his pessimistic, post-war

outlook on Western civilization in two separate contexts.

In

1921, just three years after the experience had taken place,

and then again in Volume Ten, 175 approximately thirty- three
years after the event, he relives his post-war views in a

description of his own mental and psychological kinship with
Lucretius in his experiences of Roman disintegration.

First

let us glance at the comment of Toynbee:

Lucretius wrote that: about a hundred and fifty
years after Hannibal evacuated Italy, but the
horror is still vivid in his mind, and his poetry
arouses it in our minds as we listen. The writer
will never forget how those lines kept running in
his head during the spring of 1918.
And then a look at Toynbee

8

s

translation of the passage of

Lucretius in which he felt a sense of kinship with the Roman
poet

*

So death is nothing to us and matters nothing to
us
since we have proved that the soul is not
immortal. And as in time past we felt no ill,
when the Phoenecians were pouring in to battle on
every front, when the world rocked with the shock
and tumult of war and shivered from centre to
,

175 Ibid

.

l^Arnold
Greece
sity,

,

Toynbee, "History," in The Legacy of
Oxford Univer
ed. by Richard Livingstone (London:

1922)

,

p.

j.

315.

s

183

firmament, when all mankind on sea and land must
fall under the victor's empire and victory was
in doubt
so, when we have ceased to be, when
body and soul, whose unison is our being, have
been parted, then nothing can touch us we shall
not be and nothing can make us feel, no, not if
earth is confounded with sea and sea with heaven.

—

—

—

By 1920, Toynbee was out of government service.

He

was appointed in 1919 to the chair of Byzantine and Modern
Greek Language, Literature and History at the University of
London.

And in the summer of 1920, according to Toynbee the

first traces of the Study came into conscious focus.

perspective of 1951, Toynbee looks back upon

a

literary

effort of the summer of 1920 as the "first attempt
write the present work." 177

In the

...

to

This early attempt to write the

Study is, of course, extremely interesting to anyone con-

cerned with the motivation and the shaping of the methodology
of the later Toynbee.

The references to the 1920 attempt are

provocatively brief, but yet rather revealing.

Twice the

"attempt" is mentioned and commented upon; first in the preface to Volume Seven, and again in the "Acknowledgements" of

Volume Ten.
In the preface of Volume Seven the reference reads
In the summer of 1920, after the philosophic

contemporaneity of the Western and Hellenic
civilizations had been borne in upon me by the
experience of the First World War, I for the
first time consciously tried and, at this
first attempt, signally failed to write the

—

—

Toynbee, A Study of History

,

VII, Preface ix.

.

184

present work in the form (dictated by a Late
Medieval Italian education in the Greek and
Latin Classics) of a commentary on the second
chorus (11. 332-75) of Sophocles' Antigo ne.
I
did not succeed in finding my way into my
subject till more than a year later. 178
We do not have this "first attempt" of Toynbee

•

s

unless it is

contained in embryonic form in his address of May,
1920,
entitled "The Tragedy of Greece: A Lecture Delivered

for the

Professor of Greek to Candidates for Honours in Literae

Humaniores at Oxford;" 179 and in the similar essay on "History," which was published in 1921 in Richard Livingstone's

Legacy of Greece 180
.

in the essay on "History" Toynbee does

devote eighteen pages to "The Plot of Ancient Greek Civilization," dividing the account into three "Acts," and elabora-

ting on the course of the "tragedy."
But when one asks how this can be considered the

prototype of the massive ten-volume Study
from apparent.

,

the answer is far

In the context of this discussion on a plot

or drama of the Hellenic tragedy, there is a lengthy and

closely reasoned argument to the effect that

a

historian

ought to confine himself to the reading of one civilization,,
The discussion, so foreign to the familiar twenty-one civili-

zation surveys of the Study

,

reads as follows:

178 Ibid„
179

Arnold J. Toynbee, The Tragedy of Greece (London:
Oxford University Press, 1931)
180 Toynbee, "History.

—
185

But of course one asks: Why study Ancient
Civilization rather than ours? The study ofHellenic
any one
civilization is so complex, it demands so many
preliminary and subordinate studies— linguistic,
institutional, economic, psychological— that is likely
absorb all one's energies. The greatest historiansto
have generally confined themselves to the study
of a
single civilization, and the great Greek historians—Herodotus, Thucydides, and Polybius— concentrated on their own, and only studied others in
so
far as their own came in contact with them.
Clearly
people who are going to be historians, not for life/
but as an education for life, must make their choice.
They must practically confine themselves to studying
one civilization if they are to reap the fruits of
study at all, and in this case it is natural to ask:
Why study Hellenism rather than our own history? 181
The only suggestion in this discussion of Ancient

Greek Civilization that could lead to the law-making technique of the Study of 1927 is a brief reference to the possi-

bility that the "plot" might be repeated "in our own history.

"

It is possible that the great tragedies of history
that is, the great civilizations that have been
created by the spirit of man may all reveal the
same plot, if we analyze them rightly.
Each civilization—for instance, the civilization of Medieval
and Modern Europe and again that of Ancient Greeceis probably a variant of a single theme. 182

—

This hopeful lead which seems but a step from the comparative

method of the Study is, however, carefully modified and
indeed directed back to the more traditional task of the historian who confines himself to studying one civilization or
181 Ibid

.

182 Ibid.

,

p.

297

.

186

one national community.

And to study the plot of civilization in
a great
exposition of it—like the Hellenic exposition
or our own Western exposition— is surely
the
right goal or a humane education. 183
A second argument in the context of "The
Plot of

Ancient Greek Civilization" makes it impossible to
view Toynbee's literary efforts in the summer of 1920 as a
methodo-

logical prototype of the Study

.

Not only is there an

explicit argument for the concentration upon one area of history, as opposed to the "law-making technique" of the study

,

but Toynbee seems to align himself with the "history as art"

movement.

He reasons,

The study of a civilization is not different in
kind from the study of a literature. In both
cases one is studying a creation of the spirit
of man, or, in more familiar terms, a work of
art.
Civilization is a work of art in the literal
meaning of the phrase and not merely by a metaphor. ...
It is a social work of art, expressed
in social action, like a ritual or a play.
One
cannot describe it better than by calling it a
tragedy with a plot, and history is the plot of
the tragedy of civilization. 184

—

As soon as one recalls the emphasis on technical

apparatus and the "empirically demonstrated" laws of the
Study

,

the contrast is apparent.

It is not a contrast

between the immature scholar of 1920-21 and the mature
183 Ibid.
184 Ibid.

,

p.

296

187

scholar of 1927-34.

it is the contrast of a scholar
with

strong convictions but an uncertain methodology
as over
against the later Toynbee who has found a
"sovereign methodological clue" with which he can reach his
objective.
In this

early context, Toynbee emphasized the subjective
character of
Ancient Greek Civilization with the words:
This analysis is and must be subjective.
Everyone has to make his own, just as everyone has
to
apprehend for himself the form of a work of
art. lut>

Toynbee'

s

second reference to the "first attempt" in

the summer of 1920 to write the Study contains an additional

point that is not found in the Volume Seven reference and
that may disclose the true link between the attempt of 1920

and the actual writing in 1930.

In a Volume Ten footnote the

1920 experience is described in these words:
In my first attempt, made in the summer vacation
of A. D. 1920, I had tried to cast my ideas into
the form of a commentary on the second chorus in
Sophocles' Antigone (11. 332-75).
The theme of
this poem
'the Mystery of Man'
was apposite and
the poetry was magnificent, but the approach was
unpromising; for this expedient of referring a
question to some classical oracle was the Medieval

—

—

and Early Modern Western approach into which I had
been initiated at school, whereas the intellectual
enterprise on which I had now embarked was an
attempt to take bearings in the uncharted seas of
a post-Modern Chapter of Western history.
My
appeal to Sophocles had, in fact, been a false
move, and it was therefore neither surprising nor
regrettable that it had been a failure. 186
185 Ibid., p.

304.

186 Toynbee, A Study of History

,

X,

232.

188
In this second reference to the summer of
1920, Toynbee makes

more explicit the link between the "first
attempt" and the
He can regard the effort of 1920 as a
prototype to

Study_.

the massive Study not because of the
methodological likeness

but because of the similarity of the "intellectual
enter-

prise."

This distinction between the "form" or "approach"

and the "ideas" or "intellectual enterprise" makes
it possible for him to stress the fact that the first "form"
or

"approach" was a failure, while at the same time maintaining
that there is a continuity between his historical efforts of
1920 and the search as represented by the Study in 1930.
It is worthwhile to track down the origins of Toyn-

bee

•

s

"first attempt" before analyzing the nature of this

"intellectual enterprise."

Toynbee says that he had been

initiated at school into this method of "referring
to some classical oracle."

a

question

He describes it as "the Medieval

and Early Modern Western approach."

Whether Toynbee con-

\

sciously or unconsciously borrowed this approach from

J.

B.

Bury it is difficult to say with any degree of certainty, but
the words,

the poet, the drama, and the lines are strikingly

parallel to the methodological hint thrown out by Bury in his

Inaugural Address of 1902. 187

In that year, John Bagnell

Bury succeeded Lord Acton as the Regius Professor of Modern
187 Stern, The Varieties
of History , p. 210.

189

History at Cambridge, and chose as the topic
of his Inaugural
Lecture, "The Science of History." Still in
the years of his

optimism as to the great future of the historical
sciences
and the future progress of civilization, Bury
was certain

that a more "scrupulously exact conformity to
facts" would

bring about the "revolution which is slowly and silently
progressing" 1

^

in the historical profession.

Along with his

faith in the ultimate triumph of the Rankean methodology
Bury

commits himself to

a

concept of development which may be

briefly stated as faith in the progress of man.

Trying to

express this "wider transformation" which he believed was
taking place but to which the "world is not yet alive," 189 he
refers the question of present progress back to the oracle of
Hellas; back to the Fifth Century B. C.
There is no passage, perhaps, in the works of
the Greek tragedians so instructive for the
historical student as that song in the Antigone
of Sophocles, in which we seem to surprise the
first amazed mediation of man when it was borne
in upon him by a sudden startling illumination,
how strange it is that he should be what he is
and should have wrought out, among other things,
the city-state.
He had suddenly, as it were,
waked up to realize that he himself was the wonder of the world, 'None is more wonderful than
man.
That intense expression of a new detached
wondering interest in man, as an object of curiosity, gives us the clue to the inspiration of
Herodotus and the birth of history.! 90
'

188 Ibid

.

,

p.

211.

189 Ibid

.

,

p

215.

190 Ibid.

e

4

s

"

190

Bury's footnote, number six, notes the source
of his quotation as simply "Sophocles, Antigone lines 331-75."
Toyn,

bee'

s

reference as given above was, "I had tried to
cast my

ideas into the form of a commentary on the
second chorus in

Sophocles' Antigone (11. 332-75). 191

Bury may have picked

up his "clue" to history from the 1895 Inaugural
Address of

Lord Acton who was his immediate predecessor as Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge 192 and who refers to
,

a "speech of

Antigone " as one of the sources that "gives dig-

nity and grace and intellectual value to history, and its

action on the ascending life of man."
It is not likely that Toynbee at age seven heard the

speech of Lord Acton, or at age thirteen heard the Inaugural

Address of J

.

B.

Bury, but he does note that ten years after

the Inaugural Address,

"In the autumn of A. D.

1912

had the

I

happiness of coming to know the great historian personally," 193

and he shows familiarity with several of Bury's

books. 194

From the evidence already cited of Toynbee

'

awareness of the mortality of Western Civilizations, and from
the pessimistic tone of his written material that is avail191

192

See page 69.

Dalberg-Acton

,

Lectures on Modern History

193 Toynbee, A Study of History
19 Ibid.

,

IX,

pp.

,

66-67? X, 234.

X,

2

34.

,
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3.

191

able from the years 1920-21, it is possible
to see why Toynbee in the post-war world might have
found Bury's concept of

development somewhat "unpromising" and altogether
a "false
move. "195

As he sees

of civilization." 196

.,

history is the

plofc Qf the

traggdy

And in his essay on "History" he

arrived at the two dark conclusions that we are
just being

overtaken by experiences that had overtaken Thucydides
in
431, 197 and that Hellas had broken down in 431 B.
C. 198
If one can conclude that Toynbee, while picking
up

the reference to Sophocles from Bury, was not at the
same

time adopting Bury's immense confidence in the progress of

civilization, it is also likely that Toynbee was not adopting

Bury's superb confidence that just one school of history

would shortly emerge.
Bury was confident that when Ranke

'

s

text,

"Ich will

nur sagen wie es eigentlich gewesen ist," was fully taken to
heart, though there be many schools of political philosophy,

there will no longer be diverse schools of history. 199

He

was fully convinced that history could no longer be regarded
195 Stern, The
Varieties of History
196 Toynbee,

p.

215.

"History," p. 297.

197 Toynbee, A Study of History

198 Toynbee,

,

,

X,

94.

"History," p. 317.

199 Stern, The Varieties of History
p. 215.
,

192

as an art, 200 nor as a branch of literature 201
.

stage of Toynbee

s

•

m

this

methodological development it is evident

that he equates his study of Hellenic civilization
with literature and art, and further insists that everyone
ought to

make his own "subjective" analysis of Ancient Greek
Civilization,

"just as everyone has to apprehend for himself the
form

of a work of art."

The conclusion remains then that beyond the fact that

Toynbee accepts Bury

'

s

distinction that historians use both

data and clues, there is no further light to be gained for a

study of Toynbee'

s

methodological development by an addi-

tional examination of the "Bury" lead.

Turning back to the Volume Ten explanation of the
"first attempt," it is apparent that Toynbee makes explicit
the link between the 1920 failure and the 1930 success in

writing the Study
prise on which

,

in the phrase,

"the intellectual enter-

had now embarked was an attempt to take

I

bearings in the uncharted seas of

Western history."

a

post-modern chapter of

This characterization of the Study as "an

attempt to take bearings," and as preeminently

a

concern with

the future of Western civilization is important for an under-

standing of Toynbee 's choice of method.

It brings together

the expressed pessimism of his work on the atrocity accounts,
200 Ibid.

,

p.

212.

201 Ibid.,

p.

214.

,

.

the strong penchant for prophecy in his journalistic essays
on current events, and his mystic intimations of mortality as
a

youthful traveler.

est in the 'laws

1

It sheds light on his developing inter-

of history, and explains the reason why the

original plan of the book was to climax in Part XI
in the Histories of Civilizations

M

,

"Rhythms

and in Part XII, "Pros-

pects of the West," 202

Rather interesting corroboration of this interpretation is found in another of Toynbee

mer of 1920.

*

references to the sum-

s

Several critics 203 have pointed out the simi-

larities between Toynbee and Spengler, without being sure at

what stage in Toynbee

1

the work of Spengler.

s

development he became acquainted with
Toynbee himself clarifies the problem

in an essay on "My View of History" which was first published

in 1946 as a contact publication in the volume

Between West and East 204
.

,

Britain

Referring to his first introduc-

tion to the works of Spengler he says:

This question was simmering in my mind when, in
placed
the summer of 1920, Professor Namier
in my hands Oswald Spengler s Untergang des Abend la-ndes
As I read those pages teeming with firefly
flashes of historical insight, I wondered at first
whether my whole inquiry had been disposed of by
.

.

.

f

.

202 Toynbee, A Study of History
20 3

VII, Preface.

,

Montagu, Toynbee and History

,

p.

206 and p. 210.

20 ^This essay was later republished along with several
others in, Arnold J. Toynbee, Civilization on Trial (New
Oxford University Press, 1948)
Yorks

:

,

194

Spengler before even the questions, not to speak
of the answers, had fully taken shape in my own
2

mind, 205

Toynbee's psychological reaction to his reading of Spengler
is of special importance.

His first reaction was that Speng-

ler had possibly "disposed of" Toynbee's own "whole
inquiry."

The grave concern for the West, the desire to "work out" its

prospects, to awaken others to the impending catastrophe are

implicit in this fear of Toynbee's that there may be nothing
left for him to do.

The opening lines of Spengler's work

are
In this book is attempted for the first time the

venture of predetermining history, of following
the still untravelled stages in the destiny of a
Culture, and specifically of the only Culture of
our times and on our planet which is actually in
the phase of f ulf illment--the West-EuropeanAmerican.

And Spengler goes on to emphasize the prophetic mission of
the historian

This is what has to be viewed and viewed not
with the eyes of the partisan the idealogue,
the up-to-date novelist, not from this or that
'standpoint', but in a high, time-free perspective embracing whole millenniums of historical
world- forms if we are really to comprehend the
great crisis of the present. ^0?
,

,

A year later, in September of 1921, Toynbee has a
205 Ibid.,

p.

9.

206

Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West trans, by
Charles F. Atkinson (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1950)
p. 3.
,

,

^^Ibid.

,

p.

34.

—
195

"plan" for the Study

,

but he is still without a method.

He

describes the way the "plan" came to him in
one of the most
interesting personal accounts of his study
.

On Saturday, 17 September, 1921, I was
travelling
with my school-fellow and life-long friend
Theodore
Wade-Gery in the Orient Express en route from Constantinople to England, Before dawn we had been
awakened by the rumbling of our train as it crossed
the bridge over the Maritsa, below Adrianople,
and,
for the rest of that day, we were travelling on
westward. ... As I stood, hour after hour, at
the corridor window, watching the stream glide
past, ... my mind began to dream of historical
and legendary events.
These stimulating
sights and reminiscences must have released some
psychic wellspring at subconscious level,
before I went to sleep that night, I found that I
had put down on half a sheet of notepaper a list of
topics which, in its contents and in their order,
was substantially identical with the plan of this
book as it now stands printed in volumes I, IV, and
and VIII.
The path that had thus unexpectedly
and, as it might seem, casually opened at last
before my feet was to carry me farther than I then
foresaw
.

.

.

.

—

„

,

.

It is difficult to account for the emphasis in this

preface upon a mystic origin for the Study

,

except to refer

to Toynbee's obvious interest in mystic experiences and

introspection.

Actually if his other explanations of influ-

ences of men and books upon his development are correct,
there is little need to speak of the arrival of the "Plan" as

"unexpected" and "as it might seem, casually

before my feet."

— opened,

at last

For a year now he had been acquainted with

Spengler's attempt to predict the future of the West by means
208 Toynbee, A Study of History VII, Preface x.
,

196

of a morphology of civilizations.

The similarities between

the West and the Ancient Greek Civilization
had already been

borne in upon him by his war experiences, so
he relates.

According to the reconstruction of his past in "My
View of
History," he had been thinking about the problem of
philosophic contemporaneity of societies even before his
reading
of Spengler, and had then criticized Spengler because
he had

not treated the question of the genesis of civilizations. 209
Other than these broad references to the "Plan of
1921" the Toynbee papers and notes contain no copies of the

actual plan.
ler

'

s

it is probable that it bore the stamp of Speng-

influence, if the contemporary writings of Toynbee are

sufficient witness to his general approach in the early
twenties.

Biological analogies abound.

Toynbee seems to be

fascinated with the thought that his description of the West
as a "child" of Greece,

"may be something more than a meta-

phor, for societies, like individuals are living creatures,

and may be expected to exhibit the same phenomena.

"
.

.

.

210

On occasion the analogies to biological phenomena

become rather confusing to anyone who is accustomed to the

metaphors of the Study

.

For example Toynbee describes the

early Christian church as "the last phase of ancient Hellenic
209

Toynbee, Civilization on Trial

210 Toynbee,

"History," p. 289.

,

p.

10.

.

.

197

or Greco-Roman Society; which died after it had
intercourse

with other societies and had given birth to several
children

211
•

in a further elaboration of the rela-

•

•

tions between societies as comparable to rape he argues that:

Civilizations, like individuals, spring from two
parents, and in all new civilizations whose parentage we can trace, the heritage from the civilized mother has been more important than that
from the barbarian who violated her. 212
As late as January 1924, Toynbee still seems to be

writing under the influence of Spengler

v

s

heady "analogies,"

which were supposed to lay bare the "organic structure of
history." 213

Character

,

The Introduction to Greek Civilization and

written in January of 1924 describes the first

part of the book as "occupied with the life history of Hellenic civilization, its vicissitudes between genesis and

extinction, or what, in the case of an individual human
being, we should call his or her "career.

'"

Toynbee supports

his analogy by saying:

This is the dramatic side of lif e , and also the
side on which each particular life has most in
common with every other.
There is no human
interest in a 'career unless the subject of it
which maintains its self-identity
is a "character
through all its reactions to life and all the
Characters are
enlargement of its experience
.

.

•

1

8

,

.

211 Arnold J. Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece
Constable and Company, 1922)
p^ 32*8
and Turkey London
:
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^

^
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.

^

,
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213 Spengler, The Decline of the West, I, 5.
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something permanent, and they are something
indivia
infinite * S C
in
th:ir :ariety:f?4

^fd

In a companion volume of the same
year, Greek His -

torical Thought, he reiterates his belief in
the doctrine of
philosophical contemporaneity and supports it with
a biological analogy.

Writing in the introduction dated January

1,

1924, he says:
In the philosophical sense,

all civilizations
have been and are and will continue to be
contemporaneous with one another. They are all
the offspring of the same family in the same
215
generation.
.

.

.

And in the same introduction, when Toynbee speaks in a matter-of-fact way of the sinking of the Western civilization,
it is a distillation of his earlier mystic intimations, his

post-war pessimism, and of Spengler's Decline of the West

.

In other words, the world of Hellenism
was
a world like that in which we live today, by
contrast with the Christian dispensation which
in the chronological sense intervenes between us
or with that religion, yet unborn, which will
undoubtedly lay up a new treasure in a new
heaven as our world sinks, to founder at last
like its predecessors in 'the abyss where all
things are incommensurable 216
.

.

.

However limited we are in our knowledge of the "Plan"
214

Arnold J. Toynbee, Greek Civilization and Character
(New York:
New American Library, 1953)
Preface viii.
,

215

York

j

Arnold J. Toynbee, Greek Historical Thought (New
New American Library, 1952)
Preface xv.
',

216 Ibid., xi.
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drawn up "on a half a sheet of notepaper" in
September, 1921,
and how Toynbee intended to work it out
methodologically;

however much one might speculate as to whether it would
have
paralleled Spengler's intuitive and symbolic morphology
of

civilizations, as one approaches the year 1927 there is a

clarification of the aims of the Study and the method through
which it might be accomplished.
Toynbee is quite explicit about the time in which the
stud Y to° k shape in the form of original notes.

duced Volumes Four through Six he made
in the preface that,

a

When he pro-

point of indicating

"the original sketch of Parts IV and V

[the contents of Volumes Four, Five and Six] was worked out,

like that of all the parts that precede and follow, in the

summers of 1927 and 1928,

.

.

.

"

2l7

Again in the preface to

the last batch of volumes he comments that, "more than seventeen years had now passed since the latest of the notes for
the book, which had all been written between June, 1927, and

June,

1929, had been put on paper." 218

On three occasions in

the same preface he refers to the relation of his present

thinking with his thinking and ""original notes'" of 1927.

Although it is an argument by implication, one is tempted to

"

217
'Toynbee

218

,

A Study of History

Ibid., VII, Preface vii.

219 Ibid., vii and viii.

,

IV, Preface viii.
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see in this constant reference to the notes of 1927
an indi-

cation that this planning was by far the more significant

starting point, as opposed to the notes of 1921.
In Volume Nine,

Toynbee again emphasized the impor-

tance of the notes of 1927:

When the writer was planning the present Study
in the summer of A. D. 1927, he saw that he
would have to grapple with the problem of the
respective roles of Law and Freedom in human
history before he could attempt to win a Pisgah
sight of the prospects of the Western Civilization.
Yet in the winter of A. D. 1928-9, when,
with that ulterior objective in mind, he was
drafting his notes for eventually writing the
220
present part,
.

.

.

Also in Volume Ten, Toynbee underscores the significance of 1927 for the origin of the Study

.

Speaking of his

desire to complete his study of the Arabic and Ottoman Turkish languages and to begin learning Classical New Persian he

says that he regrets having been compelled to suspend work on

these languages by the new tasks of 1924 and 1927.

The sig-

nificant dates are combined in the explanation:
After having started in A. D. 1924 to produce an
annual Survey of International Affairs under the
auspices of Chatham House, he had started in
A. D. 1927 to make systematic notes for the present Study which he began to write, 'pari passu
with the Survey in A. D. 1930. 221

1

,

Beyond these references to the importance of the work
220 Ibid., IX, 167.
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of making notes in the years 1927,

28,

and 29, there are

several significant passages which contain Toynbee's attitude
and purposes in those years in which the outlines of the

whole Study are under construction.

Here the emphasis falls

upon the growing "intimations of mortality/

1

the fear that

contemporaries are not aware of the crisis of the West, and
the desire to predict the immediate future of Western Civili-

zation

.

An example of Toynbee's pessimism in 1929 can be

found in his reference to The Rime of the Ancient Mariner
This uncanny uniqueness of the contemporary
situation of the West first struck the writer
when he was putting on paper his original notes
for the last portion of this Study in the early
months of A. D. 1929; and the subject and title
of the present Part were then immediately conjured up in his mind by a sudden reminiscence of
a passage in The Rime of the Ancient Mariner
In his mind's eye he saw the picture of the
stricken ship becalmed on the boundless expanse
of the South Seas, with the crew prostrated by
the torments of thirst; he saw the spectre of
bark shooting towards him from the horizon on
which the ribs of its skeleton hull had shown up
sinisterly black against the blood-red disk of a
and his recollection of the
setting sun;
poem ran on to bring before his eyes a vision of
the dying sailors giving up the ghost one by one,
till, on board the spellbound ship, the Ancient
Mariner is left alone alive with his dead companions lying around him.
The many men so beautiful.
And they all dead did lie:
And a thousand thousand slimy things
and so did 1.222
Lived on:
.

,

.

222 Ibid.

,

IX,

.

.

412.

,
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References to Toynbee

•

s

same grim sense of foreboding

may be found in other parts of the study

.

In the Volume Four

introduction to the Problem of the Breakdowns of
Civilizations, he refers to the same Rime of the Ancient
Mariner as a

master description of the contemporary Western world.

It is

expressed in such statements as, "For our present purpose we
have merely to take note of the fact that, among the civili-

zations which are alive at the present day, every one, apparently, has already broken down and is now in process of dis-

integration, with the possible exception of our own." 223
he further comments,

And

"As we cast our eyes around a world in

which the majority of the civilizations known to us are
already dead, while the rest of the survivors are all either
in decline of in extremis ,

and as we remind ourselves that we

have not any means of divining what our own society's expec-

tation of life may be, we may be inclined to read into the

panorama of history the same grim motif that the poet divined
in the stones of Westminster Abbey,

Mortality, behold and fearl
What a change of flesh is herei" 22 ^

Moved by a deep fear for the future of the West and an intimation that the "Time of Troubles" has descended upon us,
Toynbee speaks of the failure of his contemporaries to "look
223

Ibid

.

,

IV,

224 Ibid., 4.

3.
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at the facts of History as these presented themselves
to the
naked eye." 225 He describes Westerners of the twenties as a

generation which continue "to peer at this formidable spectacle through smoked glasses inherited from its grand-

parents." 226

In the same context he dismisses with strong

words the generation which included

J.

B.

Bury and his faith

in the progress of civilization:

The generation of Homo Occidentalis that had
already been in its dotage in A. D. 1914 had
been the latest generation to hold, with an
unquestioning faith, a dogma which, by then,
had been serving for a quarter of a millenium
as the gist of a Late Modern Western Man's
mechanically desiccated and peptonized religion.
This fallaciously comfortable doctrine
was that the Western Society could see ahead
of it an unbroken vista of progress towards an
22 ^
Earthly Paradise,
.

,

.

In a significant reference to the years 1928-29

quoted earlier 228 Toynbee says that as "he was drafting his
notes

...

he was conscious that the fateful question then

still seemed academic to most people in Western coun-

tries

..."

The context of the quotation identifies the

fateful question as the prospects of the Western Civilization.
225 Ibid

.

226 Ibid

.

227

,

IX,

167.

Ibid.

228 See page 81.
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To Toynbee the failure of his contemporaries
in 1929
to properly assess and heed the crisis of Western
civiliza-

tion was such a prominent and pressing feature in his
own

thinking that he even wonders if it might not be the result
of an "irrational imagination."

Speaking of his own gloomy

estimate in contrast with the cheerful complacency of his
contemporaries, he asks, "what sense could be made of an
irrational imagination's oracular impulse to identify the

West's situation in A.

D.

1929 with the Ancient Mariner's

plight after the death of his companions?

Need

a

once more

prosperous Western Civilization take the other civilizations'
deaths to heart?

In A. D.

1929 it had been easier than it

was in A. D. 1950 for Western common sense to dismiss this

disturbing question." 22 ^
In this analysis of the psychological motivation of

the author of the Study in the important years of 1927-29 one
can detect along with Toynbee

'

s

sense of the imminent mortal-

ity of the West, and his concern over the complacency of his

fellow-members of Western Society, an almost irresistable
desire to predict the future of the West.
In a Volume Nine reference to the writing out of the

original notes for the Study in 1927, Toynbee relates that in
the summer of 1927 he was grappling with the respective roles
229 Toynbee, A Study of History
IX,
,

413
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of Law and Freedom in human history.

We know from the pref-

ace of Volume Seven that in those years, and
indeed up to the

year 1946, the Part called "Law and Freedom in History"
had
been originally developed as "Rhythms in the Histories
of

Civilizations."

He further states that he had to grapple

with this Part on "Rhythms in the Histories of Civilizations"
before he "could attempt to win a Pisgah sight of the pros-

pects of the Western Civilization."

Additional confirmation

that Toynbee was laboring over a question of the fate of the
West, can be seen in the next sentence when he adds, "Yet in
the winter of A. D.

1928-9, when, with that ulterior objec-

tive in mind, he was drafting his notes.

"
.

.

.

230

A close examination of the outline of Toynbee

's

orig-

inal Plan of the book supports the view that it was not sim-

ply set up as a systematic morphology of civilizations, but
was a plan that led to a formulation of the "Rhythms" in the

Histories of Civilizations, and was to be climaxed by

a

Part XII discussion of the "Prospects of the Western Civilization."

This is verified by Toynbee

'

s

description of

Part XII as an "experiment in prognostication."

In an illu-

minating chapter on "The Need for this Inquiry," the by now
(November 30, 1950)

reluctant author who had sketched out the

prospects of the West in 1929, but at the present could feel

"

only a sense of distaste for this speculative subject,

attempts to bolster his courage in order to proceed with
the
prediction.

During the course of the argument he remarks

that the passage of time has helped because, "this lesson

from the experience of twenty-one sinisterly illuminating

years had made experiments in prognostication less hazardous
by pinning the still patently open questions within a frame-

work of relatively sure prediction. 231
The desire to predict, and thus to shake his contem-

poraries out of their complacency, is a prominent theme in
the Volume Six examination of the "Process of Disintegra-

tion."

For example, after finding that the rhythm of disin-

tegration has had a regular pattern in societies such as the
Hellenic, Sinic, Sumeric, Orthodox Christian, Hindu, Syriac,

Far Eastern, Babylonic and Orthodox Christian in Russia,
Toynbee asks whether there are "Symptoms in Western History
of this familiar disintegration-pattern.

While acknowledging

the problems that may make it impossible to plot out the

course and write up the log of the voyage of a still living

Western civilization, he nevertheless goes ahead with the
task of prediction.

Suppose that the pattern which we have now detected
in the histories of so many disintegrating civilizations were to prove to be discernable in our own
Western history, too. Might that not be regarded as
231 Ibid.

,

409.

1"

.

.
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presumptive evidence that our
has already been overtaken by
disintegration which is known
have been the fate of so many
tatives of the species? 232

own civilization
a process of
for certain to
other represen-

This is followed by a series of analogies between the
pattern
of disintegration in other societies and the events in
the

West since the sixteenth century.

Still couching his prophe-

cies in a tentative fashion as questions rather than direct

assertion, he asks,
Are these devils to dwell in our empty and swept
and garnished house till they have driven us to
suicide? If the analogy between our Western
Civilization's modern history and other civilizations' 'Times of Troubles' does extend to points
of chronology, then a Western 'Time of Trouble'
which appears to have begun sometime in the sixteenth century may be expected to find its end
sometime in the twentieth century; and this prospect may well make us trouble; ...
We cannot
say for certain that our doom is at hand; and yet
we have no warrant for assuming that it is not;
for that would be to assume that we are not as
other men are; and any such assumption would be
at variance with everything that we know about
human nature either by looking around us or by
introspection
This dark doubt is a challenge which we cannot
evade; and our own destiny depends on our
response 233

With these considerations of the psychological state
of Toynbee in the crucial years of 1927 through 1929 in mind,
it is important to turn next to the question of the shaping

of his method for the massive Study
232

Ibid

.

,

VI,

233 Ibid.

,

320.

314

.

A normal point of

s
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departure would be Toynbee
his debt to Professor

F.

1

J.

s

Volume Ten "acknowledgement" of
Teggart.

In this paragraph with

its accompanying footnote, Toynbee suggests that
Teggart'

contribution was methodological— that he rescued Toynbee
from
the "baffling obscurities in any initial problem
of method

and procedure

.

.

.

"

234

we have identified this initial

attempt with his early struggles of 1920 through 1924 to give
shape and substance to his pessimism about contemporary Western civilization, his sense of impending disaster and his

great desire to awaken his contemporaries to the crisis by

accurate prognostication of the fate of the West.

What Teg-

gart supplies sometime between the years 1925 when his Theory
of History first appears and 1927 when Toynbee'

s

"original

notes" are constructed is "a sovereign clue which has not

only initiated me into my subject but has piloted me through
it."

The question as to "What is the nature of this sover-

eign clue from Teggart?", or "What methodological principles
are taken from Teggart in shaping the methodology of the

Study ?" may be answered under four headings.
Teggart'

s

Toynbee shares

strongly expressed desire to escape relativity,

which is coupled with a strongly-worded attack on traditional
historiography.

Thirdly there is a heavy dependence by Toyn-

234 Ibid., IX, 232.

.

:

t
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bee upon Teggart's explanation for the errors of
traditional

historiography as rooted in the eighteenth century.

Finally

there is a close similarity between the proposed solution
of

Teggart's "science of man" and the scientific motif in Toynbee
As a preliminary and necessary observation one might

note that the Toynbee of the Study gives explicit and enthu-

siastic credit to Teggart for his methodological aid, but

Teggart in his Theory of History uses Toynbee as an example
of the type of historiography he is combatting.

It is not

without significance that the Toynbee he attacks is the Toynbee of the "first attempt"; the Toynbee who wrote the chapter
on "History" in the book The Legacy of Greece in 1922.

This

is the Toynbee who had the "ideas" for his Study but could

not find an appropriate "form" for them.

Teggart's criticism

reads
The picture varies from writer to writer, but
perhaps the most widely adopted type has been
that arrived at by instituting an analogy between
the life cycle of the individual and the entire
The most recent example
existence of humanity.
of this mode of thought is not without interest.

Teggart then adds

a

lengthy quotation from Toynbee

"s

^
chapter

in The Legacy of Greece on the analogy between Western Soci-

ety and the birth and death of a person.

Toynbee

's

Teggart dismisses

theory and a variety of such theories advanced as a

235 Frederick J. Teggart, Theory of History (New Haven
Yale University Press, 1925) , pi 42.
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basis for a synthesis of world history, as "personal
speculations" which are the "unavoidable result of the
adoption of

traditional historiography as the sole form for the
statement
of the results of historical investigation.

1,236

It is difficult to know whether Teggart's criticism

led Toynbee to give up his "first attempt" at a history
of

civilizations.

Although there are in the Study several prot-

estations as to the limited value of biological analogies,
and direct assertions that societies are not organisms 237 it
is likely that Toynbee had already found his first approach

unpromising before his reading of Teggart's brief criticism.
Teggart's positive contribution to Toynbee may best
be seen as a "sovereign clue" or way to escape the relativity

of the historical observer.

From the evidence in an earlier

chapter on "Toynbee the Explorer" it would be difficult to
deny that Toynbee was in his own view

a

methodological

explorer, grappling with the wilderness of historical data,
and the trackless wastes of as yet unframed historical quesHis problem is sketched out in his repeated use of

tions.

the phrase "shimmer of relativity" and his self-description
as an historian seeking for the "presence of some constant

and absolute object of historical thought in the background."
236 Ibid.,
7

VI, 175.
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II, 219 and 230;
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This approach to the study of history through

a

consideration

of the problem of relativity is not at all
characteristic of
the writings of Toynbee before 1927.

There is, however, in

the writings of Teggart an almost unvarying
approach to the

theory of history by a posing of the problem of
relativity in
one aspect or another.

As early as 1916, in Teggart'

s

Prolegomena to His -

tory, he introduces the subject of relativity by quoting from

Principal Caird's address on "The Study of History" given at
the University of Glasgow.

Teggart selects Caird's question-

ing of the scientific status of the study of history, when

Caird declares:

"Knowledge which has not yet been elevated

out of the domain of facts and details, which has not submitted itself to the grasp of principles, or become in some

measure illuminated and harmonized by the presence of law,
cannot,

I

suppose, be regarded as a fit instrument of the

higher education." 238
these words:

Following this quotation Teggart adds

"To this challenge there has been no adequate

response on the part of those who are professionally engaged
in the study and teaching of history.

note Teggart

1

s

11

It is interesting to

use of the terms "challenge and response" in

1916 and to speculate on its appearance as a possible source

of Toynbee
2

8

s

famous thematic use of the terms in his

38 Frederick J.

(Berkeley:

Teggart, Prolegomena to History
University of Calif ornia Press 1916)
p.
,

,

3.

.
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Study, 239 but it is more important for this analysis
to note
the fact that Teggart opens his subject with

a

series of con-

flicting views and opinions as to the validity and
universality of historical knowledge.
In 1918, Teggart wrote a volume on The Processes of

History

u
,

Again the introduction to the subject is con-

structed around the "wide differences that exist between the
many and various groups into which mankind is broken up."
The heterogenous points of view listed by Teggart include not

only the differences between French, Belgians, Italians, and

other Europeans, but differences between Europe and Asiatic,
between the Europeans and the Sikhs, Rajputs, Afghans, Buddhists and Mohammedans.
By 1925, Teggart is able to give more systematic

expression to "present discontents" with the relativity of
the social sciences.

In his introduction to the Theory of

History he summarizes his problem in this fashion:
The problem with which we are confronted is set,
then, by the fact that while publicists urge the
need of a science of society in the name of the
general welfare, and while teachers urge the need
of instruction in the elements of social science
in the interest of the intelligence of the people,
the higher learning of the universities
in
response to these demands , offers only a series of
v

9

,

2

p.

39

For various views see Montagu, Toynbee and History

,

207.

Haven:

Frederick J. Teggart, The Processes of History (New
Yale University Press, 1918)

,

.

,
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uncoordinated opinions as to the relationship of
certain academic subjects, each of which pursues
particular and separatist aims, by the employment
of exclusive modes of investigation 241
A final example of Teggart'

s

approach to the theory

of history through the problem of relativity may be found
in
a 1927 address to the

American Historical Association in

which Teggart poses a question strikingly like the question
in Toynbee' s opening chapter of the Study

,

The question, then, which calls for an answer is
whether our understanding of the greater problems
of history must, in perpetuity, remain subject to
the influence of transitory fashions in explanation; whether the formation of our judgments as to
what actually happened in the past must continue
to be subordinate to interests
religious, philosophical, political, economic or social which
undergo change from generation to generation, if
not from year to year. 242
f

8

—

—

Our second area of investigation into the nature of
the "sovereign clue" given to Toynbee by Teggart concerns the

attack which both men make on traditional historiography.

Again an argument from silence
is in order.

,

while limited in usefulness

One might argue that the lack of a sense of

methodological antithesis in the pre- Study writings of Toynbee is due to the fact that no particular occasion presented

itself to the early Toynbee to discuss problems of method.

However the series of sharp criticisms in the Study combined
241
242

Teggart, Theory of History

,

Preface xv-xvi.

Frederick J. Teggart, Two Essays on History
(Berkeley:
Privately printed by Bruce Brough Press, 1930)
p.

6

.
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with the fact that many of these criticisms repeat the Teggart criticisms gives greater credence to the view that part
of the "sovereign clue" which Toynbee discovered in Teggart

was a deep discontent with contemporary historical methodology-

Teggart

1

general annoyance with the contemporary

s

world of historical scholarship may be found in his frequent
reference to the passivity and intellectual myopia of the
historians.

Like the later descriptions by Toynbee

tional" and "academic" are terms of disapproval.

,

"tradi-

When Teg-

gart sketches out his investigation in three successive

phases

,

he introduces the analysis with the argument that:

The critical aspect of the present inquiry has
its outcome in finding, first, that history, so
far from being 'scientific has remained satisfied
with its traditional function of constructing nar243
ratives of happenings in the past,
8

.

.

.

And as a more direct criticism of the historians, Teggart
says, "It is remarkable, indeed,

that the fact should not

have impressed itself more generally on the minds of contem-

porary scholars that when established modes of procedure have

brought to the surface irreconcilable views as to method and
aim of inquiry in any field, the time has come for a farreaching inquiry into the theoretical foundations of the subject in question

a

"

244

243 Teggart, Theory of History Preface xix.
,
244 Ibid.

9
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Again in his 1927 address to the American Historical

Association Teggart argues that, "The passive attitude
of
historians, during the last century, has placed a serious

obstacle in the way of advance towards the scientific study
of Man; it has proved a barrier to the acquisition of that

knowledge which is required for the guidance of the world at
the present time." 245

The identification of traditional historiography with
the current professional historians had already been made by

Teggart in the book from which Toynbee. took his "sovereign
clue."

There Teggart discusses the growing irritation of the

other social scientists with their historian colleagues.

He

remarks that, "In the study of history, the activities of

scholars give evidence of a widespread dissatisfaction with
the conventional procedure of 'academic' historians."

A

reader of the ninth volume of the Study is reminded of the
same observation put into a much more dramatic setting with

Toynbee

'

s

word picture of the sea gulls and the "comically

'know-nothing' air of the domesticated ducks" of Round Pond
in Kensington Gardens, London.

As he describes it, the sea

gulls were catching the morsels of bread thrown to the ducks
by the visitors in the park, and the ducks "were saving their
face by pretending not to notice how aggressively the bois-

terous trespassers were behaving."

The moral of the story is

245 Teggart, Two Essays on History

,

p.

11.

not left to the intuitive powers of the reader for "When the

writer heard his wife's voice asking him, in

a tone of

amused

surprise, why he had suddenly burst out laughing, he realized
that this comic encounter between ducks and gulls on the

Round Pond in Kensington Gardens had moved him to mirth by

presenting itself to his imagination as an animated allegory
of a drolly similar encounter between historians and social

scientists.

1,246

Toynbee, like Teggart, finds it difficult to

understand how traditional and academic historians can continue to act like ducks when the sea gulls are swallowing up
the food which belongs to the ducks by right of inheritance.

Our analysis of the elements of traditional histori-

ography which Toynbee wished to repudiate included a notice
of his sharp attack on "nationalistic" history.

true that Toynbee

?

s

While it is

dislike of nationalism was rooted in his

experiences of the first World War and its bitter aftermath, 247 it is significant that his attack on nationalism in

historiography so closely parallels the Teggart criticisms.
If Toynbee s hostility to nationalistic historiography had
'

stemmed from his journalistic experiences it is likely that
his attack would have focused on the emotional prejudices of

English, French, Turkish or Greek historians.
246

Toynbee, A Study of History

,

IX,

What actually

194.

247

Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey
pp. 361-362.

,

.
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takes place is not an emotionally based irritation with the
\

nationalistic prejudices of his fellow historians, but a
high-level criticism of the limiting nature of the work of
the universal historian when he has to work with the tradi-

tional units of national, political histories.

In this sit-

uation the criticism is surprisingly like the Teggart criti-

cism from which the following excerpt is taken:
The type of synthesis dominant in the nineteenth
century is a product of the movement, in political
discussion, which has concentrated attention upon
the idea of the State.
Nationalistic history and
the Theory of the State are products of one and
the same set of conditions.
They are alike particularistic, and alike result in a narrowing of
sympathy and attention.
The wealth of materials
available for the study of the past of a country
cannot be brought within the scope of any 'central
government synthesis. Nationalistic historiography can never do justice to the content of the
past* 2
1

^

It is rather significant that Teggart and Toynbee

employ the same illustration of the limitations of nationalistic historiography.

In 19 25

,

Teggart says

s

"The restric-

tions imposed upon historical study and historical writing

will be recognized at once if we consider any such phrase as
the "history of England.

8

"

249

A few years later, between

1927 and 1933, Toynbee says, "In setting out to look for some

objective "intelligible field of historical study,' it seems
best to start with what is the usual field of vision of conTeggart, Theory of History
Ibid.

,

p.

35.

,

p,

36

"
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temporary Western historians, that is, with some national
state.

.

any." 2 50
i

.

.

Great Britain seems as good

a

choice as

Both historians procede to argue that the national

unit cannot be considered as the basis for a universal history; Teggart in a brief way and Toynbee in a rather elabo-

rate second chapter discussion.

Included in this second topic of comparison between

Teggart and Toynbee should be the observation that Teggart
adds to his "nationalistic," "passive,"

"

traditionalistic

,

"academic," "narrative" and "synthesis" criticisms of contem-

porary historiography, the further criticism that it has mis-

appropriated the title of "scientific"; and this criticism is
echoed by Toynbee.

Teggart points out this narrow definition

of the term "scientific" in the statement:

"As used by his-

torians, however, the word 'scientific' signifies merely the
use of a critical technique, and applies only to the mode of

procedure followed in the establishment of particular facts;
it does not suggest research directed to the solution of sci-

entific problems, or imply the adoption of the 'method of
2 51
science* as understood in other fields in inquiry."

Con-

tinuing his description of contemporary "scientific" method-

ology in a later context, Teggart observes that:
250 Toynbee, A Study of History

,

I,

251 Teggart, Theory of History , p.

17.
4.
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Historical criticism yields only isolated 'facts
The academic historian pursues the activity of
determining these facts 'in the faith that a complete assemblage of the smallest facts of human
history will tell in the end; the labour is performed for posterity,
... Hence the academic
historian holds to the belief that, having discovered the facts, all that remains to be done is
to state what he has found without prejudice or
1

.

1

bias. 252

It is quite apparent that this is the source of Toyn-

bee's attack 2 5 3 upon the "scientific" historians of the Late
and Post Modern Western historians such as Mommsen and Ranke

who "have given their best energies to the "assemblage

..."

raw materials.

through Toynbee

9

8

of

And to one who has worked his way

polemic and back to Teggart's attacks, it

s

is not surprising to find that one of Toynbee's favorite

"whipping-boys," the Cambridge Modern History series, was

brought to the post a few years earlier by Teggart in what
figured to be a devastating rhetorical question at the con-

clusion of an attack on such synthetic histories:
In the world as it is today, is the historical
scholar to look forward to contributing the
result of his specialized researches to some
later Cambridge Modern History, or is he, on the
other hand, to entertain the hope that his
investigation may stand beside those of the
biologist, for example, as contributing, through
an added knowledge of the operations of nature,
to the welfare of the human race? 254

252 Ibid

•

9

p

*>

25.

253 See page 16.
254 Teggart, The Processes of History , p.

35.

s
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The third part of this investigation into the nature
of the "sovereign clue" which Toynbee finds in Teggart has
to
do with the explanation of the dilemma and roots of modern

historiography.

Toynbee recognizes his dependence on Teggart

in his discussion of the antinomianism of modern historians,

when he not only quotes directly and at length from the

Theory of History 255 but bases his reconstruction of the
,

history of historiography on Teggart'
Teggart'

s

thesis.

s

explanation of how modern historians got

off to such a poor start begins with Aristotle.

He argues

that "until recently, philosophy has asserted that history is

not science."

"The distinction/' he adds, "goes back to

Aristotle, who regarded science as knowledge of the universal,

history as knowledge of the particular." 256

Although Toyn-

bee does not make explicit reference to Teggart until he

reaches Volume Five, 2 5 7 in a Volume One annex on problems of

method in the Study

he gives an explanation of the origin of

,

popular views of history which closely approximates Teggart'

explanation

.

In his words

s

According to the popular view, the ascertainment
and record of particular 'facts is the technique
The elucidation and formulaof 'History
tion of general 'laws' through a process of com1

1

;

.

.

.

255 Toynbee, A Study of History
256 Teggart, Theory of History

,

p.

,

257 Toynbee , A Study of History

IX,

,

V,

183.

51.
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,

n.

2

—

,
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parative study is the technique of 'Science
These popular equations have a respectable origin
they can be traced back to Aristotle
258
1

;

—

From

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

discussion of Aristotle's primary error, both

a

historians move to a discussion of the eighteenth century as
the age in which modern historiography adopted a metaphysical

system with rueful consequences for the study of history.
Late in Teggart's Theory of History he summarizes the thesis
^

of the book and gives a capsule treatment of a theme we have

already seen in Toynbee. 2 59

Teggart's summary reads:

The thesis of this book is that our present
difficulties, in the field of the humanities,
are the direct result of a continued adherence
to certain methodological conceptions which
had their beginning in the seventeenth century
and which received their characteristic formulation in the first half of the eighteenth century.
It is imperative that we should understand that,
in a sincere and devoted effort to reach a
strictly scientific basis for the study of man,
the humanists of the eighteenth century introduced an explicit separation between the study
Change
of events and the study of change
to them represented nature's orderly procedure
for attaining certain predetermined ends;
"events' to them appeared as accidental interferences with the 'natural order' of change.
Hence it was believed that the scientific study
of 'change' must proceed by making abstraction
from the 'events' recorded by historians.
The influence of these methodological conceptions
is evident today in the continued separation
between history, on the one hand, and the 'sciences' of economics, sociology, and anthropology,
260
on the other,
1

1

1

1

1

1

.

.

.

258

Ibid
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,

I,

•
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259 See page 14.
260 Teggart, Theory of History
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p.
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A student of Toynbee will recognize in the
above statement an

argument employed by Toynbee in the annex to
Volume One, and
in the Volume Nine section on the antinomianism
of modern
historians.

In both places Toynbee argues that there is
no

intrinsic difference in method between the historian
and the

various social scientists.

Using the successes of the

anthropologists, economists, and other social scientists as
examples, he concludes that the historians' battle for a sep-

arate discipline had been won by Science and these "pictur-

esque antinomian" warrior historians had gone down to igno-

minious defeat. 261
A fourth way in which Teggart influences Toynbee

v

s

method is found in the similar proposals or antidotes the two
historians offer to the failure of traditional historiography.

It is related to the three sections just under observa-

tion as a positive proposal is related to three aspects of

a

negative analysis, and will help us to see that Toynbee borrows from Teggart much more than just the ammunition with

which to attack contemporary historiography.
One of the prominent questions asked by reviewers of

Toynbee

's

Study is the question, "Is this History?"

While

almost all of the critics treat this question indirectly or
261 Toynbee, A Study of History

,

IX,

216.

,
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implicitly, some of them such as Barker, 262 Barnes, 263 den
Boer, 264 Brinton, 265 Geyl, 266 Renier, 26 ? and Walsh, 268

explicitly raise the question and use it as
their critique of Toynbee.

Toynbee is misleading.

framework for

a

Frequently this treatment of

It assumes that everybody, or almost

everybody, knows what "history" is, and that Toynbee is to be

viewed as

a

confused, albeit magnificently erudite person,

who somehow gets off the royal road of "history" into the
religious and psychological quagmires on either side.

While

in a sense this jockeying for position in the contemporary

academic race is made in response to Toynbee'

s

attempts to

maneuver the post-Western historians out of the race as
anachronistic "warriors" or rather stupid "ducks" who are

completely out of the main line of progress, the argument on
this level shows little evidence of becoming fruitful.
one is to understand Toynbee

!

s

If

method it must be viewed as a

262

Ernest Barker, "Dr. Toynbee s Study of History,"
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•

,
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480-486.
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XII

,

264 den Boer,

"Toynbee and Classical History," p. 221.

26S

Crane Brinton, "Toynbee' s City of God/' Virginia
361.
Quarterly Review XXXII (Summer, 1956)
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deliberate attempt to supersede traditional narrative historiography because of what he views as its inherent limitations.

Teggart offers a way to do this, and

tive way with Teggart

1

s

a

very attrac-

insistent claim that what he is doing

is "scientific" as opposed to the pseudo-scientific approach

of the fact-gatherers.

Under the banner of a "science of

man," or bearing the title of "a scientific student of history" Teggart proposes to do what the adherents of the tra-

ditional method have been unable to do.

In a decisive pas-

sage he explains his program in the following words
As a result of such an examination, it becomes
apparent that the traditional method still adhered
to by the historian, the statement of what has
taken place in the form of narrative does not lead
to any explanatory conclusion; and so, if the whole
attempt is not to be abandoned as vain and chimerical, it becomes necessary to find out how investigators have proceeded in other fields of history
This leads to the discovery that geologists and
biologists utilize the historical information at
their command not for the purpose of constructing
narratives of happenings, but to determine what have
been the processes through which things have come to
be as they are.
The point of view thus gained at once clarifies
the situation for it reveals the significance of
the chronological data which the human historian of
today has inherited from his predecessors; it throws
light upon the nature of the activities of a large
and increasing number of historical students; and it
displays the importance and utility of the great
residuary body of historical facts which historiographers have been unable to incorporate in their
,

,

,

narratives
Teggart
2

1

^Teggart

s

,

attack on the traditionalist position is
The Processes of History , p.

38.
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directed at the method of traditional historiography
and the
format in which this "history" appears.

He argues that the

usual narrative format is the result of a supposedly scientific method by which the historian gathers many facts, using
the critical technique, then he narrates the story of "what

happened."

This narrative form means that the historian is

unable to incorporate into his story many facts of great
importance.

The strictly chronological, narrative format is

too narrow and restrictive to achieve a non-partisan, truly

scientific, history.

The use of the label "scientific" sim-

ply to designate the process of finding the facts without

prejudice, of going to the original documents, of having a

critical mind, is misleading, and the traditional historian
thereby cuts himself off from the possibility of attaining
truly scientific results. 27 ^

Teggart's point is not simply

that the narrative historian works with only part of the

"scientific method" and is hence only partly successful.

He

insists rather that the narrative historian, while attempting
to be objective by merely relating the facts which are some-

how scientifically verifiable by a critical treatment of the

documents, is in actuality adding to his conception of the
facts by selecting only certain facts to narrate and by

inferring the motives of the actors in history in order to
270 Teggart, Theory of History p.
,

26.

s

fill out the narrative. 271

Teggart concludes that narrative

history remains art and is not science.
In place of the narrative form which was based on an

incorrect definition of the term "scientific" by the historian, Teggart proposes an analytical history which will be a

search for the processes or the uniformities of the past.

Arguing that the archaeologists and orientalists have removed
the old barriers of insufficient data, he says, "With this

difficulty removed, we may face the situation that the analytical study of history must be founded upon a comparison of
the particular histories of all human groups, and must be

activated by the conscious effort to take cognizance of all
the available facts." 272

Teggart attempts to support his "analytical" history
over against the "narrative" history by pointing out certain

evidences of a new movement within traditional historiography
itself.

His argument is that several historians, and fore-

most among them Lord Acton, are "reaching out in directions
unknown to the older historiography."

According to Teggart

'

analysis, these men are searching for the "elements" of history, whether those elements be "freedom," "class struggle,"
273
Of course, Teggart
"sea power," or "religious revivals."

271 Ibid., p. 66
272 Teggart, The Processes of History , p. 37

273 Ibid., p. 36.

:

.

227

does not conclude that these revolutionary historians
are

therefore following his call for a new "science of man"
but
he hopefully suggests that when they have found
themselves

and have become methodologically self-conscious, they
will

turn to analytical historiography as the school of the

future
In Teggart

f

s

view the simple narrative format will

give place to a problem study.

Stated generally the histo-

rian will pose for himself the problem,

has come to be as he is." 274

"how man everywhere

As Teggart expresses it in

another context, we must view the present not as

a

situation

but as a condition of things:
Instead of the question, 'Why did a particular
individual do this?
the inquiry, in the second
case will take the form:
"How are we to account
for the differences
.which we encounter
among different peoples?
1

,

.

•

9

Like the natural scientist he will be interested primarily in

processes or uniformities.

But he will differ from the natu-

ral scientist in that he will be dealing with dated events.

Teggart explains it in this fashion
It follows that, having dated events to work
from, the historian of man, when he comes to

investigate processes, will adopt a procedure
widely different from that followed by Darwin
Instead of confining
and his contemporaries.
his attention to the present, utilizing the
Ibld

.

,

p

275 Ibid.

,

p.

.

Dm

74.
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facts of the past for purposes of verification
only, he will begin by examining the evidence
for the actual changes that have taken place.
Hence the procedure which is bound up with the
conception that the present is the key to the
past will, if one might so say, be reversed,
and 'History' will remain the study of the past
with a view to the elucidation of the processes
manifested in the present. 27 6
The explorer motif which we found in Toynbee and

which he coupled with the methodological explorations he felt
that he was undertaking, are similar to expressions Teggart

employs to describe his methodological reconstructions.
a

In

discussion of this new science of man, Teggart does not

hesitate to lapse into exhortations to other historians to
follow him in the discarding of the narrative format of tra-

ditional historiography.

One example of these interspersed

exhortations may serve to illustrate this point.
We must, then endeavor to meet our obligation
through the utmost possible extension and
utilization of historical study.
In making this
effort, we must recognize that we cannot rely
upon others for guidance. ... We are called
upon to face the responsibility of creating an
'historical science', ... we must set ourselves
to the performance of a task which has not
hitherto been undertaken, though its execution
has long been overdue. 2 77
In summary then, Teggart proposes a new history that

will discard the narrative format.

In its place a new histo-

riography will be developed which in format and nature shall
276 Ibid

.

,

p

.

12 7.

277 Teggart, Two Essays on History

,

p.

11
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be analytical and comparative.
\

a

"History" for Teggart will be

search for uniformities and processes.

In his own words,

"the older historical study will contribute the concept of
'events,'

though the current acceptance of events as impor-

tant in and for themselves will give place to the concept of

events as the active element in change." 278
This sharp de-emphasis of events in favor of processes is, of course, what immediately strikes the reader of

Toynbee's A Study of History

.

Here is little to remind one

of the traditional historical format; little to suggest a

calendar of events from some ancient past to the present.
What does impress the Toynbee reader is exactly the kind of
"analytical history" for which Teggart was contending.

The

table of contents establishes not a series of subdivisions in
the story of a people, war, or even civilization, but sets a

series of problems for the author and reader to solve.

As

soon as the introductory chapters concerning problems of

classification are out of the way, Toynbee launches into his
inquiry, "at the natural starting-point, by considering how

civilizations come into existence,

.

.

.

"279

A final objective in this general discussion of Toynbee as the "social scientist" is to review the expectations
2 7 fi

Teggart, Theory of History

p.

,

279 Toynbee, A Study of History

,

I,

148.
183.
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of Toynbee as he applied the "science of man" to the study of
the past.

It is clear from the earlier discussion in this

chapter that Toynbee expected his law-making technique to
solve the age-old problem of historical bias and relativity,

and this in its most virulent form among his contemporaries
as nationalistic historiography.

Deliverance from the egocentrism, nationalism and

parochialism of the contemporary historians comes when he
adopts a scientific method which is able to reveal uniformities in the past and present of a universal character.

These

uniformities or "laws" of history are not useful fictions nor
fabrications of the historian's mind, but are reflections of
the nature of the universe.

In answer to the first major

question Toynbee frames as the "natural starting-point" of
his analytical history--the question of how civilizations

come into existence, he traces an alternating rhythm which is

common to all civilizations.

Volume One of the Study

,

Of this rhythm he remarks in

"We have now ascertained the nature

They are particular beats

of the geneses of civilizations.

of a general rhythmical pulsation which runs all through the

Universe." 280

J.

viitl

.

.

Again in Volume Three, Toynbee expresses

a

similar

fear of historical relativism and counters with the faith

that his scientific, comparative method will rescue the his280ibid., 205.

:
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torian by enabling him to reveal underlying
unities in the
lives of civilizations.
The last page of Volume Three,
which
marked the end of the first unit in the
ten-volume study
significantly recapitulates the opening
problem of Volume
One

And thus we have returned, at the close of
this
third part of our Study, to the point from
which
we started at the beginning of the first
part
when we dwelt upon the fact that in any age
of
any society all social activities, including
the
study of history itself, are governed by the
dominant tendencies of the time and the place.
Yet if we were merely to dwell on this point once
again, we should be ending this part of our Study
on a false note; for, as we have observed in our
critique of the concept of Race, the variety that
is manifested in Human Nature and in human life
and institutions is a superficial phenomenon
which masks, without impairing, an underlyinq
ZbL
unity.

The analytical approach to history seemed to provide a means
of escaping that species of relativity that Toynbee disliked

above all others
tric prejudice."

— the

"naively vulgar native Western egocen-

This egocentricity seemed to be almost

inherent in narrative historiography.

As Toynbee observes,

Such fixations of social emotion upon national
groups become almost universal, and historians
have been no more immune from them than other
people.
Indeed, the spirit of Nationality has
appealed to historians with special force,
because it has offered them some prospect of
reconciling the common human desire for unity
of vision with the Division of Labour imposed
upon them by the application of the Industrial
281 Ibid.

,

III,

390.

232

System to their work. 282
The corrective to this prejudice was not the addition

of new narratives to those already constructed;

a

gathering

of more data to be worked up into new synthetic histories,

but the establishment of a new standpoint.
the unavowed and unavowable axiom of egocentricity ought to be ruled out by adopting the
contrary axiom that all representatives of any
species of human society are philosophically on
a par with one another. 283
.

.

.

Toynbee's effort to drive out the nationalistic bias
of his fellow historians was not restricted to writing such

volumes as A Study of History

.

He had accepted an appoint-

ment in 1921 as Professor of Byzantine and Modern Greek Language, Literature and History at the University of London.

Sir Daniel Stevenson's intention in founding this Stevenson

chair of history as disclosed by Toynbee in the inaugural
lecture was to counteract nationalistic prejudice in the

teaching profession and in journalism by the provision of a

Chair of International History at the University of London
and the establishment of a Director of Studies in the Royal

Institute of International Affairs.

Toynbee notes in his

address that the founder is persuaded that "in practically
all countries the teaching of History and the class-books

used therefore have had a strong nationalist bias.
282 Ibid., I, 10.

283 Ibid.

,

IX,
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Beyond the beneficial task of rooting out nationalism
Toynbee could see an additional benefit in the new methodology.

The discovery of laws in history provided a basis for

predicting the future.

In the light of his earlier "intima-

tions of mortality" as he traveled in Greece and Crete before
the outbreak of the first World War, and his sense of impend-

ing catastrophe in the years following that war, it is easy
to understand why Toynbee would be fascinated with the ele-

ment of predictability that his law-making technique seemed
to promise in the 1927-1933 period.

This fascination with "prediction" is most clearly
seen in Toynbee

'

s

notes of June, 1927 to June, 1929.

It may

be noted that many of his experiments with lengths of cycles

and periods did not become sufficiently verifiable to find a

place in the final text of the first three volumes of the

Study as published in 1933, but their appearance in Toynbee

'

preliminary drafts is of great significance.
On one occasion in the notes for 1929 Toynbee

labored over the problem of the length of the cycles in

disintegrating phase of civilization.

a

To support his view

that four-hundred and two-hundred year periods appear uni-

formly and a uniform number of times in a disintegration

phase he turns to the phenomenon of wars in human history.
His research and charts reveal a constant interval of approx-

imately one hundred and three years between general wars so

234

that he is able to predict the outbreak of the second World

War in the year 2035.

It is a curious commentary on the fal-

libility of historians that nine years after this forecast

based on empirical evidence, Toynbee was busily engaged in

packing his forecast along with several chests of notes and
research material to be sent to New York in the hope that
they would survive the holocaust of the second World War in

Europe.

The same incident of the optimistic forecast fol-

lowed by the unexpected arrival of a general war helps us to

understand not only the early faith of Toynbee in what his
new methodology promised to do, but sheds a great deal of
light on the growing despair of Toynbee in the thirties and
his disillusionment with his method as expressed in Volumes

Four through Six.

CHAPTER

V

THE LATER TOYNBEE AS A "STUDENT OF LIFE"
"

.it might begin

to be possible for
pilgrim souls to feel their way towards an
"
angle of spiritual vision
Arnold J. Toynbee in Volume Seven
.

.

.

.

.

Use of the Term "Student of Life"

Approaching Arnold Toynbee

1

s

A Study of History as a

major methodological document in modern historical studies
we have sought to avoid artificial or imposed categories by

examining the metaphors with which Toynbee has classified his

methodological position.

We stressed the repeated use of the

explorer imagery in the Study

.

By the use of this motif

Toynbee was able to indicate the two-fold nature of his tasks
he was to explore the validity and usefulness of new methodo-

logical principles amid the jungle of historical events

places

f

9

persons and interpretations? and he would explore the

future of the West in a world which resembled the uncharted
seas upon whose troubled surfaces most of the other ships of

civilization had met disaster,,

The present study has brought

to light his growing use of the explorer metaphor as Toyn-

bee

1

s

early methodological optimism was severely challenged

by a much more deeply-rooted historical bias than he had
supposed.

The "shimmer of relativity," which Toynbee sup235

posed would be readily brushed aside by his law-making technique, proved in later volumes to be deeply rooted.

It was

rooted, not simply in the social conditions of the histori-

an's environment, but in the act of cognition itself.

The

explorer motif expressed Toynbee's growing methodological
uncertainty, to the point where in the post- Study writings he
regards the twenty-seven year Study as a highly speculative
quest.

He expressed the hope that somehow the variety of

people asking questions of all the various kinds may help

mankind "to take its bearing in a mysterious universe."
Having established the fact of a radical change in
Toynbee's methodology, it then became important to study the
basic "scientific" methodology with which Toynbee began his
Study in 1927, and from which he turned in 1936.

Chapter

four of this study focused on Toynbee's effort to define himself as a "social scientist."

By tracing all of the descrip-

tive phrases clustered around Toynbee's notion of "a science
of human affairs," we tried to determine the precise signifi-

cance of the scientific motif in Toynbee's methodology; to

explore its polemical usage within the Study

;

and to under-

stand the vast confidence Toynbee had in the efficacy of the

empirical method to pierce the shimmer of relativity in the
foreground of the historian's vision.
The third self-characterization is the phrase "stu-

dent of life."

Again we have an expression used by Toynbee

237
in a significant way.

It does not represent a casual refer-

ence to himself as a person who is interested in human life
as over against scholars who are mechanistically oriented.

The phrase emerges gradually in the Study as a particular

banner under which Toynbee attacks the influence of piecemeal
labor on modern historical studies.

In the early volumes of

the Study the author adopts certain arguments from the roman-

tic or vitalist tradition in order to refute and dispose of
the distortions which industrialism and mechanism have intro-

duced into the historian's work.
He seems unaware of any antithesis in his dual roles
as "social scientist" and as "student of life."

to note in the early volumes,

Our task is

the infrequent yet nevertheless

interesting polemical use of the "student of life" motif.

In

the later volumes there is a significant growth in the use

and meaning of this motif as Toynbee loses confidence in his

law-making technique

,

and turns increasingly to what had been

at first a supplemental tool, the intuitions of the "student
of life.

19

The "Student of Life" Motif Complements
the Researches of the Social Scientist

Because we are tracing a dynamic situation, namely a
reversal of roles within the corpus of Toynbee

?

s

master-work,

we shall proceed by examining successive references to the

student of life role in the Study

.

The first instance is
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found in the opening chapter on "The Relativity of Historical

Thought." 1

As argued earlier, the chapter is a springboard

for Toynbee's whole quest to go beyond the "shimmer of rela-

tivity" in the confidence that there is "some constant and

absolute object of historical thought in the background."

In

the chapter, two institutions are singled out as making such
a deep impress on the transient social environment as to

become almost a priori categories in the historian's mind.
Hence if the historian is to discern the "Lineaments of some

abiding form in the passing events" he must escape the influence of Industrialism and Nationalism.

To be sure, when

Toynbee began his work in 1927, the sources of relativism

were easily identifiable and much more susceptible of treatment than the deep-rooted and ineradicable relativity of

which he speaks in his later essay on "The Limitations of
Historical Knowledge."

Industrialism as an institution has put its impress
on historical thought in two ways.

Historians have followed

the Industrial System by adopting assembly-line procedures

for writing history

[as in the

Cambridge History Series

]

and

by trying to adapt Western scientific thought to the study of
history.

3

l lbid

.

,

I,

Ibid.

,

2.

3 Ibid.

,

3.

2

16.

.
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At this point in the argument one might expect to see

Toynbee rejecting the positivist tradition in favor of a

position resembling that of Dilthey or Collingwood.

And

indeed that hunch is strengthened by a footnote which refers
to Dilthey

's

seventh volume.

The similarity between Toynbee

and Dilthey at this point is, at first, striking.

Toynbee

seems to argue that the methods of Physical Science are dis-

tinct from the methodology of the human sciences.
The same method, however, has latterly been
applied in many realms of thought beyond the
bounds of Physical Science to thought which
is concerned with Life and not with inanimate
Nature, and even to thought which is concerned
with human activities. Historical thought is
among these foreign realms in which the prestige of the Industrial System has exerted it-

—

Dilthey

"s

sind

.

.

parallel argument is, "Die realen Kategorian
.

in den Geisteswissenschaf ten nirgends dieselben

als in den Naturwissenschaf ten

B9

^

especially noticeable in Toynbee*
and variety of life.

The similarity in views is
s

emphasis upon the richness

He speaks of "thought which is con-

cerned with Life and not with Inanimate Nature/' 6 and arrives
at the conclusion that two methods of thought need to be dis-

tinguished in life,
4

lin,

Ibid.

W- Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften
1927) , VII, 195.

Toynbee, A Study of History

,

I,

(Leipzig and Ber-

3.

^
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In the world of action, we know that it is
disastrous to treat animals or human beings
as though they were sticks and stones.
Why

should we suppose this treatment to be any
less mistaken in the world of ideas? Why
should we suppose that the scientific method
of thought a method which has been devised
for thinking about Inanimate Nature
should
be applicable to historical thought, which is
a study of living creatures and indeed of
living beings??

—

—

This emphasis upon the richness of Life is reminiscent of

Dilthey's theme of "life embracing life." 8

Nevertheless one

must pursue the matter beyond these similarities to the
really serious differences between the men.

For example, if

we look only at the similarities how can we account for the

criticism of Collingwood, a man who has historical views
admittedly close to Dilthey,^ in which he argues:
As a contrast with Oakeshott's work, which
represents the transformation of historical
thought from a positivistic stage to a new
stage which I may perhaps call idealistic
I may here mention Professor Arnold Toynbee's
great Study of History which represents a
restatement of the positivistic view itself.
.

.

.

,

Obviously this search must be narrowed to the point
where we can isolate which aspects of nineteenth-century pos-

itivism Toynbee rejects and which he accepts.
Ibid
8

(London:

.

,

7c

Hodges, The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey
Rout ledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.
1952)
p. 319.

H. A.

,

9

To see the

Collingwood, The Idea of History

10 Ibid.

,

p.

159.

,

,

p.

172.

H

.
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elements of positivism that he rejects one needs to
understand the goal he is trying to reach and what it
is that hin
ders the attainment of this objective.

From the evidence in

chapter one it would appear that Toynbee is attempting to
write universal history— in the sense of a history that is
capable of embracing all national groups and which will gain
the assent of all parochial viewpoints.

expressed in his praise of

H.

G.

Wells

This aim is

Outline of History

1

There is a strong tendency to depreciate works
of historical literature which are created by
single minds, and the depreciation becomes the
more emphatic the nearer such works approximate
to being "Universal Histories.
For example,
Mr. H. G. Wells' The Outline of History was
received with unmistakable hostility by a number
of historical specialists.
They criticized
severely the errors which they discovered at the
points where the writer, in his long journey
through Time and Space, happened to traverse
their tiny allotments.
They seemed not to realize that, in re-living the entire life of Mankind
as a single imaginative experience
Mr. Wells was
achieving something which they themselves would
hatrdly have dared to attempt--something, perhaps
of which they had never conceived the possibility

.

1

,

.

It is obvious from what follows that Toynbee had conceived

the possibility.

Toynbee objects to nineteenth-century positivism
because it hinders a whole view of history:

"This deep

impulse to envisage and comprehend the whole of Life is cer-

tainly immanent in the mind of the historian; and such
-^Toynbee

,

A Study of History

,

1

,

4-5

,,

.
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violence is done to it by the Division of Labour which the
analogy of the Industrial System imposes on historical
thought.

PiW

.

r

.

*

,

.»•

„

Toynbee's summary of the first chapter corroborates
that his goal embraces universal history:

These multiple tendencies can be summed up in a
single formula:
In the new age, the dominant
note in the corporate consciousness of communities is a sense of being parts of some larger
universe
•
If this observation is correct
and if it
is also true that historians cannot abstract
their thoughts and feelings from the influence
of the environment in which they live, then we
may expect to witness in the near future a
change in the outlook and activities of Western
historians corresponding to the recent change
in the general conditions of Western Society
they will probably find their intelligible field
of study in some landscape where the horizon is
not restricted to the boundaries of a single
nationality, and will adapt their present methodof work to mental operations on a larger scale
»

*

•

,

.

Given this goal of a universal history

,

.

the objection

to positivism was that it fractures the continuity of history

into discrete parts

,

and likewise narrows the historian

1

s

vision into a parochial framework rather than a universal
framework*

To meet these shortcomings Toynbee turned to

14
Bergson and vitalism,
12

Ibid.

13 Ibid.
14

Ibid.

8.

15.
9.

He shares with Bergson a feeling of

.
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discontent with the scientific tradition, 15 and

a

turning to

the romantic traditions in order to off -set its deficiencies.
He resembles Dilthey in evincing a mutual interest in the

romantic tradition, and an anti-mechanistic attitude.

But

the areas of agreement are fairly well circumscribed.

Toyn-

bee elects to follow Bergson rather than Dilthey in the initial volumes of his study.

The distinction between Dilthey

and Bergson occurs when Bergson defines vitalism in a biological sense, while Dilthey thinks of "Life" in terms of a

human experience which is known from within. 16

Only a care-

ful disentangling of the text and the philosophical threads

will help explain why Toynbee can appear to dismiss the
"scientific method of thought" as a methodological principle
for the historian in chapter one; 17 then spend two hundred

and seventy-one pages of Volume One developing a scientific

method of thought and finally to conclude on that page of the
same first volume:

Have we not been guilty of applying to historical
thought, which is a study of living creatures, a
scientific method of thought which has been devised
for thinking about Inanimate Nature? In making a
final attempt to solve the riddle that has been
baffling us, let us follow Plato's lead and try the
alternative course. Let us shut our eyes, for the

Morton G. White, Age of Analysis (New York:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1955)
p. 19
,

x6

Hodges, The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey

17 Toynbee, A Study of History
,

I,

7.

,

p.

320.

9

.
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moment, to the formulae of Science in order to
open our ears to the language of Mythology. !8

This apparent contradiction in Volume One in which Toynbee

warns himself against the "Apathetic Fallacy," i.e., treating living creatures as though they were inanimate, then

falls victim in the succeeding chapters to the 'Apathetic

Fallacy,
lacy

?

'

and finally attempts to outgrow the "Apathetic Fal-

by the use of mythology, is paralleled by what appears

to be an equally contradictory attack by the critics.

On the

one hand Toynbee is taken to task for his dependence upon the

methods of the natural sciences and his attempts to revive

nineteenth-century positivism in historical thought. 1 ^

On

the other hand critics constantly point to his breach with
the methodology of the natural sciences,, either to praise or

blame him for it.
no book that deals with human affairs has
been more free from the blatant parochialism of
our naive
our age and our civilization
submission to the one-eyed methodology of the
physical sciences and 'objective scholarship.
.

•

.

.

.

.

,

Although we should acknowledge that criticisms of
such divergent nature are partly explained by the fact that

Toynbee seems to shift his ground in the course of the Study
18 Ibid
1

271.

Collingwood, The Idea of History

»

,

p„

159

20 Lewis Mumford, "The Napoleon of Notting Hill," The
New Republic CXXXI (November, 1954), 17.
,
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and that Collingwood

'

s

criticism was raised after the appear-

ance of the first three volumes, it serves only to emphasize
that Toynbee begins his work with the hope of reconciling
two

methodological positions.

By refusing to follow Dilthey into

the position of recognizing a radical distinction in the

nature of the human science methodology, Toynbee appears to
be confident in the first three volumes that the historian is

not facing an either/or proposition.

Instead Toynbee was initially attracted to the new

philosophical hero of his day, Henri Bergson.

As Tangye Lean

has observed:
The year in which Toynbee graduated saw the works
of Bergson, delayed by translation, sweep into
Oxford in an abrupt and surprising flood. They
came to Toynbee s own intellectual world with the
^
force he has said, 'of a revelation*
8

•

Here was an opportunity to reject the current methodology as
too mechanistic, deterministic, and rationalistic.

Here was

the opportunity to use "intuition as superior to the scien-

tific intellect in its power to see all things and describe

them accurately."**

Yet for all its emphasis upon the con-

tinuity of time and life, this brand of romanticism did not

seem to carry with it the rejection of "English empiricism."
This was an important consideration for Toynbee as can be
21 Tangye Lean,
(January, 1947) , 25.

"A Study of Toynbee," Horizon

22 White, Age of Analysis
,

p.

65.

,

XV
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seen in his argument against the views of Oswald Spengler.

Crucial in the argument is the characterization of Spengler's

position as German transcendentalism and his own position as

English empiricism.
In the foregoing series of passages,

in which
Spengler carries his dogma of relativity from
the domain of Art into almost every other domain
of social life, there is a magnificent logic;
and an English empiricist might find this German
transcendentalist a formidable antagonist if he
were rash enough to challenge him to a tournament
with his own German weapons.

Hence it is not with the either/or of Dilthey but

with the both/and of Bergson that Toynbee confidently begins
his massive Study

.

The proof that Toynbee supposed the

"Scientific method" is valid but not able to reach far enough
into the mysteries of life; that the language of intuition

can penetrate the mystery and then translate itself into

scientific truths, will unfold as we trace Toynbee 's growing
reliance on the intuition of the student of life.

In this

section, let us simply note the awareness he seems to have

that we must "go beyond" the present methodological limits.
In the same controversial first chapter in which he reaffirms

his faith that relativity of viewpoint can be superseded, the

methodological change that Toynbee predicts is expressed in
the me.taphor of "lifting the horizon" and "operations on a

larger scale."
23

Toynbee, A Study of History

,

III,

382.

in the new age upon which we have
entered, they [the historians] will probably
find their intelligible field of study in some
landscape where the horizon is not restricted
.

.

.

so,

to the boundaries of a single nationality, and
will adopt their present method of work to
mental operations on a larger scale. ^

Summarizing our results at the end of this attempt to
find out why Toynbee describes himself as a "student of

life," we can say that Toynbee the "student of life" must

supplement Toynbee the "social scientist" if he is to reach
his goal of writing universal history.

To transpose it into

methodological terms one might say that the romantic tradition must supply the intuition because it sees life as a

whole, while the scientific tradition must supply the means
of testing the validity of the clues given by intuition, and

together universal and universally valid history will be possible.

But this is to move somewhat ahead of our systematic

tracing of the role of a "student of life."
The next instance of the "student of life" motif is

found in a series of references to the planes of li fe

.

In

this running criticism of the parochial historian who has

used the scientific method in order to treat his subject in

building-block fashion, Toynbee argues that this parochialism
is due to a superficial view of life.

While observing the

failure of the "Western historians" to write history in which
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other than western civilizations have had fair treatment,
Toynbee contends that:

"In the first place, his vision of

the contemporary world must be confined to the economic and

political planes of social life and must be inhibited from

penetrating to the cultural plane, which is not only deeper
but is fundamental." 25

This repeated description of the eco-

nomic, social, and political planes as "superficial" in com-

parison to the fundamental cultural plane is clearly attached
to Toynbee s search for "an abiding form" in the flux of his1

torical change.

In almost the identical language with which

he expressed the hope of finding an escape from the relativ-

ity of social environment at the end of his first chapter,

Toynbee indicates that the "abiding form" is actually found
on this cultural level.

On this cultural plane, for those who have eyes
to see, the lineaments of the four living nonWestern civilizations are still clear. 6
The assertions about political, economic, social and

cultural levels of experience are not argued in the text but
are simply declared to be either superficial or fundamental.
The curious reader will ask the question, "On what basis is
the classification of 'planes

5

made"?

The answer appears to

be that the cultural level is significant because it is here
25 Ibid

. ,

26 Ibid.

151.
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that Life is dynamic and lasting.
however, their mental vision had penetrated
through the political plane to the cultural
plane beneath, they would have realized that,
even if the first appearances on the political
plane had been entirely confirmed by closer
investigation, the static condition, on this
plane, of the societies which they were studying
was of little or no significance in view of the
wealth and life which reveal themselves in the
histories of these same societies as soon as the
observer's attention is transferred from the
superficial to the fundamental plane of social
existence. By ignoring the cultural plane and
by equating politics with Life, Western observers
arrive at an opinion about non-Western histories
which exposes the confusion of their thought as
much as it ministers to their self-esteem. '
If,

A similar occurrence of the "student of life" role is
found in the annex to Volume One.

Here again the appeal is

made to planes of life in which "superficial" and "fundamental" are the descriptive adjectives.

Again the economic and

political planes are dismissed as "material planes" and the
cultural plane is singled out as a deeper level.

The context

of the argument is Toynbee's attempt to answer the "Diffu-

sionist doctrine."

The Dif fusionists hold to the view that

the "geneses of civilizations can be accounted for by the

fact that certain techniques and aptitudes and institutions
and ideas can be proved historically to have been acquired,
by the majority of those who have eventually acquired them,
27 Ibid.

,

165.
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through the process of Diffusion." 28

Toynbee tries to counter

this position which is incompatible with his creative evolu-

tionary thesis by the argument that the Dif f usionists have
been betrayed by the "relativity of historical thought."
The ultra-modern Western scholar is apt to be
betrayed insidiously, by the mental atmosphere
in which his mind is constrained to work, into
persuading himself that, because Western servingmachines and Western rifles and Western cotton
goods have been diffused throughout the Orthodox
Christian and Islamic and Hindu and Far Eastern
Worlds in these latter days, this diffusion of
Western knick-knacks is tantamount to the conversion of these four other living societies to
our Western Civilization. 29

The argument proceeds a step further than its earlier form

when he goes on to state that this cultural plane is the area
of the soul.
a

Here is the plane of "inner spiritual life" of

civilization which is not superficial but is their "real

life."

30

Given that Toynbee is in search of historical truth

which is not subject to the relativity of the social environment, and that he continually speaks of finding the answer on
the cultural plane which is "real life," it is not difficult

to trace the steady progression from history as the history

of civilizations to history as the history of the soul.

However, this writing of "history" as the "history of
28 Ibid .

,

427.

30 Ibid.,

429.

29

Ibid.

•

religion" is still twenty years in the future for the Toynbee
of Volume One, so let us trace his increasing consciousness

of himself as a "student of life."
a

In Volume One he remains

"student of life" who tries to balance the opposing princi-

ples of Diffusion and of the Uniformity of Nature in order to

account for the richness and variety of life.

This appeal to

"Life" and the "student of Life" as over against the steril-

ity of the purely intellectual approach of the scientist and

philosopher makes its hesitant entrance in this opening volume to be exploited in full development in the later volumes
Thus, in any objective study of the process of
acquisition ... we have to allow for the
operation, side by side, of two different
principles.
The proper task of the student of Life is not to magnify either principle
tendenciously at the other principle's expense
but to render to both principles their real
due„
.

•

.

Even though it involves slicing into a complex argument that

will be treated as a whole under a later heading, let us
observe

a

annex to

reference to the "student of Life" role in the
I.

C(iii)

(e)

.

The implication that the historian

"student of Life" somehow goes beyond the researcher who is

limited to the technique of science is clearly set forth in
this attempt to distinguish the historian from the dramatist
or anthropologist*

Our historians are apt to pride themselves on
31

Ibid., 426.
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the enrollment of these scientific auxiliaries
as being the greatest advance which the study
of history has made in recent times; and we may
venture to agree with them in this without
exposing ourselves to a charge of inconsistency;
for while we have criticized them at the beginning of this Study for trying to apply the technique of Science outside its province, we have
never objected to their employing the sciences
in a menial capacity as hewers of wood and
drawers of water. ^

The next sustained use of the £lan motif in relation
to the historian's role as "student of Life" is found in Vol-

ume Three.

tions

,

The whole volume treats the growth of civiliza-

and in the course of the argument Toynbee discusses

"Life" or the elan vital as that mysterious factor operative
in the growth of a society .

Important for our analysis is

the series of warnings issued in the discussion to the effect

that the application of our Western Physical Science to Life
or the study of Life might have serious consequences.

example, Toynbee develops the thesis of Aldous Huxley

For
8

s

Brave

New World in order to show how dangerous it would be to "peg"
our Western Society at a certain level and thus rule out
fresh spiritual creations.

33

The fear that the life of soci-

ety might be arrested because of the sterilizing effect of
the application of Physical Science to human affairs, rests

upon Bergson's hypothesis, as Toynbee goes on to point out
32

Ibid

,

446.

33 Ibid.,

Ill,

.
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that "the will has it genius, as well as the intellect,
and

genius defies all prognostication." 34
The protection of the unique, unpredictable, spiri-

tual element of life leads Toynbee steadily toward a
position

which undermines his original hope of finding laws in history.

Still pondering the relation of elan to the question

of growth in civilizations, he concludes that although it is

possible to talk about laws in Inanimate Nature, the question
of uniqueness must prevail in any analysis of the relations

between Man and Man.

And it has been a harder task to domesticate
animals and plants than to dominate Inanimate
Nature to harness the horse than to harness
the tide.
Inanimate Nature obeys regular laws
which Man has merely to work out in order to
apply them mechanically for his own practical
purposes.
It is infinitely harder to cope
with the waywardness and complexity of

—

Li f 6

/

M

«

0

It would be premature to conclude that Toynbee in

Volume Three turns away from his original plan of avoiding
the relativism and subjectivism of historical studies by

means of a discovery of the intelligible units of history and
the laws of their behavior

.

At the most we can detect here

a realization on Toynbee s part that a dependence upon the
1

elan motif and an emphasis upon the complexity of Life makes
34 Ibid.

,

118.

35 Ibid.,

159.
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his goal much more difficult to attain.

How much more difficult is seen in his criticism of
H.

G.

Wells.

We observed in the opening chapter of the study

that Wells was singled out by Toynbee as an historian
who

sought a universal view of man in history.

The "whole monu-

mental work" is again applauded in Volume Three but Toynbee
now lodges the complaint that Wells does not go far enough.
In dealing with Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Wells is content with "a

mere description and classification and docketing of the

outer man." 36

This criticism could come from Collingwood and

Dilthey; especially in the light of Toynbee

'

s

added phrase

that Wells should have exercised his imagination "by an intuitive sympathy of one soul with another."

The criticism that

"he regards history as a mere spectacle, something consisting
of facts observed and recorded by the historian, phenomena

presented externally to his gaze, not experiences into which
he must enter and which he must make his

inserted into Toynbee

'

s

own"^ could

be

criticism of Wells with little dis-

turbance of the chain of thought.

But this is actually the

criticism levelled at Toynbee by Collingwood!

Can we then

conclude that Toynbee has now come around to the position of

Collingwood or Dilthey?
36 Ibid .

,

Evidently not, because Toynbee is

195.

3 ^Collingwood,

The Idea of History , p. 163.
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not applying a radical criticism to Wells' methodology.

Under the influence of the elan motif defined in
a spiritual

rather than biological sense, Toynbee is arguing that
Wells
does not do justice to Life by stopping with mere description

and classification.

in Toynbee

so much wrong as inadequate.

»

s

eyes, Wells' method is not

The historian qua "student of

Life" must proceed via imagination to the inner man.
The close tie of the elan motif with the problem of

proper historical method is apparent in Toynbee
of the disintegration of civilizations.

•

s

discussion

He asserts that once

civilizations have started to disintegrate and the elan vital
has gone out of them, the student can then describe them in

"cause and effect" terms.

In this case mechanism has

replaced creativity, and the civilization is now on
eling belt of interlocking cause and effect.

a

trav-

Hence in Volume

Five we find several references to the possibility that the

historian may use two ways of description.
a

He may describe

broken-down civilization in mythological language as

"remorselessly condemned to eventual destruction," or in sci-

entific language as "mechanically dispatched to the same grim
goal on a traveling belt of interlocking cause and effect
38
that can be neither reversed nor broken nor checked."

later reference continues the distinction of describing a
38 Toynbee, A Study of History

,

V,

13.

A

.
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civilization in "two different ways," but substitutes the
terms "Life" and "Inanimate Nature" for "mythological
lan-

guage" and "scientific language."

...

profound change sets
civilization breaks down and
gration.
This change can be
different ways, according as
language of Life or in terms
Nature Jy
a

in if and when the

goes into disintedescribed in two
we speak in the
of Inanimate

For the purpose of tracing the role of "a student of

Life" in Toynbee

'

s

Study

,

guages is not important.

the distinction between two lan-

These "ways of describing" are not

mutually exclusive in this context.

On the contrary the two

ways of description are put forward as supplementary to one

another for the "student of Life" who is trying to study

civilizations of the past.

In the Seventh Volume Toynbee

pushes the distinction beyond the verbal level and develops
a

thoroughgoing dichotomy between language and order of know-

ledge.

But before we reach that major turn in the formula-

tion of his historical methodology, let us notice some inter-

vening references.
While pursuing references to the historian who deals

with "Life" rather than with merely Inanimate Nature, we
should notice a growing shift in language.

Although it is

somewhat premature to discuss the fascination which Toynbee
develops for depth psychology later, there is
39

Ibid.

,

198.

a

trend in that

direction even in Volume Five.

We observed Toynbee

1

s

inter-

est in an objective view of history which he argued could be
found on the cultural plane where the "real" life of a soci-

ety is in evidence as distinct from its passing and superficial politico-economic plane of existence.

The category of

"planes" seems to lose ground as Toynbee proceeds with the

Study

.

The transitional phraseology between the "planes" of

the first three volumes and the "Collective Subconscious" of

his concluding volumes appears to be the "spiritual depths"
of Volume Five.

Once again the context is concerned with the

mystery of "Life," with the complex, spiritual element in
life that can only be grasped by the "student of Life" who

goes beyond the work of the social scientist.

What are these two ways of life which produced
these vast spiritual effects when they were
respectively adopted in place of Archaism by
Cato and in place of Futurism by Peter? In
peering into spiritual depths which may prove
unfathomable, let us begin by taking note of
the common differences.
.

.

.

The "Student of Life" Motif Raises an Epistemological
Dilemma Which Threatens to Invalidate the Method of
Toynbee the "Social Scientist"

Critics of Toynbee have noticed an increasing inter-

est in religion in the second half of Toynbee*

s

Study and we

have been tracing this trend in terms of the "student of
Life" role.

In Volume Six the methodological problem resi-

40 Ibid.

,

393.

.
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dent in this dual role of "student of Life" and "social
scientist" comes into sharp focus.

We have heard Toynbee'

s

ini-

tial warning to beware of the dangers of dividing the
histo-

rian's task into small unrelated units, as has happened in

man's technological endeavor under the impact of science and
industrialism.

A universal view, Toynbee felt, could be

obtained by adding the intuitions of the past to the work of
the social scientist.

It was further research as a "student

of Life" on the cultural plane which led Toynbee to a discus-

sion of spiritual dimensions in life.

There arises a growing

question, not so much as to the inadequacy of scientific

methodology, but as to the adequacy of reason itself.

In the

name of "Life" Toynbee begins to challenge Humanism in Volume Six, assailing its very presuppositions

However parochial the savage's horizon may be on
the plane of sheer ly human life on the surface of
this planet, his soul still lives and moves in a
spiritual environment with a superhuman dimension
which the modern Western humanist has deliberately
excluded from his reckoning. The humanist purposely concentrates all his attention and effort
upon a purely human cross-section of life which he
abstracts from the totality of his spiritual
environment by a mental operation that is performed
for the practical purpose of bringing human affairs
under the human control
.

^

The analysis of the possibilities of mental opera-

tions is carried further in this same context by added obser-

vations on the "spiritual dimension."
41 Ibid.

,

VI,

13.

Toynbee here suggests

,

^
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that the spiritual dimension may not be an aspect of
life
\

which can be encompassed by

a

wider vision, i.e., by finding

an intelligible field of study that will enable us to
escape

the relativity of the social environment.

The spiritual

dimension in history is a "mode of spiritual being" which
greatly complicates the problem of knowing in the historical
process.

However large its area on Earth, Man's Universe
cannot give Man's spirit room to breathe unless
it also extends from Earth to Heaven; and our
modern Western school of humanists have perhaps
been peculiar, as well as perverse, in planning
to reach Heaven by raising a titanic Tower of
Babel on terrestrial foundations in these dimensions as though it were sheer physical distance,
and not any difference in mode of spiritual being,
that divided and distinguished Heaven from Earth. 2

—

With the distinction pressed beyond a distinction in methods,
Toynbee poses for himself the task of knowing by means of

spiritual intercourse.

This way of knowing is distinguished

from an intellectual apprehension of reality by use of the

terminology "Head" and "Heart."

For example, Toynbee seeks

to make this distinction in the case of the philosophers

knowledge as opposed to the saint

*

s

knowledge.

Yet, for all their sublimity, these three attributes of the Divine Nature are in themselves no
more than conclusions of the human understanding?
they are not experiences of the human heart ; and
while it is no doubt possible for a human soul
which has made its first discovery of God on the
intellectual plane to enter into communion with
42

Ibid., 14
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Him thereafter on that higher level of spiritual
intercourse on which human beings are able to
love, as well as know, their human fellow creatures, the attainment of communion with God. 43
If this train of thought is a faithful reproduction

of a growing dilemma in Toynbee, we find a further elaboration of it in his crucial discussion of "Transfiguration."

Although often overlooked, this chapter rivals the initial
chapter of the Study in methodological significance.

Vol-

umes Five and Six are concerned with the process of the dis-

integration of civilization, and more specifically with the

problem it presents to the Soul living in such intolerable
circumstances.

Leading up to chapter eleven in which "Trans-

figuration" is introduced as the only possible alternative
for the searching Soul, Toynbee concludes that "we have

already passed in review three different attempts to find
one; but, so far, our survey has brought us each time to the

dead end of a blind-alley." 44
There follows a twenty-page description of the way of

Transfiguration for the Soul in
tion.

a

disintegrating civiliza-

Does this "Soul" refer solely to past situations or

does Toynbee regard himself as suffering similar dilemmas?
It is my opinion,

in the light of the following evidence,

that Toynbee identifies himself as a twentieth-century histo43
44

Ibid

.

,

41.

Ibid., 149.

rian with the Soul who finds an answer in "Transfiguration."

There are two kinds of evidence which can be cited.
First, the "Head" and "Heart" distinction is used to refute
the "Way of Detachment."

We know from later discussion that

Toynbee is concerned as an historian to yoke together the

Heart and the Head "in a common enterprise of striving to
reach and grasp this hidden treasure

[a

unitary truth]." 45

In the final paragraph of chapter ten concerning Detachment

as a way of life he argues that Detachment is no solution to

the Soul.

11

.

.

.

for in consulting only the head and

ignoring the heart it is arbitrarily putting asunder what God
has joined together." 46

The way of Detachment is linked with

the philosophers or the rationalists as distinct from the

saints and the men of faith.

Furthermore the way of the

Head, or intellect, must be superseded by the way of the
Heart:.

In concrete terms,

"therefore the philosophy of

Detachment has to be eclipsed by the mystery of Transfiguration.

The Hinayana makes way for the Mahayana, Stoicism for

Christianity, the Arhat for the Bodhisattva, the sage for the
saint." 47
Second, the pronoun "we" is used to emphasize a sense
45 Ibid

.

,

VII, 505.

46 Ibid.

,

VI, 148.

47 Ibid.
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of being personally involved.

The passage on "Transfigura-

tion" begins with the usual phraseology of the student of

history who is examining certain phenomena of the past.

As

in earlier cases the "we" has the sense of an observer;

We have found that the experience of being
constrained to live in the adverse social
environment of a disintegrating civilization
confronts the Soul with a spiritual prob48

...

lem.

So he continues to discuss the "Soul" in the light of an

historical observer until the second paragraph where he suddenly switches the "we" from a formal, stylistic usage to a

participant in this search for escape.
As we gird up our loins to take this fourth and
last turning a clamour of disapproving and derisive voices assails our ears.
Shall we allow
ourselves to be intimidated by this chorus of
protest? Shall we abandon at this point a course
of exploration which has hitherto proved so disappointing as it has been laborious? It is tempting
to yield to the promptings of weariness and disillusionment.
Yet, before we do give in, it may be
well to consider whether we really wish to resign
ourselves to remaining imprisoned in a city of
destruction like rats in a trap--so long as there
is still one possible egress left untried.
When we look the hostile chorus in the face we see
before us nothing more formidable than the sullen
countenances of the baffled philosophers.,

—

.

.

.

.

.

«

The tie that connects the Soul in a collapsing soci-

ety with the historian hampered by a disintegrating methodol
ogy is a common search; the "Soul" is searching for the
48

Ibid., 149.

49 Ibid.
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lasting value, and the historian is searching for the absolute behind the relativity of events.

Keeping in mind the

initial passage of Toynbee in Volume One as to his search
for
the "abiding form" behind the "shimmer of relativity/' notice

the similar way in which he describes the "Soul" in a disin-

tegrating society.
The painful perturbing dissolution of familiar
forms, which suggests to weaker spirits that the
ultimate reality is nothing but a chaos, may
reveal to a steadier and more penetrating spiritual vision the truth that the flickering film
of a phenomenal world . • • is an illusion which
cannot for ever obscure the lasting unity that
lies behind. ^0

The same identification of the historian and the
"Soul" is indicated in a later passage in which Toynbee

describes the self-transcendence of the futurist.

The "Soul"

that turns to futurism as a way of escape from a disintegrating society will be disappointed, but in his disappointment
he might stumble upon the way of transcendence.

Through the disappointment of a mundane hope we
have been admitted to an apocalypse or discovery
of a reality which has been there all the time
behind the scenes of the narrow man-made stage
that has hitherto set the limits of our field of
vision and of action.

^

The significance of this passage rests upon the attached

footnote in which he spells out the direct relationship
0

between the Soul and the contemporary historian:
50 Ibid.

Ibid., 129.

"The quest

.
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that originally led us into this Study was the hope of
seeing

through the 'shimmer of relativity in the foreground of historical thought.'" 52

Further evidence that chapter eleven on "Transfiguration" focuses for us Toynbee

8

s

methodological problem as well

as the problem of the Soul in a foundering society may be

found in a figure of speech common to both problems.

The figure of speech is that of a man who gains a

mountaintop view of the surrounding countryside.

In this

context the overall view can be gained either by means of
flying in an airplane or climbing a mountain.

The figure of

speech is applied to the Soul in a splintering society as a

situation in which he must escape the familiar collapsing
forms in order to see the larger whole.

Toynbee frequently

uses the same figure of speech to describe the work of the

historian.

For example he acknowledges the contribution of

Augustine to a supra-mundane range of vision. 53

The fre-

quency of appearance of this metaphor as a description of the

historian's task has been noted in an earlier section of our
discussion
If it is true,

that Toynbee identifies his role of

an historian in a methodological dilemma with the predicament
52 Ibid.

,

n.

53 Ibid.

,

IV, Preface.

1.

.
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of the Soul in a disintegrating society, then this section

sheds light on the methodological shift in the Study as well
as the shift in Toynbee from history to history of religion.

Of the. whole crucial chapter on "Transfiguration" the key

passage is the one in which Toynbee asserts:

—

To know Him and, through Him, the Kingdom over
which He reigns it is not enough for our yokel
in his airplane to see the world with the eye of
a hawk

—

We will break the quotation at this point to interject the

argument that this was precisely what Toynbee originally
hoped was possible

— to

find a large enough field of study,

the intelligible unit of civilization, to make parochialism

impossible
The man must be given an eye which not only
magnifies but also penetrates into other
dimensions.
What he needs is the eye of the
poet,
„

.

.

Again one might observe that if Toynbee had stopped
at this point he would still be within the framework of his

original plan because he has earlier argued that a poet's

contribution to the historian's search can be valuable.

The

poet has an insight that can be translated into the language
and work of the empirical historian.

Now Toynbee adds a fur-

ther qualification:

And the poet who has this vision of the transfiguration of This World by the Kingdom of God
must also be something of a prophet, for he must
have an intuition of the Godhead which poetry
The act of Transfiguration
alone cannot give him.

—
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is a mystery because it is an act of God and
an

effect of God's presence--and this is a truth
which has been less obscure to the Jewish
futurist than to the Greek philosopher. 54

Far from being an isolated reference, the same chap-

ter contains a similar conclusion.

In this case Toynbee is

attempting to describe the Civitas Dei

The point of inter-

.

est for our methodological analysis is the use of the phrase
"a

supra-mundane spiritual dimension."

This is the old "cul-

tural plane" of Volume One on which Toynbee hoped to find an

"abiding form" as distinct from the "shimmer of relativity."
Gradually, as we observed earlier, the cultural plane became
a

"spiritual dimension."

Now it is

a

"supra-mundane spiri-

tual dimension."
As far as this Civitas Dei enters into the Timedimension at all, it is not a mere dream of the
future but is a spiritual reality which is at
all times present in This World besides existing
and, indeed, just because it exists
as well in an
Eternity and an Infinity that are in a supra-mun-

—

dane spiritual dimension.

5

Put in relation to a question posed by Toynbee in

chapter one of Volume One where he asks if it is possible to

ascertain "the presence of some constant and absolute object
of historical thought," 5

*'

the answer of Volume Six is that

this "constant and absolute object" is the Civitas Dei
54

Ibid

.

,

VI, 161.

55 Ibid

.

,

156.

56 Ibid.

,

I,

16.

.

How

:

\
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the historian knows about this Civitas Dei is the
vital ques-

tion for other historians.

Toynbee

'

s

answer is that this

"problem may be intractable to attempts to solve it in
terms
of logic." 5 7

In a footnote he compares our knowledge of the

Civitas Dei to the "rending of a veil in order to bring into

view

a

hitherto invisible kingdom that has been in existence

in the background all the time and has merely been awaiting

the hour appointed for its revelation." 58

Although there is considerable diversity among the
critics as to Toynbee

1

s

relation to Christianity, and a

noticeable variation in Toynbee

Christianity

9

s

own convictions about

we can observe in a preliminary way that Volume

,

Six contains his closest affirmation of
history.

a

"Christian" view of

Espousals of Christianity climax this long argument

on the Soul in a disintegrating civilization
The member of a disintegrating mundane society
who has taken this road has a surer hope, and
therefore a deeper happiness, than the merely
once-born member of a mundane society that is
still in growth for he has learnt the saving
truths that 'the Most High hath not made one
world, but two,
and that the human wayfarer
who still finds himself a sojourner in This
World is not on that account beyond the pale of
the Other World but is travelling all the time
within the domain of the Kingdom of God and is
at liberty to live as a citizen of this omnipresent commonwealth here and now, if he is
willing with all his heart to pay allegiance to
;

1

57 Ibid

58

.

,

VI, 157o

Ibid.

,

156, n. 4.

,
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Christ the King and to take upon himself those
obligations of citizenship which Christ has
consecrated by voluntarily fulfilling them in
person.
This entry into the Kingdom of God is
a second birth. 59

Effects of This Turning Point in the Study
It would clarify the significance of this turning

point to examine how critics of Toynbee have ignored changes
in his views.

Some of their wholesale attacks apply either

to the early empirical, or the later religious Toynbee, but

not to both.

It is usually claimed that Toynbee deliber-

ately abandons the Enlightenment criteria of empirical reason.

The clearest spokesman for the charge of antiration-

alism is probably Karl Popper.

He includes Toynbee "s work in

his study of The Open Society and Its Enemies

fully conditions his attack when he sayss

clear that

I

.

Popper care-

"I wish to make it

consider this a most remarkable and interesting

book, and that

I

have chosen it because of its superiority to

all other contemporary irrationalist and historicist works

I

know of." 60
The criticisms of Popper are directed toward the his-

toricist attitude in Toynbee 's Study
59 Ibid

60

. ,

,

i.e.,

"the fashion of

168.

Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies
Princeton University Press, 1950)
Princeton:
(rev. ed.
;

p.

435.

s
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not taking arguments seriously

.

.

.

the attitude of looking

at once for the unconscious motives and determinants in the

social habitat of the thinker, instead of first examining the

validity of the argument itself. 61

Popper describes the

general situation in the Study in the following way.
Thus I think that we have every right to make
the socioanalytical diagnosis that Toynbee s
neglect to take serious arguments seriously is
representative of a twentieth century intellectualism which expresses its disillusionment, or
even despair, of reason, and of a rational solution of our social problems, by an escape into a
religious mysticism. 6
1

Again stressing the change in Toynbee

,

Popper summarizes his

description of the Study thus:
A social science which cannot quite meet these
demands is therefore inclined to defend itself
by producing elaborate attacks upon the appliSumming
cability of science to such problems.
up my historioanaly tical diagnosis, I venture
to suggest that Toynbee s historicism is an
apologetic antirationalism, born out of despair
in reason, and trying to escape into thg^past,
as well as into prophecy of the future.
1

Of course Popper is not alone in the criticism of Toynbee s
8

Renier remarks that:

antirationalism.

"I dislike Toynbee*

method, because it dwells in the sphere of myth and allegory,

outside rationality, and because the intense loyalties he
61
62

Ibid

p.

436.

p.

440

Ibid.

63 Ibid.,

"
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inspires are equally innocent of rationality." 64
A critic in the "London Times" argues that "in

another section there are some pertinent criticisms of the

antinomianism of modern historians; nevertheless r Dr. Toynbee
feels, the laws of history may be transcended in the

God which is perfect Freedom,

'

f

Law of

thus turning a moral insight

into an epistemological principle which makes all reasoning

impossible
A.

October,

.

J.

1954

P.

Taylor in "The New Statesman and Nation" of

makes a rather passionate attack on the irra-

,

tionalism of Toynbee.

After quoting Toynbee

1

s

intuition

about the superiority of higher religions over civilizations
as the vehicle for helping human beings make their pilgrim's

progress

,

dental.

Taylor retorts:

"The echo from Bunyan is not acci-

These monstrous volumes with their parade of learn-

ing are a repudiation of Rationalism."*^

In the same vein as

Taylor, Christopher Hill berates Toynbee as a betrayer of

rationalism.

Nevertheless, after all is said, A Study of
History can only be described as a very sad
book.
It is sad because its final aim is to
lead us to a conscious and deliberate irrationalism.
64

Renier, History

65 Ibid

.

,

p.

,

pp. 215-219.

117.

66 Christopher Hill,
Quarterly , II (n.d.), 291.

"Time and Mr. Toynbee," Modern
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Mr. Hill is not content to identify a general trend
toward

religion in the Study but specifies the personal goal of
Toynbee in a rather dramatic fashion when he writes that

Toynbee "turns back in fear and horror when he perceives

where his own assumptions are leading his argument; and he
ends on his knees praying for a miracle.
self into the Roman Catholic Church.

He has written him1,67

.

.

.

These charges of irrationalism or antirationalism
have much in common with a series of criticisms which come

from several Dutch scholars.

Verbally, the criticisms of

Geyl and Baudet appear to be quite unrelated to the "anti-

rationalist" charges

,

but actually both schools of critics

agree on the distorting effect of a Toynbee who has passed
this point under discussion in his methodological develop-

ment

.

We have seen Toynbee

'

s

crucial decision to turn to

the spiritual dimension for his clue to history; or, as he

expresses it, to pay allegiance with all his heart to Christ
the King in order to gain a revelation of the "abiding

forms."

This move has been interpreted as an escape mecha-

nism, or "despair in reason" by the rationalists.

Obviously

the implication is that this escape into irrationalism leads

the historian to a distortion of history.
67 Ibid.

Geyl and Baudet

p

:

:

,

.

'
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begin with a discussion of the "vision" and argue that this

"compelling vision" is the distorting factor in Toynbee

Study

1

s

Geyl argues

,

But when a man comes to the past with a compelling
vision, a principle, or dogma, or such magnitude
and emotional potency as Toynbee s unity in the
love of God; with a system which causes him to
reduce the multitudinous movement of history to
one single criterion, rejecting most of them, and
incidentally his own, as unimportant; that man can
write a work full of color and striking theories,
but no history.
The Student of History,
as Toynbee calls himself, may know more of history
than I shall gyer do, but he is no historian. He
is a prophet.
'

.

•

.

.

.

.

Baudet has a similar criticism.

Describing the Study

as a theodicy and accounting Augustine as the chief contribu-

tor to Toynbee

,

Baudet observes

'Primary vision,
that is the original basic
thought, the idea with which Toynbee commenced
writing his book. One always begins with an
idea a brain-wave
Many have criticized Toynbee s primary vision as a theoretical a priori
Certainly it is that, too. But is such an a
priori not a self-evident and inevitable basis
of theoretical thought ; a compelling necessity?
That is also the opinion of Romein, who has even
referred to the famous 'a priori* of Gibbon in
order to demonstrate that vision simply originates
in such a way.^9
1

,

.

?

1

'

1

,

1

uo

Geyl,

69"

"Toynbee the Prophet," 269.

dat is de oorspronkeli jke kernvisie
dedachte de idee waarmee Toynbee begonnen is zi jn boek te
Vele
Men begint altijd met een idee, een inval.
schrijven.
hebben Toynbee zi jn primaire visie theoretisch verweten als
Zeker dat is zij ook.
Maar is denktheoretisch
a priori'
zulk een 'a priori niet een vanzelf sprekend en onvermi jdeli jk
fundament; een dwingende noodzakeli jkheid? Dat is ook de
meening van Romain, die nog op het beroemde 'a priori' van
i

,

r i ma i re

?

,

,

f

1

.

8
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If these two groups of criticisms are to have any

direct relevancy to Toynbee's work they must address themselves to this crucial point in the Study

.

The temptation is

strong to digress from the study of Toynbee's methodology in

order to line up the two sides in the argument on a rational-

irrational axis.

This could easily degenerate into a fruit-

less exchange of epithets, or a stalemate of mutually immov-

able faiths.

Another temptation would be to follow Geyl on

this endless merry-go-round of whether or not Toynbee is an

historian.

The question may be legitimate, and has certainly

been a bone of contention among the friendly and unfriendly

critics, but again it sheds very little light on the present
study of Toynbee's methodology.
tant, on the other hand,

It would seem rather impor-

to press the question at this par-

ticular place, of whether or not Toynbee's affirmation of
faith in a spiritual dimension has any effect on his historical views.

It is important to ascertain the nature and

extent of this methodological turning point in the Study

.

The two groups of critics tend to emphasize the radical

change in Toynbee.

The rationalist critics in their general

criticism of Toynbee argue that this act of transfiguration
Gibbon heeft gewezen om te betoogen, dat nu eenmaal visie op
zulk een wijze ontstaat." H. Baudet, "Een beschowwing over
de beteeknis van het werk van A. J. Toynbee in het verband
van zign tijd cultuurkring, " Historie en Metahistorie (Leiden)

,

(1952)

,

46.

™

represents a break in methodology, or escape from reason
or a

despair of finding a rational solution of our social problems.

Geyl and Baudet also emphasize a breech in the method-

ology caused by this introduction of an "a priori" or
"vision.

11

Toynbee and his publishers emphasize in contradis-

tinction to these critics, the continuity of the historian's

methodology.

This concern to couch changes in the Study in

terms of an expanded program rather than a repudiation of an

original program is interestingly expressed by the publishers
on the jacket of Volume Seven.

This volume is the first in

the concluding batch of volumes of the Study
1954,

,

and appeared in

fifteen years after Volume Six had been published.

On

the jacket is the explanation:
In the course of the thirty-three years separating
the conception and the completion of an undertaking
on a scale comparable with Gibbon s Dr Toynbee s
1

1

,

.

outlook has inevitably undergone changes which have
vitally affected the trend of his great work. The
most significant of these changes concerning his
estimate of the role of Religion in History has
led him beyond the limits of his original purpose,
though without disrupting the basic plan
,

,

.

This explanatory remark reflects Toynbee

•

s

analysis

in the preface to Volume Seven where he speaks of recasting

his original notes

.

To express the continuity of this last

batch of volumes with the earlier ones he puts the descrip/u Toynbee,

jacket.

A Study of History , Vol. VII, on the dust
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tion in quantitative terms.
In the outcome,

the original plan of the book
still stood and the execution of Parts VI, VIII
X, and XIII was carried out more or less
on the'
lines of the original notes.
The subjects of
Parts VII, IX, and XII, on the other hand, came,
in the event, to be treated very differently from
the original design and the subject of Part XI,
in particular, so differently that the title of'
this Part had to be changed from 'Rhythms in the
Histories of Civilizations' to 'Law and Freedom
in History.

—

'

Put in this way the reader might well say that the

changes are certainly minor if but one out of eight parts has
had to be changed in a minor sense.
leading.

But this is very mis-

Part XI was not simply one part in a series of

essays, but was to be the climax of the whole scientific
study.

Looking back to Volume One where the plan of the

whole Study is outlined, and comparing this plan on page V
with the first chapter, it is obvious that Part XI would

harvest the careful, empirical researches of the first ten
parts.

The problem, Toynbee argues,

is to escape the distor-

tions of past historians who were subject to the relativisms
of time and social environment by discovering an intelligible

unit of study and by proceeding empirically.

The second step

in the operation is to put these civilizations through their

paces in a comparative study in order to find the uniformities of behavior.

Under this plan Parts II through X are to

be viewed as putting the civilizations through their paces.

So the "Plan of the Book" logically proceeds with such ques-
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tions as genesis, growth, breakdown and debris of civilization in order to complete the study and to isolate the
link

between these civilizations.
it might be,

All of this work, important as

is nevertheless preliminary to Part XI where the

results of the investigation would be set out as uniformities, or laws, or the "lineaments of an abiding form" behind

the "shimmer of relativity."

That this is a fair analysis of

Toynbee's initial purpose may be seen in Part XII.

Here

Toynbee proposed to deal with the "Prospects of the Western

Civilization."

The whole point of including a section on the

"Prospects of the Western Civilization" depended upon his

finding empirically verifiable rhythms or laws by the time he
reached Part XI.

Further evidence that the initially hopeful

plan broke down somewhere along the line is the apparent

reluctance of Toynbee to enter into Part XII when he finally

reached that topic on November 30, 19 50.
As he took up his pen to write the present Part
of this book, the writer was conscious of a sense
of distaste for this self-imposed task which was
due to something more than a natural shrinking
from the obvious hazards of a speculative subject.

When Toynbee goes on to analyze his 'sense of distaste" he advances a reason for it which he cannot seriously

hope to maintain.

While it may appear to be a reason, in the

light of Toynbee's earlier writing it can only be interpreted
71 Ibid.

,

IX,

406.
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as a rationalization.

Why was it, then, that, so far from diminishing,
his distaste had been increasing steadily in the
meantime? The answer to this question was not
obscure to the writer himself. The reason was
that this growing disinclination of his had in
fact little or nothing to do with the difficulty
of estimating the Western Civilization's prospects, but was rooted in a reluctance to throw
overboard one of the cardinal principles governing the writer's whole approach to this study of
History. He was distressed by a fear that, if he
allowed himself to single out any one civilization
for special treatment, he might be abandoning a
standpoint from which alone it was, in his belief,
possible to see in true perspective the whole history of a species of Society of which the Western
Civilization was one, but only one, representative.^
Toynbee tries to explain his distaste on the basis of
a

"cardinal principle" that he ought not to single out any

one civilization for special treatment.

Two considerations

immediately suggest themselves to the reader of the passage.
First, why did Toynbee promise the reader in his original

plan to treat "The Prospects of the Western Civilization,"
(Part XII in The Plan of the Book, Volume One)

contrary to

a

if it were

"cardinal principle" of the study?

To demon-

strate that this original intention was not simply a youthful
and temporary ideal, Toynbee repeats his plan to include a

study of "The Prospects of the Western Civilization" in the
second batch of volumes (preface to Volume Four) and in the

preface to the last batch of volumes (Volume Seven)
Ibid.

,

410

.
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thermore he argues in Volume Seven that, "the prospects of a

contemporary Western Civilization
and graver

.

.

"

.

73

.

.

.

had become clearer

It cannot be argued by Toynbee that

this matter of "singling out" the West is the violation of a

cardinal principle.
The second consideration that makes this violation of
a "cardinal principle"

a specious argument is the fact that

Toynbee has repeatedly singled out the West in his earlier
volumes for unusually full treatment without expressing
reluctance.

In these earlier cases the plea is always to the

effect that the West is still living, in contrast to the dead

civilizations of the past.
Toynbee"

s

reluctance to discuss the prospects of

Western Civilization is based on a disillusionment with his
original methodology and the results that this method seemed
to promise.

If his original plan had been successful and the

"abiding form" had emerged from the "shimmer of relativity,"
then he would have been armed with empirically verified law

with which to analyze the prospects of the West.

Now, how-

ever, the results of his study are valid only for the one who

has been through the act of transfiguration and can see his-

tory through this vision.

critics

1

Needless to say, those 'captious

help to make the task even more disagreeable.

73 Ibid.,

VII, Preface vii.
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Before leaving the matter of Toynbee

'

s

reluctance to

write Part XII, let us point out a second major consideration.

Not only is his reluctance psychological and arises

from an apparent failure to reach the desired certainty, but
his reluctance is rooted in the fact that Part XII is now

quite superfluous.

As long as Toynbee could proceed under

the assumption that civilizations were the intelligible unit
of study,

and that the future of mankind was bound up with

man-in-the-process-of-civilization, then it was quite logical
and imperative that something be said about the prospects of

Western Civilization.

But after the great change in Toynbee,

it is obvious that the Western Civilization has nothing in

prospect.

Through Volume Four the question of the future of

the West was a very live issue.

For example Toynbee rejoices

in the fact that the cyclic version of predestination is not
a legitimate inference from historical data and that "This is
a

message of encouragement for us children of the Western

Civilization as we drift today alone

,

on the 'wide sea' of

human history, with none but dead or stricken civilizations

around us,"^

Toynbee argues that the West has the live

option of discarding war either by agreement or by
out blow.

a

knock-

In the context of the passage he lapses into the

role of a warning or imploring prophet, and the point is

clearly made that the Western Civilization has to choose
74 Ibid.,

IV,

38.

:
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peaceful means in order "to reprieve mankind from the
doom of
physical extermination." 75
the same volume Toynbee emphasizes the importance of treating the prospects of
Western

m

Civilization when he contrasts our position with the hopeless
ness of the Hellenes;

"...

for them the whole game is

over, for good and for ill, while for us, whose civilization
is still

'a

going concern', the crucial part of this game is

probably still to play." 76
Now, however, following the major reorientation of

Volume Six, the need no longer exists for discussing the

prospects of Western Civilization.

Man's future is tied to

the development of the Kingdom of God, and Western Civiliza-

tion is "only a vain repetition of the heathen." 77

Toynbee

argues
In this perspective the civilizations of the

first and second generations might justify
their existence, but those of the third generation would cut a disconcertingly poor figure.
If civilizations were the handmaids of Religion,
and if the Hellenic Civilization had served as a
good handmaid to Christianity by bringing this
higher religion to birth before that civilization had finally fallen to pieces, then the
civilizations of the third generation would
appear to be 'vain repetitions' of the heathen. 78
75 Ibid

.

,

180.

76 Ibid

.

,

317.

77 Ibid

. ,

78 Ibid.,

VII, 445.
444.

—
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In the same vein, Toynbee regards Western
post-Chris-

tian secular civilization as at best a
superfluous repetition
of the pre-Christian Hellenic Civilization,
and at worse "a

pernicious backsliding from the path of spiritual
progress."

To one who worried through the first six volumes

with Toynbee in the hope that some plan might be devised
to
renew a faltering Western Civilization, his casual
dismissal
of Western Civilization in Volume Seven involves a radical

psychological reorientation.

At most in Toynbee

«s

new view,

the West can have a negative role that it might "inadver-

tently perform."

This would be the task of "unintentionally

providing" a meeting ground for higher religions, and of

serving as a demonstration of a peculiarly vicious idolatry
man's corporate worship of himself. 80

It is not by accident

that Toynbee concludes this section with the statement, "as
for the civilizations of the third generation, they are now

right out of the picture."

On the basis of this new view of

history, it is clear why Toynbee would be exceedingly reluctant to discuss the "Prospects of Western Civilization."
The situation becomes even more difficult for a dis-

cussion of the "Prospects" as Toynbee continues in Volume
Seven.

This changed view of history which grows out of
7

Ibid.

80 Ibid.

,

445.
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Toynbee

methodological turning point in Volume Six, has
increasingly radical implications for Toynbee s
original view
's

'

as he begins to press it into service.

For example, there is

a forced change in the categories of
civilization.

The old

"Western Civilization" which Toynbee once treasured,
is now

divided without explanation into two entities,

Western Respublica Christiana " and
civilization.

a

a

"Medieval

Modern Western secular

Notice that this clever distinction allows for

an amazing change in the discussion of the origin and growth

of the Western Civilization.

This Western Civilization had

been described as an "intelligible field of Study" 81 and had
been worked out empirically in Volume One. 82

Although Toyn-

bee was not specific as to the date of its birth, he indi-

cated that it was in the neighborhood of 1200 years ago:
since the time, now more than twelve hundred years ago, when our Western Christendom was
born, --a feeble infant from the Church's womb. 83
o

.

.

When this early conclusion is placed alongside of

a

Volume Seven conclusion on the same subject, the contrast is
striking:
It will be seen that the monstrous birth of a
Modern Western secular civilization from the

womb of a Medieval Western Respublica Chris tiana,
was made practicable by the
.

81 Ibid
82

Ibid

.

.

51.

.

,

1,

.

,

147.

83 Ibid., V,

190.

e
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renaissance of the Hellenic institution
absolute' state in which Religion had of the
been a
department of Politics. 84
In the following paragraph he speaks
of the civiliza-

tions of the third generation as an "unhappy
delivery."

Hence if we have correctly represented
Toynbee

regarding "Western Civilization/' as
a

a "vain

'

s

position

repetition/' as

"monstrous birth/' and as "now right out of the
picture/'

his reluctance to discuss "The Prospects
of Western Civilization" is quite understandable.

Once it is seen that Toynbee the student-of-lif

plays the dominant role after Volume Six and that
Toynbee the

social scientist steadily loses ground, the series of
contra-

dictory descriptions in the later volumes emerge as Toynbee
attempts to carry out the implications of his new position

while attempting to preserve the results of his earlier
investigations.

We have argued above that this change should

have brought about a radical readjustment in the "Plan of the
Book" but that Toynbee attempted to complete his original

plan even though he himself had cut the foundation out from

under the plan to write on "The Prospects of Western Civilization."

We further argued that the tension which built up

as the Study approached Part XII, Toynbee explained away by

an appeal to a "cardinal principle."
84

Ibid.

,

VII, 539.

284

The attempt to preserve the results of
Toynbee

'

s

bold

plan for empirically establishing "intelligible
fields of
study," putting these units through their paces,
and then
jotting down the rhythms or uniformities, is
found in several
places in the later volumes.
One example is found in Volume

Eight under the heading "An Expansion of the Field
of Study."
Here the implication is that the Study has gone somewhat

beyond its original intention but that the expansion is
merely supplemental.

The problem for Toynbee is to salvage

as much as possible of the original position of "intelligible

fields of study."

This is no mean task in the light of the

new view that civilizations are meaningful only in the measure that they contribute to the progress of higher religions.

Nevertheless, Toynbee makes the attempt when he sayss

Actually we have found that a civilization can
be studied intelligibly in isolation so long as
we are considering its genesis, its growth, or
its breakdown.
Indeed, the historical evidence
that has presented itself in our empirical survey of breakdowns has seemed to warrant the conclusion that the breakdown of a civilization is
invariably due to some inward failure of selfdetermination and never due to blows delivered
by external agencies. ®^
But even this hope of salvaging something from the

detailed investigation of the first five volumes by limiting
the empirical survey of civilizations to their "genesis,

growth, or breakdown" is open to challenge.
85

Ibid.

,

VIII, 87.
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in the preceding argument,
Toynbee was forced to reconstruct

the genesis of Western Civilization.

As late as Volume Five,

Western Civilization was described
as being born from the
womb of the church in the time of
Gregory the Great. But in
Volume Seven the once "intelligible
field of study" known as
Western Civilization has somehow been
divided into
an unde-

fined Medieval Respublica Christiana
and

a

Modern Western

secular civilization which comes to
"monstrous birth" out of
the mistakes and sins of the Medieval
Western
Church.

Per-

haps the most disconcerting feature of
this major change in
the treatment of Western Civilization
is to notice Toynbee
'

repeated argument that this new thesis is validated
by one
test case.
In the light of the careful marshalling

of cases

in the early volumes in order to establish
uniformities it

is surprising to read,

in Volume Seven,

If we take, as a test case for the verification
of this thesis, the eruption of a Modern Western
secular civilization out of a Medieval Western

Respublica Christiana

,

...

86

And in the same chapter,
If we take, as a test case for the verification
of this thesis, the genesis of the Christian

Church

.

.

.

It is difficult to see what Toynbee could have in

mind when he speaks of one case as verification for

a thesis.

Earlier Toynbee had objected to Spengler's laws on the basis
86

Ibid., VII, 534.
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that they were induced from

Spengler employed

a

a

"handful of facts," and that

simile in order to mask "the inadequacy

of the evidential basis." 87

Toynbee

'

s

conclusions had always

been prefaced with the call, "Let us test, by
making a survey, whether the phenomena which have thus
presented them-

selves in a single case are unique and therefore
of little

account or regular and therefore significant." 88

m

Volume

Five a single case was "of little account"; now in
Volume

Seven one test case somehow is supposed to verify a thesis.
In this exploration of the implications of Toynbee 's

methodological shift in Volume Six we have brought to light
the radical changes in the plan of the book, the forced

re-classification of Western Civilization,
entation of the prospects of the West and
use of evidence.

a
a

complete re-orisharply different

Because the Study is so lengthy and

detailed, many readers and reviewers simply glide over obser-

vations in the later volumes which do not harmonize with
their memory of observations made in the early volumes.

One

such set of observations or "findings" we should like to con-

sider in this section on Toynbee the "student of Life,"

because it illustrates the view that a fundamental change has
taken place in Volume Six and that the findings of the his87 Ibid

.

,

IV,

88 Ibid., V,

11.
83.

,
,
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torian in the second part often do not
supplement or complement the earlier empirical findings,
but rather contradict
them.

The "findings" under discussion concern
the relationship between civilizations as propounded
specifically in

Volumes Five and Eight.
The first picture developed by Toynbee is
the domi-

nant scheme of the first five volumes.

It is a view of

civilizations which attempts to escape the egocentric illusion by means of a comparative study.

In this comparative

study Toynbee hopes to avoid the question of value by
the

assertion that these "civilizations are separate representatives of a particular species of societies which are all

philosophically contemporary with one another and philosophically equal to one another in value." 89

Toynbee rejoices

that the old "magic bean-stalk" view of civilization with all
of its egocentrism and provincialism can be discarded in

favor of the "true image" of evolution as it has come to be

conceived by our Western botanists and zoologists. 90
image of the "pollarded willow" promises

a

This

way of escape from

the egocentric illusion and the relativism of "our Western

historians/' and Toynbee clearly states that "we have already

attempted to transpose it into terms of human history."
89 Ibid.

I,

90 Ibid.

168.

91 Ibid.

169.

178

.
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Because we will refer to this image
of the "pollarded willow"
on a number of occasions, let
us notice its details in Toynbee's own words.
The workaday willow, like the magic
starts its growth perpendicularly in bean-stalk,
a
line; but, before it has time to grow single
top-heavy
a man comes along with an axe
and pollards its
head.
will the tree die of the shock, or
will it adapt its manner of growth to the
new
conditions that have been imposed on it from
outside? Possessing the will to live, the
tree
chooses the latter alternative; and from its
mutilated summit it now puts forth half a dozen
shoots instead of one and sends those up in all
directions,
Each of these shoots attempts,
in its own growth, to overcome the effects
of the
blow which the trunk has received and to carry
the life of the tree forward one stage farther. 92
.

.

.

When this image is applied to the history of civilizations it produces the standard picture we have come to

recognize in the first five volumes of the Study

.

We have suggested that the histories of individuals and communities and societies fall into
successive chapters, in each of which a number
of representatives of which ever the species may
be are confronted by some identical challenge
which imposes an ordeal. Under each of these
common ordeals the parties react in different
ways.
The majority succumb outright; some just
manage to survive
others discover a
response to the challenge which is so satisfactory that it not only carries them through the
ordeal of the moment but puts them in a favorable
posture for undergoing the next; others, again,
follow these path-finders as sheep follow their
leader into a gap which he has forced through a
hedge 9J
.

92 Ibid.,

168

93 Ibid.,

169.

.

.

;

"

Toynbee adds that "we shall be
guided by this conception
throughout our Study
.

Upon such a master-plan Toynbee
develops elaborate
views on the relation of the
creative minority to the other
members of the society.
it harmonizes rather well
with his
views about peaceful encounters
and creative inspiration.
Indeed a number of passages rather
lyrically describe the
results of a successful response on
the part of a creative
minority.

For those who do not catch the
inspiration in
their souls, "like a light caught from
a leaping
flame
are induced to conform externally by
the
enlistment of their faculty of mimesis. 94
_

,

Our interest is now narrowed to the
results of this creative
response on peoples outside the growing
society.
The metaphor of light is employed to describe the
results when Toynbee affirms that

When this light strikes the walls it is not
arrested there, for the walls of a growing
civilization are walls of glass in a city that
is set on a hill and that cannot be hid.
The
light streams out and on to shine before

men;

.

.

"

.

A further description of the effects of a growing

civilization speaks of the radiating civilization's value as
"a

means of self-education for the party by whom the act of
94 Ibid

.

,

196.

95 Ibid., V,

196.

"
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mimesis is performed, and as a
tribute of admiration and
token of friendship for the party
towards whom the mimesis
directed

i

.

Mimesis is evoked by charm; and we
can now see
that the charm which is exercised,
durinq
growth of a civilization, by a succession the
of
creative minorities preserves the house
not only
from being divided against itself but
also from
being attacked by its neighbors in
so far, at
least, as these neighbors happen to be
societies
of the primitive species. 96

—

Toynbee describes this situation of "accepting
and transmitting" the radiation of a growing civilization
as "the normal
relation between a civilization and the primitive
societies
round about

..."

when a civilization falls into collapse

it "ceases to be a whole on which other societies
can model

themselves, or decline to model themselves, consistently
and

integrally." 97

The tragedy of a disintegrating society is

carefully assessed;
In fact, while a disintegrating society surpasses
a growing society in its radiation on one, or
even two, of the three social planes, it simultaneously falls behind it on one plane at least:
and, if we now substitute qualitative for quantitative standards of measurement, we shall be left
in no doubt that the net result is a moral loss
and not a moral gain. 98
In brief,

this development is described by Toynbee as a "dis-

astrous miscarriage.'
96 Ibid

.

,

198.

97 Ibid

.

,

199.

98 Ibid.,

200.
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When we turn from this analysis of
Volume Five to the
discussion in Volume Eight on the same problem
of the relation between societies, quite a different
situation is

described.

The "findings" no longer follow the
pattern of

the "pollarded willow";

the assumption of the philosophic

equality of the civilizations has been dropped,
and the whole
pursuit of "civilization" as an intelligible field
of study

has lost its meaning.

Clearly the old tension between Toyn-

bee the "student of Life" and Toynbee the Social
Scientist

has turned in favor of the "student of Life."

Under these

circumstances a survey yields these conclusions:
In the field of encounters between contemporaries
in which both parties are societies of the species

that we have labelled 'civilizations', and even in
the wider field in which the 'agent's' role is
played by a primitive or semi-primitive society,
an Orpheus captivating all fellow creatures within
earshot by the enchanting harmony of his heavenly
music is a rare figure by comparison with a Charlemagne forcibly baptizing the captives of his bow
and spear or an Awrangzib morally alienating
intended victims who have proved more than a match
for him on the battlefield.
The rule at which we
thus arrive inductively proves to be that normally
an encounter between contemporaries is culturally
sterile even when one party, and a fortiori when
either party, is in a healthy state of cultural
integration; and the historic evidence likewise
bears out the converse 'law' that a state of cultural disintegration is favourable to cultural
intercourse, and most favourable of all when it is
the state of both parties to the encounter and when
on both sides it has gone to extremes.^
We have then two "normal" situations.

"ibid.

,

VIII, 507

The first

"normal" situation as discussed in
Volume Five rests on the
moral gain, the self -education the
tribute of admiration,
and the preservation from attack which
ensues when a growing
civilization allows its light to stream out
through walls of
glass to the "boundless field in which there
is nothing to
,

limit their range except the inherent
limitations of their
own carrying power." 100 in the second
"normal" situation we

have the rule that encounters between contemporaries
are

"culturally sterile."

Stated in its most extreme form the

second "normal" situation reads;
The intrusion of any alien cultural element into
the life of any society, in whatever state of
life it may happen to be at the time, is manifestly a dangerously disruptive, and therefore a
painfully harassing, experience.
.

.

,

Briefly stated, the "findings" in the first instance

support the early view of Toynbee that in

a

growing and

healthy civilization progress is possible through creative
leadership and the radiation of a healthy and integrated culture.

In the second instance the "findings" point to the

opposite conclusion that the normal relationship between
societies is "culturally sterile," and proves to be "dangerously disruptive" to the passive society.

It ought to be

pointed out that the master-plan of the second half of the
100 Ibid., V, 196.
101 Ibid.

,

VIII, 509.

J
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Study_ sees no creative
possibilities in "civilizations," for

these civilizations are not the
"path-finders" who lead the
other sheep "into a gap which he
[path-finder] has forced
through a hedge." 102 The master . plan of
the second half q£
the Study_ sees the real or "spiritual
significance" in the

relationship between societies.

This relationship must be

that of "encounters" from which a new creation
springs.
At the time of writing, half-way through the
twentieth century of the Christian era, Christianity and the Mahayana were the two great
living witnesses to the spiritual significance
of the social phenomenon of encounter between
civilizations.
Humanly speaking, it was
a creative response to the challenge of one
of
these encounters that had brouaht to birth
Christianity and the Mahayana and Islam and
Hinduism. 1U
.

.

.

One more task remains to be done in this section on

Toynbee as "student of Life."

We have traced the growth of

this role in the Study as a means of identifying the methodo-

logical struggle.

Our argument thus far has been that Toyn-

bee looked to the elan motif in order to supersede the paro-

chialism and subjectivism into which contemporary historiography had been betrayed.

To gain a whole view of Life was an

important complementary feature to the effort to induce laws
of history from the empirical study of civilizations.

This

meant, as we have seen, the introduction of mythological and
102

Ibid

.

,

I,

169.

103 Ibid., VIII, 628.
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religious intuitions in order to give the
empirical historian
certain clues with which he might develop
surveys leading to
the laws of civilizations.

The uneasy working arrangement

between what Toynbee variously calls reason and
intuition, or
science and religion, or head and heart, or
science
and Life,

was steadily breached in Volumes Five and Six,
culminating in
the transfiguration argument of Volume Six.

We have intro-

duced a number of those "captious critics" at that turning

point in the Study

,

and have raised the question as to what

extent does this methodological shift effect the original

purpose and actual results of Toynbee

«

s

While it was

work.

important to explore the extent of the methodological shift
in this present context,

it might in one sense be considered

a deviation from our stated purpose of tracing Toynbee s view
1

of himself as the "student of Life."

So let us return to our

initial task with but one modification.
"Student of Life" Role Leads to a Solution
to the Problem of the Meaning of History
We began by a notation of the successive instances of

"student of Life" role from Volume One to Volume Six.

Our

modification now involves a departure from the chronological
sequence to a topical treatment of the "student of Life"
motif.

Three topics may cover the remaining references.

First we can note the reiteration of Toynbee

1

s

position

— the

view that religion makes sense out of the historian's task.

Then we turn to his discussion of the
place of reason, pointing out his attack on rationalism
in the first phase, and his
more moderate attempts later on to
limit the extent and use
of reason.
Finally we shall observe Toynbee s
efforts to
reconcile reason with his religious commitment.
•

As a "student of Life" who goes beyond
reason and

science to a mystic experience of transfiguration,
Toynbee

stresses the value of this discovery both for
society and the
historian within society. in Volume Seven he treats
at
length the advantages of regarding the churches
as a higher

species of society.

missal of Toynbee'

s

This "reversal of roles" forced the dis-

original assumption that all civiliza-

tions are philosophically equal— an assumption that he had

depended upon to deliver him from parochialism and subjectivism.

It has led him to discard his attempt to write a his-

tory of civilizations in favor of a history of religions.

But these are minor affairs compared with the advantages of
the new position, and Toynbee hastens to indicate "what light

the significance of the churches' past may throw on the promise of their future." 104

His plea for a new position reads:

This human fellowship with the One True God,
which had been approached in the primitive
religions and been attained in the higher religions, gave to these certain vital virtues that
were not to be found in either primitive societies or civilizations.
It gave power to overcome
104 Ibid., VII, 506.
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the discord which was one of the
inveterate evils
of Human Society; it offered a
solution
problem of the meaning of History; ... of105the
In a further elaboration he identifies
the meaning-

lessness of history with the spatial and
temporal limitations
of the historian.
This of course was the problem with
which
Toynbee opened his Study
However, the difference between
Volume One and Volume Seven is quite apparent,
for
.

in this

context the hope of finding an abiding form is
based not on
an empirical study of the rhythms of civilizations,
but
rather in

a

religious experience.

Even in the most narrow- verged society the ablest,
most energetic, and most fortunate individual cannot influence, or even survey, the action in which
he is concerned beyond the close-drawn limits of a
horizon which embraces no more than a fraction of
the human participant in it, is 'a tale told by an
idiot, signifying nothing.
But this apparently
senseless 'sound and fury' acquires spiritual
meaning when man catches in History a glimpse of
the operation of a One True God who is both transcendently infinite and intimately loving, and who
has the power and the will to take up His human
creatures into His own range of action and mode of
106
existence.
'

.

.

.

If the meaning of history is found in the experience
of transfiguration, the historian then faces the problem of

accounting for the use of the intellect in historiography.
Two attitudes seem to reflect Toynbee

s

struggle to find the

boundaries between reason and prophecy.

There is a strongly

105 Ibid.

106

,

507o

Ibid., 512.
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hostile attitude expressed in the
later volumes toward the
rationalists and rationalism.
The attack is directed toward
what Toynbee regards as the
excessive claims of Reason.
Volume Seven the extended argument
begins with the assertion
that the Hellenic minds discovered
"Reason" and

m

then 'idol-

ized it.

'

He traces the idolization of Reason
into the mod-

ern Western secular civilization where
the Western rationalists have followed an Hellenic philosophy
"in worshipping a
false 'God the Reason. "107 0ne Qf
chi&f objections he
'

^

has to rationalism is that it has become
a parochial faith

which sees Western Civilization as the culmination
of history,

in addition, it cuts off from human experience
those

areas of knowledge which come via religion and
prophecy. 108

Just one example of the many criticisms of Western
Rationalists suggests this double accusation:

even if the traditional Western rationalist,
in an elegiac mood, were to acquiesce in seeing
the Western Civilization deposed from the place of
honor in the moving picture of human progress up
to date, he would be moved to indignation and
mockery at the notion of assigning the vacated
place to Religion. 1° 9
.

.

.

A third objection to Rationalism is the charge that
it leads to a constriction of the moral capacity of the
l° 7 Ibid.,
l Q8

Ibid

.

l° 9 Ibid.

,

468.

450.
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individual and thence to an irresponsible
abandonment of
Society.
This charge is rooted in Toynbee s
journalistic
•

experience of 1933.

In that year he had written in the

Survey of Internation al Affairs
\

a

critique of the World Dis-

armament Conference and the World Economic Conference
in
which he had put his finger on the inadequate
ideological
basis of those conferences.

His argument was that Enlight-

ened Self-interest, "so far from being an automatic,
self-

regulating psychological mechanism for making all things work
together for Man's good, was nothing more than an intellectual abstraction which had no counterpart at all in the realm
of practical life." 110 in this present context the argument
of 1933 is incorporated into a general attack on Rationalism.

The ideology of enlightened self-interest is traced to a

parentage in Rationalism and the family tree boasts a grievous collection of juvenile delinquents.
The association of the words 'enlightened' and
'self-interest' is, indeed, a contradiction in
ad jecto --when 'enlightenment' is taken to mean
a blindness to everything supernatural and
superhuman in Man's vision of the Universe.
In
such a Weltanschauung in which the Heavenly
Light has been 'blacked out', 'enlightened' does
not lead even to the common-sense conclusion
that the interest of the individual is inseparable from 'the greatest good of the greatest number'.
Within the narrowing moral horizon of a
godless universe, in which piety towards the
dead has become inept, and providence for the
unborn quixotic, a concern for the living
generation of his fellow men also ceases to be
,

110 Ibid.,

517.

within the individual's moral capacity. Thus,
paradoxically, pure rationalism applied as a
rule of conduct leads to the conclusion that
the only 'realistic' course is to abandon Society
to the irrational play of Chance;
111
.

.

.

This outburst of hostility toward Rationalism and
the

Rationalists of which the above quotations are examples cannot stand as representative of Toynbee

*

s

more considered

arguments concerning the use of the intellect.

While strenu-

ously objecting to the claims of "Reason" to serve as the

foundation for a complete Weltanschauung, he does attempt to
mark out the spheres of experience in which the intellect
plays the dominant part.

As an example of a situation in

which Reason might be said to transgress its proper limits,
Toynbee points out the strife between "two possible schools
of metaphysics."

In this case the argument concerns the

regularity of the Laws of nature as observed by the Hellenic
and Indie World, and the regularity of the "Law of God" which
the Israelite and Iranian prophets discovered as the regu-

larity of a single constant aim pursued "unwaveringly,
by the intelligence and will of a personality

2

.

.

.

Although

our interest is not in the "regularity" argument as such, we
are interested in Toynbee
a

'

s

handling of what he thinks may be

theoretical inconsistency (i.e., "of being logically irre-

ducible to unity.") in the two kinds of regularity.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.,

i
,

IX,

174.

His
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comment or resolution of the theoretical inconsistency
is to
subsume logic under "real life."

As he says,

In fact, the apparent incompatibility between
the
two kinds of regularity is merely a mirage in the
shadow-world of abstract logic; in real life they
are not only compatible with one another, but are
inseparably complementary in a divinely inspired
interplay in which, at divers levels of Reality,
cyclic movements according to laws of Nature are
successively transcended in experience and endeavors that, in turn, are subject to cyclic movements
113
at a higher level.
.

.

.

Narrowing the general problem of the limits of the
intellect to the specific area of historical method, we
observe the same procedure at work in Toynbee's formulation.
Here the intellect has a limited sphere of operation and a

limited value to the historian, as Toynbee remarks;
When we are investigating the relations between
the facts of History, we are trying to see God
through History with our intellects. The sorting
out of facts is essentially an intellectual
activity.
The Intellect, however, is only one
faculty of the Soul. 114

Toynbee analyzes Augustine, as one of a group of out-

standing historians, in this two-phase operation of the historian who sorts out the facts of history with his Mind and
then seeks the meaning of history with his Heart.

his analysis reads

.

.

.

In summary

"in passing to the second part of

De Civitate Dei from the second installment of the first

113 Ibid
114

.

Ibid., X, 113.
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part, Saint Augustine is being carried by
the Human Mind's

impulse to investigate the relations between the
facts of

History into embarking on the Human Heart's quest to
find a
meaning behind them." 115
If the historian uses his intellect to sort out
the

facts of history and to investigate the relations between
the
facts, then the question arises as to the adequacy of this

first operation in the historian's task.

Clearly in the fol-

lowing notations Toynbee wishes to establish the necessary

part the intellect plays in the historian's performance but
at the same time the secondary and inadequate role it plays.

One example of this position can be found in his dispute with

Collingwood.

In the argument he advances the point in sev-

eral different phrases that "Thought is not the whole of
Life"; and that Collingwood "is wrong in instructing the his-

torian to ignore all strands of experience except the intellectual strand."

This appeal to "real life" leads Toynbee to

the statement of his own position, which is that "the histo-

rian must discover for himself some additional means of

establishing psychic communications with the human objects of
his study beyond a reperf ormance of acts of thought.

11 ^
.

.

.

The same argument as to the insufficiency of Reason
is found in the Volume Ten discussion of the "Inspirations of

115 Ibid., 91.

116 Ibid., IX,

732.

/
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Historians.

Commenting on Ibn Khaldun's recourse to

a tran-

scendental thesis, Toynbee observes:
His conclusion is that human affairs do not
constitute an intelligible field of study so
long as the inquirer is attempting to study
them in isolation from the action of Man's
Creation; and this is equivalent to saying
that Man's Oikoumene only becomes intelligible
when it is recognized as being a fragment of
God's Universe.
Ibn Khaldun is here saying, in. effect, that
Man on Earth is a denizen of two worlds.
Man has a franchise in a mundane commonwealth in
virtue of a human esprit de corps , and at the
same time a franchise in a supra-mundane commonwealth to divine revelations
.

.

.

.

The task of tracing out the limitations of the use of
the intellect in the historian's work does not represent a

period of psychological exhaustion which might have influenced the last volumes of Toynbee 's Study

.

pertinent topic in his post- Study writings.
in his post-mortem essay "What

I

It is a very
He discusses it

Am Trying to Do," in connec-

tion with the problem of what human affairs are subject to

scientific law, i.e., open to investigation on the level of
the intellect.

Summing up the results of more than twenty-

seven years of historical research, Toynbee concludes that
"there are some things in human affairs that have no pattern

because they are not subject to scientific laws.

...

I

also think that the poetry and the prophetic vision that well
up out of the subconscious depths of the human soul are not
117 Ibid., X,

87.
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ammenable to law.

"

^
.

Again in a recent discussion in An Historian 's

Approach to Religion

,

Toynbee includes a chapter on the

"Encounters between Higher Religions and Philosophies."

In

this chapter he further develops his earlier thesis
of two

"Truths."

It is apparent that he wants to speak of two

truths, the Truth of the Subconscious Psyche and the Truth of
the Intellect,

in order to avoid the conflicts between Sci-

ence and Religion.

At the same time he does not want an

absolute dichotomy, so that he hastens to speak of the truths
as modes of apprehending the unitary Truth.

Our interest in

the key passage below focuses on the inferior status of sci-

entific truth.
In either mode of apprehending the Truth, however, there can be either a vision of some
particular feature or aspect of the Truth or a
vision of the whole of it.
On the poetic level
of the Subconscious Psyche, the comprehensive
vision is Prophecy; on the scientific level of
the Intellect it is Metaphysics
I f our foregoing analysis of the difference between Poetry
and Science is correct, a comprehensive view of
poetic truth must, in the very nature of the
two modes of apprehension be more feasible than
the attempt made by Metaphysics to present a
comprehensive view of scientific truth. 1*'
.

,

The footnote to this lengthy quotation further

defines the limitations of the Intellect in gaining the
118 Toynbee,
9 Toynbee

,

"What

I

Am Trying to Do,"

An Historian

9

s

p.

4.

Approach to Religion

,

p.

126
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vision of the whole truth.
^Prophecy' in the original and authentic sense
in which the word means, not a forecast
of the
future, but the revelation of a mystery that
is out of the Intellect's reach.
The literal
meaning of 'prophecy' is the 'utterance' of
Truth from a hidden source from which Truth
cannot be extracted by intellectual processes.

Having examined Toynbee

'

s

hostility to the Rational-

ists and Rationalism of the contemporary West, and having

watched a more moderate and considered judgment emerge as to
the limits of the use of the intellect in historical studies,

let us now turn to our third topic.

The reconciliation of the findings of the Intellect

with the intuitions of the subconscious is attempted in terms
of two motifs we have found frequently employed in the Study .

The first motif of the historian as an explorer or adventurer
sets the formal context of the reconciliation.

He argues

that every historian is on a voyage of "spiritual adventure,"

indeed an "enthralling voyage of spiritual exploration." 120
In this adventure the historian depends upon Science

(in this

passage used interchangeably with "Intellect" or "Head") and

Religion in a joint endeavor to solve the problem of the

meaning of history.

So the motif or role of the historian-

traveller is used by Toynbee to suggest that theoretically or
formally the conflict is resolved by the historian who
120 Toynbee, A Study of History , VII, 500.
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rejects neither, and draws from both, for "In this
present

Study we cannot aspire to do more than follow our
pair of

explorers— if Science and Religion can be imagined

as setting

out hand in hand— on the first voyage of this new
quest for
the Visio Beatifica ."

This verbal reconciliation in the metaphor of the

traveler implies an equality and harmony of Intellect and
Subconscious,

"a hand in hand"

relationship which is not

carried out in actual practice.

It would seem to me that the

reconciliation is couched in these terms in order to preserve
the appearance of being philosophically unprejudiced or

uncommitted.

The phrase "we cannot aspire to do more than

follow our pair of explorers" is the counterpart in Toynbee's

historical methodology to the one praise-worthy element he
defends in historic Rationalism.

While agreeing with Martin

Wight that Rationalism imbibed a Judaic fanaticism and intolerance from Christianity, he yet admires Rationalism's prin"to follow the argument whithersoever it might lead,

ciple,

without being willing to allow its pursuit of intellectual
truth to be arrested by any non-intellectual considerations.

"

121

The genuine as opposed to verbal reconciliation of

Science and Religion, Head and Heart, Intellect and Subconscious, is made by Toynbee in terms of the "Student of Life"
121 Ibid.„

474.
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metaphor.

Here there is no misleading imagery
of hand in

hand effort unless it is the picture of
blind Science being
led by visionary Religion.
.

The argument starts with the distinction
between "two

kinds of Truth."

in order to reconcile these two truths and

avoid an absolute dualism, Toynbee links the two kinds
of
Truth to the concept of "planes of life," a concept which
he
had introduced without discussion in Volume One;
"Scientific
truth and prophetic truth are experiences on different
planes, as are scientific truth and ritual observance." 122
If the Intellect and/or Science are restricted to one

plane of experience and Religion to another level of experience the question still remains as to the relationship

between these levels of experience.

Little doubt is left in

the mind of the reader as to the deeper level of experience

or the priority of the intuitive truth.

—

When this difference had been recognised and
only then--it might begin to be possible for
pilgrim souls to feel their way towards an
angle of spiritual vision from which the real
nature of the relation between these diverse
kinds of experience would become apparent. 12
-^

Thus the reconciliation takes place on the grounds of

religion

—a

vision,,

and it would seem in the light of the passages now

feeling one's way towards an angle of spiritual

122

Ibid., 475.

123

Ibid

.
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being examined that without Religion the
historian's task is
useless
In the Volume Seven exposition of the relation

between churches and civilizations, Toynbee summarizes
the
three "vital virtues" that had been attained in the higher

religions.

The second of the three reads:

"it

[human fel-

lowship with the One True God] offered a solution of the

problem of the meaning of History." 124

The elaboration of

this passage underscores the meaninglessness of history if it
is attempted apart from a "glimpse of the operation of a One

True God."

Interestingly enough the objections to

a non-

religious interpretation of history are the same objections

which Toynbee tried to meet in the opening chapter of Volume
One of the Study

.

But this apparently senseless 'sound and fury"
acquires spiritual meaning when man catches in
History a glimpse of the operation of a One
True God who is both transcendently infinitely
loving, and who has the power and the will to
take up His human creatures into His own range
of action and mode of existence, in so far as
they respond to His challenging call to act in
This World as partners in His divine Work. 12
-"

The same emphasis upon the meaninglessness of human

history is found in the annex to this chapter as Toynbee
seeks to explore the assertion that higher religions alone
124 Ibid

,

507.

125 Ibid.,

512.

.
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give value and meaning to History.

He argues,

"No doubt

every human life-trajectory does have this
enduring effect,
just as the motion of a single atom or electron
affects the

equilibrium of the whole physical universe.

But this so-

called 'impersonal immortality' is no redemption
of Man's
role in terrestrial history? it is the heart of
the nightmare
of Human Life on Earth without the fellowship of
n
A
God;

126
.

.

.

In Volume Eight a similar conclusion regarding the

meaninglessness of history as seen from the standpoint of the
human observer is drawn.

Only when the scientific labor of

the historian is placed in the framework of Religion can

there by any significance to history.

Was this uniform self-defeat of Zealotism and
Herodianism the last word that the oracles of
History and Mythology had to speak when asked
for light on the spiritual consequences of
encounters? If it were indeed the last, then
the outlook for mankind would be forbidding.
Perhaps the true answer to this anxious
question was that this might well be the end
if the whole story was comprised in the history
of civilization, but not if Man's attempt at
civilization was no more than one chapter in
the story of a perennial encounter between Man
and God.i 27

Again in Volume Nine the reconciliation of the findings of the Intellect with the intuitions of the Subconscious
126 Ibid.,

756.

127 Ibid., VIII, 624.
i
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takes place in a religious framework.

The context of the

crucial passage is

a

the "Law of God."

The "Laws of Nature" are obtainable in

discussion of the "Laws of Nature" and

Toynbee's view by an empirical study of the rise
and fall of
civilizations. But the pessimistic conclusions from
this

Study^ of the vain repetitions of civilizations
must be res-

cued by religion.
'Laws of Nature' display the regularity of a
recurrent movement for instance, the motion of
a wheel revolving any number of times round its
axis.
If we could imagine a wheel coming into
existence without owing its creation to a wheelwright, and then revolving ad infinitum without
ever serving any purpose, these 'repetitions'
would indeed seem 'vain'; and this was the pessimistic conclusion drawn by Indie and Hellenist
philosophers from a Weltanschauung in which, by
a tour de force of intellectual abstraction they
had set the sorrowful wheel of existence turning
for ever in vacuo
'Laws of Nature' make
sense when they are pictured as being the wheels
that God has fitted to His own chariot;

—

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

In Volume Ten Toynbee turns to his own experience and

the experiences of other historians for insight into the role

of the historian as a

'Student of Life."

The reader is

strongly tempted to lose the thread of the argument in favor
of an enjoyable hour with this modern Plutarch's Lives

.

But

for our purposes in this chapter the argument itself is more

relevant and important-

The whole volume might be described

as an attempt to make and hold to a distinction between the

128 Ibid., IX, 174.
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facts of history and the meaning of
history.

Although the

distinction has not been systematically
advanced in the earlier volumes, it does have points of likeness
with the distinction between the two kinds of truth of
Volume Nine.
The
"facts" of history, like "scientific truth,"
are in the province of the Intellect, while the "meaning of
history," like
the "religious truth" is in the province of poetry
and the

subconscious.

This distinction, however, does not represent

two distinct fields such as "history" and "theology";
for we

notice that Toynbee emphasizes that a true historian must

know the facts and the meaning of the facts.

...

if the child is to become an historian in
very truth and deed, it must learn to harness
its curiosity about the facts to the service of

something more purposeful and creative than
curiosity itself.
It must come to be inspired
with a desire, not just to know the facts, but
29
also to divine their meaning;
^-

.

.

.

This same two-fold division of the historian's labor,
the collecting of facts and the divining of their meaning, is

again related to two separate faculties of the historian's
Soul in a later reference of Volume Ten.

When we are investigating the relations between
the facts of History, we are trying to see God
through History with our intellects. The sorting out of facts is essentially an intellectual
activity.
The Intellect, however, is only one
faculty of the Soul. When we think about something, we are apt also to have feelings about
it, and our impulse to express our feelings is
129 Ibid., X, 42

"

,
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er than ° Ur im P" lse to ««PresB
our
^oigh^y?3§
"Facts" and "meaning behind the facts"
is linked to
the activity of one of Toynbee
s historian-heroes Augustine;
again with the Mind/Heart or Intellect/Feeling
distinction in
the historian's Soul.
Toynbee sees the greatness and immortality of Augustine's De Civitate Dei in
the fact that the
'

author was "carried by the Human Mind's impulse
to investigate the relations between the facts of History
into embarking on the Human Heart's quest to find a
meaning behind
them. 131

Another of his selected list of historians has the
same experience as Augustine.

Ibn Khaldun is described as an

historian who attempted to write history in secular sociological terms or in a "would-be strictly scientific explanation." 132
It will be seen that the failure of a secular

sociological explanation of the rises and falls
of empires to account for the course of history
in the Maghrib has led Ibn Khaldun to introduce
a new actor onto the stage of History and, in
doing so, to give History itself a new dimension.
His conclusion is that human affairs do not constitute an intelligible field of study so long as
the inquirer is attempting to study them in isolation from the action of Man's Creator; and this
is equivalent to saying that Man's Oikouniene only
130 Ibid., 112.

131 T
,
Ibid.
,

.

132 Ibid.

t

91.
85.
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becomes intelligible when it is recognized as
being a fragment of God's Universe. 13 3
The ^intelligibility or meaninglessness of
history

that is not placed in a larger religious context
is clearly

argued by Toynbee in what appears to be the climax of
the
thesis of Volume Ten.

We have noticed the basic distinction

between facts and the meaning of the facts as it is developed
in this volume and illustrated by autobiographical and bio-

graphical references.

section "E" reads,
of History.

Of the five sections in Volume Ten,

'The Quest for a Meaning Behind the Facts

Here one finds the most emphatic pronouncements

8

on the radical difference between the findings of the Intel-

lect and the intuitions of the Subconscious.

third section of this volume

,

As late as the

in the discussion of Ibn Khal-

dun's historical work, Toynbee had argued that even though
the "big questions" of history could not be solved by Khal-

dun's secular sociological explanations, at least "a fraction
of the phenomena" had been explicable 134
.

In this climactic

and summary section of the whole argument, however, Toynbee
seems to find little value in the historian's intellectual

endeavors if it is not rescued by religious intuition.

For

example, he comments on Gibbon's definition of history as the

"register of the crimes, follies, and misfortunes of mankind"
133

Ibid

,

87.

134 Ibid.,

86.

.
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and the "all is vanity" of Ecclesiastes
that they are an
anthropocentric angle of vision. His further
comment is that
from an anthropocentric angle of vision,
"Life presents the
mirage of a wilderness, not only for mankind
but for the

gods." 135

Added emphasis upon the uselessness of the
find-

ings of the historian working by intellect
alone is given in
the descriptive phrase "this spiritual
cul-de-sac," and in
the statement that "a spectacle in which no
meaning can be

found, so long as the meaning of it is sought in the
crea-

ture's vain endeavors, proves to be meaningful as soon
as the

meaning of it is sought in the Creator's indwelling purpose "136
,

One last reference from this section is noteworthy
for in it Toynbee refers to the "riddle of Life" which

appears to be without solution from a secular viewpoint:

When 'Dominus illuminatio mea" is taken in lieu
of 'Man is the measure of all things* as Man's
key to the riddle of Human Life, the vanity of
Man is transfigured in this divine light. ^7
135

136

Ibid

.

,

127.

Ibid

.

,

pp.

137 Ibid., 127.
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CHAPTER

VI

TOYNBEE'S QUEST ENDS AS "CHRISTIAN
HISTORIAN"
"But this apparently senseless
'sound and
acquires spiritual meaning when man catchesfury'
in
History a glimpse of the operation of
a One
True God
Arnold J Toynbee in Volume Seven

..."
.

"God alone knows the truth."
Arnold J. Toynbee in 1947 Civilization on Trial

Explanation of Approach Used
This study of the historical methodology of Arnold

Toynbee began with a discussion of the various self-charac-

terizations which Toynbee has used, such as the "explorer,"
the "scientific historian," the "student of life" and the

"Christian historian."

By following the use of the

"explorer" role one could trace the problem of change in
Toynbee'

s

A Study of History and see his early confidence in

what his "new history" would accomplish steadily dissolve
into the deep questionings and ambivalence of his summing up
of the "haunted enquiry."

Clearly the change in Toynbee

'

attitude toward his Study rested in part upon the methodological framework he employed, and through the frequentlyused terms, the "Social Scientist" and the "Student of Life"
we traced the shift in Toynbee

'

s

position from the confident

"laws" of the early volumes to the religious intuitions of
314
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the concluding volumes.
If the law-making method
of the Social Scientist

seemed to provide an inadequate
framework for Toynbee s Study,
and failed to reveal the
"lineaments of some abiding f or m,
or that "which is absolute and
not merely relative to the
particular social environment of
particular historians," and
if the "Student of Life" had to
first complement and finally
dominate the "Social Scientist," then this
task is
•

not com-

plete without one further stage of analysis.

We must seek to

analyze the theoretic structure of reality
upon which Toynbee s method depends, and on the basis
of which theoretic
'

view Toynbee discards one method for another.

This analysis

may best be attempted by investigating a final
self-charac-

terization of Toynbee

»s

choosing, the "Christian historian."

One might expect to find in a chapter entitled
"The

Christian Historian" some kind of
bee

'

s

religious views.

a

systematic study of Toyn-

From the remarkable profusion of Bib-

lical texts which fill the pages of A Study of History

,

the

many discussions of theological doctrines, and the recent
involvement of Toynbee with a Religio Historici

systematic study is surely possible.

,

such a

But it would be some-

what irrelevant to an investigation of his methodology and
could be challenged also on the grounds that it lacked

intrinsic value.

Another approach one might anticipate in

this chapter would be a discussion of Toynbee"

s

view of the
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Christian church in history.

Again this approach is

a

pos-

sible one, and might be of value to students
of Church History, but for a study of methodology it offers
only an inter-

esting diversion.

What will be attempted in the following

pages is to trace the self-characterization of

a

"Christian

historian," and to investigate the meaning of the term
"Christian" as it relates to the working historian.

Argu-

ably, Toynbee discloses his view of "ultimate reality" when
he speaks of himself as a "Christian historian," and it is

this theoretic view of reality which becomes the final

arbiter in his methodological problems.

As a further exten-

sion of this argument we will examine two theoretic views

which Toynbee holds which can be identified as early and
later, and views phrased successively as the "pollarded willow" versus "bean-stalk," as the "growth rhythm" versus

"encounter rhythm" or as the "Humanist" versus "Christian"
poles in Toynbee 's thought.

This analysis should result in

the clarification of many of the changes that take place in
the course of the Study among which are the re-evaluations of

certain historical figures and movements, shifts in forecasting,

the curious indecision as to whether a civilization is

dead or alive, and sharply divergent estimates as to the
"crisis" of the West.
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Use of Term "Christian Historian"

Does the term "Christian Historian" or
its equivalent

occur often enough to demonstrate that this
self-characterization is neither an incidental nor irrelevant
role? As one

might expect from the earlier examination of
the "Social
Scientist" designation which Toynbee equates with
a "discreet
attitude of neutrality" or a refusal to make value
judgments,
any such designation as "Christian Historian" is
unlikely to

appear in the early volumes of the Study
ences to

a

.

Interesting refer-

committed position begin to appear in the sections

of Volume Six in which Toynbee chooses to follow Augustine

out of the City of Destruction and into the Civitas Dei

.

Volume Five contains an annex discussion of "Marxism, Socialism,

and Christianity" 1 and in the course of the argument

Toynbee speaks of himself as a "Christian critic," a "Christian observer" and as

a

"latter-day Christian."

Briefly the references are:
The Christian critic will have no quarrel with
the Marxian Socialism for going as far as it
does:
he will criticize it for not going far
enough.
Thus, from the Christian standpoint, the
Marxian experiment in Socialism is a tragedy;
but this cannot be the Christian observer's
last word; ... We latter-day Christians may
still turn a Marxian attack upon Christianity
.

1

.

.

Ibid., V, 481.

"
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to good account.

...

2

The identification of himself with the pilgrim
who

follows Augustine into the Civitas Dei has been
examined in

chapter four, and we can refer to it here as the Volume
Six
link in the chain of identifications Toynbee forges
in the

last part of the Study

.

It may be sufficient to note that in

this section he refers to the new standpoint as a "Christian

Weltanschauung," and as possessing
dimension

a

"supra-mundane spiritual

.

A Volume Seven identification of his position with
that of a Christian historian may best be found in the sec-

tion called "The Bow in the Cloud."

In an attempt to explore

the implications of the new standpoint

r

Toynbee poses the

question,
If we adopt this Augustinian Platonic Weltan schauung as our own and attempt in the light
of it, to envisage terrestrial history sub specie
aeternitatis what significance shall we find in
the idea of progress in this world?**
,

,

In Volume Eight,

Toynbee again links his work as an historian

with the religious standpoint,

twentieth-century historian might venture
to predict. ...
A Christian-bred historian,
however, would be a traitor to the genius of his
•

.

.

2

a

Ibid

.

,

pp*

586-587

3 Ibid

.

,

VI,

156.

4

Ibid., VII, 561.

:
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ancestral faith if

...

5

A Volume Nine reference to the "Christian
historian" appears
in the middle of a paragraph devoted to the question
of the

relative merits of the higher religions.

Toynbee introduces

his view by saying:
it seemed unlikely to a latter-day Christian historian that either Hinduism or Islam
would be placed on a spiritual par with the
.

.

.

Mahayana or Christianity.

...

6

There are scattered references throughout Toynbee

1

s

volumes to his personal experiences, and this part of our
study of his methodology may be clarified by bringing them
together.

Three comments on his early life suggest that his

boyhood was molded by a religious training.

In his Volume

One attack on "The Protestant Background of our Modern Western Race-feeling," he thought it necessary to append this

footnote
As the following analysis of the historical
relation between Protestantism and modern Western race-feeling might conceivably be misinterpreted as an expression of religious prejudice
in the mind of the writer, it might be pertinent
for him to mention that he was brought up as a
Protestant and that he has not become a Catholic.

Further explanation of his Protestant childhood can be found
in the final volume reflections on the influences which
5

Ibid

.

,

VIII, 627.

6 Ibid

.

,

IX,

7 Ibid.,

I,

394.

211.

°
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inspire historians.

Contrasting the valuable influences of

home and church that teach the "Biblical vista
of History

from Creation through the Fall and the Redemption
to the Last

Things" with the "well-meaning but myopic-eyed
organizers of

national systems of compulsory education" that teach parochial, secular historians, Toynbee rejoices that he had been

"taken to church as a child every Sunday as a matter of

course

"
.

The next phase in his life followed his education at

Winchester (1902-1907) and he speaks of it as

wandering in the wilderness. 9

a

"forty years"

This phase is similarly des-

cribed as agnosticism.
The third period in Toynbee'

begins in the year 1936.

s

religious experience

He describes it as a turning "on

the road back to Religion from Agnosticism.""^

The best

observer of that experience may be Toynbee himself, as he
lapses into a favorite form of third person description:
In the summer of A.

1936, in a time of physical
sickness and spiritual travail, he dreamed during
a spell of sleep in a wakeful night, that he was
clasping the foot of the crucifix hanging over the
high altar of the Abbey of Ampleforth and was
hearing a voice saying to him Amplexus expecta
D.

8 Ibid.,

X,

9

VII, 544.

Ibid

.

,

10 Ibid.,

IX,

5.

635.
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(

'Cling and wait

1

)

.

The resemblance of Toynbee's religious
experiences to

Augustine's description of his own conversion in
the garden
at Milan is not accidental.
By recalling the stages in which
the Study was written one is able to understand
the emergence
of the "Christian historian" designation in Volumes
Five and
Six.

The Study was completed in three "batches of volumes."

The first three volumes were being written from June,
1927,

when the systematic plan for the Study was started, until
May,

19 33.

The second batch of volumes numbering Volumes

Four, Five, and Six, was being written from the summer of

1933 to March, 1939.

The last four volumes were written

after Toynbee returned from war-time government service, from
194 7 to 1951.

It can be seen that the middle batch of vol-

umes coincides with the time of Toynbee's religious turning

point, and that the classic passage in Volume Six, where he

chooses to follow Saint Augustine into the Civitas Dei

interesting methodological elaboration of

a

,

is an

personal relig-

ious experience.
As a precaution against reading too much into this

experience before we have analyzed the concept of

a

"Chris-

tian historian" let us note that as late as 1952, Toynbee

speaks of himself as a "semi -penitent agnostic" and as a

twentieth-century Western
12 Ibid.

"

ci-devant Christian agnostic." 12

"

In his own account of his religious
orientation, Toynbee

refers to the impossibility of taking "a
traditional form of
Christianity as he found it." 13 He prefers to
view his

experience as that of one who is making

a

perilous passage,

or as a "disciple of Saint Francis," whose
present require-

ment was "to hold on his course and to trust in
God's
grace. 14
We have recorded Toynbee

'

s

direct testimony to the

effect that he has become a "Christian historian," and this
has been correlated with references to his religious experi-

ence.

Additional corroboration may be found in his attitude

toward "Humanism" over the span of years from 1922 to 1958.
In 1922 an essay by Toynbee on "History" was published in the
b oo k

/

The Legacy of Greece

.

In the essay he expressed his

admiration for the Greeks and argued that the Renaissance in
the West was "one of the greatest and most fortunate deci-

sions in the career of our civilization." 15

His approval of

the Greek way to civilization was so strong, and his delight
in the West's determined and successful attempt to learn

everything our predecessors could teach us so enormous that
he enthusiastically concluded that this decision "largely
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid

.

,

644.

15 Toynbee,

"History," p. 294.
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accounts for the wonderful impetus which
has revealed itself
in Western Civilization during the
last four centuries." 16
By 1927 the same attitude was
reinforced and made

explicit in the plans for the Study

He pleads for Humanism

.

as the final and proper attitude of the
ideal historian.

The

non-religious character of the remedy for Western
problems,
under the striking paragraph heading of "What must

we do to

be saved?", carried a three-fold remedy consisting
of eco-

nomic, political and cultural reforms.

Toynbee'

s

turning away from "Humanism" as

a

dangerous

idolatry can be found where one might anticipate it if this

reconstruction has been correct up to this point, namely in
the second batch of volumes.

In a Volume Four section on the

"nemesis of creativity," Toynbee identifies the worship of
self, which "leaves none but God out in the cold" as the

creed of Communists and Positivists, and "the more numerous

adherents of a vaguer,

.

.

.

school of humanist thinkers and

humanitarian men of action whose outlook has become the dominant Weltanschauung of our Western Society in its Modern
Age." 1 ^

The Greeks are linked with this movement as those

who have idolized the state.

The Papal Encyclical of

March 14, 1937, is called in as a parallel view of man's
16

Ibid.

17 Toynbee, A Study of History

,

IV,

pp.

302-303.
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temptation to idolatry:

Whoever detaches race or the Nation or the
State
from the temporal scale of values
and raises them to be the supreme model and
deifies them with idolatrous worship, falsifies the divinely created order of things. 18
.

.

.

A final reference to "humanism" shows Toynbee in com-

plete revolt from his early glorification of the Greek spirit
and the Renaissance.

The circumstances are most intriguing

to anyone interested in the development of Toynbee s views,
'

because they come close to providing a clear test of a complete about-face on the same subject.

In 1914 Professor Gil-

bert Murray asked the twenty-five year old Toynbee,

a

promis-

ing young historian-don at Oxford to write a book on Hellen-

ism for the Home University Library.

A draft of four chap-

ters, or about forty-two pages, was written before war-time

government service interrupted the author's work.

In 1950

when Toynbee was finishing the twelfth part of the thirteenpart Study

,

he speaks of resuming his work on the Hellenic

A footnote adds:

world.

"As he wrote these words, he took

these sheets out of a drawer in a bookcase, given him by his

mother in his study at No. 45 Pembroke Square, Kensington,
London."

19

He made a new plan in 1951 for the book, and the

writing was completed in 1956 and 1957.
18 Ibid
19

.

,

303.

Ibid.

,

X,

22, n.

1.

In the preface to

.
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Hellenism Toynbee struggles to emphasize the
completely new
approach that he is using by asserting that,
"Since then

(1914)

20
have not re-read either this draft or the
notes."

I

It is difficult to conceive of an author
so intensely curious
as Toynbee taking out a forty-two page
manuscript in 1950

with the declared intention of planning "the completion
of a
history," and yet refusing to "re-read" the material he
had

already collected and written.

The probable explanation is

that the views in 1951 had so little in common with the views
of 1914 that Toynbee decided to act as though the early manu-

script had not even been written.
At any rate the book on Hellenism wastes little time
in charging the Greeks with developing a civilization that

"was the most wholehearted and uncompromising practice of

man-worship that is on record up to date." 21

"Man-worship or

Humanism" is the distinctive mark of Hellenic history.
Toynbee now sees Hellenism:
the mere institution of city-states is not,
in itself, the distinctive mark of the Hellenic
way of life. What is distinctive of Hellenism is
the use that it made of this institution as a
means of giving practical expression to a particular outlook on the Universe.
In the fifth century
B. C* the Hellenic philosopher Protagoras of Abdera
expressed this in his celebrated dictum that 'man
is the measure of all things'.
In traditional Jewish-Christian-Muslim language we should say that
.

.

.

20

Toynbee, Hellenism (London:
Press, 1959)
Preface.
,

21

Ibid.

9

p.

8

Oxford University

As
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the Hellenes saw in man 'the Lord of Creation'
and worshipped him as an idol in place of
God. 22

At the end of the book Toynbee deals with the
legacy
of Greece.

In his 1922 essay he had expressed enthusiastic

praise for the legacy of Hellenism, but now the "spirit
of
Hellenism" is a "Demon" which the modern world must exorcise
if it is to save itself from meeting with its Hellenic
prede-

cessor'

s

fate.

In place of the 1922 version of a "fortunate

decision," which, "largely accounts for the wonderful impetus

which has revealed itself in Western Civilization during the
last four centuries," Toynbee now warns that this "Hellenic

form of idolatry is

a

ghost of Hellenism that we harbour at

our peril."

Toynbee

?

s

First Theoretic Structure of Reality

In addition to Toynbee

1

s

avowal that he regards him-

self as a "Christian historian," one can profitably explore
the theoretic structuring of reality with which he starts his

study, and against which he reacts in terms of an Augustinian

Weltanschauung.
Toynbee' s initial view has its roots in ancient Greek

vitalism, which regards man and the universe as the expression of a basic monistic principle.

This elan or Life prin-

ciple has a rhythm of rest and action.
22 Toynbee, A Study of History ,

23 Ibid.,

I,

197.

To this rhythm ToynIII, 223.

bee attaches a teleological
principle of conditional progress
from the lower to the higher, which
may have its roots in his
Platonic studies. The addition of this
concept of develop-

ment saves Toynbee from the pessimism
of Spengler, and is
reiterated whenever his laws of rhythm come
to the point of
grim contemporary application. The secondary
principle, however, forms the bridge for a new theoretic
view of reality
and a reconstruction of the study.

Vitalism comes to Toynbee through four favorite
sources in the years when his Study was in
preparation.

The

footnotes, sources, and authoritative guides of the
first
three volumes are J. G. Smuts' Holism and Evolution
(1927),
"The South African philosopher-statesman whose guidance
we

have sought on many occasions"; 24 Gerald Heard's The Ascent
of Humanity (1929), whose "standpoint is almost coincident

with ours"? 25 Henri Bergson's L'Evolution Creatrice (1921);
and J. Murphy's Primitive Man

;

His Essential Quest

(1927).

In the Volume Ten "Acknowledgements and Thanks," Toynbee sin-

gles out General J. C. Smuts, who "in his 'Holism and Evolution', communicated to me his insight into the cosmic move-

ment in which Reality passes through different orders of

being without losing its continuity or its identity." 26
24 Ibid

.

,

in,

25 Ibid .

,

I,

197.

26 Ibid., X,

234.

223.

when
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we recall that before the Studv.
began Toynbee was depressed
about the future of the West and that
he was seeking to gain
a "Pisgah" view of the prospects
of the West, the promise

offered by Murphy, Smuts, Beard, Wells, and
Spengler that an
overview elaborated out of biological evolution
was the key

to the science of human affairs must have
been most attractive.

Teggart's contribution to the crucial shaping of the

Plan of the Study in 1927-30 was to assure Toynbee
that a

scientific method could be applied to historical studies

which would give the researcher "laws" instead of opinions.
The "laws" of the historian would have predictive value, and

would be of universal validity because they reflected the
very nature of reality itself.
In a revealing phrase in Toynbee

'

s

Volume One expla-

nation of his method, he explains it as an attempt "to transpose it (the botanists and zoologists image of evolution)
into terms of human history." 2 7

The view of reality with

which he begins is that there is

a

basic life principle in

the cosmos which reveals itself in "non-human fields" under
the evolutionists*

image of the pollarded willow, and in

human fields as a multiplicity of civilizations.

It is

important to recognize that for Toynbee the acceptance of a
"pollarded-willow" view of human life excludes the "old-

329

fashioned image of the bean-stalk."

m

histor iographical

terms Toynbee is saying that to see
human life in its historical forms as the expression of a cosmic
rhythm, is to forego
any value judgments about civilizations
("the bean-stalk
view")

in favor of the view that all civilizations
are philo-

sophically equal.

The "bean-stalk view" is disposed of as
a

"christian scheme of history," which survives in modern
Western historiography as the "relic" of an "egocentric
illu-

sion," and even as a "malicious trick" 28 to which Western

historians have fallen victim.
On this foundation, or as we have termed it a theo-

retic structure of reality, Toynbee attempts to account for
all the phenomena of the historical scene.

His remarks in

Volume One show a confidence which subsequently proved illfounded.

He states,

"we shall be guided by this conception

throughout our study." 29

in his eyes,

it explains the

dynamics of society, accounts for the crisis of the West,

provides a criterion for success, makes clear the mystery of
religion, makes possible a series of predictions, and inter-

prets the place of Toynbee himself in the historical process.

However the failure of this framework, explained at first as
merely an inadequate methodology, leads Toynbee to the major
28 Ibid

,

170.

29 Ibid.,

169.

.
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reconstruction that we have seen emerging
under the banner of
the "Christian historian."
Throughout Toynbee's first three volumes
there is an
overview or general framework, contained
in a number of brilliant metaphors, which is familiar to
readers of the early
Toynbee and which best express the various
parts of Toynbee's
initial view.
Under the imagery of the "Ancient Mariner"
he
outlines a melancholy picture:
As we cast our eyes around a world in which
the
majority of the civilizations known to us are
already dead, while the rest of the survivors
are all either in decline or in extremis
we may be inclined to read into the panorama of
history the same grim 'motif that the poet
divined in the stones of Westminster Abbey.
Mortality, behold and fear!
What a change of flesh is here! 30
,

Or as he records it elsewhere

.

.

.

.

.

"among the civi-

lizations which are alive at the present day, everyone,
apparently, has already broken down and is now in process of

disintegration, with the possible exception of our

own.*' 31

The most dramatic presentation of the "panorama" of history
is repeated a little later:

This is a message of encouragement for us children
of the Western civilization as we drift today
alone, on the 'wide wide sea' of human history,
with none but dead or stricken civilizations
around us
The dead civilizations strew the
deck of the ship of human fortunes? and we, and we
.

.

3Q

Ibid

.

,

31 Ibid.,

.

IV,
3.

.

4.

only, are left. 32

The parallel overview of the mountain
climbers with
its primitive societies lying dormant on
lower ledges and the

ci-devant civilizations lying dead on higher ledges,

a simile

made famous in the United States by the cover of
"Time Magazine," likewise expresses Toynbee s theoretic view
of reality
'

as a rhythm "fundamental in the nature of the Universe." 33

The mountain-climbers or civilizations are viewed as
channels
of elan

,

and the problem of history is viewed as one of mak-

ing certain the elan is not baulked by the hardening or

institutionalizing of society.

The rhythm of challenge-and-

response is always the same, whether the society is growing
or passing into disintegration, argues Toynbee, for the some-

what astounding reason, that,
Challenge-and-Response cannot fail to be found
anywhere where there is Life, since our formula
is simply a description of Life itself in terms
of Will. 34
In Toynbee 's analysis of the West one can see the

application of his view of reality worked out in
case.

a

particular

Motivated by concern for the future of western civili-

zation, he invariably brings the result of his analysis to

bear on the western contemporary situation.
32 Ibid

.

,

38.

33 Ibid

.

,

I,

34 Ibid.,

VI,

197.
177.

The "crucial
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question on which the destiny of our civilization
hangs," the
"crux of the crisis," and the "crisis of the
West," are
favorite expressions in the Study

.

In Toynbee s first read•

ing of the "crisis" of the West, the problem
is envisaged in

terms of the elan vital

.

Later he shifts to a second reading

of the crisis in terms of a "Christian Weltanschauung."

The first reading of the "crisis" is found in the

Volume Three analysis of growth, where Toynbee turns to the

question of why the advances of

a

creative minority in the

modern western world are being brought to

a

standstill.

At

first it is suggested that the "Yellow Press" might be

responsible for "debauching the rest of Society" but this is
rejected on the grounds that the "Yellow Press" was only
reflection of the retardation of the masses.

a

When Toynbee

has "really probed to the bottom of the mischief" he finds
that,

"This stagnation of the masses is the fundamental cause

of the crisis with which our Western Civilization is con-

fronted in our day." 3S

When the "crisis" is viewed in terms of institutions
rather than people, the same blockage of elan is the ultimate
explanation.

In the section of the "Intractability of Insti-

tutions" Toynbee sees the "pernicious institutional anachro-

nism" of the Parochial Sovereign State as that which "has
35 Ibid.,

Ill,

242.

s

become the chief obstacle to human
welfare and indeed the
archenemy of the Human Race." 36
The general circumstances of breakdown
of which the
crisis. of the West is but one case, are
explained by reference to this ultimate view of reality as
a rhythm.
At the

beginning of Volume Four Toynbee collects the
various similes
he has used in the first three volumes,
the drivers
of the

backsliding cars, the climbers who fall to their death,
and
the piper who can no longer conjure the feet
of the multitude

into a dance.

Then he restates his argument that they

"define the nature of the breakdowns of civilizations" as
a
"loss of creative power in the souls of creative individu-

als," and "this failure of vitality on the leaders' side

divests them of their magic power to influence and attract
the uncreative masses."^
It would not be accurate to suggest that Toynbee'

initial theoretic view of reality contains only the one prin-

ciple of life as a rhythmic movement between rest and action.
This universal rhythm is made more sophisticated by seeing it
in a dynamic relationship between higher/lower, spirit/matter

poles.

This view has had many precedents, notably among the

Gnostics in the late Roman empire, and it is not wholly
36 Ibid.,

IV,

37 Ibid.,

5.

221.
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coincidental that Toynbee

-

s

one great hero among the Church

Fathers, Origen, was strongly attracted
by the advantages of
explaining Christianity in a Gnostic framework.

Toynbee picks up his teleology from Smuts,
and "purpose" in life is now subsumed as simply a
manifestation of
the universal movement of elan
Toynbee 's analysis of the
.

nature of growth is summarized and supported by
Smuts'

assertion that:

Evolution is a fact of observation and experience,
and it shows a persistent trend:
from Matter to
Life; from Life to more Life and to higher Life;
from higher Life to Mind; from Mind to more and
higher Mind and to Spirit [sicl in its highest
creative manifestations ... 38

With his primary principle that the nature of reality
is a

pulsating rhythm alternating between rest and action,

and the assertion that this elan moves upward through a
series of stages in a great chain of being from matter to
spirit, Toynbee

's

dynamics of society can be completed by the

elaboration of an already implicit criterion of growth.
he sees it,

"...

As

Civilizations grow through an elan that

carries them from challenge through response to further challenge and from differentiation through integration to differ-

entiation again." 39

As in any system that begins with a

monistic principle of elan
38 Ibid

,

III,

39 Ibid.,

128.

.

127.

,

the problem of the individual and
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of separate "wills" soon comes to the
fore.

For the histo-

rian this problem poses itself in the
form of the dilemma of

whether "history" is the result of some
unconscious factor,
what Bergson calls the "great subterranean
currents
of

thought," or is in some sense the work of individual
personalities.
With the help of Bergson and Smuts, Toynbee
argues
that the fundamental elan throws off smaller
representations
of elan

.

...

so there have arisen privileged souls who
have felt themselves related to all souls, and
who, instead of remaining within the limits of
their group and keeping to the [restricted]
solidarity that has been established by Nature,
have addressed themselves to Humanity in general
in an elan of love.
The apparition of each of
these souls has been like the creation of a new
species composed of one unique individual the
thrust of Life arriving at long intervals, in
the person of a particular human being, at a
result which could not have been attained all at
once for the aggregate of Mankind. 40

—

In Toynbee 's interpretation of Bergson' s passage he

links the elan of the cosmos with that of society when he

describes the "new factor" of "Personality" as that which
breaks the vicious circle of primitive human social life in

order to "resume the work of creation." 41

These new centers

of elan must not be construed as moving billiard balls which
set the others in motion through direct contact, but are seen
40 Ibid.

from H. Bergson, Les Deux Sources de la
Morale et de la Religion pp. 96-97.
,

232,

,

41 Ibid.,

233.

"
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by Toynbee in the context of his
scale from matter to spirit.
The problem seems to be one of
distinguishing an 4lan of

repetitive motion from an ^lan of creative
or progressive
motion.
The solution is to measure the action
of one man
upon another according to whether it is
a direct exertion of
will-power, as in the case of the soldier and
the statesman;

or the indirect evoking of a response from
another person, as
in the case of the poet or artist.
Direct action of will
upon will is labelled "crude/' and is written
off as

a

"duress that has been imposed on it (another's will)

'more

mechanico' or 'manu militari

.

•

42

Spiritual action as high

on the scale of being is expressed most clearly in
this pas-

sage

:

In every kind of action,

the agent's scope is
limited by the nature of his field; and the
scope of the 'practical' man of action is bounded
by the confines of the personal and institutional
relations through which he is operating.
It is
only when human action is transmuted by the
purging out of all its human passion and its human
animus— from the gross medium of will into the
etherial media of perception and thought and feeling and imagination, that it is able to transcend
all limits of Time and Space to win its way into a
field that extends to Infinity. 43

—

This same distinction between a higher spiritual

action and

a

lower mechanical action can be discerned in the

action of a healthy and unhealthy civilization.
42 Ibid.,

288.

43 Ibid..

289.

A healthy
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Civilization is one that has "inspired

a

voluntary allegiance

in the hearts of people below
its surface or beyond its borders." On the contrary the "ailing

civilization pays the

penalty for its failure of vitality by
becoming disintegrated
into a dominant minority which attempts
to find a substitute
for its vanishing leadership in a regime
of force,

.

.

.

»

44

So far we have been concerned to sketch
out the main

outlines of a study of history as seen from
the perspective
of Toynbee's early theoretic view of reality.
A whole series
of explanations of historical events rest
upon the social

dynamics just outlined.
As pointed out earlier Toynbee's analysis of the

present crisis recapitulates his vision of reality as an elan
vital.

Stagnation, baulked energy, failure of creativity,

and paralysis, were the clues with which one could understand
the problems of the present.

Toynbee's preoccupation with

the present crisis and remedies for the crisis make it at

least possible to interpret his Study as a tract for the
times.

There is considerable evidence for the argument that

Toynbee resembled Marx in his attitude toward the "use" of

historical studies.

Walsh sees Marx as one who "needed the

theory not so much for its speculative content as for its

predictive properties." 45
44 Ibid

.

,

I,

Of Marx he says, "He wanted to

336.

45 Walsh, Philosophy of History

,

p.

161.

s

.
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find his way through the thicket of
contemporary events, to
make sense not of history as a whole but
of what was happening at the time and what had happened
in the comparatively

recent past."

This aspect of Toynbee as the prophet of
the

present and the future is noted by many of the
major critics.
Barraclough argues that Toynbee s concern with a survey
of

»

other civilizations was only "a preliminary task" and
that
his great concern was with the breakdown of the West. 46

Den

Boer regards his effort as going far beyond the historian's
task,

and as adopting the role of the prophet. 47

Brinton

notes "the predictor's purpose" of the "City of God" in the
Study

,

— the

efforts of Toynbee to answer questions about

where we are going. 48

motives in Toynbee

*

s

Dawson's analysis sees two parallel
work, the second of which he labels the

"Hebraic prophetic mission" to justify the ways of God to man
and to find a religious solution to the riddle of civilization. 49

Frankfort speaks of Toynbee and Spengler as writers

born under the shadow of an impending war, and of Toynbee'

"preoccupation with decay." 50
46 Montagu,

47 Ibid .

,

p.

48 Brinton,
49

York*

«

Geyl as one of the most

Toynbee and History

,

p.

118.

241.

"Toynbee

City of God," 363.

's

.

Christopher Dawson, Dynamics of World History (New
Sheed and Ward, 1956)
p. 400
,

50 Henri Frankfort, The
Birth of Civilization in the
Near East (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1954) p. 23.
,
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emphatic of the Toynbee critics, argues
that he only pretends
to investigate the phenomena, in
51
reality he
is a prophet.

Gottschalk thinks that Toynbee

'

tendency to transcend the

s

usual concept of historical sources is due
to the "boldness

of [his] quest for the lessons of history." 52

Kohn credits

Toynbee as being by far the most serious and
reasonable of
all the prophets who tell of decay, and refers
to his study
as a "tract for our own age and its predicament." 53

stone

points out that the general reading public has sensed
the

contemporary concern in Toynbee

'

s

Study and that the public

looks upon it "as a work of prophecy by which may be unlocked
the secrets of the future." 54

vancy of Toynbee'

s

Perhaps the contemporary rele-

Study could not be better made than by

glancing at the excited concern it has raised among contemporary statesmen.

Mr. Abba Eban,

in a 1955 address at Yeshiva

University puts Toynbee' s concern with the contemporary crisis in a somewhat more dramatic way by saying,

"Professor

Toynbee is not merely the historian of the twentieth century;
he is the Attorney-General of the Almighty upon the Day of
51 Geyl,

"Toynbee the Prophet."

52

J<£,

Louis Gottschalk, "The Historian's Use of Generalization," in The State of the Social Sciences ed. by Leonard
D. White (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1956),
,

p.

438.

53 Montagu, Toynbee and History
p.
,
54 Ibid.

,

p.

111.
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Judgment.

"

5

When one assembles Toynbee

•

s

prophecies of what or

who might rescue the West from complete
breakdown and disintegration, the list is astonishing in its variety
and dissim
ilarity of rescuers. A reader might wonder what
kind of a
"rescue" is in store for the West if the possible
rescuers

include the American Negroes, Communist Russia, the Papacy,

Protestant Revivalism and the Oxford Groups, the Bahai Movement, and possibly even the African Pygmies.

Taking these prophecies in order of their appearance
the negroes are put forward in Volume Two as a possible con-

ductor of elan in

a

Western society that is showing signs of

joining the other civilizations in breakdown:
The Syrian slave-immigrants who once brought
Christianity into Roman Italy performed the
miracle of establishing a new religion which
was alive in the place of an old religion which
was already dead.
It is possible that the Negro
slave-immigrants who have found Christianity in
America may perform the greater miracle of raising the dead to life.
With their childish spiritual intuition and their genius for giving
spontaneous aesthetic expression to emotional
religious experience, they may perhaps be capable
of rekindling the cold grey ashes of Christianity
which have been transmitted to them by us, until
in their hearts the divine fire glows again.
It
is thus, perhaps, if at all, that Christianity
may conceivably become the living faith of a
dying civilization for the second time ^6
.
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Ibid.

f
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Twenty years later, Toynbee decides
that the Negroes
have turned "soft" under the "fascinating
mirage of a middleclass Earthly Paradise which had been
conjured
up there at

the North and in the West since the Civil
War." 57

But it is

much more credible to suppose that a historian
whose judgments were usually based on a survey of
milleniums was in
this case expressing not so much a change in
the "negroes" as
a change in his requirements of any
would-be saviors of the
West.
The changing views of modern Russian Communism that

Toynbee has held over the span of his historical work
would
make an interesting essay in themselves, but at present we
are interested in the view of the "Russian Communist Move-

ment" as a possible channel for the elan in the predicament
of the Western Civilization's immanent disintegration.

"salvation" is articulated in terms of the elan motif:
Can we explain the apparent contradiction of
Communist Russia's simultaneous centrifugal and
centripetal movement vis-a-vis the Western Society in the formula that Russia, while resigning
herself to her incorporation into the Great
Society, is at the same time attempting to make
a temporary withdrawal from the general life of
the society in which she has been enrolled by
force majeure and that she is making this
attempt to withdraw in order to play the part of
a creative minority which will strive to work
out some solution for the Great Society's current
;

problems?58
57 Ibid

,

VII,

417.

58 Ibid.,

Ill,

365.

.

Here

This view of the "Russian Communist
Movement" as

playing

"creative role which will enable her to
recast the
general shape of Western life on a more
or less Russian pattern" seems even more startling when it
is advanced
a

as

"an

explanation of the present posture of Russian
Orthodox
Christendom." 59

Again the view that will aid in understand-

ing this "prediction" as part of a series of
predictions is
to see the "Negroes" and the "Russian Communists"
as possible

exemplars of the challenge-and-response rhythm, and thus
as
possible breakthrough for the creative eian.

a

The next savior of Western Civilization that Toynbee

sees--the papacy--is equally as difficult to harmonize with
his earlier predictions of the American Negroes and the Rus-

sian Communist Movement, unless one understands the predic-

tion as part of his search for a release of elan
is 1938,

.

The date

five years after his optimistic look at the Russian

Communist Movement, and two years after his religious experience of the summer of 1936.

The setting of this "hour of

decision" or the "zero hour" is, of course, the eve of the

outbreak of the second World War.

Toynbee

's

sense of impend-

ing catastrophe finds expression in the phrase, "As we gaze

round our spiritually devasted world in our generation,
59 Ibid

.

,

60 Ibid.,

364.
IV,
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and was urgent enough to impel him
to send his notes on the

unfinished volumes to New York for safe-keeping
as the war
broke out. The "papacy" (on the basis of
its earlier success)

is called upon to

establish a new Christian Republic;

The creative spirits in the Roman Church who
set
themselves in the eleventh century to rescue our
Western World from a feudal anarchy by establishing a Christian Republic then found themselves in
the same dilemma as their spiritual heirs who are
attempting in our day to replace an international
anarchy by a political world order. The essence
of their aim was to substitute a reign of spiritual authority for the reign of physical
bi
force,
.

.

.

The measure of the success of Hildebrand and those

who followed him was the measure in which they used spiritual
weapons rather than physical or material.

This criteria

comes out of Toynbee's view of the creative elan proceeding
from matter to spirit.

It leads him to posit a highly ideal-

istic account of Hildebrand'
he says,

s

early victories.

For example,

"No physical force was exerted in Hildebrand'

s

act

of deposing and excommunicating the emperor Henry IV; yet the

moral effect of the Pope's winged words upon the hearts of
the Emperor's Transalpine subjects was so intense that within
a few months it brought Henry to Canossa.

"

The explanation

of the failure of Hildebrand, is given in an appeal to the

theorem, "for the substitution of the material for the spiri61 Ibid., 535
62 Ibid.

„

tual sword is the fatal and fundamental
change of which all
the rest are corollaries." 63

When Toynbee issues his plea in 1938,
there lurks in
his remedy a dangerous contradiction with
his day-by-day

experience as

a

working historian. 64

The plea that in this

"zero hour of sin and shame" a second Hildebrand
should come
"to the fight and the rescue/' 65 and his program
that all

Westerners, both Christian and "Gentiles," "should call
upon
the Vicar of Christ to vindicate the tremendous title
which

Pope Innocent III has bequeathed to subsequent successors
of

Saint Peter," 66 carries with it an inescapable plea for pacifism in the face of the threat of German militarism.

Toynbee

recognizes the dilemma toward which his system is pushing
him, and hastens to work out a second analysis of Hildebrand

only a few pages after his clear assertion that the "substitution of the material for the spiritual sword is the fatal
and fundamental change of which all the rest are corol-

laries."

The recognition of his problem can be seen in the

63 Ibid

.

,

538.

*ti

64

Toynbee worked for five years in the Foreign Office
of the British Government (Turkish Affairs in Political
Intelligence) and was responsible among other things for the
writing of the atrocity accounts so effective in swaying
American public opinion in the early years of the war.
In
the second World War he again entered government service
65
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583.

,
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statement

And in our own later generation, when we find
ourselves confronted once more by Hildebrand's
dilemma, with the advocates of an uncompromising
pacifism arrayed ancipiti Marte against the
advocates of enforcing peace, we cannot pronounce
that Hildebrand's choice was intrinsically the
wrong one simply because it resulted in a disaster in Hildebrand's case. 67
Toynbee's second explanation is an attempt to argue
that it was not so much the use of force as the fact that

Hildebrand and his successors "persisted in the use of
force." 6 8

The argument here is an appeal from a consequence

of his matter-spirit teleology back to a more fundamental

assumption that Life is rhythmic action, and to stop this

rhythm with one successful swing of the pendulum is to become
petrified.

The explanation then follows that the "Papal

aegis that had been stretched over the devoted heads of the

Plebs Christiana had turned into a cope of lead.

This

increasing top-heaviness was the mistake in the pontifical
architecture which was bringing the building down in ruin." 69
The "history of the papacy" as interpreted from the stand-

point of Toynbee's first theoretic structure of reality is

envisaged as a series of routs and rallies beginning with
Hildebrand's mistake of choosing to fight with physical
67 Ibid .

,

546.

69 Ibid.,

572.

68 Ibid.

,,
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weapons down to the nineteenth century
when "a Papacy which
had once been the heart of the Western
body social seemed to
have become an atrophied member, in which
the blood no longer
coursed and the life no longer throbbed." 70
it is important
to take a closer look at the "Papal aegis"
that "had turned
into a cope of lead." Toynbee defines it as
"a modern cen-

tralized autocracy" and as "papal pretensions."

He praises

the Conciliar Movement as an offer of salvation
to the

Papacy.

He speaks of the "price

...

of its rehabilitation"

as the "introduction of a parliamentary element into
the

constitution of the Western body ecclesiastic." 71

With char-

acteristic confidence in his interpretive principles Toynbee
dramatizes the scene in these words:
Would the Papacy be willing to atone for its
past and assure its future by bowing, in this
matter, to the will of Western Christendom?
Once again a Pope had to make a decision which
was momentous for the fate of the Western World
as well as for that of the Roman See; and, once
again, the answer was in the negative.
The
Papacy rejected the parliamentary principle and
opted for an unrestricted sovereignty in a
restricted field as the alternative to accepting
a limited constitutional authority over a loyal
and undivided Christian Commonwealth. 72
Nine years after his plea for a second Hildebrand,

and following the end of the second World War, Toynbee issued
70 Ibid.

579.

71 Ibid.

572.

72 Ibid.

573.
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a

1947 version of his view of the future.

m

this version,

"what may happen is that Christianity may
be left as the
spiritual heir of all the other higher
"73
religions.
.

.

.

And in view of the 1938 prediction of a
second Hildebrand, we
notice that the 1947 version has two parts.
Not only will
there be a universal Christianity, but the
"Christian Church
as an institution may be left as the social heir
of all the

other churches and all the civilizations." 74

The reader is

not left in doubt that Toynbee has a vision of the triumph
of
the "Church herself in her traditional Catholic form,
which,
on the long historical view, is the form in which one has
to

look at her."

In even greater detail he marks out the fea-

tures of Roman Catholicism:
The Church in its traditional form thus stands
forth armed with the spear of the Mass, the shield
of the Hierarchy, and the helmet of the Papacy. 76

Many critics have noted the fascination that the
Roman Catholic Church has for the pilgrim-author of the
Study

,

but our interest in the 1938 and 1947 predictions is

related at present to the two different interpretations of
the "history of the papacy" that are involved.
73
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75 Ibid .
76 Ibid.

,

p.

242.

,
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history of the papacy was sketched out as

a

sad and deplor-

able decline, analogous to the history of
Athens, in which
the papacy became fatally rigid and finally
atrophied.
The
1947 version of papal history has cut itself away
from the

old theoretic structure of reality, and the
Papal aegis is no

longer a "cope of lead" but his "heavy panoply of
institutions,

(the spear of the Mass,

and the helmet of the Papacy)

the shield of the Hierarchy,
in which the Church has clad

herself is the very practical one of outlasting the toughest
of the secular institutions of this world, including all the

civilizations." 7 7

Toynbee continues in the same vein, that

these institutions "are the toughest and the most enduring of
any that we know and are therefore the most likely to last

and outlast all the rest."

The complete break with the first

view, which Barraclough pointed out as the old Creighton

view,'780 but which was an adaption of Creighton'

Liberal interpretation placed on Toynbee

'

s

s

Protestant

elan foundation,

can be seen in the reconstructed judgment of the 1947 version.

Now he argues that "The history of Protestantism would

seem to indicate that the Protestant act of casting off this
armour four hundred years ago was premature."

He then makes

the startling suggestion that a way to universal order would
77 Ibid .
7ft
/0
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be to have the secular power
"subordinated to religious

authority

.

79

While it is instructive to bring together
differing

interpretations of the same historical events,
clearly Toynbee's second version of papal history grows
out of a different orientation which we shall shortly consider.
One more

prediction in the early volumes of the rescuers of the
West
should be noted.
If the Negroes in the second volume
are

possible conductors of creative elan in the crisis of
Western
stagnation, and Volume Three holds out hope that the Russian

Communist Movement may play this role, and Volume Four shifts
to a hope in the universalism of a regenerated papacy, we

should not be surprised that a new channel of

glimpsed in Volume Five.

e"lan

is

Protestant Revivalism and the

Oxford Groups may seem to have little in common with the
ideology and program of the Russian Communist Movement and
not much more with the papacy, and the American Negroes, but
the common link is the fact that they may be a symptom of

spiritual life in a civilization which shows all the signs of
sterility, materialism and stagnation.

Protestant Revivalism and the Oxford Groups are symptoms of spiritual life because they reveal an "awakening to
the sense of sin.
79

M

This is a valuable symptom in a civiliza-

Toynbee, Civilization on Trial, p. 241
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tion because it offsets the sense
of drift which acts as an
opiate.
in contrast, "the sense of sin
has the effect of a

stimulus because it tells the sinner that
the evil is not
external after all, but is within him and is
therefore subject to his will.

...

-80

Toynbee finds this valuable

"sense of sin" in the Hellenic and Syriac
civilizations and
tentatively in the Mayas and Sumeric societies.
An interesting example of a 'sense of sin'

in the early Hellenic society

shows how Toynbee clearly abstracts the "sense of
sin" from a

Hebrew-Christian context in which

"sin."

is defined in terms

of a divine-human relationship, and generalizes it into
a

feeling of dissatisfaction.

On an £lan foundation the

"sense of sin" becomes "the pent-up religious feeling for

which the Hellenes of the sixth century B.C. were eager,
above all, to find a normal outlet." 81

Turning to the riddle

of the destiny of our Western Civilization in the "critical

act of the tragic drama," Toynbee again phrases his prediction in a dramatic rhetorical question:

But we may anxiously scan the landscape of our
contemporary spiritual life for any symptoms that
may give us ground for hope that we are regaining
the use of a spiritual faculty which we have been
doing our worst to sear and sterilize. Dare we
allow ourselves to see at any rate a favorable
omen in the emphasis that is laid upon a conviction
of sin in the 'revivalist' version of Protestantism
80
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which has been rife on the
of the Western World during English-speaking frinae
the last two hundred
years and which— winning its first
foothold in a
n*U
lal P^tariat, and spreading
t^

T™T^

In a chapter designed to explain
the meaning of the

self-characterization "a Christian Historian,"
Toynbee
changing views of Christianity are of great
significance.
It
has been noted that this self-characterization
appears in the
latter volumes, that it coincides with the
religious experience of 1936, and that it can be correlated
with a change
from an early Humanism to the later hostility to
'

Humanism.

We have regarded as of prime importance the first
volume

assertion that the Study was an attempt to transpose the
botanists* and zoologists' image of evolution into terms
of

human history, that this conception should be

a

guide

"throughout our Study," and that it excluded the bean-stalk
or "Christian scheme of history."

An objection might be

raised at this particular way of grouping the evidence, that
it overlooks the repeated use of Christian terminology,

Christian institutions and examples in the early volumes, and

altogether attempts to establish a false antithesis in the
Study .,

The answer to this objection can be found by compar-

ing his early view of Christianity with discussions of
82

Ibid.

,

439.
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Christianity in the later volumes.

Briefly stated it may be

argued that up to the fifth volume passage
in which Toynbee
exhorts man to follow St. Augustine out of
the City of
Destruction to the

"

civitas Dei ," and which he describes

methodologically as adopting the Augustinian-Platonic
Weltanschauung, he sees Christianity in terms of the
6lan view of
reality.

After this turning point, Toynbee becomes concerned

with Christianity as it affects his fundamental outlook,
and
he writes his last four volumes in an attempt to
explore and

apply

a

"religious meaning" to history.

This attempt to

reconstruct the study of history without discarding an earlier foundation results in the many ambiguous interpretations

of his last four volumes, and his final summation of ambivalence expressed in the phrase "wavering between the bean-

stalk and the pollarded willow."
To avoid confusion, it is advisable to look first at

Toynbee' s treatment of various doctrines generally identified

with traditional Christianity, and then examine the place he
gives to Christianity in his scheme of world history.

Although the term "God" appears repeatedly in the
Study

,

in the early volumes the term is abstracted from its

traditional context and defined in relationship to the elan
There is actually a rather free use of the term in Volume
One.

Sometimes it is used to designate the "eternal and

.

3

,
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ubiquitous" power or action in the universe. 83

As a synonym

for the rhythm of the universe, Toynbee
argues that it makes
little difference whether we call it "God" or "
Elan Vital ."

But on other occasions he uses the term "God" to
designate
just one phase of the two-phased rhythm of the
Universe.

This is clearly the case in the discussion of the nature
of
the geneses of civilizations when he selects the Sinic

expression of the rhythm of the universe as being more apt
than the exposition of Empedocles and Saint-Simon.

The term

"God" is made synonymous not with the rhythm of the Universe
as a whole, but with the "static condition" or the Yin phase

of the rhythm.

Here is the Sinic expression with which Toyn-

bee agrees 84
The Ultimate Principle has operated from all
eternity, and now ceaselessly operates by a
dynamical process in virtue of which Animate
and Inanimate Nature has existed from all
eternity.
The Ultimate Principle, in
its active expansive operation, constitutes
and produces the Yang or Positive Essence, in
its passive intensive operation it constitutes
and produces the Yin.
Not only did all
material and mental existence of which we are
cognizant originate by the process described-if we may speak of the origination of that which
has existed from eternity but all existences do
now subsist in virtue of the same process, operating in ceaseless repetition.
.

.

.

.

.

.

—

This Sinic conception of Yin and Yang is equated with
8

84

*
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,
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a "modern

Western Physical Science" explanation
of a change
in equilibrium.
in Smuts' explanation a change
in equilibrium "is an inherent character of the
physico-chemical structure as such, and is explicable on purely
physical and chemical principles which do not call for the
intervention of an

extraordinary agent." 85

Toynbee then proceeds to reduce the

many religious and mythical explanations of
change into the
terms of an immanent rhythm of the cosmos, as
a change in
equilibrium.

The various religious interpretations of
change

in life are easily disposed of by Toynbee
s dicta,
'

"The

essence of the act is not its moral character but its
dynamic
effect." 86

On this reading the "God" and the "Satan" of the

Biblical account become the "divine equilibrium" and the
"Satanic instability" of the universal elan:
The Devil's intervention has accomplished that
transition from Yin to Yang, from static to
dynamic, for which God had been yearning ever
since the moment when His Yin-state became complete, but which it was impossible for God to
accomplish by Himself, out of His own perfection.
And the Devil has done more for God than this;
for, when once Yin has passed over into Yang, not
the Devil himself can prevent God from completing
His fresh act of creation by passing again from
Yang to Yin on a higher level. When once the
divine equilibrium has been upset by the Satanic
instability, the Devil has shot his bolt; ... 87
85 Ibid.

284

86 Ibid.

288.

87 Ibid.

284.

.

Toynbee

's

reduction of Christian doctrines
to the

elan motif follows this same pattern.

Just as the terms

"God" and "Satan" are removed from
any transcendent and moral

connotation in order to appear as phases
of

a

general rhythm

so the figure of "Christ" and the
doctrine of the incarnation
in the New Testament "are readily
translated into the lan-

guage of our Modern Western Physical Science."

Toynbee

argues that it would not matter whether the
incarnation is an
"incarnation of God" or an "incarnation of the Devil"
as long
as the rhythm of the universe passed over
from rest
to

action.

This complete indifference as to the character of

the person who provokes the struggle between God and
Satan,

between Yin and Yang, is justified by Toynbee's appeal to
Smuts' "Physical Science" explanation that, "The individual

and its parts are reciprocally means and end to one another;

neither is merely self-regarding, but each supports the other
in the moving dynamic equilibrium which is called Life." 88

With this explanatory principle in hand, Toynbee

declares that the essence of many myths can be readily
extracted.

The imagery of the myths can be translated into

the formula of science "that genesis is a function of inter0
action.' 89

An interesting example of this process of reduc-

tionism is found in his treatment of another part of the
88 Ibid.,

286

89 Ibid.,

299
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Christian corpus, the temptation of
Jesus in the wilderness.
Based on the formula that it is the
action of the ^lan that
matters, the "change from passivity to
activity, from rest to
motion, from calm to storm, from harmony
to discord, in fact
from Yin to Yang," the story of the
temptation is interpreted
as follows:
The action may be either dynamically base,
as
when the Ancient Mariner shoots the Albatross
or Loki shoots Balder with the blind God
Hoder's
hand and the mistletoe shaft; or dynamically
sublime, as when Jesus, in the temptation in the
wilderness which immediately follows his baptism
Jordan, rejects the traditional Jewish role
of the militant Messiah who was to raise the
Chosen People to dominion in this world by the
sword.
The essence of the act is not its moral
character but its dynamic effect. The Ancient
Mariner's act changes the fortunes of the ship
and her crew; Jesus' act gives the conception of
the Messiah a new turn and therewith a power
which had not resided in it before. 90

m

The Genesis account of the Fall of Man goes through
the same process of a reduction to the elan motif.

Toynbee

describes it as a symbolic representation of the truth per-

ceived by an earlier generation that there is

a

universal

rhythm in the affairs of men from an achieved integration to
a fresh

differentiation.

Stripped of any religious, moral or

transcendent significance, the "Fall of Man" is in essence

a

dynamic act in which Eve's eating of the fruit of the Tree of

Knowledge "symbolizes the acceptance of a challenge to abandon the achieved integration and to venture upon a fresh
90 Ibid.,

288.

"
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differentiation out of which another integration
may-or may
not arise. 91

—

One must be careful in this analysis of the
elan

motif not to reduce Toynbee
besian mechanism.

'

s

exposition to a simplistic Hob-

Toynbee seeks to avoid any necessitarian

doctrine by allowing for an act of will on the part of
individuals in the drama of life.

The individual will seems to

have the choice of acting and thus becoming the vehicle of
elan, or of refusing to act and consequently remaining sterile and uncreative.

This means that every creative moment

consists of two decisions to act.

First an individual will

take a dynamic action which re-liberates the elan from the

Yin stage to the Yang, and then the individual will must make
an act of resignation

[called by Toynbee "this activity

through passivity"] which "brings on another cosmic change."
As Toynbee expresses it, "Just as the dynamic act in the

first phase of the ordeal shook the Universe out of Yin into
Yang, so the act of resignation in the second phase reverses
the rhythm of the Universe

— guiding

it now from motion

towards rest, from storm towards calm, from discord towards
harmony, from Yang towards Yin again."
On this distinction between a cosmic rhythm of the
91

Ibid., 290.

92 Ibid.,

293.
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universe and man's freedom either to
cooperate or not to
cooperate with it, Toynbee builds his
vast structure of man-

in-process-of-civilization.

As long as an individual or a

group of individuals act dynamically they
liberate the |lan
to seek new levels on the matter-spirit
cosmic graph.
if
their decision is to be truly creative it
must reflect

a

willingness to participate both in the action of
differentiation [the Yang stage variously described as Satan
by Christian theologians, as "Hate" by Empedocles, and as
the
active

expansive operation of the Ultimate Principle by Sinic thinkand in the action of resignation

ers]

[the Yin phase vari-

ously described as God by Christian theologians, as "Love" by
Empedocles, and as the passive intensive phase of the Ulti-

mate Principle by Sinic thinkers].
By equating God and Satan with two phases of elan,

both necessary in the cosmic rhythm, Toynbee has discarded
any explanations in which transcendent interruptions are con-

ceivable or desirable.
can be,

'at work.'

As he describes it 'no demon is,' or

This seems to mean in Toynbee's view that

an adequate analysis of growth or disintegration can be made
in terms of the change in equilibrium, and need not have

recourse to a transcendent God or devil.

It leads to his

insistance upon analyzing civilizational breakdowns as suicides

,

from within rather than from any external factor such

as military attacks.

The empirical analysis of breakdowns as

s

359

suicides is actually

a

examples to illustrate
in the 4lan motif.

m

process of rounding up
a

a

series of

principle to which he is committed

Volume Eight when Toynbee has given up

the £lan explanation he is able to find
evidence of break-

downs which are not suicides but are the
result of a militant

encounter between civilizations. 93
With "God" and "Satan" interpreted as necessary

phases of

a

cosmic rhythm, it is apparent that Toynbee

'

analysis earlier of how a "sinful soul comes to grief,"
or

how

a

civilization comes to destruction, can not imply that

it was "by the impact of some external agency's immoral
or

unmoral exercise of power." 94

The explanation must be that

the sinner refuses to cooperate with the creative cosmic

rhythm.

As a prime example Toynbee gives the case of the

Jews who, after responding to the challenge of a 'Time of

Troubles' by rising to a higher conception of Religion,
'rested on their oars' and thus "they 'put themselves out of
the running'

for serving once more as pioneers in the next

advance of the Syriac spirit." 95
Ibid
VIII, 447.
"In both tragedies a hard-pressed
civilization responded to the challenge of barbarian aggression by succumbing to a militarism that had originally been
foreign to its nature; and in both, likewise, this militarism
was eventually fatal to its addicts as well as to their victims "
.

,

.

94

Ibid.

,

IV,

95 Ibid.

,

263.

257.

:

.
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Toynbee tries to give content to the term
"moral" by

relating it to the "cosmic tug-of-war between
Life and Matter."

He still speaks of the "moral responsibility
for the

breakdowns of civilization" even though his system
constantly
threatens to explain the failure simply as the
"flagging of
the Promethean elan " or "the failure of the
Promethean
elan." 96

An example of his problem is his desire to condemn

the Spartans, Osmanlis, Nomads and Esquimaux while
advancing
as an explanation of their predicament the simple
description

that there is no margin of energy left over for reconnoi-

tering the course of the road ahead.

The whole passage

reads
The equilibrium of forces in their life is so
exact that all their energies are absorbed in
the effort of maintaining the position which
they have obtained already, and there is no margin of energy left over for reconnoitring the
course of the road ahead, on the face of the
cliff above them, with a view to a further

advance 97

On the basis of the cosmic tug-of-war between Life

and Matter Toynbee can call an action bad if it tends toward
the mechanization of Life, and good if it tends toward the

spiritualization or etherialization of Life.

Applied to

individual action in the context of a civilization, good

interaction between individuals achieves growth, and bad
96 Ibid

,

132.

97 Ibid.,

130.

.

"

,
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interaction brings disintegration 98
.

Bad integration is

equated with mechanization, resorting to
total mimesis, or
the use of force, in short "the mastery
of matter over
Life." 99 Good interaction on the other hand,
is equated with
leadership by illumination and example, the
radiation of the
major charm of genius, in short, "the triumph of
Life over
Matter.
A whole series of applied judgments follow from this
criterion.

The breakdown of the Orthodox Christian Civiliza-

tion can be traced back through a fatal chain of causation
to

Leo Syrius's enforcing of the claim of the superiority of the
state over the church, which was in effect "to check and

sterilize the tendencies towards variety and elasticity and

experimentation and creativeness in Orthodox Christian
life;

.

.

.

"

10 °

St. Francis and St. Dominic were able to

put fresh life into the Christian institutions of monachism

because "Saint Francis wholeheartedly followed the path of

Gentleness while Saint Dominic did not walk exclusively in
the path of Violence." 101

Athens brought tragedy on the

whole of Hellas because she "transformed herself from
98 Ibid.

122

.

"ibid., 125.
100 Ibid.,

353.

101 Ibid.,

370.

a
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'liberator of Hellas' into a 'tyrant city. '102

Hildebrand,

"in choosing the alternative of
meeting force by force"

started the fatal and fundamental change
of substituting the
material for the spiritual sword 103 and
brought spiritual
disaster on the Western World.
Zealot reaction to the impact
of an alien culture is both a disastrous
error and a deadly
sin because it is an attempt to fight the
aggressive culture
with its own weapons. 104

While this discussion has primarily focused on the

relationship between Toynbee

'

s

early view of Christianity and

his elan structure of reality, and has sought to avoid
the

introduction, however tempting, of later changes of view, it
may be legitimate to digress for a moment to show the conse-

quences of the moral criterion Toynbee has worked out in or

with his elan motif.

This brief digression will help to

emphasize the fact that Toynbee is working out of

a

system

which he buttresses by illustrations, and that his criterion
of growth does not follow from the evidence but from his root

view of reality.

The strange interpretations of historical

events which grow out of the system are perhaps nowhere better illustrated than by his treatment of Machiavelli.

also be noted that Toynbee
102 Ibid.

,

503.

1Q3 Ibid

,

538.

.

104 Ibid., V,

331.

's

It may

trouble over "Machiavelli" is

363

one of the important indications to him
that his original

foundations are inadequate.

While he ruled out by re-defini-

tion a traditional Christian concept of "sin,"
he yet finds

himself confronted with problems which call for

a

more ade-

quate frame of reference than an immanent elan en route
from

Matter to Spirit.

Creative personalities, he argues, are

those individuals who have followed the path of etherialization rather than mechanization, of gentleness rather than
force.

Toynbee exhibits eight historians, in an "empirical

survey" of the working of the rhythm of withdrawal-and- return

who provide "a conspicuous example of that process of etheri-

alization which we have taken as our criterion of growth." 105
These historians in the first chapter of their careers "set

themselves to produce an effect upon their fellow men by the
obvious and crude and finite 'direct method' of bringing
their wills to bear upon the wills of their neighbors.

Com-

pelled to withdraw from practical life these men have found
a new form of action on a new plane.

The ci-devant soldiers and statesmen who once
produced an effect on their fellow men by the
direct exertion of will-power, have been taught
by necessity to invent the alternative method of
creating works of art; and just because it is
more etherial, this alternative method is more
It is only when human action
effective. ...
is transmuted
by the purging out of all its
human passion and its human animus--from the
gross medium of will into the etherial media of
perception and thought and feeling and imagination,

—

105 ibid., Ill, 288
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that it is able to transcend all limits
of Time
and Space and to win its way into a field
that
extends to Infinity. 106

Machiavelli is one of these eight creative spirits
discussed in Volume Three of the Study
Toynbee

finds that

.

Machiavelli and Italy were facing a challenge similar
to the
contemporary challenge confronting the European states in
1927.

The challenge was how to transmute "political plural-

ism and political strife into political concord and
political
solidarity." 107 Toynbee suggests that both the Italian chal-

lenge and our present European challenge can only be solved

by a stroke of Machiavellian genius:
It will be seen that the task which confronted
Italian statesmanship in Machiavelli s generation, and which likewise confronts European
statesmanship in ours, is a task of peculiar
difficulty; if the problem can be solved at all,
it can only be solved by some stroke of genius;
and, in the Italy of Machiavelli s generation,
'

'

Niccolo Machiavelli himself had many of the
qualities for serving as the man of the hour. 108

After a discussion of Machiavelli
experiences

,

1

s

qualities and

Toynbee concludes that he was the man of the

hour and he did make an effective response.
"The break in his career was complete:

As he puts it,

yet, in putting him

to the proof of this tremendous personal challenge

,

Fortune

did not find Machiavelli wanting in the power to make an
106 Ibid., 289.

107 Ibid.,

305.

108 Ibid., 306.
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effective response ." ^9

Spurred on by

^

perfection Qf

"Machiavelli" as a case of creative
withdrawal-and-return,
Toynbee praises the work of the Florentine:
This was the origin of The Pr ince;
He was
addressing himself once more to the ...
one vital
problem of contemporary Italian statesmanship
in
the hope that perhaps, even now, he
might help
to bring that problem to solution by
transmuting
into creative thought the energies which
had been
deprived of their practical outlet.
if The
rince
had
happened
to inspire some living-Ital?
ian princeling— if a Medici or Este or
Sforza
Gonzaya had employed the author's methods to or
attain the author's ends— it is not inconceivable
that Machiavelli might have lived to see the
political union of Italy accomplished; ... 110
The conclusion reached by Toynbee is that Machia-

velli

's

The Prince is not a failure even though its immediate

effect was not achieved.

His return to the World "on a more

etherial plane on which his effectiveness has been vastly
greater" is proven by the fact that Machiavelli the political

philosopher has influenced the course of history to

a

much

greater extent than Machiavelli the practical politician
could have hoped to do.

In a summary paragraph his achieve-

ments are these;
For,

in finding his 'true nourishment" in his
communion with the Ancients, Machiavelli was
really finding his opportunity to perform his
life-work.
In those magic hours of 'catharsis'
when he rose above his vexation of spirit,
Machiavelli succeeded in transmuting his 'practical' energies into a series of mighty

109 Ibid.,

307.

110 Ibid.

pp. 308-309.

,

s

s

intellectual works- The Prince and the
Discourses
° n Llv V and The Art of War and
TheHist^f
Florence— and these fruits of a~Florentine
politician s broken career have been the
seeds
modern Western political philosophy. The of our
which these famous books put out into the thought
World
is still living and working in our
thought today. 111
Toynbee soon changed his mind about Machiavelli
'creative thought' and his "effective" solution.

•

The rather

astonishing reversal of judgment begins in Volume Four,
although it is relegated to the sixth annex in
seven.

a

series of

However one must take into account that Toynbee

1

s

first interpretation of Machiavelli in Volume Three belongs
to the first set of volumes,

that it was planned and written

between 1927 and 1933, and that it represents the results of
his initial enthusiasm for the elan rhythm.

His change of

interpretation of Machiavelli begins in the second batch of
volumes in an annex which may have been written as late as
March, 1939.

It occurs in the volumes in which Toynbee tes-

tifies to a change of religious orientation, and undoubtedly

reflects as well the sobering shift in world affairs.

emergence of Hitler and Mussolini and the threat of

a

The

second

World War, which Toynbee in 1927 did not expect to happen for
at least another century, must have had a strong effect on

his earlier enthusiasm for the genius of Machiavelli.

It is

also pertinent to note the effect of the critics on Toynbee
views.

After the first three volumes had appeared at least
11:L

Ibid.

,

310.

'

s

.

two important historians addressed
themselves to Toynbee

criterion of ether ialization
G.

F.

.

•

On a closely related matter

Hudson of Oxford wrote:

Wha ^ r bled me in m reading of the
^
chapters
??
on n Challenge-and-Response"
was the fear that
too much emphasis on the role of hard
conditions
in producing Civilization may work in
favour of
the 'heroic' Nazi idea, ...
It seems to me
essential to distinguish between the value of
112
different kinds of responses
.

.

.

And H. A. L. Fisher questions the ambiguities of

a

Withdrawal-and-Return pattern which allows Toynbee to include
such a minor figure as Ollivian in the list of great
men,
while ignoring such dynamic personalities as Napoleon and

Darwin because they do not have such

a

clear-cut withdrawal

experience in their lives. 113

Whatever the full explanation of the motives for a
change may be

— the

change itself is unmistakably set out in

the annex essay on "Militarism and the Military Virtues."

Toynbee now sees Machiavelli against a background in which
the West is compared with a spiritual void, a house unten-

anted by the Christian spirit that had formerly dwelt in it.

Machiavelli is no longer the genius, or the 'man of the hour'

who finds his "true nourishment in his communion with the
Ancients," but is rather a false prophet worshipping on the
112 Ibid

.

,

IV,

650.

XXJ H. A. L. Fisher, Pages From the Past
(Oxford:
University Press, 1939), pp. 219-220

:

.
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altar-steps of the Abomination of Desolation.

The passage

reads
As it happened, these two religions were
virtually
the same; they were, both of them variants
of the
punitive idolatrous worship of the tribe or stateand therefore the modern Western apostate
from
Christianity, in a search after a new god, found
the same idol awaiting his adoration in
whichever
of the two alternative directions he cast his
eyes.
Machiavelli consulting his Livy and Rousseau his
Plutarch and De Gobineau his Sturlason and Hitler
his Wagner were each led, by his respective literacy or musical oracle, to the altar-steps of the
same Abomination of Desolation:
the Totalitarian
Parochial State. 114

Machiavelli reappears in Volume Five and on this

occasion is used as a manifestation of the phenomenon of
"abandon" in the disintegration of the medieval Italian city-

state cosmos.

Unlike his heroic and praiseworthy creative

withdrawal-and-return as noted in Volume Three, Machiavelli
becomes the incarnation of the mood of "abandon."

This

unheroic role as Toynbee defines it,
implies something more than a mere external
rack and ruin.
It means a state of mind in which
antinomianism is accepted consciously or unconsciously, in theory or in practice as a substitute
for creativeness 115
.

.

.

—

Toynbee

—

change of interpretation of Machiavelli

"s

cannot be explained away by identifying one interpretation

with Machiavelli

'

s

theory and the other with his person.

both cases Machiavelli
114 Toynbee,

115 Ibid., V,

1

s

political theory is the focus of

A Study of History
399.

,

IV,

pp.

645-646

In

attention, and The Prince is singled
out in Volume Three as
creative thought, as a stroke of genius,
as a living and
inspiring effective response.
In Volume Five "the Thrasymachean political theory of Machiavelli" 116
becomes a manifestation of the characteristic behavior of
individuals in

disintegrating societies.
By Volume Eight Machiavelli

complete.

•

s

decline and fall is

Now he is enrolled among the prophets of a West-

ern

Gentile Nationalism, responsible only for 'inspiring'
a
secular Zionist act of impiety and presumption in the
modern
Zionist movement, and stripped of his mantle of political
philosopher, author of "mighty intellectual works," he is

dismissed as "the Florentine publicist Niccolo Machiavelli." 117

Finally in Volume Ten when Toynbee intended to reconsider the "Pleiad of historians," 118 Machiavelli is quietly

dropped from the list of five creative historians.
The second phase of the effort to account for Toynbee

's

view of Christianity under the elan motif is concerned

with his assessment of Christianity as a factor in world history.

By isolating discussions of the role of Christianity

in history there is further support for the above argument

116 Ibid., 403.

117 Ibid

.

,

VIII,

118 Ibid.

,

III,

300.

290.
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that his interpretation rests upon a more
basic assumption as
to the structure of reality.

Toynbee's usual treatment of the role of Christianity
is to see it in relation to Greek civilization
and Western

civilization.

The relationship is usually stated in biologi-

cal terms and a summary list of the interrelationships
shows
one rape, 119 one normal birth, 120 one "monstrous birth," 121

one miscarriage, 122 and one marriage. 123

appears in Toynbee's pre- Study works.

The first case

In the writings of

1922, Toynbee describes the Christian Church as the last

phase of Graeco-Roman Society, argues that this Society was

violated by the barbarians, and the result of this intercourse was the birth of our Western civilization.
second case, found in the early parts of the Study

In the
,

Toynbee

has excised the violence of the rape but has continued the
use of the birth analogy as a significant description of the

relation between the Western Civilization and Greece.

account may be paraphrased as follows

s

The

the Hellenic Civili-

zation died by its own hand, the internal proletariat escaped
119
x
^Toynbee,
p.

12 and p.

120

121J

,

32 8.

Toynbee, A Study of History , V, 190.

121 Ibid.
122

The Western Question in Greece and Turkey

,

VII, 539.

Toynbee, An Historian's Approach to Religion
Toynbee, Hellenism, p. 177.

,

p.

117

from the disintegration, formed
itself into the Catholic
Church and succeeded in bringing to
birth our Western Civilization.
The barbarians in this second version
did not have
"the spirit to compete with the Catholic
Church
for the

paternity of

a

new civilization "124
.

The date Qf birth To ^_

bee fixes as sometime between 600 A.D. 125
and 800 A.D. 126
The first two versions of the role of Christianity
as stated
above can be reconciled without much difficulty.
The first

case may be considered as a tentative, and preliminary
ver-

sion of the second.

One should recognize that in both

accounts Christianity plays the role of the culture-bearer,
and that the chrysalis view of the early volumes of the study
is the fully developed product of the pre- Study tentative

versions.

In this chrysalis role of the church two matters

are of great importance.

The description of the church as a

chrysalis or womb of the West is grounded upon Toynbee's
first theoretic structure of reality.

History as the con-

stant rhythm of the elan vital provides an interpretive

framework within which the church finds a place as a channel
of the elan
a "sucker"

On one occasion Toynbee describes the church as

.

sent out by the Hellenistic Society which fastens

on to the West.

The second matter of interest in the

124 Toynbee, A Study of History II,
,

125 Ibid

.

,

IV,

185.

126 Ibid., V, 190.

321.
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chrysalis role of the Church is the interpretation
of Christianity which grows out of it.
Throughout the early volumes
of the Study

Toynbee reiterates the view that "Christianity

,

was a syncretism or nothing." 127

Consonant with his assump-

tions that the elan moves upward from matter to spirit,
from

crude force to peaceful persuasion, Toynbee depicts Chris-

tianity as a peaceful and hence a successful response to Hellenism.

His interpretation reads that "Judaism had only

defied Hellenism as a forlorn hope and Catholic Christianity
had not defied Hellenism at all but had found its field of

action in the Hellenic World as a Syro-Hellenic syncretism.

..." 12 8

This syncretism consisted of translating

the Christian Syriac spark into the terms of Hellenistic

philosophy.

Arguing according to his system that the new

spark must be made attractive, and to be made attractive it

must be made intelligible, he not only speaks of the "legitimate/" "successful" Hellenizing of the Syriac spark, 129 but
of the necessity of this syncretism.

Toynbee

's

1 ** 0

rather superficial views on the content of

Christianity as a syncretism into which he was led by the
biological thrust of his elan motif, come under review in the
127 Ibid

.

,

II,

128 Ibid

.

,

374.

129 Ibid.

,

V,

130 Ibid.,

287.

539.

366.
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final volumes of the Study

.

In Volume Seven he succeeds in

reversing his earlier account of Christianity as

response—as

peaceful

a

movement which did not defy Hellenism at all,

a

into an account of the first seven centuries of Christian

history as a contest between Paganism and Revelation. 131

The

"successful," "legitimate" and "necessary" synthesis of a

Syriac spark with Hellenistic philosophy, turns out to have
been merely a verbal, "would-be reconciliation."

Not only

did it fail to solve the problem of reconciling a religious

truth with a scientific truth, but this verbal accommodation

made it harder for souls born in a later generation to solve
the problem "than it would have been for them if their prede-

cessors had shirked the issue and refrained from meddling." 132
It is clear that such a radical re-reading of the

history of the early Christian church cannot be described as
a

modification or development of his earlier views.

Some

light can be shed on the change by returning to explore the
shift Toynbee makes from his Volume Five description of the
"normal birth" of the West to his Volume Seven description
of the same relation as the "monstrous birth" of the West.

The reader who has followed the "intelligible units of Study"
as outlined in Volume One, and has regarded Western civiliza-

131 Ibid

.

,

132 Ibid.,

VII, 474.
475.

J
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tion as a fairly sharply defined society
which has existed
from about 600 A.D. to the present, finds
considerable confusion in the Toynbee version of Western
civilization that

dominates the later volumes.

From Volume Seven onward Toyn-

bee begins to talk about Western civilization
as two civili-

zations

.

The new picture of the Christian Church and Western

Civilization as Toynbee works it out in his post-second World
War volumes may be sketched in this way. Following the disintegration of the Graeco-Roman Civilization, the Christian

Church attempted to fashion itself into a Respublica Chris t-ana.

This Respublica Christiana

,

which Toynbee calls an

"ecclesiastical civilization" 133 was a spiritually higher

order of society than the civilizations Toynbee had been

describing up to that time.

The shaping of this ecclesiasti-

cal civilization was in the hands of the papacy, and its for-

mative period seems to extend from Gregory in the seventh

century to a climax in the time of Hildebrand and his successors. 134

,

.

In this Civitas Dei ,

"The secular parochial

princes of a Western Christian World were to dwell together
in unity under the presidency of an ecclesiastical shep-

herd;

..."

But this ecclesiastical civilization

13 3
XJ
Toynbee, An Historian's Approach to Religion , p.

134 Toynbee, A Study of History
VII,
,

135 ibid.

403.

202.
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suffered what Toynbee calls

a

"breakdown," 136 or a "miscar-

riage," 137 or it was "politically debauched by
its own founder." 138
down,

Aside from the question of the cause for its
break-

it is apparent that Toynbee has divided the
Western

Civilization of Volume One into these two civilizations.

For

example he speaks of the non-Western World as one which
"had

rejected the Early Modern Western ecclesiastical civilization," and now,

"found itself constrained in the end to adopt

the Late Modern Western secular civilization unreserv-

edly." 139

He adds the Western ecclesiastical civilization to

his former list of twenty-one civilizations, making now

"twenty-two known civilizations." 140

The footnote explains

the additional civilization in the words, "On a count in

which a Medieval Western City-state cosmos is given the
status of a civilization distinct from the main body of the

Western Society."

The status of a distinct civilization is

also given to this Medieval Western City-state cosmos in the

annex of Volume Seven, where Toynbee traces out its breakdowns and its reaching of a "universal state" in the emer136 Ibid .

137 Ibid .
138 Toynbee, An Historian's Approach
to Religion , p. 117.
139 Ibid

.

,

p.

202.

140 Toynbee, A Study of History
IX,
,

392.

gence of the Napoleonic Empire. 141
The division of Western Civilization
into two dis-

tinct civilizations leads to an interesting
reconstruction of
that society which the reader of the
Study would customarily
regard as the West.
in place of the view that Western
civilization was born a feeble infant from the
womb of the church
in the time of Gregory the Great, is
a new description of a

thirteenty-century "monstrous birth of

a

Modern Western secu-

lar civilization from the womb of a Medieval
Western Respub lica Christiana." 142 The "monstrous birth" is described
in
an alternate phrase as a secular civilization "that
breaks

out of a body ecclesiastic." 143

On the basis of a new con-

cept of development this new civilization in Toynbee

'

has little claim on the historian's time or interest.

remarks,

"

.

.on

.

s

eyes
As he

this showing, a Western post-Christian

secular civilization might at best be a superfluous repetition of the pre-Christian Hellenic Civilization, and at worst
a

pernicious backsliding from the path of spiritual prog-

ress." 144

From Volume Seven onward this civilization is

called the "Late Modern Western secular civilization," the
"post-Western Christian Civilization," or "deconsecrated
141 Ibid

.

,

VII,

142 Ibid

.

,

539.

143 Ibid

.

,

545.

144 Ibid., 445.

571.

society," and is regarded as a "supreme
tragedy." 145
It is obvious that this view of
the West as a "mon-

strous birth" and as a "supreme tragedy"
cannot be part of
the original interpretative framework
provided by the |lan

structure of reality.

On the assumption that Life is a uni-

versal rhythm of Yin and Yang and that human
history can be
understood as an extension of this rhythm Toynbee
was led to

conclude that, "Every species of living creature
is an ear-

nest of growth, inasmuch as it is the fruit of some
past
creative mutation of an antecedent species and might become
in its turn the seed of some further creative mutation
into
yet another species?
" 146
But here is the case of a
.

.

.

new civilization coming to birth whose very existence is a
mistake.

Instead of being a new opportunity for the elan to

attain its goal, it requires some kind of an evil life force,
and to think of it in these terms is to break apart the

monistic life principle with which Toynbee began his Study
into a radical dualism of a good and evil elan.
The situation is similar in epistemology where Toyn-

bee had felt that this elan motif delivered him from egocen-

trism by eliminating subjective value judgments and by

affirming the philosophical equivalence of all representa145 Ibid

.

,

146 Ibid.,

447.
IX,

392.

,

378

tives of the species. 147

The view that the Christian Church

served in a chrysalis role, as a channel
of 6lan, is a logical extension and application of this
basic position and
seemed to maintain the "discreet attitudes
of neutrality"
that a scientific historian should possess.
It is evident
from his Volume Five struggle to admit the
possibility of a

judgment of value with regard to higher religions
that Toynbee felt that he had maintained a scientific,
and neutral

historical position, quite free from value judgments.

He

asks

Are we warranted in taking a liberty with religions that we have scrupled to take with civilizations? At an early point in this Study we
debated whether we should take account of possible
differences of value in comparing one civilization
with another, and in this case we decided not to
presume to act as judges or dividers. When we
pass from the study of civilizations to the study
of religions, are we going to abandon this discreet attitude of neutrality and to take the
perilous plunge into passing judgments and meting
measures? 14 °
The argument that "Christianity was a syncretism or

nothing" and that its various doctrines could be understood
as mythical constructions of primitive intuitions of the uni-

versal rhythm, is also a logical extension and application of
his prior assumptions as to the elan motif.

But when Toynbee

has developed the view that the Church is a higher species of
147 Ibid
148

I,

175.

Ibid., V,

371.

.

,

society, that the birth of a civilization
can be eithe r an

aberration or

a

success on the grounds that it interferes

with or assists in the growth of

higher religion, it is

a

clear that he is revising his "previous tacit
and uncritical

assumptions" 149 not only about the value of religion,
but
about the neutral epistemology and the theoretic
structure of
reality with which he began his Study
.

From the comparatively minor place of religion in the
early volumes, when it is treated descriptively by a scientific historian holding a "discreet attitude of neutrality,"

Toynbee has moved to the position that religion provides the
intelligible unit of historical study, 150 and becomes the
criteria for "good" and "bad" civilizations. 151

Furthermore,

religion holds out the hope of deliverance from an epistemological dilemma posed by relativity, 152 and addresses itself

with destructive force 15 3 to Toynbee

'

s

earlier faith that

ultimate reality is a universal rhythm, and that the study of

history is the task of uncovering this rhythm in human
affairs.
149

One may speak of Toynbee
Ibid

.

,

VII,

150 Ibid

.

,

449.

151 Ibid

.

152

Ibid.,

153 Ibid.

,

IX,

e

s

initial assumptions

422

402.

VII, footnote on p. 421.
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about the nature of reality as a faith
not only on purely
theoretic arguments but also because Toynbee
himself recognizes in Volume Seven that his Volume One
"discreet attitude
of neutrality" was really not what it
seemed.
This recognition comes to light when Toynbee discusses
the inadequacies
of his own "chrysalis" interpretation.

At this point he

readily admits his earlier view rested on

a

judgment with

regard to absolute value.
On this view, universal churches have their raison
d etre in keeping the species of society known as
civilizations alive by preserving a precious germ
of life through the perilous interregnum between
the dissolution of one mortal representative of
the species and the genesis of another.
In this
repetitive process of the reproduction of civilizations, which is assumed to have an absolute value
as an end in itself, the churches are useful and
perhaps necessary, but secondary and transitional
phenomena.
The writer of this Study had to
confess that he, too, had been satisfied for many
I* 4
years with this rather patronizing view.
'

.

.

.

„

.

.

As we have argued above, there is a coherence in

Toynbee

's

early views when they are recognized as the super-

structure built on the elan motif.

An overview of civiliza-

tions, cultural dynamics, crisis analysis and the place of

religion in history are made intelligible in Toynbee

mation by referring them back to the universal elan

.

'

s

estiHis own

action as an historian is similarly made intelligible to him
by seeing it as an expression of the elan motif.
154 Ibid.

,

pp.

392-393.

When he
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comes to a "parting of the ways" in
Volume Five and decides
to follow Augustine, Toynbee begins
a reconstruction of his
Study_ on a new theoretic structure of
reality,

and begins to

see himself in a new role as a "Christian
Historian."

One

might state it briefly that in the first part of
the Study

Christianity is interpreted in the light of the elan
motif,
whereas in the later volumes, Christianity, as one of
the

great intuitions of mankind, becomes part of the basic
inter-

pretive foundations.
In the first half of the twentieth century,

period of Toynbee

's

the

historical labors, few historians would

deny that the fashion in historical literature had been set
by the monographs and specialized studies.

And very few of

the historian-critics of Toynbee have failed to conclude

their criticism of A Study of History without expressing

admiration for the courage and ambition of this attempt to
reverse the tide of monographic historical studies in favor
of an attempt at a universal synthetic history.
a

There may be

psychological explanation yet to be uncovered by some Toyn-

bee biographer for this drive to write a universal history,

but for the student of Toynbee

's

historiography there is an

interesting ideological explanation for the ambition to write
a

universal history which can be found in the intellectual

development of Toynbee.
enters Toynbee

'

s

The ideal of a universal history

thinking sometime between the years 1921 and
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Toynbee finds the justification
for his synthetic universal history by an appeal to the
rhythmic nature of scholarship itself.
just as there is an alternating
rhythm in the
universe of nature and the universe of
events, so there is
the same rhythm in the universe of
knowledge.
1927.

For the alternation perpetually recurs in
virtue
of the very nature of thought.
When the mind is
employed in finding facts, its sheer success
inhibits it sooner or later from fact-finding
uninterruptedly ad infinitum
Then the
mind changes its activity perforce and employs
itself for a season in making syntheses and
interpretations.
This rhythm is native to
thought in all its different channels. 155
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

The alternating rhythm according to Toynbee

•

s

calcu-

lation not only makes rational his drive toward a new
synthesis, but offers an explanation of a state of affairs in
which

the dominant trend is toward fact-finding.

The fact that the

great majority of his contemporaries are in disagreement with

him can be explained by regarding them as involved in a stagnant, sterilized, mechanized Yin phase of historical scholarship.

On this view Mommsen is illustrative of the encyclo-

pedic, historical worker who has been caught in the subjuga-

tion of this ancient kingdom of historical thought by the

modern "Industrialism of Western life." 156

The tendency of

Lord Acton and the Cambridge History series to compose

a uni-

versal history (in a manner quite contrary to the Toynbee
155 Ibid

.

156 Ibid.

,

I,

3.

"
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method) by joining

,

finding studies is

ogether a nu mber of m0
nographic

Gained

ilizing infiuence of

b

iustria

facfc .

roynbee as the tragic "ster,

sm upon historical

thought. 157
By an appeal

t

Lhmic nature Qf scholarship

Toynbee can argue that it
is time for a change in
historiography, even though only a
few historians such as H
G. Wells
and himself recognize this
need. 158 By a further
development
of his view that the 4lan
finds expression only in creative
individuals, he can explain his
own breach with his fellow
historians, the mystic inspiration
that accompanies
.

it, and

the hostility of those who remain
in the Yin stage.

The

argument for a new creative synthetic
history of almost
superhuman magnitude by a creative
historian who will give
expression to a new Yang phase in historical
studies is an
extension and application of Toynbee *s
general theory of cultural dynamics and may offer a psychological
explanation for
Toynbee' s vast undertaking.

Drawing on Bergson and Smuts, Toynbee analyzes
the

process of growth as the work of creative
individuals.
The individuals who perform this miracle of
creation, and who thereby bring about the
growth
or the societies in which they arise,
are more
than mere men.
They can work what to men seem
157 T .,
Ibid
,

.

,

158 Ibid.,

46
4.

!

,
,

384

be aus
TnT
}?J
m a literal^ and^

the Y themselves are superhuman
no mere metaphorical sense. 159

The explanation for the vision
which carries Toynbee into
such an enormously ambitious universal
history may be found
in the Bergsonian teaching which
Toynbee finds so inspiring

that,

"Henceforward, the soul has a superabundance
of life;

it has an immense elan

;

it has an irresistible thrust which

hurls it into vast enterprises.

"
.

.

160

.

Again by referring to the elan motif with its concomitant theory of cultural dynamics Toynbee seeks to
explain
the sharp and even hostile criticisms of the professional

historians.

In 1933, before his Study came into the hands of

his critics, his theoretic view was that:

The emergence of a superman or great mystic or
a genius or a superior personality inevitably
precipitates a social conflict. The conflict
will be more or less acute, according to the
degree in which the creative individual happens
to rise above the average level of his former
kin and kind.
But some conflict is inevitable,
since the social equilibrium which the genius
has upset by the mere fact of his personal
emergence has eventually to be restored either
by his social triumph or by his social defeat. 161

And the response of the creative individual to his timebound, Yin stage contemporaries is dictated by the elan
motif.

As the elan is attractive by virtue of its quality of
159 Ibid.

Ibid.
Ibid.

III,
t

234.

236.

232.
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living-ness, so the creative "personalities
that have succeeded in attaining self-determination
through self-mastery
find,

.

.

.

that, having been lifted up,

until they have drawn all men unto them;

they cannot rest
.

.

.

»

162

Quoting

from Bergson, Toynbee describes this action
of the creative
soul who is faced by hostile critics as an
act of addressing

"themselves to Humanity in general in an elan of
love." 163
The curious way in which the Toynbee controversy
has

developed since the publication of A Study of History is

a

witness to the enduring attitudes and views which Toynbee
derived from the elan motif.

One might normally expect that

the scientific study of the past, based on empiricism rather

than transcendentalism as Toynbee avers, would lead to a

sharp exchange of views as to the validity of the laws and
the evidence which supports them.

Many of the critiques of

the first batch of volumes started to follow this expected

pattern, but the controversy since then has been marked by

Toynbee

's

refusal to become involved in a battle over the

evidence.
In 19 60 Philip Toynbee, the son of Arnold J. Toynbee,

described the 1950 's as the years of the "Toynbee hunt."
is correct in underscoring the one-sided aspects of the

162 Ibid

.

,

234

163 Ibid., 232

He

.
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controversy, and the bitter tone of the polemic
directed at
his father.
However the tone of the polemic may in part be
explained by the sense of frustration which the
critics often

express in their tilt with the author of the Study 164

Toyn-

.

bee's defense of his Study has been marked by
these characteristics:

an attempt to disarm the historian-critics by an

appeal to the rhythmic

felan of

historical scholarship; a

studied effort to respond to the critics in an

felan of

love;

and the suggestion that his "insights" are the mystically

received intuitions which have not yet been vouchsafed to the
pedestrian, time-blinded professional historian.

major defense of his system has been

a

First his

Volume Nine argument

that professional historians are men who have been by-passed
in the creative advance of the new sociologist-historian.

The figure of the typical antinomian latter-day
Western historian caught fast in bondage to an
invisible pattern whose dominion over him was
secure just because he believed himself to be
proof against ever entertaining any such idea,
was, of course, a living witness to a relativity
of historical thought that was the looking-glass
through which we forced our entry into the vista
of our present Study.
This captive mammoth was
a unique twentieth-century relic of a now oldfashioned- looking Western intellectual fauna
which, save for this single surviving representative, had become extinct because its habitus had
been too nicely adapted by the goddess Natural
Selection to the temporary exigencies of an
164

Professor Geyl s shift from a moderate, considered
critique in 1946 to a harsh and censorious rebuttal in 1956
is the best example of this growing sense of frustration
among the Toynbee critics
fi
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eighteeoth-century Western intellectual environment u J
.

Secondly his response to the critics in direct
controversy, apart from this Volume Nine attack
on their anachronistic views has been characterized by the mellow,
tolerant
spirit one might expect to find in Bergson's creative
personality, who addresses himself to Humanity in an
elan of love.

A good example of this gentle response is found in
Toynbee's
1956 rejoinder to a very strong attack by Professor Geyl in
t ^ ie Journal of the History of Ideas

.

Toynbee's one-page com-

ment begins:
What struck me in
book by Professor
Professor Geyl is
another, and that
view of what I am

reading the two reviews of my
Fiess and by my old friend
that they agree with one
I agree with them in their
trying to do.* 66

Another example of the gentle response may be found
in the "Toynbee-Jerrold Controversy";

one of the few occa-

sions in which Toynbee allowed himself to be brought into a

published debate on his views.

The London Times carried an

interchange of correspondence between Arnold Toynbee, Douglas

Jerrold and other interested parties in the Spring of 1954.
Toynbee's four brief replies to Jerrold reveal a remarkably

conciliatory and gentle spirit in the midst of a sharp
165 Toynbee, A Study of History
IX, 197.
,

166 Toynbee,
(June,

1955), 421.

Journal of the History of Ideas

,

XVI
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exchange of views between Toynbee's defenders and det ractors. 167

Thirdly, the belief that the nature of reality is a

rhythmic elan is employed by Toynbee to support the argument
that there are advanced souls who gain an intuition of the

meaning behind the facts, which must be passed on to historian-contemporaries still caught in the Yin stage.

Thus

Toynbee's defense along the lines of an esoteric mystic expe
rience has shifted the development of the controversy from a

systematic rebuttal on empirical grounds to a more nebu1
lous X00
and frenetic attack on Toynbee
ft ft

and influence. 169

8

s

abilities, claims,

Toynbee's seven mystic experiences in the

"process of progressive initiation" 170 into the Beatific

Vision 171 by which a meaning may be found in the human spec•

tacle,

172

are recorded in Volume Ten.

The relation between Toynbee's defense of the Study

and his view of reality as a rhythmic elan even continues
^^^ Counsels of Hope
pany, 1954)

(London:

The Times Publishing Com-

.

*

°

See the editor's leading article entitled
Ibid
"Clouds and Sledge-Hammers " p. 26.
«

,

i69 ibxd.

170 Toynbee, A Study of History , X,

171 Ibid

.

172 Ibid.

,

126.

129.
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into the later volumes of the Study and into the post- Study

controversy.

This is unusual in the sense that one does not

expect this appeal to the elan motif after it has been

dropped out of the Study from Volume Five onward as the basis
for an overview of history

,

cultural dynamics

a

explanatory principle of the Western crisis.

,

and an

But the appeal

to the elan motif in the later volumes is limited to polemi-

cal

usage— as

convenient and effective rebuttal of the

a

critics along historical lines.
In the question of the purpose of history-writing,

the normal early volume exposition of the purpose or inspira-

tion of history-writing is framed as an aspect of the univer-

Toynbee returns to the same subject in a

sal elan rhythm.

later volume but this time there is a reconsideration or

restatement of the subject in terms of

a

second structuring

of reality.

Toynbee

first view of what history is

's

t

word in Herodotus

8

.

using the

l

sense of tffTOpli*

opening pages of the Study

,

B

may be found in the

After developing the analogy

between biological life and the life experiences of human
societies as multiple expressions of the universal elan

,

Toynbee comes to the following conclusions about the historian

8

s

task:

In the light of these conclusions on matters of
historical fact, we can draw certain other conclusions regarding History as a humane study.
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Its true concern is with the lives of societies
in both their internal and their external aspects.
The internal aspect is the articulation of the
life of any given society into a series of chapters succeeding one another in time and into a
number of communities living side by side. The
external aspect is the relation of particular
societies with one another, which has likewise to
be studied in the two media of time and space. 173

A full and fair exposition of what Toynbee includes
in the "purpose" of the historian would have to record his

view that there is a secondary purpose or cultural by-product
to the historian's task.

experience of "catharsis."

This purpose is referred to as the

We come across the first refer-

ence to catharsis in the 1921 draft of the Study which may be
the one composed on the Orient Express in September of that

year.

During this time Toynbee was attempting to write his
and specifically opposes the view that

Study as a drama

history is a search for scientific laws

.

One can speculate

in the absence of any further information about "catharsis w

that Toynbee envisaged the use of history as a kind of purging experience for the historian and his reader? probably to

purge out the nationalistic and parochial spirit that had

brought earlier societies to a tragic end*
By the time the systematic notes of 1927-1929 were

completed, Toynbee had accepted the methodological clue of
173 Ibid.
^ 74

r

I,

46.

We have discussed his use of Sophocles
a possible master-plot in chapter four.

8

Antigone as

:
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Teggart and had begun the attempt to establish the scientific
law pattern which the universal rhythm of the elan
view, should provide.

,

in his

But even though he had rejected the

analogy of history and drama as the basis for a historical
method, he retained the idea that the study of history serves
the purpose of a catharsis.

The cathartic purpose is now

attached to the elan motif by the argument that the historian
is moved from the Yin,

Yang,

[passive, receptive state]

into the

[creative, writing state] by means of several stimuli,

among which is the cathartic experience of the "Communion of
Souls."
In the later volumes of the Study

,

the major purpose

of historical study has shifted from an analysis of the

internal and external aspects of the lives of societies to a

religious calling.

The Volume Ten passage to be put along-

side the Volume One discussion of purpose reads

Why do people study History? Why, to put the
question ad hominem had the writer of the
present work been studying History ever since
he was a child and been spending thirty years
on this book which he was now finishing?
The present writer's personal answer was that
an historian, like anyone else who has had the
happiness of having an aim in life, has found
his vocation in a call from God to 'feel after
... In beginning by asking
Him and find Him
ourselves why we study History we have begged
What do we mean by History? And
the question.
the writer, continuing to speak simply for himself from his personal experience, would reply
that he meant by History a vision dim and partial, yet (he believed) true to reality as far
as it went of God revealing Himself in action
,

.

?

.

—

—

.

.
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to souls that were sincerely seeking Him.
The historical angle of vision
shows us
human souls, raised to a sixth dimension by the
gift of the Spirit, moving, through a fateful
.

.

.

.

exercise of their spiritual freedom, either
towards their creator or away from Him. 17 ^

In this comparison of a Volume One definition of the

nature and purpose of history with a Volume Ten definition
one is able to see the shift from an elan motif to some kind
of a religious transcendental framework and the case is simi-

larly as interesting and instructive with regard to Toynbee

views on catharsis.

1

In the notes of 1927 the cathartic value

of historical scholarship was noted as an important feature

of the historian's motivation and purpose.

By the time the

Study is completed in 1952, the West has lost its historical

significance for Toynbee and it appears from the absence of
any mention of catharsis that there is no longer any driving

need to purge the Western historians of parochialism and the

Westerners of nationalistic spirit in order to save the Western civilization.

A call to repentance seems to have

replaced the earlier hope that by holding up the tragedy of
past civilizations Westerners would emerge from a cathartic

experience and open up new channels of elan

.

By Volume Six

the shift from a hope in catharsis to a hope in repentance

has taken place, and the historian breaks into a direct plea
to his contemporaries that "we may and must pray that a
175

s

Toynbee, A Study of History

,

X,

pp. 1-2.

,
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reprieve which God has granted to our society once will not
be refused if we ask for it again in a contrite spirit and
with a broken heart." 176 The same shift from catharsis to a

call for repentance is given epistemological application as

Toynbee addresses himself to his fellow historians.

Toynbee-Jerrold controversy of 1954, Toynbee

v

s

In the

major conten-

tion is that Jerrold has misinterpreted history because of

pride

The antidote is

,

s

In this grave hour let us in the West beware of
asserting:
°God, I thank Thee, that I am not as
other men are.
Christ counsels us to pray:
'God, be merciful unto me a sinner.
Christ's
is the counsel of hope*
The publican is laying
himself open to the possibility of salvation;
the Pharisee is making himself fatally proof
against it. 177
1

9

And to re-emphasize the direct plea to Jerrold the historian,
Toynbee' s next letter continues, "Mr, Jerrold has not yet
told your readers what is his response to the Baptist
In the present correspondence , so far,

8

s

cry.

"Only the echoes

which he made relent, Rung from their flinty caves, Repent
Repent!

v

"

1

178

Toynbee 's Second Theoretic Structure of Reality
This investigation of the term "Christian historian"
176 Ibid

.

,

VI,

^^ Counsels
178 Ibid.

,

p.

321.

of Hope , pp. 15-16.
29.
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has carried us through an initial stage of Toynbee

'

s

work

where he attempted to develop a coherent historical view on
the basis of an elan structure of reality.

In place of the

discarded "beanstalk view" which he called the relic of

a

Christian scheme of history, he envisaged reality in terms of
a

universal rhythm which in the world of events takes the

form of innumerable civilizations, like the suckers that

spring to life from the trunk of the pollarded willow.

The

absence of the self-characterization of "Christian historian"
in the early plans of the Study from 1921 through the comple-

tion of the first three volumes in 19 33, and the corresponding personal references of Toynbee to his agnostic period

helped to confirm the argument that Toynbee

naturalistic historicism. 179

'

s

Study began as

The many references to Chris-

tianity as a theology and as an institution which can be
found in the first three volumes did not refute the thesis
but on closer analysis demonstrated more clearly the pervasive power of the elan structure to reinterpret traditional
This term is effectively used by Carlo Antoni, disciple of Croce and professor of the history of modern philos
ophy at the University of Rome, in his excellent study From
History to Sociology (Detroit: Wayne State University,
He defines ''naturalistic historicism" [as distinct
1959)
from metaphysical historicism and aesthetic historicism] as
the tendency to assume that the similarities between nature
and history are more significant than the differences. As a
consequence these historians attempt to apply the categories
of positive science to historical phenomena, thus resolving
Preface xix.
history into sociology
.

»
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doctrines as mythical expressions of the universal rhythm.
The role of the church in the historical process was

described as a temporary vehicle for a baulked elan in the
transitional state between

a

dying civilization and a new

civil izational form.
Toynbee'

s

use of the adjective "Christian" before the

word "historian" is greatly clarified when one sees that he
is using the word "Christian" with reference to a second

theoretical structuring of reality with which he hopes to
resolve his earlier difficulties.

This second theoretic

structure is introduced into the second batch of volumes,

which were written in the years 19 33 through 19 39.

But its

major outworking comes in the final batch of volumes, as is

evidenced by Toynbee'

s

need to reconstruct the format of the

post-war volumes, and by the number of reconstructed interpretations which he develops in Volumes Seven to Ten.
This second view of reality can be distinguished from
the first by recognizing that it is dualistic as opposed to
the monistic universal rhythm Toynbee uses in his early

Study

,

The dualism usually appears as a distinction between

the mundane and the supra-mundane.

Four, written in March of 1939

itself was begun in 1933)

,

In the Preface to Volume

(although the fourth volume

Toynbee thanks Augustine for a

glimpse of a supra-mundane vision*

His comment is that "Of

course the author of this tale of two cities had a supra-
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mundane range of vision in comparison with which no
appreciable difference is made by a few thousand terrestrial
miles or
years more or less; and a glimpse of this vision is the
boon
for which the present writer is the most deeply grateful to
the writer of De Civitate Dei 180
,

The section in the Study to which this Preface refers
is the familiar Volume Five "turning point" where Toynbee

elects to follow Augustine "out of the shattered prison-house
of the City of Man into the infinite liberty of an inviolate
and inviolable City of God," 181 and the companion passage in

Volume Six which relates Augustine's way of "transfiguration"
to the individual soul who is caught in a disintegrating

civilization.

These are parallel and complementary passages

in the Study even though they appear in succeeding volumes.

In the context which includes both discussions, Toynbee is

dealing with "The Process of Disintegration."
Augustine is introduced as
the Body Social

.

"

a

In Volume Five

way of escape from "Schism in

In Volume Six Augustine is again intro-

duced as a way of escape from "Schism in the Soul."

Both

passages may be called "turning points" 1 R2 in the Study
180<p O n k ee
y

181 Ibid

.

,

^

V,

a Study of History

,

IV, Preface p.

;

the

ix.

374.

l^We have recognized

the importance of the Volume Five
"Augustine" passage in the chapter on "Toynbee the Explorer,"
on page sixty-one, and the importance of the Volume Six
"Augustine" passage in the chapter on "Toynbee the Student of
Life" on page two hundred and sixty-six*
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first with regard to the history of societies, and the
second

with regard to the history of individuals.

It is significant

that the insights of Augustine do not appear in any of the

early outlines of the Study

.

It is important to recall these epistemological turn-

ing points in this chapter to show that there is a deeper

significance to the passages than the epistemological shift.
Toynbee is in effect discarding his monistic principle of the

universal rhythmic elan for

a

second structuring of reality.

His search for an abiding form in the flux of historical

change no longer rests on the assumption that the elan moves

rhythmically in an objectively verifiable law-pattern, but
that reality has a supra-mundane dimension
a "Unique and Omnipotent God."

— that

there exists

As Toynbee expresses it, "The

closing sentence of this last quotation brings us back to the
now familiar f orking-point of the road which we are attempting to survey; but this time we have not to follow out the

branch leading towards a cosmic Law, which we have explored
already, but the other branch which leads towards a Unique

and Omnipotent God.""^^
It is instructive to note that Toynbee distinguishes

himself from "our modern Western school of humanists" on the
basis of his second structure of reality; namely, that they
183 Toynbee, A Study of History

,

VI,

34.
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fail to recognize a basic distinction in the mode of
terres-

trial and spiritual being.

He accuses them of "planning to

reach Heaven by raising a titanic Tower of Babel on terrestrial foundations in three dimensions

— as

though it were

sheer physical distance, and not any difference in mode of

spiritual being, that divided and distinguished Heaven from
Earth." 1 8 4

Gibbon is mentioned in Volume Ten as an example

it

of the humanist who constructs his historical views on a nar-

rowly mundane view of reality.

Instead of asking the historian's elemental
question 'How has this come out of that? with
the spiritual humility that would have allowed
his answer to expand to the full measure of
its potential dimensions
the self-assured
child of a post-Christian Western secular
enlightenment cramped the fruitful question
from the outset by introducing into it a specious qualification.
'How on Earth has this
come out of that?' was the form in which Gibbon
recast, in his own style, the question that had
been planted in his mind by its heavenly visitant; and, in thus automatically ruling the
suipra-mundane dimension of Reality out of his
reckoning, he was unconsciously precluding himself from finding the treasure hid in his
1

,

field,

.

.

.

185

As long as Toynbee remained within the framework of
his original monistic view of reality his task as historian

could be directed toward the uncovering of the universal

rhythm in its law-patterns, and toward a description of 'man
184 Ibid
185

.

,

14.

Ibid., X, pp. 106-107.

in process of civilization,

'

but a different conception of

history follows from Toynbee's changed assumptions as to the
nature of Reality.
of civilization,

God

Now history is more than man in process

it is a "perennial encounter between Man and

"
.

An example of this change may be found in Volume

Eight.

The context is similar to the Volumes Five and Six

passages in which Augustine was introduced respectively as a
way out of the "schism in the body social" and a way out of
the "schism in the soul."

It revolves around the question of

the "responses of the soul" in a civilization which has suf-

fered an assault from a neighboring contemporary society.

Toynbee discards the various reactions of the victim to the

assault as unsuccessful attempts to re-perform the miraculous
act by which a creative minority of Primitive Mankind had
once succeeded in passing over from the Yin-state of an

apparently hard-set stagnation into the Yang-movement of an

astounding renewal of progress

.

Just as in the Volume Five

and Six passages in which the inescapable pessimism of the

monistic rhythm was avoided by recourse to a supra-mundane
Reality, so in Volume Eight the answer to the pessimistic

question "Was this the end of the story?" is found in an
appeal to a view of Reality which transcends the earlier
monism,,

Perhaps the true answer to this anxious question
was that this might well be the end if the whole
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story was comprised in the history of Civilization, but not if Man's attempt at Civilization
was no more than one chapter in the story of a
perennial encounter between Man and God. 8 °
A few pages later, the "perennial encounter" which
gives significance to the repetitious clash of civilizations
is described as a situation into which there comes "a new

revelation of the nature of God and of the character of Man's
relation to Him." 187

And a concrete example of this "erup-

tion of eternity into time," to use the phrase Toynbee bor-

rows from Berdyaev, is the story of the encounter between

Jewry and Hellenism.

Toynbee carefully points out that the

significant moment in the encounter "was thus not achieved in
any episode among the vicissitudes of alternating victory and

defeat in these two civilizations' long-drawn-out duel" but
'It

was manifested in the transcending of both these civiliza-

tions by a newly revealed higher religion that had made its

epiphany 'above the battle' which Judaism and Hellenism were
fighting with one another."
In the last thirty pages of the Study there is con-

siderable evidence to show that Toynbee was coming to the

realization that the "encounter" theme of history and the
"man- in-process -of -Civilization" theme are irreconcilable,
186 Ibid
^"^

Ibid
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and that they rest upon different
views of Reality, and that
the "encounter" theme has a Christian
origin.
As for the grand epic whose theme is
History
herself, this stands in two rival versions
cannot be reconciled, ... H G. Wells in which
Outline of History has written an epic poem The
oTT
the theme 'Man Makes Himself which is
explicit
in the title of a subsequent book from
the pen
of an eminent Western archaeologist of the
next
generation.
This bleak assertion is a postChristian Western Man's defiant answer to the
Psalmist's joyful assurance that 'the Lord He is
God' and that 'we are His People and the sheep
of
His Pasture' because 'it is He that hath made
us
and not we ourselves
and that verse enunciates
the theme of History as a series of encounters
between Man and his Creator in which a Paradise
that has been lost through a Fall is regained
through a Redemption, and in which this deliverance of God's creature is achieved at the cost of
a passion that Christ has suffered 'for the means
of grace and for the hope of glory.' 189
.

»

;

If Reality is viewed as a dualism of Time/Eternity

Mundane/Transcendent, and historical events are to be understood as an encounter between Man and God rather than as Man-

in-process-of-civilization, the historian ought to focus his
attention on the encounters of the past in order to help his

contemporaries to understand the past and the present.

This

re-focusing of the historian's work takes place in the Study
as Toynbee writes the last four volumes.

It may be described

as a re-focusing, or as a second "overview" of history which

replaces the first "overview" of the early volumes.
In the first overview as Toynbee states it in the
189 Ibid., X, 118
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first four volumes, he uses the poetic
metaphors of the
"Ancient Mariner" and addresses himself
to his contemporary
"children of the Western Civilization as we
drift to-day
alone, on the 'wide wide sea' of human
history, with none but
dead or stricken civilizations around us
and we, and we
only, are left." As argued earlier this
overview is not a
.

.

.

temporary flight of poetic fancy but a consistently
worked
out expression of his early monistic principles,
and
is

repeated in

a

series of parallel metaphors.

The second overview is also expressed in dramatic

metaphors, and is likewise rooted in a theoretic structure
of
reality.

What strikes the eye of the casual reader of the

stud Y is th e dynamic aspects of the second overview as con-

trasted with the first.

To one accustomed to the dead and

dying civilizations of the early volumes, to the solemn question of whether or not the West will have sufficient elan to

make a creative response to its internal problems, the later
volume dynamic encounters between the World and the West, the

sudden coming to life of the Mexic and Andean Societies, the

awakening of the Jewish fossil, and other appearances of
unexpected life, unmistakably suggest that a radical

re-focusing of the contemporary scene has taken place.
Before analyzing the second overview, and this expansion of the whole Study in terms of encounters, it would be

worthwhile to observe several remarks Toynbee makes in the
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early volumes.

In the Preface to Volume Four
there is an

interesting indication that as late as 1939
Toynbee felt that
the greater part of his work had been
accomplished with the
completion of the first six volumes. He
remarks that "these
three volumes contain Parts IV and V of the
thirteen parts
which are set out in the plan of the book on
p.

v above.

The

writer hopes to publish the remaining eight parts
in one more
batch of volumes, as he believes that the five
parts con-

tained in the first six volumes will prove to amount,
in

aggregate length, to rather more than two-thirds of the
whole
work." 190

As a matter of fact the first six volumes of the

Study_ contained two thousand,

of text, but Toynbee

"s

three hundred forty-seven pages

changing views were about to extend

the remaining eight parts into an almost equal-length second
half.

After the second World War he completed the study with

the last four volumes containing two thousand,

pages of text.

fifty-three

While one should not read too much signifi-

cance into this expansion of the text, yet it serves as sup-

porting evidence for the argument that the theoretic changes
which began in the middle batch of volumes required considerable alteration in the historical reconstructions in the

final batch of volumes.

The most significant change takes

place in Part XI which had been scheduled as a discussion of
190 Ibid.

,

IV,

Preface vii.

.
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"Rhythms in the Histories of Civilizations"
and was changed
to "Law and Freedom in History."
In the preface to Volume
Seven Toynbee speaks of it as being
"treated very differently
from the original design." The expansion
of this Part is in
terms of a major textual addition of two
hundred twenty pageS
on the topic of the encounter between the
modern West and

contemporary societies.

The curious way in which Toynbee

introduces the topic of the "World and the West" may
reveal
his underlying feeling that the change is not at all
in har-

mony with his early overview and original plan.

For example

he gives the reasons why the history of the encounters

between the Modern West and its contemporaries is "comparatively unilluminating" and notes that it is "an imperfect
specimen."

However he then proceeds to devote the next two

hundred twenty pages to an analysis of the encounters with
the Medieval West, and merely the last forty-eight pages to

an analysis of encounters between an assortment of other

civilizations
One other preliminary task remains before we can

sketch out the new "encounters" overview, and see its rela-

tionship to the second theoretic structure of Reality in the
Study

.

It is important to examine Toynbee'

s

assertion that

the "encounter" is simply an extension of the Study in terms

of the universal rhythms with which the Study began.

The

argument is stated in Volume Eight, just prior to the full
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exposition of the encounter overview.

Briefly the argument

reads that history has not been fully
intelligible to us
because we have been studying single
civilizations instead of
the encounters between civilizations.
He concludes,
"It thus

appears that the genesis of each of the higher
religions that
were still alive in the twentieth century
of the Christian
Era becomes intelligible only when we expand
our field of

study from the ambit of a single civilization to
embrace

encounters between two civilizations or more." 191

But it

requires only a return to the first volume arguments to
see
that this is a falsification of his own previous methodology.
The hope of the Study rested upon the use of the comparative

method; so that "having decided to attempt a comparative

study of the twenty-one representatives of the species which
we find at our command, we may now start our inquiry

...

considering how civilizations come into existence." 192

by

The

crux of the Volume Eight argument for expansion of the Study
is the word "intelligible."

The early volume attempt to make

history intelligible did not fail because Toynbee restricted
himself to the "ambit of

a

single civilization," but because

the elan structure of reality was unable to provide an ade-

quate principle of historical explanation.
191 Ibid

.

,

VIII, 90.

192 Ibid., I,

183.

Actually the
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shift he is advocating in Volume
Eight is not from the consideration of one civilization to a
consideration of the col-

lisions of several civilizations, but
from an earlier belief
that the comparison of civilizations
would reveal the universal law-patterns of societal life to the
belief that only in

transcendental framework of Reality will the
"thread" of
history become apparent.
a

Before examining the second overview,

a

summary of

the first, drawn from a Toynbee source outside
of the study

may provide useful insights.

In the interwar years, Toynbee

gave a summer lecture at Oxford on the topic, "The
Graeco-

Roman Civilization."

Relating the failure of the Greek civi-

lization to the present experiment of Western civilization,
he cautioned Western optimism by saying,

No known civilization has ever reached the goal
of civilization yet.
There has never been a
communion of saints on earth.
In the least
uncivilized society at its least uncivilized
moment, the vast majority of its members have
remained very near indeed to the primitive human
level, and no society has ever been secure of
holding such ground as it has managed to gain in
its spiritual advance.
All the civilizations
that we know of, including the Greek, have
already broken down and gone to pieces with the
single possible exception of our own Western
193
civilization.
.

.

.

The second overview of Toynbee

contrast to the first.

's

Study is in sharp

Instead of an internal challenge that

\

19 3

Toynbee

,

Civilization on Trial

9

p.

56
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the West faces in its aloneness
on the sea of life, Toynbee
now sees a series of external dynamic
encounters between the

West and its living contemporaries.

Instead of

a

problem to

be solved by the West in order to
release its creative 4lan

Toynbee now sees the Western civilization
"as an aggressor"
in a concatenation of military and
cultural encounters.
Instead of a hope that the West will find a
creative solution
that will lead the rest of the World by
imparting the divine
fire of the elan from one soul to another
'like light caught
from a leaping flame,' Toynbee hopes that the bitter
encounter between the World and the West may give "occasion
for a

higher religion to make its appearance on the stage of His-

tory/ for, "the entry of this new actor signifies the open8

ing of a fresh play with a different cast and plot." 194
This second overview is advanced by Toynbee as a

master-plan which accounts for both the past and the present.
As an account of the past the encounter then makes intelligi-

ble all of the higher religions and almost all of the civili-

zations

.

In fact,

the histories of all the higher religions
and all the civilizations except the Mayan and the
Sumeric and the Indus Culture and the Shang Culture
could have been housed by an imaginary twentiethcentury Herodotus in the authentic Herodotus' capacious house of many mansions; and in taking a concatenation of encounters as the ground plan for his
masterpiece of literary architecture, Herodotus was
194 Toynbee, A Study of History VIII,
,

476.
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showing a penetrating insight into
the struct ure
of an oecumenical historian's
subiect195
matter;
.

.

.

As an account of the present the
"encounter" overview

yields this dramatic setting for the twentieth
century.
Future historians will say, I think that the
great event of the twentieth-century was the
impact of the Western civilization upon all the
other living societies of the world of that day
They will say of this impact that it was so
powerful and so pervasive that it turned the
lives of all its victims upside down and inside
out— affecting the behavior, outlook, feelings
and beliefs of individual men, women, and chil196
dren in an intimate way,
.

.

.

While this change in overview from the early-volume
\

picture of the lonely, drifting West to the late-volume picture of the dynamic encounters between an aggressive West
and
its living contemporaries appears obvious to the general

reader of the whole Study

,

one must still substantiate the

fact that a real change has taken place.

If this is more

than merely a shift in dramatic metaphors, it is then important to relate the change in overview to the more fundamental

change which is taking place in Toynbee

'

s

theoretic structure

of reality.
The fact that a real change has taken place may be

established by observing that Toynbee has had to re-vitalize
a number of the dead civilizations of the first overview in

195 Ibid.

,

463.

196 Toynbee, Civilization
on Trial, p.

214

•
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order to develop his second overview.

It is instructive to

note than an "encounter rhythm" does
not simply complement
the growth rhythm but actually drives
out the earlier notion
of a "disintegration rhythm" projected
in Volume Five as the
true completion of the rhythmic theme.

But first let us turn

to the resurrected societies.

Toynbee's Universal history as the history of the

Promethan elan

,

the "inner creative factor" led him to make

decided judgments on contemporary history which found
expression in his first overview.

A review of these judgments will

show that the picture of the West drifting alone with none

but dead or stricken civilizations strewing the deck of the
ship of human fortunes, is not merely poetic fancy.

In Vol-

ume Four Toynbee says,
On this showing, we may pronounce that the

ci-devant Central American Civilization, as well
as the cT-devant Andean Civilization, has now
been completely incorporated into our Western
body social? and we can point to other ci-devant
civilizations which have been incorporated into
other bodies social with comparable completeness
in other times and places.
The Babylonic Society,
for example, merged its identity in the Syriac
body social.
.

In Volume Five the same view of the contemporary

scene is repeated
This a priori probability can be tested in the
case of our own Western Civilization, which by
now has swallowed--and in some degree digested
Toynbee, A Study of History

,

IV,

81
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and assimilated— at least eight
alien societiesthe Mexic, the Andean, the Hindu,
the Iranic' ?he
Russian Orthodox Christian, the Japanese
Far Eastern and the main bodies of the Far
Eastern and
Orthodox Christian societies in China
Near East. The number of victims risesand in the
from eiqht
to ten if we reckon in the Yucatec
and Arabic societies, while their Mexic and Iranic
neighbors
respectively succeeded in devouring on their had
account before these two gorged beasts of preyown
preyed upon in their turn and disappeared down were
our
Western Society's all-devouring throat. 198

Toynbee concludes the picture of the contemporary
\

scene with the prophecy that, "If we do live
to see a West-

ernized Japanese governing class share

a

Westernized Russian

governing class's fate, then we shall have seen the whole
•man-power' of ten disintegrating civilizations absorbed—

with all previous social distinctions now confounded and

effaced into the gigantically swollen internal proletariat of
the single civilization of the West," 199

This overview depends for its validity upon the elan

structure of reality, with its accompanying theory of social

dynamics to the effect that

a

disintegrating civilization is

one which has broken down and is consequently "mechanically

dispatched to the same grim goal on a travelling belt of
interlocking cause and effect that can be neither reversed
nor broken nor checked." 200
198 Ibid
199

Ibid

.

,

V,

.

,

pp.

200 Ibid., 13.

89.

89-90.

As far as the West is concerned
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in the above picture of the
contemporary scene,

it is part of

Toynbee's early view that the West
was entering into its
"universal state."
The bringing to life of the
disintegrated or absorbed

civilizations in order to complete the
"encounter" overview
takes place in Volume Eight.
The passage is lengthy
but of

sufficient importance to warrant its reproduction.
A striking example of a subjugation that
every appearance of being definitive was had
the
prostration of the Mexic and Andean societies
after the military overthrow of the Aztec and
Inca powers by the Castilian pioneers of one
of the civilizations of the Old World.
Yet the
judgment, hazarded in an earlier passage of
this Study, that these two subjugated civilizations of the New World might be considered to
have been completely incorporated into the
Western Christian body social by the time of
writing, might have to be suspended in the
light of the surprisingly different denouement
that had eventually declared itself in certain
comparable cases.

Toynbee's rapid change of historical judgment on
these New World civilizations is at first confusing, and can

only be understood as it is related to the change he has made
from the elan foundation to that of encounter.

Just as Mach-

iavelli was praised in the early volumes as long as Toynbee

needed an example of an elan response to the Italian challenge, and then was condemned in the late volumes when Toyn-

bee decided that Machiavelli

20L,
Ibid.

,

VIII,

465.

•

s

response was nationalistic and
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secular instead of religious, so we have
the case of the New
World civilizations making several
appearances in the study

according to the changing demands of Toynbee

'

s

overview.

As long as Toynbee labored under the
first overview,
in which he saw the Western Civilization
as the sole survivor

in the experiment of Man-in-Process-of-Civilization,
and put

his hope in the radiation of creative elan
through gentleness
and inspiration, he could value highly the colonizing
of the

Spanish in the New World.

On several occasions Toynbee con-

trasts their peaceful occupation of the decadent Aztec and
.

Inca societies with the ruthless brutality of the
Protestant

colonists of North America. 202

He speaks of them as "step-

ping into the shoes of the Aztecs and Incas—-sparing the con-

quered in order to rule them as subject populations, converting their subjects to their own religion, and interbreeding

with their converts." 203

The strong attack on the North

American "Protestant method of conversion by extermination"
is a negative example in his general theory of progress in

the early volumes as has been observed earlier.

By the time Toynbee has begun to reconstruct his

viewpoint in the middle batch of volumes, the Spanish activity in the New World is no longer held up as a case of
2Q2 Ibid

.

,

203 Ibid.,

I,

464

212.

,

conversion by example but is recorded
as "the atrocities committed by the Spanish conquistadores
in Mexico and Peru surpass the misdeeds of the Roman Army
which pillaged Asia Minor
in 189-188 B.C." 204
When the transition of the middle volumes
works
itself out into a systematic overview of
oecumenical history,
and the encounter thesis becomes the
framework of explanation,

Toynbee's interest in the New World civilizations

revives.

Now the Spaniards appear in the Study as an
example

of sophisticated barbarians, 205 who plunder the
New World in
a "heinous crime."

A little later he compares the "Span-

iard's suppression of the indigenous civilizations of
the

Americas" to the barbaric suppression of the indigenous civilizations of the Old World by Alexander the Great's successors.

The Spaniard's conquest of Mexico, Central America,

the Inca Empire, and the Andean World is described as an act

of crude violence and shattering subversiveness 206 and Toyn-

bee concludes in Volume Nine, "As for the living civiliza-

tions of the New World, they were at that moment losing con-

sciousness through being brutally knocked on the head by Castilian conquistadores." 207

The Spaniards are not even left

204 Ibid

.

,

V,

205 Ibid

.

,

VII, 229.

206 Ibid

.

,

VIII, pp. 117-118.

207 Ibid.

,

IX, 213.

46.

414

with the praiseworthy virtue of
having made the ethereal cultural advance of persuading their
subjects to accept their
religion.
in Toynbee «s post- Study works he
describes the
Spaniards as converting the Indians to
Christianity by
force. 2 °8

Alongside Toynbee

•

s

very fluid interpretation of

Machiavelli, and of the New World civilizations
and of the
Spanish activity in the New World, one may place
his interpretation of Russia.
The difficulties of adequately interpreting the
mod-

ern history of Russia should be granted from the
outset, and
it is not surprising that Toynbee

1

s

interpretation of Russia

reflects the ever-changing contemporary optimistic or pessi-

mistic phase of European relations with the Soviet Union.
What is legitimate and instructive however, is to recognize
the interpretive framework within which Toynbee "s optimistic

and pessimistic attitudes toward Russia are expressed.
In the early volumes Russia is regarded as part of

the Orthodox Christian Civilization; Russian Communism as a

regime which is "attempting to transform the complexion of

society in Russia out of all recognition," 209 and the whole
thing as having passed through the breakdown into the stage
of disintegration, and assimilation by the West. 210
08 Toynbee, An Historian's Approach
to Religion

209 Toynbee, A Study of History I,
,

210 Ibid., IV.

84.

34.

By

,

p.

163.
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seeing Russia in terms of the 4lan
overview, and describing
the Communist experiment as a
part of the great process of
assimilation and Westernization, Toynbee
is able to advance
his most optimistic view of Russian
Communism.

He sees it as

the withdrawal of a creative minority
in order to return with
an answer to the problems of the
West.
"There are, of
course, creative individuals at the back
of all creative

minorities, on the hypothesis that some
individual human
being is the ultimate author of every creative
human act." 211
This Volume Three optimistic view of Russian
Communism

closely parallels his optimistic reading of
Machiavelli during the same pre-1933 period. And just as
Machiavelli loses
his place in history as a praiseworthy example
of a creative

response, so the Russian experiment when lifted out of
the

elan framework rapidly becomes a "notorious example"
of a

Western philosophy which became a violent proletariat religx^
ion. 212

When we come to the Volume Eight discussion of
encounters, and Toynbee introduces the new overview of the
«

West in dynamic encounter with the other living societies,
Russia is brought back from the process of disintegration

which was earlier described as "the travelling belt of
211 Ibid

.

,

in,

212 Ibid.

,

V,

364.

177.
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interlocking cause and effect that
can be neither reversed
nor broken nor checked." Like
the civilizations of the New
World, Russia is re-vitalized to
fit the new pattern.
Yet this concentration of the World's
attention
and apprehension on this particular
encounter
between two contemporary civilizations
was in
no sense presumptive evidence that
the RussoWestern conflict would continue to occupy
Fy the
whole field. 213
At first glance one is inclined to
accept Toynbee

'

Volume Eight assertion that history
as-a-series-of-encounters
is the same as his Volume One
history-as-a-rhythm-of-

challenge-and-response.

But what betrays this argument is

the point made at the end of the following
quotation that one

particular encounter is "the stem from which all living
branches of human history had ramified."
If Herodotus had happened to be born into the
post-Alexandrine instead of the pre-Alexandrine
Age of Hellenic history, his unrivalled genius
for finding a clue to the tangled skein which
is every oecumenical historian's raw material

would assuredly have led him to take this postAlexandrine Kulturkampf in preference to a preAlexandrine military conflict between the
Achaemenian Empire and the city-states of European Greece, as the point of departure for his
own reconstruction of a history of Mankind which
presented itself to his eyes as a concatenation
of encounters between divers civilizations in
which the Spirit of Man had expressed itself.
And indeed this brilliant Hellenic discoverer of
the historical phenomenon of concatenations
could have found no better vantage-point if the
chance that so capriciously allots the time and
place of each individual's birth had condemned
,

213 Ibid., VIII, 113.

"
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Herodotus to be born into a
twentieth-century
Western World:
for, in the perspective
of an
observer posted in that society
in
that age?
the story of the post-Alexandrine
competition
between the Syriac culture and
Hellenism for
0 " ° f SOuls sti11 manifested
itself
fr0m WhiGh a11
in 9 branches
o? human
hi history had ramified. 214
HY
of

^V^r^

Here is a return to the "primitive
image of the magic
bean-stalk" which Toynbee had so vigorously
opposed in Volume One.
He had dismissed it as an unhappy
relic of a Christian scheme of history, and as the
view of men who had "succumbed to the egocentric illusion by treating
the transition
from the one dispensation to the other
as the turning point
of all human history." 2
The fact that the encounter thesis
means a return to a discarded bean-stalk view
of historical

^

reality is recognized by Toynbee in 1955 when
he reflects on
the writing of the Study in the essay "What I
Am Trying
to

Do

.

and my own belief is that there are some
things in human affairs that have no pattern
because they are not subject to scientific laws.
One such thing, I believe, is an encounter
between two or more human beings
... I think,
in fact, that here we are in the presence of
genuine acts of creation, in which something new
is brought into existence; and this leads us back
towards the Biblical view of history which was
accepted in the West from the fourth century till
the end of the seventeenth. 216
.

.

.

.

214 Ibid
215
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,

463.
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,
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170.

216 Montagu, Toynbee and History
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The bean-stalk view of historical
reality had been
discarded by Toynbee because it had
appeared to impose arbitrarily chosen fixed points or turning
points or absolutes in
the flux of time.
The adoption of the master
metaphor of the

pollarded willow and the assumption of
the "philosophic contemporaneity" of all representatives
of the species of civi-

\

lization seemed to be a way of escape
from the egocentric
illusion.
But now Toynbee fixes upon the
"post-Alexandrine
competition between the Syriac culture and
Hellenism for the

conversion of souls" as the "stem from which
all living
branches of human history had ramified."
From this fixed
point the history of the Graeco-Roman civilization
no longer
appears as the Greek struggle for self-articulation,

the cri-

sis of the Fifth Century B.C. and its resultant
breakdown.

Earlier in

summary statement in Volume Four he had dis-

a

cussed Graeco-Roman History in terms of the elan motif.
From the opening of the fifth century B.C. onwards
the whole of the rest of Hellenic political history can be formulated in terms of an endeavor to
transcend City-State Sovereignty and of the resistance which this endeavor evoked.
Before the fifth
century closed, the obstinacy of the resistance to
the accomplishment of this urgent political task
had brought the Hellenic Civilization to its breakdown; and though the problem which had baffled an
Athenian first attempt to solve it was eventually
solved in a fashion by Rome, it was not solved in
time to prevent the disintegration of the Hellenic
Society from running its course to its final dissolution 217
.

217

Toynbee, A Study of History , IV, 208.

Toynbee's first attempt to make
intelligible the his
torical experience of the Greeks
was to put them in the
framework of the monistic 4lan view
of reality.

The -judg-

ment of history" consisted of noting
their failure to solve
the problems of a dynamic living
society; their baulking of
the creative 4lan and the resulting
inability to inspire "a
voluntary allegiance in the hearts of people
below its surface or beyond its borders."

Toynbee's second attempt to make intelligible
the
historical experience of the Greeks is to see them
in the

framework of the dualistic encounter view of reality.

Looking back on Graeco-Roman history to-day,
about thirteen hundred years after the date'
when the Graeco-Roman civilization became
extinct, we can see that, in this perspective,
the most important thing in the history of the
Graeco-Roman world is its meeting with other
civilizations; and these encounters are important, not for their immediate political and
economic consequences, but for their long-term
religious consequences. iy
Events in the Graeco-Roman civilization are no longer

intelligible or important in the measure in which they give

expression to creative elan

— to

the solution of civiliza-

tional problems, but gain their significance in relation to
the religious bean-stalk.

The historian's interpretation of

Hellenism takes its perspective from the second century B.C.
rather than the fifth century, for "Hellenism's encounter
218

Toynbee, Civilization on Trial, pp. 219-220.
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with Judaism in and after
Iter 17S
1,t> tt
B r
c
*

-

was +.u
the most portentous

single event in Hellenic history." 219
The turning-point, the significant
encounters, the
fixed points in the time-flux for
the historian are provided
by the bean-stalk, or what Toynbee
begins to refer to as the
"key" or "stem" or "thread" of
history.
in an important

footnote exchange with Dr. Edwyn Bevan
in Volume Five, Toynbee starts to make explicit the "thread"
of history that

occupies the later-volumes of the Study

The discussion

.

reached this agreement:
In the present writer's view 'a unique
beginning
of something new in the history of Mankind'
is
to be seen, if anywhere, not in the flowering
of
a brilliant rationalism in the springtime
of
Hellenic history, but in the discovery or revelation of a new conception of God, and of Man's
relation to God, which was made in the last phase
of the dissolution of the Sumeric Society (if
that is indeed the date and the provenance of
Abraham), and which, ever since then has gone on
gathering light through a series of epiphanies of
which the culmination has been Christianity.
This
view
is not at variance with that of Mr.
Bevan, as he has communicated it to the writer of
this Study in a later letter in the same correspondence:
'I see I didn't make my view quite clear in
one respect.
I should hardly say that the significant central thread of History is the rise of
Rationalism:
I should say, rather, with you that
the central thread is the preparation for the King220
dom of God and its partial coming*

...

.

.

.

Later on in Volume Five the "bean-stalk" that Toynbee
219 Toynbee, Hellenism
220 Toynbee,

,

p.

177.

A Study of History

,

V, n.

7.

has adopted, despite his protestations
against a bean-stalk
view of history in Volume One, is further
elucidated.
It will be seen that while Judaism and
Christianity appear to be 'philosophically
contemporary
and equivalent'
there is another angle of
vision from which they present themselves in
the
quite different aspect of successive stages in
a
single 'ascending' process of spiritual enlightenment.
In this picture Christianity stands, not
side by side with Judaism, but on its
shoulders
while they both tower above the primitive religion of Israel.
Before and below the
Prophets, the Biblical tradition presents us with
a Moses, and before and below Moses with an
Z1
.

.

.

.

.

.

Abraham.

When one re-reads Toynbee

'

s

polemic against the bean-

stalk view in Volume One, his dismissal of contemporary his-

torians who "dispose their periods in a single series end to
end,

like the sections of a bamboo-stem"

;

and his contempt

for those who succumbed to the egocentric illusion of the

Christian Weltanschauung by treating the transition from the

Hellenic Civilization to the new dispensation of the Christian Church as the turning-point of all human history, it is

hard to see how he expects to exempt his own Volume Five

bean-stalk view from this same Volume One critique.

To

recognize that he does not subject his later views to his
early historical relativism is to see in Toynbee a human foible often repeated in the history of scholarship, but it

would seem to be a more serious criticism of an historian
1 Ibid.

,

119
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when his later views are portrayed
by him as simply an expansion of the adequate foundations
of his life-long study.
In Volume Seven Toynbee continues
the task of

describing his religious thread of history.

The bean-stalk

appears as "the story of progressive
spiritual experience of
which Christianity was the climax." 222 In
other descriptive
phrases the bean-stalk is compared to "Stations
of the Cross
in anticipation of the Crucifixion," and
the sections of the

bamboo-stems are the "successive sufferings through which
they won a progressive enlightenment." 223
Clearly we have left the elan structuring of reality
in which Toynbee claimed to be able to scientifically
deter-

mine the laws of the universal rhythm.

In its place is the

structuring of reality into a dualism of mundane and supramundane, and behind the apparent flux of events there is no

longer the immanent rhythm of Yin and Yang, but a transcendent 'friend behind the phenomena."
a

The historical method of

scientific, i.e., empirical induction of the laws of his-

torical change has given way to an ambivalent historical

methodology whereby the facts are scientifically ascertained
but the meaning behind the facts is reached by religious

intuition, divination or revelation. 224
222 Ibid.

,

VII, 424.

223 Ibid

,

425.

.

224 Ibid., 427.
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CHAPTER

VII

CONCLUSION
"How can these things be?"
Arnold J. Toynbee in 1952
In this paper, we have traced the
methodological

odyssey of one of the twentieth century's
rians.

foremost histo-

It would be easy for us to represent Arnold
Toynbee

as an a-typical historian,

the curious and innovative scholar

who has wandered from the main stream of historical
thought.
Indeed, the sheer weight of criticism has tended to support

this view by appearing to isolate Toynbee and by masking the

wide differences among his critics.

Philip Toynbee, his son

and a noted literary critic in his own right, described some

phases of the Toynbee controversy as the "Toynbee hunt"; and
it can be argued that the controversial aspects of the Toyn-

bee question frequently obscure his proper relationship to
the historical discipline.
The tendency to emphasize the peculiarities of Toyn-

bee against the uniformity of the historical profession, the

unity of the hounds versus the individuality of the fox, is

immediately checked when we recognize the consensus of
affairs in the profession itself.

In the most recent presi-

dential address of the American Historical Association,
423
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Palmer describes historians as being
in an "identity
crisis."
his words, "As historians we claim
to be a proR.

R.

m

fession, but we do not quite know what
the profession is." 1
By attempting to understand the dynamic
character of histori-

cal thought in the twentieth century,
we have opened up the

possibility of understanding what Toynbee was
trying to do.
In A Stud y of History, our analysis has
shown that Toynbee »s
struggle to become an effective historian was shaped
by the
tensions in British historiography in the early twentieth
century.

At first he identified "historian" in terms of the

dominant "science of history" school that had developed in

England between 1870 and 1910.

To Toynbee, it seemed only a

natural extension of the scientific motif to move from the

fact-gathering stage of the British Rankeans to the law-

making techniques of his own A Study of History in the
1920 s.

He expressed this sense of progress in methodology,

v

indeed in scientific methodology, in the metaphor of the
explorer.

Toynbee used this metaphor sparingly but effec-

tively in the early volumes of the Study to re-define the

historian and to convey his sense of confidence and exhilaration in his huge new project.

But the explorer metaphor also

provided a clue to a basic change in Toynbee 's methodology
Palmer,

"The American Historical Association
in 1970," The American Historical Revie w, LXXVI (February,
1971), 1.
*-R.

R.

and outlook.

As his early confidence in the
"law-making-

technique began to evaporate, and as
the problem of relativity grew more intractable, Toynbee
turned to the explorer
motif, not simply as a stylistic and
romantic metaphor, but
as a way of describing his methodological
dilemma.
In the
later volumes of the Study

and in the post- Study writings,

,

the explorer motif allowed him to hold to
several unresolved

and contradictory positions,

justifying his methodological

uncertainties by describing them as inherent in life
itself.
Thus, the epistemological problem had become a
metaphysical

dilemma

— the

ego-centric illusion could not be banished

because in the nature of existence "we are bound to be self-

centered

"
.

In view of this important methodological shift that

came to light in the explorer motif of chapter two, it became

important for us to review the major methodological basis of
the early part of the Study

took this task.

,

and in chapter three we under-

By tracing his view of historical method

from his earliest writings, we were able to observe that
Toynbee'

s

development in his Oxford and London University

years accorded with the pattern established by Stubbs and the
"exact school of history" for professional and scientific

historiography.

It became apparent that Toynbee

'

s

experi-

ences in the first World War were propelling him to reevaluate the nature of historical thought, and to demand that the

s

historical sciences be re-defined.

This study showed that he

felt cramped by the narrow definition
of history as factgathering, and that he saw in Spengler's
work in 1920 a

breakthrough into

a

wider definition of the nature of history

and the task of the historian.

Although other historians had

shared his distress with the limitations of the
scientific
school in a growing Methodenstreit in British
historiography,
it was an American historical theorist, F. J.
Teggart who, in

Toynbee's eyes, offered the clearest explanation for current
problems in historical method and the best solution to them.
By looking closely at the notes and early efforts of Toynbee
up to 192 7 and comparing them with his post-Teggart formula-

tions, we were able to identify the extraordinary influence

of Teggart on Toynbee's dream of writing a universal history,

valid for the delineation of the past, and capable of providing prognostications for the future.

In one sense, we may

summarize chapters five and six of this study as a description of Toynbee's long wrestling with the law-making technique; his effort to use Teggart

's

"sovereign methodological

clue" and then to extricate himself from it.

But Teggart'

influence on Toynbee cannot be measured only by the degree to

which he uses or refuses to use the law-making technique.
This study revealed Toynbee's strong emotional identification

with Teggart' s repudiation of traditional historiography.
One could see it most clearly in Toynbee's attack on

contemporary British historians.
Toynbee

's

ation.

What might have been

It is unfortunate that

sense of the inadequacy of Rankean
historiography
in the decade of the nineteen
twenties, and his fear of what
was happening to Western civilization
in the postwar period
should have been brought together and shaped
by Teggart's
conviction that the Western historical profession
was traveling on a dead-end street.
The coalescing of these fears and
assessments added a very large emotional element to
the situ-

a

a

fairly straightforward case of

historian testing the limits of contemporary historiography

and electing to try to overcome these limits becomes,
under

Teggart's tutelage, a case of challenging the entire historical profession.

By linking the failure of Western historians

with the failure of Western civilization, and by offering his
own law-making technique as a sharp and exclusive alternative, Toynbee turned the methodological discussion into a

vast and often unfruitful controversy.

Spurred on by Teg-

gart's theory, Toynbee developed his own method as an either/
or situation, and buttressed his position with descriptions
of the antithesis between the anachronis tically-inclined his-

torians and the progressive sociologists.

It is not surpris-

ing that the historians perceived the situation more as a

threat to their existence than as a reasonable advance in

historical method.

As the controversy mounted, Toynbee felt

it necessary to make greater claims for the scientific

428

validity of his method-a value-free,
comparative study of
civilizations. When Toynbee went over
to a normative study
of history in Volumes Four and Five,
he was so entrenched in
his earlier claims that he continued
to treat the study of
History in its original framework and, as
we saw in chapter
three, to issue frequent defenses of
his law-making technique
throughout the entire Study
it would seem to me that the
historical profession was not faced with the
exclusive alternatives of continuing with the traditional Rankean
.

fact-

gathering historiography or of turning to
sociology.

a

Teggart-Toynbee

This essentially false dilemma pressed by Toynbee

tended to short-circuit the methodological debate and
created

acrimony harmful both to the historical profession and to
Toynbee himself.

It is evident that the historian's task as

envisioned by Stubbs and his scientific school of history was
simplistic and inadequate.
a naive theory of

The British Rankeans, by offering

historical facts and by reducing the com-

plicated process of reaching historical understanding to a
matter of seeing the facts or collecting the evidence, had

routed the literary and amateur historians of the nineteenth
century.

But,

in practice,

they had covertly assumed various

concepts of development by which they had selected the
"facts" and turned them into an intelligible account.

We

have seen that in his early training as a history student and
then as a professional historian, Toynbee had accepted at

face value this explanation by the
scientific school of what
the professional historian's method
should be.
In the nineteen twenties when Toynbee recognized
the failure of this

official version of historiography, he turned
not to a more
critical study of what he had been taught, but
to Teggart's
view that fact-gatherers needed to give way to
law-makers.

When Toynbee presented his fellow historians with
the alter-

native either of remaining with the fact-gatherers
(and hence
becoming more and more anachronistic) or of turning
their

discipline into sociology, he overlooked the option of subjecting the entire process of historical thought to
analysis.

a

fresh

Unaware of the weaknesses in the Rankean model,

yet unsatisfied with its results, he constructed an artificial dilemma for his fellow historians with his insistence
that they join him in the re-definition of the historian as
a

law-discovering scientist.
It was far from reassuring when, in the last two

chapters of our study,, we found Toynbee himself expressing a

growing lack of confidence in the law-discovering ability of
the historian-sociologist, and an inclination to re-define
the historian as a historian- theologian

.

If Toynbee had not

forced an artificial breach between the historian as fact-

gatherer and the historian-sociologist as law-discoverer, he

might have avoided the largely fruitless controversy in the
historical profession and, at the same time, galvanized

^

,
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himself to a reconsideration of the basic
processes of the
working historian. In my opinion, when he
undertook the task
of law-discovering, he was not creating
a new science of his-

tory, such as was implied in the romantic
and heroic picture
of "the Explorer."
Instead, he was actually raising the

problem, integral for every historian, of what concept
of

development the historian uses to make historical events
intelligible
W.

H.

Walsh, following Croce

s

'

distinction between

chronicle ("a simple narrative") and history ("a significant
narrative") describes the historian's task as follows,
The Historian is not content to tell us merely
what happened; he wishes to make us see why it
happened, too.
In other words, he aims
at a reconstruction of the past which is both
intelligent and intelligible
.

.

.

.

Bury, Acton and others spoke of this problem as a search for

the "key" of history or the "significance" of history and

thought they found it in the idea of progress, the growth of

freedom or a social version of biological evolution.

In

1920, Toynbee thought he had found an adequate concept of

development in the classical-humanist notion of the "wonder
of man" as expressed in Antigone

,

then "groped for an answer"

in Spengler's biological analogies.

When he followed Teg-

gart's lead after 1927, it was doubly exhilarating because he
^Walsh, Philosophy of History

,

p.

32

hoped to define certain uniformities in
history which would
provide a concept of development for him,

and to do it in an

utterly objective and value-free way.

If he had been able to

keep the effort of 1927 in proper perspective
as another

attempt to define and test out certain
uniformities that he
had discerned as occurring repeatedly, in
similar fashion and
in roughly comparable societies of the past,
his initial fame

might have been less but the long-term value of his
writings

might have been greatly enhanced.
What we face now is the prospect of having a very

impressive set of volumes in the library of historical
thought, which will remain largely unread because so much of
the work represents a negative example of historical method.

As a result, Toynbee's valuable insights into certain events

and societies which are scattered throughout his volumes may

well be overlooked.

Even if this judgment is correct, it

must be balanced with the recognition that Toynbee's personal
odyssey is one of the fascinating chapters of twentieth century intellectual history.

It is a welcome change in the

history of historical thought to break with the cult of

impersonality professed by historians of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century.

Toynbee's struggle and his can-

did discussion of his own changing views, values and perspectives help us to understand that historians are not computers, anonymous recorders, or chapter-writers in a chronicle
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of history, but are human participants
in a human history
and, like Everyman, they live in a
continual struggle of partial answers, unclear but inescapable
choices, and the need
to understand the present in the light
of the past.

\

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY
The basic bibliographical guide
for

torical method in Arnold J. Toynbee

'

s

a

study of his-

A Study of History is

Monica Popper's A Bibliography Of The Works
In English Of
Arnold Toynbee, 1910-1954 (London: Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 1955). This guide was carefully
and

exhaustively compiled with the support of the Royal
Institute
of International Affairs

(where Toynbee served as Director of

Studies from 1925 to 1955), and carries a foreward by
Arnold
J.

Toynbee.

It is structured chronologically and contains

both published works and periodical articles, totaling two

hundred and ninety-six entries.

When it was compiled in

1955, Toynbee had already published the first three volumes
of A Study of History in 1934, Volumes Four through Six in
1939, and the four concluding volumes in 1954.

But his vol-,

ume called Reconsiderations in which he re-evaluates his

study in the light of contemporary criticism, was not pub-

lished until 1961 as Volume Twelve.

Although not all of

Toynbee' s publications since 1955 are significant for a study
of his methodological problems in A Study of History , it is

imperative to include his Reconsiderations (London:

University Press, 1961) both for Toynbee

'

s

Oxford

own reflections on

his work and for the bibliography of critics appearing on

pages 675 to 690.
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Since the completion of A Study
of History and the
various lectures and books dealing
with that project as noted
in the Popper bibliography,
Toynbee has continued his writing
and publication in several fields.
While his books on
travel, East to West (New York:
Oxford University Press,
1958); Between Oxus and Jumna (New York:

Press, 1961); Between Nig er and Nile

Oxford University

(London:

Oxford Univer-

sity Press, 1965); and Between Maule and
Amazon (London:

Oxford University Press, 1967) are of interest
to the historian and the biographer of Toynbee, they are not
essential to
a study of his problem of historical method.
Likewise,
his

books on religion, Christianity Among the Religions
of the

World (New York:

Scribner, 1957); and his editing of Man's

Concern With Death (London:

Hodder and Stoughton, 1968), and

The Crucible of Christianity (London:
1969)

Thames and Hudson,

as well as his books on cities, Cities of Destiny
,

edited by Toynbee (London:
Cities on the Move (London:

Thames and Hudson, 1967) and

Oxford University Press, 1970)

may be regarded as peripheral to the problem of historical
method.

Two books which he started to write early in his

career, Hellenism (London:
and Hannibal's Legacy
Press, 1965)

(2

Oxford University Press, 1959),

vols.; London:

Oxford University

are of limited value in ascertaining Toynbee

historical method.

*

Several scholars have pointed out that

his Hannibal's Legacy is an attempt to prove to his critics

.
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that he could write history books
in the more traditional
mode
One other group of Toynbee

interest the student of Toynbee

'

s

post- Study books does

historical method.

Arnold and Philip Toynbee published
Comparing Notes:
logue across a generation (London:
Weidenfeld

in 1963

dia -

a

and Nicolson,

1963)

which contains many interesting biographical
insights

into the formulation and writing of A Study
of History

and

,

the reactions of Toynbee to the hostile
critics of the 1950s

and 1960s.

His Change and Habit; the challenge of our time

(New York:

Oxford University Press, 1966) and Surviving the

Future

<

New York:

Oxford University Press, 1971) are essen-

tially efforts to review the problems of our time and the

historical precedents which might suggest a solution.

As

such they serve as an interesting basis of comparison to the

problems which Toynbee outlined in A Study of History

autobiographical books, Acquaintances (London:
versity Press
.

,

1967)

and Experiences (London:

.

Two

Oxford Uni-

Oxford Univer-

sity Press, 1969) have been harshly received by the critics

but contain many valuable references to the historians who

influenced Toynbee, and to the personal and methodological
struggles which shaped A Study of History

.

Popper's Bibliography of the primary sources should
be supplemented by the unpublished materials of Arnold J.

Toynbee as well as by the above mentioned published works
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from 1956 to the present.

Much of the unpublished material

for A Study of History was purchased
for a private collection
in this country and is to be
released for public use upon
Toynbee's death.
It is described by Toynbee as the
"Debris"
of Parts I through XIII, and consists
of large folders containing extensive notes, letters from various
scholars who

were consulted on that particular section, various
lectures,
and many undated scraps of paper on the topic
under consideration.

The most valuable part of the large collection of

materials for a study of Toynbee's changing method is the
collection of early outlines of A Study of History

.

There

are two drafts of Toynbee's "first conscious attempt" to

write the Study in the summer of 1920 as he describes it in
the preface of Volume Seven.

The first draft of thirty-four

pages is written in ink and has the note "(done at Galscombe,
[sic]

in the cottage, summer of 1920)."

The second draft of

thirty-eight pages contains many word changes but remains

substantially the same in content and appearance.

Another of

the early outlines appears to be an expansion of the draft

written on the Orient Express enroute from Constantinople to

England on Saturday, September 17, 1921, and is dramatically
described in the Preface to Volume Seven as the beginning of
his thirty-year intellectual journey to write A Study of His -

tory

.

There is also an abortive draft called "Outline I,"

consisting of twenty-nine pages
of hand-written materials
in
pencil, written sometime after
1925, and probably absorbed

in

the large outline of 1927-29.

The major document for a
trac-

ing of Toynbee 's historical
method is a five hundred and
forty-eight page outline, written in
pencil throughout except
for a later correction in ink,
and entitled "Outline of
June 1927 to June 1929." it
appears to be the crucial set of
notes that Toynbee had sent to the
Council on Foreign Relations in New york in 19 39 for safe-keeping
during the second
World War, and which enabled him to resume
his writing seven

years later.

With reference to the secondary sources two
developments have occurred which are invaluable for
a study of Toynbee s method, and contemporary methodological
debate.
In
'

1960 the journal History and Theory was established
to

encourage studies in the philosophy of history, and is
the
only international journal devoted to questions of the

methodology of history.

It brought together an outstanding

editorial committee and has provided scholarly contributions
from many countries of the world on the general problems of

historiography.

In addition to the advancement and clarifi-

cation of problems in the field, the journal has published

important bibliographies in the Toynbee controversy and in
the philosophy of history.
In 1965, John C. Rule and Barbara S. Crosby published

.
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very comprehensive "Bibliography
of Works on Arnold J.
Toynbee, 1946-1960/' nis_tory_^nd_Th^
4
(1965), 212-233.
Although it deliberately excludes
the books and articles published in the non-Western
languages and the very brief
newspaper and periodical reviews, it
contains the major materials
for a critical study of Toynbee
from the time he began to
emerge into international prominence
in 1946 until the abatement of the Toynbee controversy in
1960.
During that
fourteen-year period Rule and Crosby
record three hundred and
thirty critical articles on Toynbee
's work and forty-nine
a

books which gave major, if not complete,
attention to Toynbee
As a further aid in what has been one
of the most

rapidly growing fields of study in the last
two decades History and Theory began to publish a very extensive
bibliography in philosophy of history.

It has covered the years from

1945 to 1968 and has limited itself to books and articles
in

Western languages.

To date it has appeared as Beihefte of

the journal under the heading Bibliography of Works in the

Philosophy of History 1945-1957

plement thereto
(

Beiheft

3,

(

1964)

Beiheft

3,

(

1964)

Beiheft
by John

by M. Nowicki; 1962-1965

by Lewis D. Wurgaft; 1966-1968

(

1961)

1,

Rule;

C.
(

with Sup-

Beiheft

1958-1961
7,

1967)

Beiheft 10, 1970) by Lewis D.

Wurgaft and others, with A Supplement to Bibliography of
Works in the Philosophy of History 1962-1965

.

This general

s.

'
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bibliography has included the new
Toynbee material since the
end of the special Toynbee
bibliography in
1960.

Since the publication of the
bibliography up to 1968,
several books have appeared on the
problem of identifying and
analyzing civilizations, thus renewing
the debate on Toynbee s comparative method of
historical study. Matthew
Melk °' S ^e Nature of Civilization
(Boston:
Porter Sargent,
1969) attempts to supersede earlier primitive
efforts by setting up a model for the comparative study
of civilizations,
'

and Roger Wescott's "The Enumeration of
Civilizations" His tory and Theory 9:1 (1970) seeks to reconcile
the various
lists of civilizations as advanced by Spengler,
Toynbee,

Danilevsky and others.

But it is Talcott Parsons' Societies:

Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey:

Prentice-Hall, 1966)

that may offer a more suc-

cessful analysis of societies by providing

a

more adequate

distinction between culture and society than Toynbee was able
to do.

On a related problem in Toynbee it is interesting to

note the appearance of Robert A. Nisbet's Social Change and

History (London:
represents

a

Oxford University Press, 19 69) because it

contemporary effort by a prominent American

sociologist at the University of California to revive the
views of Frederick J. Teggart in an analysis of a Western
theory of development.

Also not yet on the printed bibliog-

raphies is a brief but judicious treatment of Toynbee in The

.
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Heritage and challenge of History
(New York:
Dodd, Mead ,
Company, 1971) by Paul K Conkin
and Roland N. Stromberg.
it
attempts to place Toynbee's writings
in the framework of the
twentieth century's "crisis of
historiography,"
.

and in the

wider setting of this century's
"anarchy in the world of
knowledge." Roland Stromberg promises
to further develop
this theme in a forthcoming book on
Toynbee (Southern

Illinois University Press)

